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ABSTRACT
The problem at the heart of this study is: to what extent and in
what ways was the development of trade unionism in the Derry shirt
industry influenced by sectarianism? This problem and my approach to
it were elaborated in contradistinction to existing theories of trade
unionism in Northern Ireland. According to the main theory,
developed most cogently within traditional Irish marxism, trade
unionism was thwarted by sectarianism. I suggest that this theory
has more to do with the reductionist and evolutionist assumptions of
its authors than with social reality and argue that the relationship
between trade unionism and sectarianism Is better understood with an
approach in which it is recognised that both of these institutions
are constituted through the actions of concrete individuals who are
themselves consituted by society, and in which priority is given to
the meanings which individuals ascribe to their actions and
predicaments.	 My- study is based on interviews with a sample of
retired union officials and activists.
My respondants were keenly aware of the Catholic-Protestant
dichotomy, but, contrary to what traditional Irish marxists would
lead one to expect, they did not regard sectarianism as a significant
problem until the 1950s, My analysis of union growth and structure
1920-1952 largely confirmed this view: union densities compared
favourably with clothing workers in Britain, and the main factors
underlying fluctuations in membership were more or less the same as
elsewhere in Britain. Conflict between Protestant and Catholic
shirtmekers only became a problem as a result of inter-union rivalry
which followed the formation of a breakaway union in 1952. Sectarian
conflict was activated by a specifically trade union power struggle,
not vice versa, Thus, this study does not merely contradict the
prevailing view of the relationship between trade unionism and
sectarianism - it inverts it.
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CHAPTER 1: TRADE UNIONISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND: A THEORETICAL AND
METHODOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.
1. 1 Introduction
This study does not fit easily into the literature on British
trade unionism. The pioneers of research on British trade unionism
were the Webbs (1897 arid 1902). Turner, writing in 1962, described
the literature in the following way:
Since the Webbs, nobody has attempted (or atleast,
succeeded in) an emulation of their classic study of trade
unionism's history and character at large. But particular
aspects of trade unionism as a broad institution - strikes,
wages, internal government, and so on - have been taken up
by specialists of various kinds. Then, particular unions
have been separated as objects of description or enquiry -
a line especially developed by labour historians... A more
recently developed interest concerns the smaller group of
workers, in a particular workplace for instance, from whom
it is hoped to establish some general conclusion. (1962:
13).
Following the publication of Dunlop's Industrial Relations Systems
(1958), academic interest shifted away from trade unions, as such,
towards the system of rules which governed relations between
employees, employers, and government agencies (cf Hyman 1979a: 10-16;
Poole, 1984: 45 and 187-188; and Watson, 1988: 6). My study is not
concerned with the history of a single union, or with one aspect of
trade unionism as an institution; nor does it focus on relations
between employees and employers. Rather, it is concerned with trade
unionism in a particular industry in a particular city during a
particular period; as such, it involves consideration of the various
organisations which had members in this industry, and touches on
various aspects of their development including their growth, their
internal government, and their structure.
If my study is, in this sense, unconventional it is because the
problem with which I am concerned and the theoretical approach which
I have adopted are quite different to those which have preoccupied
-9-
scholars of British trade unionism and industrial relations. 	 The
problem Is to do with the effect of sectarianism on the development
of trade unionism. My theoretical approach Is along the lines
developed by Abrams (1982: ix) In his discussion of 'the problematic
of structuring': the attempt to understand social processes in terms
of the action of concrete Individuals who are conceived of as
simultaneously constituting, and being constituted by, society and
history. The raw material upon which my analysis is based is derived
from in-depth interviews with a sample of trade union officials and
activists and from extant documentary sources.	 From a social
anthropological perspective my study can been regarded as a part of
what Ortner (1984: 159) has described as the discipline's
'rapprochement with history,' but it Initially emerged as a critique
of the literature on trade unionism in Northern Ireland, and it is as
an anthropological contribution to an ongoing debate about the nature
of sectarianism and trade unionism in Northern Ireland that my study
derives much of its general interest.
Some general interest also accrues to my study because of the
particular group of organisatlons which are its subject. These are
the trade unions which organised in the Derry shirt industry between
1920 and 1968. They are of general interest for two reasons. First,
because Derry is an Important city and the shirt industry was its
staple Industry. But it is not simply as a city - not even as
Northern Ireland's second city - that Derry is important, indeed it
is more a provincial town than city. Rather, Derry's importance
belongs to the realm of political symbolism: it was the place where a
number of key events in the history of Ireland took place. Secondly,
as will become apparent, much of the literature on trade unionism in
Northern Ireland Is actually concerned with trade unionism in
Belfast, and my research may be seen as an attempt to redress the
balance.	 These aspects of my project will be pursued in the next
chapter; in this one I will deal with theoretical and methodological
concerns. In section 1. 2 I will review the literature on trade
unionism in Northern Ireland and define my area of study. In section
1.3 I will pursue my critique of the literature and develop my
theoretical approach to the Issues discussed In section 1.2.
	 In
section 1. 4 I will discuss how my project as a whole developed in the
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course of my field research and in relation to my training as a
social anthropologist. In section 1.5 I will describe my research
procedure and demonstrate its validity in relation to my area of
study and my theoretical approach.
1.2 Trade Unionism and Marxism in Northern Ireland: The Problem of
Sectarianism
Trade unionism in Northern Ireland has been the subject of much
comment and debate but little sustained study. In this section I
will explore the reasons for this paradox, and attempt to bring the
subject into sharper relief.
The predominant view of trade unionism in Northern Ireland is
that it has failed, or been rendered less effective than trade union
movements in other places, because of the prevalence of sectarian
divisions among the working class. This view is held by many
scholars, but has been most developed by those writing from a marxist
perspective (examples of non-marxist versions of this thesis include
Moody, 1954: 127; Messenger, 1981: 207; and Dohr, 1952: 146). One of
the most influential contemporary exponents of the marxist analysis
Is Michael Farrell (1980). Referring to Belfast in the period 1880-
1914 he writes (1980: 16-17):
The Ulster Unionists... secured the allegiance of the
Protestant workers by a systematic policy of discrimination
against Catholics which left the Protestants with a virtual
monopoly of the well paid skilled trades, especially In the
shipbuilding and engineering Industry... The Unionist
bosses soon discovered that the policy of discrimination
had an added advantage - It prevented any effective labour
or trade union movement from developing in Belfast.
The emphasis on the shipyard workers is understandable: these were a
large, well organised, strategic - Reid (1980: 121) describes them as
the 'vanguard of the Protestant working class' - group of workers
whose exclusivism towards Catholics is well known and sometimes took
dramatic forms. For example, In the summer of 1920 several thousand
Catholic workers - and some Protestant socialists - were driven from
their Jobs in the Belfast Shipyards by their loyalist colleagues.
Farrell analyses this infamous episode as the result of a conspiracy
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by Unionist 1 politicians designed to stymie the class consciousness
which had begun to develop In the shipyards during a strike in 1919
(1980: 27-28).
Farrell does not develop a systematic analysis of the Northern
Irish trade union movement in the period after 1920 - if it was such
an abject failure such an analysis is hardly worth the effort.
However he makes it clear that he regards his analysis of Belfast in
the period before the First World War to be valid for subsequent
years and for the rest of Northern Ireland too. In his preface
(1980: 11) he states:
Most confusion of all has arisen over the relations between
Protestant and Catholic workers In Northern Ireland and the
utter failure of the Labour movement there - even in so
heavily industrialised a city as Belfast. This failure can
only be understood against the backround of religious
discrimination in employment which divided the working
class, giving the Protestants a small but real advantage,
and creating a Protestant 'aristocracy of labour'
particularly in the Belfast engineering Industry.
And, in his conclusion (1980: 327) he mentions an Instance in 1932
when Protestants and Catholics united to demand changes In state
funded employment schemes (the outdoor relief system), but adds that,
'since then every attempt by political groups to unite and mobilise
the working class on social and economic issues has foundered,
because it came up against the question of discrimination and
Protestant privelege.
Farrell notwithstanding, there is ample evidence that trade
unions did develop in Northern Ireland. In 1953 there were 92 trade
unions with a combined membership of 200,000 in the province
(Bleakley 1953: 158), and Roiston (1980: 70) notes,
contemporary membership figures suggest a strong NI trade
union movement. Approximately 57% of workers are unionised
(a rate slightly higher than Britain but lower than in the
Republic (of Ireland]).
In what sense, then, does Farrell regard trade unionism in
Northern Ireland to have been a failure? In fact he does not make
his criterion explicit, but It can be inferred from the problematic
within which his analysis is located. Farrell, both as an historian
and as a political activist, is part of a tradition of Irish marxism
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which traces its origins in the writings of James Connolly the
renowned socialist republican politician and trade union organiser
who was shot by the British after taking part in the 1916 rising in
Dublin. For Connolly Belfast was a paradox: it was the most
industrialised part of Ireland, and as such, according to his
theoretical preconceptions, should be the place were class cleavages
should be the most pronounced; in fact, he found that it was, 'the
happy hunting ground of the slave driver and the home of the least
rebellious slaves in the world' (Cork Workers Club, 1975: 38). In
other words, Connolly was puzzled by the fact that Protestant workers
tended to make common political cause with their Unionist bosses
rather than with their Catholic colleagues. 	 As Patterson (1980: ix;
cf Reid, 1980: 113) has put it, Connolly solved his paradox
by analogy to developments in the world of trade unionism.
The skilled worker, the member of a union, looked upon the
unskilled and ununionised as a threat, 	 Consequently, he
was deaf to all appeals to the solidarity of Labour. 	 The
Protestant worker enjoyed a similarly priveleged position
with regard to his Catholic counterpart. This was the
basis for the dominant conservative ideology and politics
amongst Protestant workers.
Additionally, Connolly (1911) argued that Protestant workers were
subject to ideological manipulation. The manipulators were the
Unionist bourgeoisie; their instrument was the Orange Order, an
explicitly anti-Catholic organisation. 	 That Farrell shares
Connolly's problematic is self evident. To be sure, Farrell puts
most emphasis on the argument about Protestant privelege, and
presents the Orange Order primarily as the agency of 'discrimination
and patronage' (1980: 358), but he shares Connolly's view of the
power of Orangeism as an ideology (eg 1980: 11). From the
perspective of what might be called 'traditional Irish marxism' trade
unionism and Unionism are viewed as incompatible or in mutual
'contradiction' (Workers' Research Unit, 1979: 14).
It now becomes possible to discern the criterion according to
which Farrell judges the Northern Ireland trade union movement to
have been a failure. The traditional Irish marxist problematic is
based on a reductionist and evolutionist view of history according to
which
the development of capitalist social relations necessarily
replaces the diversity and fragmentation of pre-capitalist
popular strata and strips away the veils of paternalism,
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religion, and so on; that the development of the capitalist
mode of production necessarily produces a social formation
in which (at last!) economic Interest determines political
action and in which the massing of workers in towns and
factories gives them a greater organizational power. (Reid,
1980: 113).
Thus it is assumed that In the normal circumstances of capitalist
society, workers, sharing a common position as the propertyless
class, will unite in opposition to the capitalist class as part of a
process leading to socialist revolution. Trade unionism is conceived
as an integral part of this process, and it is in this context that
trade unionism in Northern Ireland is judged a failure. For,
although trade unions have attracted a large membership throughout
Northern Ireland, the working class, as Farrell and others have
shown, has tended to support socially conservative Unionist or
nationalist parties; socialism has only occasionally won significant
working class support, and even then only in a reformist form.
During the late 1960s and 1970s evolutionist and reductionist
assumptions of this kind were undermined by new interpretations of
Marx's writings; the most notable of which was Aithusser (1969 and
1971). Inspired by Aithusser's writings, a number of marxist
scholars began, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, to develop a
thorough-going theoretical and historical critique of the traditional
Irish marxist perspective (see Gibbon, 1975; Bew, Gibbon and
Patterson, 1979 and 1980; Patterson 1980 and 1982; and Reid 1980).
This critique did not involve any sustained analysis of the trade
union question; the main critics, Bew, Gibbon and Patterson were more
Interested In challenging the traditional Irish marxist view of
Unionism and of the Protestant working class. However, their
arguments are important in relation to this study firstly, because
they have Important implications for our view of the nature of
working class division and sectarianism in Northern Ireland;
secondly, because they suggest a different way of looking at trade
unionism in Northern Ireland; and thirdy because they provoked a
sophisticated defence of the traditional Irish marxist view of trade
unionism in Northern Ireland as a failure (Rolston, 1980; and Munck
1987). Thus, before attempting to define the issues which will be
addressed In this study it is necessary to examine the debate between
traditional Irish marxists and their critics.
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Bew et al (1979 and 1980), Patterson (1980 and 1982) call into
question the two fundamental tenets of the traditional Irish marxist
analysis of Unionism. They denounce the traditional argument that
Protestant working class support for Unionism was based on Orange
prejudice and the result ideological manipulation on the part of the
ruling class as 'pre-marxist' and untenable (Bew et al, 1979: 6).
They agree with Farrell that Protestants tended to monopolise skilled
jobs in the Belfast shipbuilding and engineering complex, and that
these workers dominated the local trade union movement in the years
before World War One. Nevertheless, Farrell's attempt to explain
Protestant working class politics in terms of discrimination in the
allocation of jobs is rejected: they argue that the Protestant
working class was not a homogeneously privieged stratum, and that
many Protestants were unskilled (Bew et al, 1980: 157-158); Reid
points out that it 'overlooks the "relative autonomy" of ideology and
culture' (Reid, 1980: 114). Bew et al and Reid argue that Unionism
should be conceived as an alliance of classes and class fractions
constructed by the Unionist bourgeoisie in opposition to the Home
Rule Bills mooted in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries and, after 1920, by the Northern Ireland state. The
material basis for this all-class alliance is said to have been the
uneven development of capitalism in Ireland such that the north
eastern part of the island around Belfast industrialised while the
south remained primarily agricultural (cf The British and Irish
Communist Organisation, 1972).	 Moreover, the ideology around which
the alliance was originally mobilised was not Orangeism but
a specific representation of the structural division in
Irish society.., according [to which] the social and
economic character of the north, and in particular its
monopolisation of capitalist machine industry, was the the
expression of two distinct racial and religious histories
(Ireland - Two Nations).	 (Bew et al 1979: 8).
Patterson (1982: 27) concedes that Unionist ideology had sectarian
aspects, but argues that its main thrust was that
rule from Dublin would be economically and socially
retrogressive and this was of particular importance in
integrating the Protestant working class into the Unionist
movement.
He concedes that sectarianism remained 'an element' in Protestant
politics after partition, but argues that the 'militant anti-
nationalism' of Protestant workers can best be explained in terms of
- 15 -
the continued 'divergence In economic and social structure north and
south' (1982: 28). In other words, Unionism and sectarianism are not
necessarily one arid the same thing.
On the question of trade unionism, Patterson (1980) and Reid
(1980) introduce a few new insights. Reid concedes that organised
Protestant workers in Belfast's shipyards often revealed an exclusive
attitude towards Catholics, but he suggests that this hostility may
have originated less in sectarianism than in the routine trade union
sectionalism of a group of workers who, because of the nature of the
shipbuilding labour process, felt insecure (1980: 123). In this
respect, the behaviour of Protestant trade unionists in Belfast's
shipyards was not unlike that of their counterparts in Britain.
Patterson developed this kind of analysis further in his study of the
'The Protestant Working Class and the Belfast Labour Movement 1868-
1920' (1980). He does not regard trade unionism in Belfast to have
been a failure. In a similar way to Reid, he argues that the
exclusivism of organised skilled workers was rooted in the 'nature
of certain types of trade unionism' (1980: xiv) rather than in
sectarianism. Moreover, he suggests that the indifference of skilled
trade unionists to the organisation of less skilled workers in
Belfast's other major industry, linen spinning and weaving, had more
to do with the fact that the former were men and the latter women
than it had with the fact that most of the former were Protestants
and many of the latter Catholics (1980: 31).
Rolston's first foray into the debate on the labour movement In
Northern Ireland comes In the form of a chapter in a book which he
co-authored with O'Dowd and Tomlinson (1980). 	 It is one of several
discrete case studies of how sectarianism has been reproduced in
various spheres of Northern Irish life despite the implementation of
reformist policies by the British state following the collapse of the
Unionist regime in 1972. The authors attempt to incorporate some of
the theoretical Insights made by Bew, Gibbon, and Patterson and, at
the same time, hold onto the main conclusions and tenets of the
traditional Irish marxist analysis.
	
This results in some
contradictions.	 Thus, In the first chapter - the purpose of which
'is to provide an historical and theoretical context for the
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subsequent case studies' (1980a: 3) - O'Dowd rejects the traditional
Irish marxist view of discrimination as a policy, sectarianism as
something existing only In the realm of ideas, and both 'as a tactic
(operated by the Unionist bourgeoisie or the British state) to divide
and rule the working class' (1980a: 23). Rather, he argues (1980a:
25-26) that sectarianism is one of the fundamental structural
divisons in Northern Irish society:
The first step in combatting the deficiencies of the
foregoing analyses is to confirm the importance of social
divisons other than class In all historical capitalist
societies. Sectarianism is not a superstructural
phenomenon floating free of an abstracted economic base
which In turn Is divided into classes. In NI sectarian
division is a material reality which has been constituted
and re-constituted throughout the history of capital
accumulation and class struggle In Ireland as a whole..
Class relations in NI were only experienced as sectarian
class relations. Sectarian division is itself only a
particular historical division of class, or more precisely
class fractions, cemented together in Protestant and
Catholic class alliances. In other words sectarian
division is a class phenomenon and vice versa... The
division amounts to a near apartheid in many areas of
social life... Segregated housing, schools, churches,
recreational facilities and workplaces testify to the
Importance of the division which is at its sharpest [his
emphasis] In urban working class areas.
This notwithstanding, Rolston evidently shares shares Farrell's
evolutionist and reductionist view of trade unionism. For example,
at the beginning of his chapter on trade unionism he criticises those
(mainly trade union officials) who present the trade union movement
as 'a veritable island of social democracy in a sectarian sea' (1980:
62):
If [this] is to be more than a mere grasping at straws,
there must be evidence of a reality behind the image. Such
evidence would at the very least need to reveal a history
of the pursuit of class politics on the part of trade
unions in NI, as well as a vibrant trade union movement at
present. (1980: 69-71).
However, unlike Farrell, Rolston extends his analysis of trade
unionism beyond 1920 and, in doing so, is confronted by the reality
that although socialist or labour politics have only occasionally
attracted significant support, trade unionism has grown and attracted
members, Catholics aswell as Protestants, in numbers that compare
favourably with the rest of the United Kingdom (1980: 70). Having
recognised this, and, rio doubt, mindful of the criticisms made by Bew
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et al (1979), Roiston develops a more subtle version of the
traditional Irish marxist argument that trade unionism in Northern
Ireland has been thwarted by sectarianism. His analysis is of
particular importance not just because it is the most subtle and,
perhaps, most influential contemporary re-working of the Connollyist
argument, but also because, although comparatively short, it is the
only systematic sociological analysis of the history of trade
unionism in Northern Ireland from the nineteenth century to the
present day 2 ); it therefore demands further discussion.
Rolston begins his analysis of trade unionism by going over the
well rehearsed period before the First World War. He entitles this
section of his article 'The Developement of Sectarian Trade Unionism'
(1980: 71). His main argument is as follows:
sectarian division was part of the normal [his emphasis)
operations of trade unionism in Ireland from the beginning.
That is not to say that trade unionists in the 19th century
were unceasingly sectarian in their attitudes and
utterances; it is to emphasise that divisions in the
working class were necessarily reconstituted in the
movement that sought to organise that class. Consequently,
developments which had one connotation in a non-sectarian
setting took on a different meaning In a sectarian setting.
Thus the sectionalism and exclusivity evident in the
development of trade unions elsewhere became in the North
of Ireland precisely a sectarian sectionalism and sectarian
exclusivity. (1980: 71),
At the turn of the century the Belfast working class was,
divided into two fractions: on the one hand Protestant and
more skilled, on the other Catholic and less skilled.
Early trade union organisation reflected this division of
unionised skilled Protestant workers from non-unionised
Catholic workers. (1980: 72).
Rolston denies the significance of Patterson's and Reid's claim that
this division and the exclusivlsm of the former towards the latter
may have been rooted in a particular form of trade unionism:
objective division had subjective consequences. As
Beatrice Webb commented after a visit to Belfast, the
skilled workers were 'contemptuous and indifferent to the
Catholic labourers and women who were earning miserable
wages in the shipyards and linen factories of Belfast'...
whether such contempt derived from the exclusivity of the
skilled, from sectarian attitudes and/or from sexist
attitudes hardly matters to those on the receiving end of
it.	 (1980: 72).
Attitudes like these Inhibited the organisation of unskilled and
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female workers; it was not, as Farrell suggests, just employers who
frustrated trade union activity by fomenting religious hatred:
Workers themselves, divided on the intertwined bases of
religious affiliation and skill, were not easily united on
the question of organising the predominantly Catholic
unskilled... Those who sought to advance the cause of trade
unionism were faced with a double bind of a divided
clientele and an institutionally divided movement. (1980:
73).
The institutional division to which Rolston refers was that
between British based and Irish based trade unions. After 1850 many
local craft societies in Ireland amalgamated with the British based
craft unions which were then beginning to expand vertically and
horizontally (cf McCarthy, 1977: chapter one passim, and Hyman, 1979:
48). In the 1890s and 1900s organisers for British based general
unions attempted to recruit previously unorganised unskilled workers
in Ireland.	 The most successful of these was James Larkin, the
Liverpool born Irish organiser of the National Union of Dock
Labourers (NUDL). In December 1908 Larkin was suspended by the
English general secretary of the NUDL, James Sexton, and the
following month he established the Irish Transport and General
Workers' Union (ITGWU).	 From the outset the ITGWU was explicitly
identified with Irish nationalism. The new union grew prodigiously
in the south of Ireland during the War of Independence, and, after
partition, it became the largest union in the Free State, but in
Belfast dock workers split: 	 Catholics joined the ITGWiJ and
Protestants remained loyal to the NUDL.
As I have pointed out, Roiston aknowledges that despite these
difficulties trade unionism grew and accommodated workers of
different religious and political affiliations and different levels
of skill as members of unions which were affiliated to a single all-
Ireland trade union congress - the Irish Trade Union Congress (ITUC).
However, he argues that it is precisely this accommodation which
emasculated the movement:
The trade union movement could only exist on the basis of
the least common denominator between divided workers. It
is for this reason that a number of characteristics came to
the fore in trade unionism in the North. The movement, in
as far as It existed at all, could most successfully do so
on the basis of a centralised rather than mass
orgariisation... Furthermore, the central organisation had
- 19 -
to concern itself primarily with avoiding 'politics'. In
other words, economism represented the limits of the
movement to organise and agitate: wages and conditions were
not necessarily seen as political issues. .. Given the
sectarian division of labour in the North, unity was
possible, for the most part, only at an Institutional
level.	 The institution thus became disproportionately
Important In Northern trade unionism. (1980: 73-74)
This Institutional unity survived partition, but collapsed in 1945
when a number of Irish based unions, led by the ITGWU, left the ITUC
because it was perceived to be dominated by British based unions. A
separate Congress of Irish Unions (CII)) was established, but
institutional unity was restored in 1959 when, after prolonged
negotiations between the CIU and ITUC, the Irish Congress of Trade
Unions (ICTU) was formed. However, Rolston argues that this was
purely formal, institutional unity devoid of any real meaning:
following the unification of the CIU and ITUC a Northern Ireland
Committee (NIC-ICTU) was formed, and since then the ICTU has
'operated as two trade union movements, each working relatively
independently of the other in each of the two states brought about by
partition' (1980: 77).
Having established to his own satisfaction that 'in NI a trade
union movement hardly exists outside this institutional level' (1980
:80), Roiston devotes the rest of his study to an analysis of the
policies of the NIC-ICTU. From my point of view, the most
interesting aspect of this analysis is the extent to which Rolston
judges the NIC-ICTU according to the same kind of criteria as
Farrell. He catalogues the NIC-ICTU's failure to confront
discrimination and sectarianism in the workplace and in the wider
society: 'issues on which labour movements in other societies might
be expected to agitate' (1980: 81). However, the problem for trade
union officials and activists is not merely that 'taking stances
outside purely trade union issues would certainly drive away one or
other section of the divided clientele' (1980: 73); it is that the
NIC-ICTU has accommodated Itself to Unionism and therefore, by
Rolston's lights, to sectarianism.	 Roleton discusses three aspects
of this accommodation.	 The first is that despite union officials'
claims to be non-sectarian and apolitical:
economism is a political position, not just by default, but
also because it requires a definition of the correct target
against which trade union demands can be directed. In the
- 20 -
North the target was Britain. Many trade Unionists saw
themselves, as a result of the Union [with Britain], as an
integral part of the British trade union movement,
struggling against British capitalists for better wages and
conditions. (1980: 74).
The second is that the NIC-ICTU, first recognised by the Stormont
regime in 1964, has been co-opted and become an integral part of a
Unionist state. And third,
Given the centrality of Protestant workers to the economy,
the issues relevant to them... are less tinged with
opprobrium than those issues of relevance to many Catholic
workers. Moreover the militancy of Loyalist workers is
less easily combatted even If the will is there; they are
more likely to have a point of production than Catholic
workers, and at that point are more likely to be skilled
workers.	 It is thus disingenuous of the NIC to argue that
It is non-sectarian because it is equally against Loyalism
and Republicanism.	 Integrated as It Is into the state, it
cannot be. (1980: 90).
Thus for Roiston, as for Farrell, the failure of trade unionism in
Northern Ireland Is it's political emasculation.
To sum up.	 Trade unionism in Northern Ireland has been the
subject of much contention. In the course of the debate sectarianism
has been identified as the major issue. However, there have been,
with the partial exception of Belfast In the period before 1920,
remarkably few sustained analyses of the effect of divisions within
the working class on trade unionism. The main problem Is that the
trade union question has been obscured by debates about the nature of
socialism and of working class politics; this is due to the
theoretical legacy of traditional Irish marxism. In the latter,
trade unionism Is conceptualised in terms of an evolutionary and
reductionist schema in which the development of progressive socialist
politics on the part of the working class is seen as being - in
normal conditions - inevitable. Socialist politics have only rarely
attracted significant support in Northern Ireland; therefore, trade
unionism is judged a failure. The fact that trade unions succeeded
in attracting many members, from both communities, is either not
aknowledged (Farrell) or held to be irrelevant (Roiston). The
traditional Irish marxist perspective leads to teleological forms of
explanation in which serious, open-ended research is aborted in the
search for evidence to confirm a pre-conceived end: the failure or
emasculation of trade unionism in Northern Ireland.
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These difficulties are sufficient reason for rejecting the
traditional Irish Marxist perspective as a basis from which to
develop and understanding of trade unionism in Northern Ireland.
However, a rejection of traditional Irish marxism is also a rejection
of the evolutionist and reductionist assumptions upon which it is
based. This is rio loss, nor does it necessarily involve a rejection
of marxism as such. The notion that history is governed by
underlying laws of evolution, and its corollary that it is possible
to identify social laws to which can be attached the same force which
accrues to laws in the natural sciences, may serve to impose an order
on the untidiness of history - and has consequently had an enduring
attraction for social theorists of disparate ideological hues - but
it Is now regarded as untenable by a wide range of scholars, marxist
and non-marxist alike. As Reid notes, the traditional Irish marxist
approach, 'finds its most authoritative support from The Communist
Manifesto, the polemical sections of Capital and Lenin's The.
Development of Capitalism in Russia' (1980: 113). But as Abrams
(1982) and Giddens (1979) indicate, these cannot be seen as
representative of Marx' s writing as a whole. Both writers note that
there is a tension and an ambiguity in Marx's writing; according to
the latter (1979: 52):
The Hegelian inheritance in Marx, with its connotation of
active consciousness and the coming-to-itself of the
subject in history, mingles uneasily and in a unresolved
way in Marx's works with an allegiance to a deterministic
theory in which actors are propelled by historical laws.
In Abrams view (1982: 109), Marx constructed a model of the
capitalist mode of production and identified tendencies and
contradictions within it which led him to the conclusion that the
working class was the potential agent of revolutionary change, but,
The point of writing The Communist Manifesto and of all the
other polemical and directly political activities in which
Marx and Erigels engaged, was precisely that the transition
to socialism was not an inevitable necessity of capitalism
but a possibility within it which could be realised through
appropriate action.
Once evolutionist and reductionist assumptions have been
rejected it becomes possible to recognise what many marxists - and
Marx himself - have also recognised: that the 'optimism' of the view
of working class and trade union development presented in Ih
- 22 -
Communist Manifesto was misplaced (Hyrnan, 1975: 4 and 8-11); that
trade unionism and socialism are distinct phenomena; and that trade
unionism is compatible with disparate political affiliations. For
example, two of the foremost marxist theorists of twentieth century,
Lenin and Gramsci, criticised colleagues who tended to assume a
necessary identity between trade unionism and socialism. The former
drew a sharp - perhaps too sharp - distinction between trade unionism
and socialism:
The history of all countries shows that the working class,
exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only
trade union consciousness le the conviction that it is
necessary to combine in unions, fight employers, and strive
to compel the government to pass necessary labour
legislation, etc. The theory of socialism, however, grew
out of the philosophic, historical and economic theories
elaborated by the educated representatives of
	 the
propertied classes, by intellectuals. (1978: 31-32).
The latter, as part of a debate among the Italian left in 1920 on the
relationship between trade unions and the factory councils which were
in 1920 widely regarded as the Italian equivalent of soviets (Hoare,
1986: xxxvii-xxxx), argued:
The trade union is not a pre-determined phenomena. It
becomes a determinate institution, le it takes on a
definite historical form to the extent that the strength
and the will of the workers who are its members impress a
policy and propose an aim that define it. (1977: 265).
Kendall's (1975) review of the labour histories of Western European
states reveals that although trade unions are often associated with
labourist or social democratic politics they are compatible with a
range of diverse political philosophies. In Britain, as Hyman
(1979b: 63) has argued, the conception of trade unionism as an aspect
of a political struggle against capital is, 'at best an extremely
subsidiary element within a tradition and an Ideology powerfully
dominated by the centrality of collective bargaining.'
If, as I have argued, trade unionism need not be viewed as an
essentially political institution, then it is possible to distinguish
two sets of questions in relation to Northern Ireland. 	 One set of
questions is as follows: why have socialist politics only
occasionally - and then only In a reformist form - attracted
significant support among the working class? Conversely, why have
Protestant workers tended to vote for socially conservative Unionist
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parties, arid Catholic workers for socially conservative nationalist
parties? In other words why have politics in Northern Ireland
revolved around mutually antagonistic religious, rather than class,
identities? This is the 'big' question to which much of the
literature on Northern Ireland is addressed, and with which many of
the authors reviewed here have been mainly concerned. However, there
is a more modest set of questions which - having rejected the
teleology of traditional Irish marxism - can be summed up in the
following way: to what extent, and in what ways, did sectarian
divisions between Protestant and Catholic workers influence the
development of trade unionism amongst them? It is with the latter
question that I am mainly concerned in this thesis.
The reasons why I choose to explore this question in relation to
shirt workers in Derry will be explained in the section 1.4 of this
chapter; for the moment I only wish to emphasise that it is not part
of my concern to account for the sectarian divide in Derry society
and politics, or for the failure of socialist politics there, Rather
I intend to show where, when, and how sectarian divisions were
relevant (or irrelevant) in the history of the unions which organised
in the city's shirt industry. This has a certain intrinsic interest
- as I have already indicated Derry is a significant place and
shirtmaking was its staple industry - but the main value of my study
is as a contribution to an important, ongoing debate: as will become
apparent, it calls into question the general validity of many of the
assertions discussed above. However, having examined the development
of trade unionism in the Derry shirt industry I will, as part of my
conclusions, attempt to use this particular case study to say
something about the 'big' questions in Northern Irish life: about the
nature of sectarianism, and about the relationship between trade
unionism, socialism, Unionism, and nationalism.
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1.3 An Alternative Approach
In the process of defining the problem to which my thesis will
be addressed I suggested that trade unionism had been mis-conceived,
particularly by traditional Irish marxists, and claimed that my study
would call into question the general validity of many of the
assertions which have been made about the effect of sectarianism on
the development of trade unionism in Northern Ireland. It is now
necessary for me to make explicit, and justify, the theoretical
criteria which underlie my critique and according to which this study
has been organised. The simplest way to do this is by returning to
Rolston's analysis and examining his assumptions about the nature of
social reality.
Roiston (1980) does not make his theoretical preconceptions
plain, but, as I have argued, his analysis Is based in traditional
Irish marxism, and, although theoretically more sophisticated than,
for example, Farrell, he shares the reductionism and evolutionism
which is characteristic of that form of marxism. In evolutionist and
reductionist theories, human action, and the meanings and intentions
which underly it, tend to be treated as though of little consequence.
Rolston (1980) clearly shares this trait. Thus, his main argument is
that sectarian 'divisions in the working class were necessarily
reconstituted in the movement that sought to organise that class'
irrespective of 'the attitudes' or 'utterances' of trade unionists
(1980: 71 and 84); he wishes to characterise trade unions as
sectarian, but not 'impugn the sincerity of individual trade
unionists' (1980: 81). This is linked to his view of sectarianism as
one of the major structural divisions in Northern Irish society:
sectarianism is ubiquitous, therefore, although trade unionists may
not have been markedly sectarian in their attitudes, their actions
(or inaction) inevitably had sectarian consequences.
That this is Rolston's view is made explicit in a more recent
book (Munck and Rolston 1987). The book is about the relationship
between socialism and sectarianism in Belfast in the 1930s and is
based on interviews with people who were involved in the labour
movement, the republican movement, and loyalist politics at that
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time. The authors note the difficulties which they had in
reconciling the idiosyncratic experiences of the people who were
interviewed with wider social structures and social change; the
dilemma is resolved in the following way: 'We believe in the social
determination of the individual so that our respondants would be part
of a broader social flow whatever personal characteristics might be
displayed' (1987: 13). If individuals are socially determined, and
merely act out a pre-given role according to their position in the
social structure, then their attitudes, intentions, and motives are
irrelevant, or, insofar as they are relevant, may be inferred from
their structural situation. Thus, as we have already seen, when
Rolston discusses the 'contempt' of skilled Protestant trade
unionists towards unskilled and unorganised Catholics, he asserts,
'whether... [the] contempt derived from the exclusivity of the
skilled, from sectarian attitudes and/or from sexist attitudes hardly
matters to those on the receiving end of it' (1980: 72). Clearly, he
is not very interested either.	 Indeed, in another article Rolston
(1983) makes it clear that when he talks about 'sectarian trade
unionism' he is not necessarily referring to the religious
affiliations of the members or their attitudes and intentions, but to
some esoteric property of trade unionism as an institution, and that
he is far more interested in the latter than the former:
The word sectarianism is not used in the narrow sense to
connote merely a set of attitudes. It refers to the
material reality, reconstructed and hence perpetuated in
everyday life. If sectarianism is taken in the narrow
sense of a set of attitudes only, then it can refer to the
attitudes of both the dominating arid the dominated. But in
a structural sense of the word, it can only be fully
applied to the activities of the dominating. This approach
to the analysis of sectarianism has respectable links with
analyses of other ideologies, for example, racism... and
sexism. .. By analogy, if racism exists only at the level of
attitudes, then blacks who hate whites can be said to be as
racist as whites who hate blacks. Many state policies to
supposedly counteract racism are built on that assessment.
But, if racism is a phenomenon at the structural level,
then it is only institutions and policies designed and
managed by powerful whites that can properly be said to be
racist in as far as they perpetuate the domination of
blacks. In this sense, even those institutions and
policies designed to counteract racist attitudes can
themselves be racist, (1983: 206)
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There are a number of problems with this perspective. The most
obvious one is that the meaning of the term 'sectarianism' becomes
somewhat elusive: it is an institutional phenomena, but it is not
dependent on the attitudes or even, necessarily, the religious
identities of the people who compose that institution. But there are
more fundamental problems with this kind of approach; these are well
summed up by Giddens (1979: 1) when he takes issue with the view that
'institutions.., work "behind the backs" of the social actors who
produce and reproduce them,' and with the
common tendency of many otherwise divergent shools of
sociological thought... to adopt the methodological tactic
of beginning their analyses by discounting agent's reasons
for their action (or what I prefer to call the
rationalisation of action), in order to discover the 'real'
stimuli to their activity, of which they are ignorant.
Such a stance, however, is not only defective from the
point of view of social theory, it is one with strongly-
defined and potentially offensive political implications.
It implies the derogation 'of the lay actor.
Rolston's (and Munck's) stance is 'defective from the point of
view of social theory' because it fails to recognise that
institutions - such as sectarianism and trade unionism - are created
and re-created through the actions of the individuals who constitute
them, and that to understand them it is necessary to take account of
the meanings and intentions which those individuals attach to their
actions and predicaments. To understand the effect of sectarian
divisions on the development of trade unionism in Northern Ireland
one must take account of the views and intentions of the people who
produced, reproduced, or changed the trade unions. But one must also
recognise that although institutions are created by individuals,
individuals are also influenced by the social and institutional
ntilieux in which they live. This is the dilemma of human agency; it
is, in Abram's words (1982: xiii), 'an age old problem.' Recently,
however, there have been a number of attempts to understand social
phenomena as historical process or in terms of what Giddens (1979: 5)
describes as
the duality of structure... the essential recursiveness of
social life, as constituted in social practice: structure
is both medium and outcome of the reproduction of
practices. Structure enters simultaneously into the
constitution of the agent and social practices, and
'exist& in the generating moments of its constitution.
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Abrams refers to this kind of approach as 'the problematic of
structuring. ' My thesis is firmly located within this problematic,
and it is the perspective from which I will criticise the authors -
mainly traditional Irish marxists but also their critics - reviewed
in the last section. For although I have developed my argument in
relation to Rolston and traditional Irish marxism, Bew, Gibbon and
Patterson are - insofar as they conform to Aithusser's 'theoretical
anti-humanism' - equally susceptible c3 ). Indeed, as I will argue in
the next section, the failure to aknowledge human agency is a problem
shared by the functionalist and structuralist paradigms which have
dominated anthropology and social theory more generally in the last
30 or 40 years.
I will describe how I came to embrace the problematic of
structuring, and elaborate on it further, in the next section; for
the moment I am more concerned with discussing its consequences for
my mode of exposition. Once one rejects deterministic theory in
which actors' meanings, aims, and intentions are regarded as being
simply given by the their position in the social structure - whether
that position is defined in terms of class, ethnicity, or some
mixture of the two as in the case of Roiston - one must take
seriously how they interpret their own situations, and what they say
about their intentions; and this means that the researcher must take
into account realities and identities which cannot be reduced to
class or ethnicity (cf Gledhill, 1988: 4 and 15). Consequently,
although my main concern is with the question: to what extent, and in
what ways, have sectarian divisions among Derry shirt workers
influenced the development of trade unionism in local factories? it
will be necessary to take into account, identities, social realities,
and institutional patterns other than those of a religious and
political nature. Indeed, posed as it is, the question implies some
assessment of of the influence of sectarianism in relation to other
factors. But when one examines any actual historical event one is
confronted by a mass of detail, so it might be thought that the
question of choosing which details are relevant, and which are not,
is arbitrary and problematic. In practice, it Is not so difficult, I
was guided in my choice by the patterns which emerged in the material
which I gathered during my research and also by theoretical
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considerations. By the latter I mean that I paid particular
attention to those factors which have been identified as being
significant influences in the development of trade unionism
elsewhere, particularly in Britain. In effect I will be attempting
to 'tease-out' and distinguish those characteristics of trade
unionism in the Derry shirt industry which are unique to the local
situation and which reflect sectarian realities from those
characteristics which it shares with trade unions in other places.
The foregoing implies a view of social and historical causality
which is quite like that advocated by Max Weber; it is worth making
it explicit. As Abrams (1982: 105) suggests:
Causality in history does not for him [Weber] imply
intention nor does it imply a social world governed by
abstract general laws. Causal importance is a matter of
the contribution of any specific factor in a given
historical complex to the construction of that complex as a
whole.
The relevance of this mode of exposition can best be illustrated
by taking up the debate between the traditional Irish marxists and
their critics at the point were we left off in the last section. As
the reader may remember, Reid and Patterson suggest that the
exciusivism of organised skilled Protestant workers in Belfast had
more to do with routine sectionalism, with certain types of trade
unionism, or - in relation to linen workers - with gender based
differences than it had with sectarianism. Here we have a
rudimentary attempt at the process of distinguishing what was
peculiarly sectarian in the case of trade unionism in Northern
Ireland.	 Patterson takes this kind of argument further in a more
recent article (1984). Here, he argues (1984: 79) that the Belfast
trade union movement in its formative years before the war was not
unlike the labour movement in the rest of the United Kingdom,
in fact the 'problem' as far as the politics of the labour
movement in Ulster is concerned is, in part, in the eyes of
the beholders.. . for too long historians of nationalist
sympathies have tended to exaggerate the dismal side of the
labour history of Ulster.
In relation to linen workers, Patterson notes a number of factors
which retarded trade unionism: first, their position in the labour
market was weak; second, 'there was the complex of factors related to
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a predominantly female labour force'; third, cultural factors such as
localism and the tradition of daughters following mothers to work in
the same mill, engendered a pacific acceptance of working conditions;
and fourth, paternalism on the part of employers promoted class
peace. So far as sectarianism is concerned, he writes (1984: 76):
A final factor in weakening unionisation in linen and
indeed many other sections of industry, is often considered
to have been sectarian division inside the working class.
The notion that religious differences, encouraged by
employers, were at the heart of many of the problems of the
labour movement in Ulster has been at the centre of a
traditional view of the province's labour history. However
if we wish to deal with the structural reasons for the
weaknesses of union organisation among linen workers, then
the factors outlined above are of fundamental importance.
Sectarianism would, at most, have exacerbated these
problems at particular times of heightened political
tension. But it is important to remember that the majority
of employers wanted a disciplined workforce and production
unhindered by sectarian outbursts. Those employers who,
like the Ewarts, encouraged an almost completely Protestant
labour force were in a minority.
Rolston, in his later work with Munck (Munck and Rolston, 1987),
remains wedded to the traditional Irish marxist view that
sectarianism was the major factor inhibiting the development of trade
unionism in Belfast (1987: 114, 117, and 122), and that 'competition
over jobs seemed to be the root of most sectarianism in the
industrialised world' (1987: 112), but, confronted with the
recollections of trade union activists, he is forced to aknowledge
that there may have been other factors involved.	 In relation to
shipyard workers, he mentions fear of unemployment. The linen
workers who were interviewed mention various factors such as
managerial opposition and paternalism, the high turnover in the
factories due to women getting married and having children, and
prejudice against women workers on the part of male trade unionists.
Munck (1986: 87) also tends to be more circumspect about the effect
of sectarianism on trade unionism:
We can accept that deliberate discrimination cannot explain
everything, but. .. the effect of exclusivist practices
(whatever their origin) was felt predominantly by one
section of the working class. We can accept that most
trade unions were sincere in their commitment to non-
sectarianism, but the fact remains that employment in the
shipyard usually required an Orange Order contact, and this
precluded Catholics.	 Nor	 did	 the	 trade	 unions
systematically and consciously fight against sectarianism
-
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amongst their members during the regular disturbances of
the nineteenth century.
Where there is little disagreement Is on the fact that
trade union organisation was thwarted by sectarianism. A
prime case of this was the linen mills, where a mixed
workforce proved remarkably difficult to organise right
into the twentieth century. Yet we must not forget that
the linen workers were also predominantly female, and for
this reason they were neglected by the paternalist trade
union leaders of the time... What this suggests is that
sectarianism did Indeed weaken the efforts at trade union
organisation, but as part of a constellation of exclusivist
practices directed at the the less skilled and women as
well.
Thus, while the protagonists In the debate about trade unionism
In Northern Ireland remain preoccupied with sectarianism, they have
begun to aknowledge the potential significance of other factors, and
of identities and divisions other than religion and politics. Pre-
eminent among these is gender. This reflects an increasing awareness
in the wider literature of important differences in the way in which
men and women relate to trade unionism. More than 90% of the shirt
workforce was, and is, female; thus, in attempting to answer my
question about the effect of sectarianism on the development of trade
unionism in the Derry shirt industry, it is possible to anticipate
that gender will feature among the 'other factors' which I consider.
However, I will reserve discussion of the various arguments about
gender and trade unionism to the appropriate parts of my analysis.
1.4 The Dialectics of Field Research
This history of trade unionism In the Derry shirt Industry has
been researched and written as a thesis within the discipline of
social anthropology. However, my problematic, as outlined in the
last section, does not appear to bear the stamp of anthropology: I
have not made any reference to anthropological texts, not even to the
considerable anthropological literature on Northern Ireland; I have
defined my study in relation to a particular institution, trade
unionism, but rather than study how it operates or functions in the
present according to some specifically anthropological model, I have
advocated an historical analysis; and having adopted such an approach
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the research technique most commonly associated with anthropology,
participant observation, becomes void. In this section I will
explain these absences, silences, and preferences, arid argue that,
despite appearances, my work is firmly situated within the discipline
of social anthropology. I have choosen to do this by giving an
account of my practical experience of field research because it was
in the 'dialectic' between theory and experience (Harris, 1987: 6)
that the problematic outlined above was developed, and because it
will demonstrate that my earlier rejection of teleology and my
insistence on open-ended research was not just rhetoric.
When I began as a student of social anthropology in 1977, the
subject was in a state of flux, but the most dynamic schools of
thought within the discipline were structural marxism, and 'world-
systems and underdevelopment theories' (see Ortner 1984: 141 and
passim), and it was through these theories that I first became
interested in Ireland as an object of study. By the time I began my
fieldwork in March 1982 my world-view was an unstable amalgam of
the structuralist marxism and the theories of underdevelopment and
ethnicity which I had been taught as an undergraduate together with
traditional Irish marxism and Bew et al's revisionism. It was based
on essentially the same deterministic model of social reality in
which priority is given to social and economic relations rather than
actual individuals as that which I rejected in the last section. I
shared Irish marxism's preoccupation with the relationship between
sectarianism and class politics, and my main reason for choosing to
do research in Derry was that all the literature on this subject had
focused on Belfast, and that Derry, Northern Ireland's second city,
had been neglected. But another reason was that, for me, Derry had
that sense of 'otherness' which is still regarded as a crucial
ingredient of anthropological research (Ortner 1984: 134): all of my
life - apart form five years in London as an undergraduate student
and then as a postgraduate student - has been spent in Northern
Ireland, but until I started my fieldwork I had had no connection
with Derry, and whereas I come from Belfast Protestant backrourid,
Derry is a mainly Catholic city.
- 32 -
With these theoretical perspectives in mind, it is easy to
understand why the anthropological literature on Northern Ireland had
little initial Influence either on my choice of a topic, or on my
theoretical approach to It. To be sure, following Harris (1972),
there have been many anthropological studies which deal with
sectarianism, but these nearly all focus on 'small scale rural
networks' (Donning and McFarlane, 1983: 113). Indeed, when I began
my research the only studies of urban sectarianism which were based
on anthropological methods were those written by Burton (1978), a
sociologist, and Nelson (1984), a political scientist. In any case,
these studies were concerned with aspects of social reality to which
I was, at the time, theoretically unsympathetic. For example, Harris
(1972: vii) wanted to show
that attitudes and behaviour are moulded by very complex
factors, and that it Is absurd to stick a simple label,
'bigot', on to people even when they seem most predudiced.
Such labels explain nothing; it is more difficult but much
more rewarding to try with patience to understand their
motives.
And	 Donning	 and	 McFarlane	 (1983:	 110)	 characterise	 the
anthropological literature on Northern Ireland as being concerned
with 'Informal relations which exist between Catholic and
Protestants,' and 'the relevance of being a Protestant and being a
Catholic In the mundane areas of everyday life.'
Despite my structuralist marxist preconceptions, I began my
fieldwork by engaging in a form of participant observation. I went
to public meetings which had anything to do with the local labour
movement or local politics, and introduced myself to, and had casual
conversations with, trade union activists and officials. As a result
of these conversations I became aware that the contemporary structure
of trade unionism in the shirt Industry is dominated by a three-way
split: most of the small number of male workers employed in the
processes associated with shirt cutting belonged to the Amalgamated
Transport and General Workers' Union (ATGWU), and the women were
divided between the National Union of Tailors and Garment Workers
(NUTGW) and the the ITGWU. My Interest was intensif led when several
of the people I spoke to intimated that these divisions had sectarian
undertones such that the ATGWU and N1JTGW, both British based unions,
tended to Protestant and the ITGWU, an Irish based union, tended to
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be Catholic. I decided that I would focus my research on attempting
to understand these divisions.
My training as a social anthropologist and my structuralist
marxist leanings impelled me to study the contemporary dynamics of
the organisational divisions between shirt workers, but gradually I
became more interested in tracing their historical development.
Contemporary trade union officials were only dimly aware of the
origins of these divisions, and none of the unions concerned had
retained relevant minutes going back further than the last few
years'. I started reading back copies of the local newspapers, and
I eventually found that the three-way split was rooted in two
distinct secessionary movements. The first occurred in the 1920s
when, following a protracted strike, male shirt cutters defected from
the United Garment Workers' Union (UGW, the direct precursor of the
NUTGW) and joined the ATGWU.	 The second occurred in 1952 when the
Derry Branch Committee of the NUTGW seceded and set up an independent
union which later transferred to the ITGWU. Initially I regarded
this historical research as simply a matter of gathering material for
a chapter on what anthropologists and sociologists usually call 'the
historical backround'; however, it gradually became the central focus
of my thesis. Two things underlay this shift from the present to the
past. The first was that my early experience of participant
observation convinced me that a contemporary ethnography of trade
unionism and sectarianism in the shirt industry would be extremely
difficult for someone who did not have a clearly defined local
identity: I began my fieldwork shortly after the end of the hunger
strike by republican prisoners in Long Kesh, and the atmosphere in
Northern Ireland was particularly fraught; and later, with the onset
of the 'super-grass trials', the term 'informant' or 'source' took on
a sinister meaning outside academia. On the other hand, I found it
impossible to construct a local identity which was both morally
defensible and relevant to the contemporary situation. For reasons
which will be made clear, questions of identity were less problematic
with respect to an investigation of an historical nature. The second
was simply that I found the the history of the three-way split
fascinating. This fascination was undoubtedly linked to the dramatic
quality of the original secessionary movements, but more importantly,
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I felt sure that the organisatlonal divisions in the shirt industry
could only be properly undestood in terms of the processes by which
they emerged, and that the analysis which resulted from the attempt
to come to such an understanding would form a significant
contribution to the debate about trade unionism and sectarianism in
Northern Ireland.
The newspaper accounts of the two secessionary movements were
fairly detailed, but were not In themselves sufficient to construct
an analysis. In the absence of any other sources, I decided to
interview retired managers, union officials, and ordinary shirt
workers in an effort out find out more. Initially, I usually
contacted these people on the recommendation of, and using
introductions provided by, some of the contemporary members of the
labour movement with whom I had become acquainted, but I gradually
came to rely more heavily on the recommendations provided by the
people I interviewed; in the field of oral history this strategy Is
known as 'snowballing' (see Thompson, 1978: 128 and Rolston and
Munck, 1987: 10). When I began interviewing I regarded it as
essentially an exercise in correcting ambiguities in the newspaper
accounts and gathering 'facts' about the structure of the industry
and of the labour proce.ss which they had not mentioned. However, as
I read over these interviews in an attempt to cull the required
factual information from them, it slowly became apparent to me that
the people whom I had interviewed did not conform to my neat
preconceived structural categories; for example Catholics were not
necessarily nationalists and members of the ITGWU, and Protestants
were not necessarily Unionists and supporters of the NUTGW.
Furthermore, they defined events and situations in ways which my
theories (literally) could not comprehend; for example, I was
frequently told that the 1952 breakaway was inspired by a personality
conflict not by ideological or sectarian differences as I had
assumed.	 It was at this point that I started to question my
theoretical preconceptions. This self questioning, led me to a
series of realisations: that It was necessary to take account of the
actor's intentions and his/her view of events, that these could not
be inferred from the structure of a situation, but that they had be
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directly studied; ultimately it led me to locate my work within the
problematic of structuring.
I embraced the problematic of structuring because it helped me
make sense not only of my data but of my project as a whole. First,
it helped me to understand the kind of knowledge which is
communicated during interviews with people about their past
experience, and thus enabled me to develop interviewing as a
systematic research strategy. Second, it provided the theoretical
link between, on the one hand, my historical approach to the
understanding of institutions and, on the other, my concern with
action and meaning as well as structure; moreover, it enabled me to
relate both to recent developments in anthropology. For the moment I
am concerned only with the second point; the first will be discussed
in detail in the next section.
As Harris (1987: 3) has pointed out there has long been a strand
in anthropology which has attempted to understand culture in terms of
both,
the complex factors which structure a situation for the
individuals caught up in it and (her emphasis]... the
'meaning' of the situation for these individuals; the way,
that is, that they understand it and how, in consequence,
they try to manipulate the structure,
and which has recognised that,
it is not legitimate simply to infer meaning from structure
but (that] we must also grant significance to people's own
understanding of their aims and actions, (and that] we must
in principle allow them to 'speak for themselves.'
However, this strand was never explicitly or adequately theorised
within anthropology - or indeed the other social sciences. Within
structuralism and functionalism, which, as Giddens (1979: 9) notes,
have been the dominant paradigms in anthropology and general social
theory over the last 40 years, action and actors are subordinated to
the system and to structure. On the other hand, theories such as
symbolic interactionism and transactionalism which attempt to to take
account of action and meaning fail to deal adequately with
institutional and cultural patterning (Giddens, 1976: 156 and Ortner,
1984: 146). Recently, however, there have been a number of attempts
within anthropology - and parallel attempts in sociology, history,
linguistics, and literary criticism - to comprehend the social
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process in terms of human agency without collapsing into subjectivism
or objectivism. In anthropolgy the most prominent exponent of this
approach is Bourdieu (1978), in sociology it has been embraced by
Giddens (1979), Abrams (1982), and Elias (1978); Ortner (1984), dubs
these 'the newer practice' theorists. All of these authors are
united by - and distinguished from previous social theorists - by the
argument that the best way to understand the relation between action
and structure is in terms eventuation, as process in time. Abrams
(1982: xv) insists on the need for a 'sociology of process as an
alternative to our.. . inadequate sociologies of action and system.
Giddens (1979: 113) argues against functionalism - in its non-marxist
and marxist varieties (cf Harris, 1987: 226) - in the following way:
Not even the most deeply sedimerited institutional features
of societies come about because those societies need them
to do so. They come about historically, as a result of
concrete conditions that have in every case to be directly
analysed; the same holds for their persistence.
And Ortner concludes (1984: 158-159)
Rather than seeing the theoretical shift in the field as a
move from structures and systems to persons and practices,
it might thus be seen as a shift from static, synchronic
analyses to dlachronic, processual ones... a practice
approach offers, or atleast promises, a model that
implicitly unifies both historical and anthropological
studies.
Thus, although my thesis is historical in character and is not
based on participant observation, it is, nevertheless, profoundly
anthropological both in the way that it evolved, and in its central
concerns. Harris (1987: 5-6) writes that an essential characteristic
of anthropological research is that it is,
relatively open-minded.., there Is a 'dialectical'
relationship between theory and experience of the field.
Initial perceptions are essentially guided by theoretical
expectations, but these in turn will develop, and be
altered by field experience.
As I have shown, this thesis has evolved as the result of long and
quite painful dialectic between theory and experience. Jenkins
(1983: 22) describes 'the interaction between researcher and subject'
In anthropological fieldwork as involving a 'potent de-stabilisation
of the taken-for-granted conventional wisdom of the social
scientist'; this has also being my experience of doing research. As
we have seen, Donning and McFarlane (1983: 110) characterIse the
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anthropological literature on Northern Ireland as being concerned
with 'informal relations which exist between Catholic and
Protestants'; Harris (1987: 5) describes the 'informal and the
unintended'	 as the 'twin areas of particular anthropological
concern. ' I would not agree that these are defining features of
anthropological work, but it is true that once one adopts an approach
in which priority is given to understanding what actors say about
their actions and predicaments, then, the informal and the unintended
do, as will become apparent in this case, assume considerable
importance.
I wish to make one final point in this section. Although I
locate my study within the problematic of structuring, and use
insights made by several of its exponents, I do not intend to
advocate any one of the general theories proposed by them. The
dilemma of human agency is an age old problem, but the problematic of
structuring is a comparatively new departure and a variety of
divergent theories and methods have been elaborated (cf Ortner, 1984:
127 and Abrams 1982: vii). Moreover, although Bourdieu and Giddens -
the two most prominent advocates of the problematic of structuring -
set out to transcend the old oppositions between subject and object,
action and structure, they ultimately fail in their own terms: as
Jenkins points out (1983: 5 and 11-12) both tend to reify social
structure, Indeed, Marx (1959: 109) may well have been correct when
he suggested that these oppositions can never be adequately resolved
in the realm of abstract thought, and, perhaps, the best that can be
achieved within social science is, as Abrams argues (1982: xv), to
recognise that individuals and society constitute each other
historically.
1.5 Methodological Issues
The main research technique employed in this project was the in-
depth semi-structured interview. In the last section I explained, in
practical terms, how I first began using this technique in the course
of my field work. Altogether I interviewed 35 people: 11 trade union
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officials, 5 male shirt cutters, 	 12 women shirtmakers, and 7
managers; I met and had, often quite lengthy, conversations with many
more shirt workers, trade unionists, and political activists. 	 From
this 35 I constructed a sample of 11 retired union officials and
activists whom I interviewed in more detail (see appendix 1). Much
of the empirical material presented in this thesis is derived from
the recollections of the 11 people who constituted my sample, but
there is a sense in which all the interviews and conversations which
I conducted in the course of my fieldwork contributed to this thesis,
and, on a few appropriate occasions, I refer to, or quote from an
interview or conversation with someone who was not part my sample.
The use of interviews in social and historical analysis (ie oral
history) is not unproblematic. In this section I want to examine
some of the problems with the technique and discuss how I constructed
my sample in such a way as to minimise them.	 There are two main
problems.	 First, there is the problem of the relationship between
what respondants say about a particular event during an interview and
what actually happened. For example, Donning and McFarlane (1983:
110) advocate participant observation as research strategy in
preference to interviews because,
attitudes and actions are not in any simple relationship
with one another: not only do they interact but they often
seem to be in apparent contradiction with one another,
and as a participant observer one can study what people do as well as
what they say. Historians, committed to their discipline's
traditional stress on documentary sources, have made a similar kind
of criticism of oral history. They argue that recollections elicited
in the present cannot give an accurate picture of past events and
behaviour because such recollections are suseptible to distortion due
to the fallibility of memory and the influence of subsequent changes
in social values or norms, or of subsequent experiences, on a
respondant's perceptions (cf Popular Memory Group, 1982: 223-224). A
second problem with the use of interviews in historical and social
analysis is that of the selection of respondants: how can one make
analytical statements about events or social patterns on the basis of
interviews with a small number of people who may be untypical or
unrepresentative? I will consider each of these problems in turn,
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looking at how other social researchers and oral historians have
dealt with them and then elaborating my own response.
Paul Thompson, one of the leading exponents of oral history, has
responded to the arguments about memory lapse and retrospective re-
assessment in the following way. He argues (1978: 100) that al].
historical sources - including the documents used by traditional
historians - are biased in the same way as an interviewee's
recollections:
newspapers, court hearings, Royal Commission interviews or
committee minutes... are also retrospective. Neither
contemporary nor historical evidence is a direct reflection
of physical facts or behaviour.	 Facts and events are
reported in a way whch gives them social meaning.
Moreover, according to the findings of social psychologists and
gerontologists, memory Is relatively reliable and constant over long
periods of time, Finally he argues (1978: 112) that it is not
difficult to identify retrospective assessments in 'the ordinary
life-story in western societies' (as opposed to the formal and
stylised oral traditoris of some tribal societies): 'it is often quite
conscious, and when it is not may be identified through the
anachronism with with it Is conveyed.'
It seems to me that Thompson's arguments are valid and
convincing; however, using insights dervived from Giddens's theory of
'structuration' it is possible to make a stronger case for the
validity of knowledge gained about the past through interviews
conducted in the present. Traditional historians tend to eschew
explicit theory, but much of their work is based on an implicit
empiricism (cf Abrams, 1982: xvi) according to which they assume that
there is an objecive world of facts and that the
'source,' the product of a now unchangeable past... provides
the possibility of a knowledge that is objective if it is
honestly and critically interrogated. (Popular Memory
Group, 1982: 221).
This is akin to what Jenkins calls	 (1983:	 10)	 'ojectivist
epistemology' in social science, according to which,
not only is there an objective reality, but that actors'
accounts, folkmodels, are necessarily 'false knowledge', and
that objective reality may only be apprehended in the
analytical models of scientific practice.
Against this, in the theory of structuration, actors' accounts or
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folk models are given central importance; it is recognised that, as
Giddens (1979: 5) argues, 'social agents are knowledgeable about the
social systems which they constitute and reproduce in their action,
that actors 'reflexively monitor their conduct', and that they can,
and routinely do, give reasons for their conduct. However, Giddens
also recognises that
the reasons that actors supply discursively for their
conduct in the course of practical enquiries, in the context
of daily social life, stand in a relation of some tension to
the rationalisation of action as actually embodied within
the stream of conduct of the agent (1979: 57),
and alerts us to various aspects of this tension. Thus there is the
possiblity of 'deliberate dissimulation', the influence of
'unconscious elements of motivation', and, most important from the
perspective of social science, the possiblity that actions can
escape the scope of the purposes of the actor. The
unintended consequences of action are of central importance
to social theory insofar as they are systematically
incorporated within the process of reproduction of
institutions. (1979: 59).
In this context, to paraphrase the Popular Memory Group (1982:
226), the problems, insuperable difficulties, and closures adduced by
traditional historians and empiricist social scientists become,
respectively, a resource, an agendum, and a starting point. I did
not interview people with the aim of 'finding out' absolute, pre-
given, facts about past events, but so as to understand their views
of situations and the reasons why they acted in particular ways. I
conducted my interviews such that silences, contradictions, and
retrospective assessments, could be identified and learnt from.
Thus, I interviewed virtually all of my sample of 11 respondants more
than once, and I covered the same ground from different perspectives
in the second (and in some cases the third, fourth, arid fifth)
interviews which were usually separated by an interval of several
months. However, it is not possible to discern contradictions and
silences simply through checking interviews for internal consistency.
I compared each respondant's recollections with those of the others
in my sample, and all of them were compared with the documentary
record. Thompson (1978: 178) distinguishes 'three ways in which oral
history can be put together': 'the single life-story narrative'; a
collection of life-histories used to illucidate a theme such as
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family life, or portray a particular community or social group; and
cross-analysis: the oral evidence is treated as a quarry to
construct an argument. .. wherever the prime aim becomes
analysis, the overall shape can nolonger be governed by the
life-story form of evidence, but must emerge from the inner
logic of the argument. This will require much briefer
quotations, with evidence from one interview compared with
that from another. Usually.., only a bare context for each
quotation can be provided. (1978: 204-205).
The latter comes closest to describing my project: I did not
interview people wih a view to constructing an analysis of individual
careers, rather, I intended to use my interview material to elaborate
an anlaysis of particular events and processes in the development of
a set of institutions. However, to interpret the meaning of
silences, contradictions and retrospective re-assessments it is
necessary to analyse particular recollections in relation to each
respondant's biography and their present situation. Thus, although
my Interviews were planned with the intention of elicitng knowledge
about particular aspects of my respondants' identities - their
religious and political affiliations and those aspects of their
experience pertinent to the events and processes in which I was most
interested - I also questioned them about broader aspects of their
biography: their parents, schooling, work history, residence, marital
status and family life. My interviews were structured, but not so
structured as to prevent respondants from pursuing aspects of their
life which they thought important. As Thompson point out, it Is not
always practicable to contextualise every quotation as it appears in
the text, and for this reason I have included appendix 1 giving the
biographical details of each of my respondants. By following these
procedures it was possible for me - arid hopefully for the reader - to
develop a fairly rounded view of each of the dramatis personae in
this history, and to locate what each of them told me in the context
of their broader life history and of their current situation. It
should also ally the anthropologist's suspicion of the use of
quotations as 'apt illustrations.., that simply confirm an author's
argument. ' (Harris 1987: 4).
The second problem concerns the representativeness of
respondarits.	 The procedure which I have described above is lengthy
and time consuming,	 and that means that only a relatively small
number of people can be interviewed; how does one know if they are
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typical or representative? A related problem is: how can one use the
experiences 'of a few individuals to make more general statements
about institutions, broader social patterns and processes? Paul
Thompson (1978), the Popular Memory Group (1982), and, it may be
remembered from section 1.3, Roiston and Munck (1987) all supply
different answers to these questions. I will consider each of these
befo-e describing my own approach, but first it is important to
further clarify what is meant and, more importantly, not meant by the
insistence on according central importance to actors' acounts. It
does not mean that the only valid explanations are those given by
actors (in anthropological parlance ernic explanations), but that, in
Jenkins's words (1979: 10),
folk models and analytical models must be given
epistemological equality.., both are essentially oriented
towards similar ends: the practical investment of perceived
reality with meaning.., equality does not, however, mean
that they are the same... analytical models... [are] capable
of making more sense of social reality.., for a number of
reasons: analytical models may be capable of accommodating
the contradictions between conflicting folk models, [and]
social analysts may have access to a broader body of
knowledge than their research subjects.
Sociologists overcome the problem of the representativeness of
respondants by sampling a given population or group at random.
Thompson points out (1978: 122) that this is not practicable for the
oral historian: random sampling depends on the availability of a full
list of the people who compose a particular population, an electoral
register for example, and this is rarely available for populations or
groups which existed in the past. And even if it was possible to
survey a past population at random, such a survey would probably
distort the past and yield material of an intrinsically lower
quality: 'some of the best potential informants will be missed, and
others often less willing will be choosen in their place.' He argues
(1978: 128) that
to meet the various problems raised by retrospective
representativeness, the oral historian needs to develop,
rather than the standardised random battery sample, a method
of strategic sampling.
Strategic sampling can take various forms depending on the nature of
the problem being studied, but it involves ensuring that a sample
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includes people from all the significant social strata of a
particular population, or all the organisations involved in an event.
The Popular Memory Group tend to dismiss Thompson's efforts at
sampling as an unfortunate response to the criticisms of oral history
made by traditional historians. They argue that all that is required
to enable an oral historian to make inferences about broader social
patterns is
the presence of sources of relevant knowledge other than the
[respondant's] account itself... and the presence of some
explicit and productive theory of social relations and forms
of consciousness. (1982: 227).
The theory which they suggest Involves what I have argued in this
chapter: namely, the recognition that
Marxism has always contained within it both a stress on
human individuality as a socially produced phenomenon and a
recognition that our constitution within social relations is
an active process of which we may become conscious and over
which we may engage in struggles of a collective kind.
(1982: 235).
Armed with such a theory, it is possible for an oral historian 'to
see the representative elements of individual life histories as part
of a more general history' (1982: 234), Munck and Roiston (1987)
solve the problem of the representativeness of respondants and of
bridging the gap between private narratives and large scale social
processes by attempting a form of strategic sampling, and, as I have
shown, by asserting that
we believe in the social determination of the individual so
that our respondants would be part of a broader social flow
whatever personal characteristics might be displayed. (1987:
13)
The inadequacy of the latter formula is implicitly acknowledged in a
confused 'Afterword on Ideology' where Munck writes (1987: 202):
Our oral history testimonies are not simple records of past
events but complex cultural products involving still
untheorised (my emphasis] relations between the 'private'
and the political, the past and the present. We must seek
the 'matrix of meaning' within a discursive formation, the
system of social/psychological/subconscious relationships
which make sense of our experience.
I agree with the Popular Memory Group that, armed with a theory
In which actors are seen as both constituting and constituted by
social relations, and with access to other sources of knowledge, It
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is often possible to gain an understanding of wider social and
institutional patterns from a single life history, but I also found
that it was crucial to attempt a form of strategic sampling. I will
specify the 'additional sources of knowledge' in a moment but first I
want to discuss the form that my strategic sampling took. Given that
I was interested in finding out the reasons why, at particular
junctures, some shirt workers joined one of the three unions which
organised in the Derry shirt industry in preference to the other two,
and in tracing the development of each of these organisations, it was
important that I interviewed people who were members of the various
organisations at particular times. Obviously, it was not possible to
interview each and every member of the three different organisations
during the last 60 years, nor, f or the same reasons adduced by
Thompson, was it possible, or desireable, to sample at random the
shirt workers who were members of each of these organisations during
the period with which I was concerned. The 'snow balling' strategy -
conducting follow-up interviews with a particular respondent's
friends - which I had used in my first round of interviews was also
Inadequate for my purposes as it tends to limit one's sample to the
social networks of a few individuals. I decided, therefore, to
construct a sample of respondants who had been officials of, or
activists in, each of the unions which organised in the shirt
industry during the period with which I was concerned, and who had
had experience of the secessionary movements mentioned above. I was
also careful to ensure that my sample included Protestants and
Catholics, and men and women.	 Altogether, as I indicated at the
beginning of this section, my strategic sample included 11 people.
The construction of the sample was facilitated by the existence
of four 'other sources of knowledge': the reports of Branch activity
in local newspapers and in union journals, the minutes of the Derry
Branch of the NUTGW 1924-1926, and the minutes of the Shirt Cutters'
Committee of the ATGWU 1950-1951. Using these I was able to
construct a list of the officials and main activists in each union.
As it turned out, I was unable to interview every person on my list:
some were dead, some were unwilling to be interviewed, and in other
cases It was not possible, for various reasons, to conduct a full
Interview, This gave rise to a few lacunae in my sample, but I was,
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for the most part, able to fill these gaps by asking each of my
respondents to name people who were actively involved in a particular
organisatiori at a particular time.	 My decision to focus on union
officials and activists was undoubtedly influenced by the
(comparative) ease of constructing a sample, but it can be justified
on other grounds: activists and officials are the people whose
actions contributed most to the production and reproduction of the
unions; by virtue of their positions they were likely to be more
knowledgeable about their union and about events in its history than
the ordinary member; and they were also more likely to be interested
in the subject than the ordinary member - as Thompson (1978: 130)
points out a person who is interested in a subject usually has more
reliable memory of it. However, although most of my main
respondants were activists or officials, I also take into account the
views of a few ordinary union members and one or two non-trade
unionists. These include some of the people whom I contacted during
my first round of interviews, and people who I 'caine across' by
accident in the course of the 12 months which I spent in Derry, or
during one of my many subsequent visits.
Access to the additional sources of knowledge specified above
undoubtedly made it easier for me to relate individual experiences to
larger events and processes, and to wider social relations and
patterns. Thus, particular events and processes are analysed not
just from the - often contradictory - perspectives of my respondants,
but in relation to reports of local union activity in the minutes of
the Derry Branch of the NUTGW, in local newspapers, and union
journals. These additional sources enabled me to make
generalisations which would not otherwise have been possible; for
example, starting with lists of the names of Branch Committee members
derived from the NUTGW minutes and, then, asking respondants about
each of the named individuals it was possible to discern patterns in
the sexual and religious composition of Committees and the marital
status Committee members over a period of 44 years. Indeed, these
additional sources of information where crucial at every stage of my
project, not just in the construction of a sample and the
interpretation of recollections, but in the framing of questions to
be asked.	 So much so that I have been able to construct a more
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detailed analysis of the NUTGW than for the other two organisations;
hence the subtitle of my thesis - 'with special reference to the
NUTGW.
Some anthropologists and sociologists have suggested that
Northern Ireland poses a particular problem for researchers. For
example, Donning and McFarlane suggest (1983: 135):
it is perfectly reasonable to conjecture that the tolerance
and harmony to be found in many reports [about Northern
Ireland] is simply the product of using interviews more than
any other research tool. Everyone in Northern Ireland knows
that few people are willing to be frank and open about their
strong opposition to the other side, especially to seemingly
educated researchers.
And Munck and Rolston (1987: 110) found that a common response to
questions about sectarianism in the workplace was 'simply to deny
that there was any.' There are really two problems here: the first
is the problem of persuading respondents to talk about sectarianism;
the second concerns the verisimilitude of what they say. The latter
problem is susceptible to the same arguments and procedures which I
discussed above, and requires no further elaboration. But what about
the problem of persuading people to talk about sectarianism in the
first place? Donning and McFarlane and Munck and Roiston are
undoubtedly correct: it is not easy to get people in Northern Ireland
to talk frankly about sectarianism. I suspect that this applies as
much to local researchers as to their interviewees: I initially found
it extremely difficult to broach the subject with respondents.
Ultimately, however, the problem of getting Northern Irish people to
talk about sectarianism seems to be little different than that of
getting people anywhere to talk about sensitive or controversial
issues, and, as such, can be overcome by the development of skills
and techniques which researchers elsewhere have developed.
	
I will
briefly describe my own experience.
Part of my own early inhibitions about posing questions to do
with sectarianism were that I did not feel that I had a legitimate
(in the eyes of my respondants) position from which to be asking such
sensitive and personal questions. As Benney and Hughes (1956: 241)
note:
Anthropologists have long realised.. . that it is not until
they have been in the society long enough to fit into one of
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its better-defined roles that they can 'tap' a valid
communication system and hear the kind of messages that the
others in the culture hear.
I found it difficult to fit into a role which I could live with and
which would have enabled me to 'tap' knowledge about the present
state of Catholic-Protestant relations in the shirt industry and
local labour movement. I am not quite sure why this was, but, as I
have already mentioned, I am sure that it had something to do with
the general political situation in Northern Ireland in the early
1980s; moreover, I found a few individuals, members of a particular
left-wing faction, who were prominent in the local labour movement at
the time to be hostile and exclusive. In relation to past events,
however, I was able to find a role which both made me feel
comfortable in asking questions, and my respondants comfortable about
replying to them: I became involved in various adult education
projects as a teacher of local labour history. My part in organising
the 1985 annual conference of the Irish Labour History Society (ILHS)
in Derry was one aspect of this role which I found both particularly
satisfying and particularly useful.
Various exponents of the interview technique stress that however
transient and artificial, an effective interview is also a social
relationship in which the interviewer and interviewee talk as social
equals (eg Beriney and Hughes, 1956: 239 and Thompson 1978: 178).
Equality means treating the interviewee with respect and
understanding; it also means not coercing a person to give an
interview in the first place or to diviuge information which they do
not wish to divulge. In any case, it can be safely assumed that the
more freely information is given the more valid it is likely to be
(cf Benney and Hughes, 1983: 237). I usually made my first approach
to respondants by a letter in which I briefly explained that I was
interested in the history of trade unionism in the shirt industry,
and that I was keen to speak to them. It was usually possible make
the detailed arrangements for each interview on the phone. This
process was made much easier if I could cite a mutual friend or
acquaintance who had recommended the respondant to me. I found that,
In most cases, the best place to conduct the interview was in the
respondant's home: this is generally were people feel most at ease,
and with retired people it was usually the most convenient (cf
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Thompson, 1978: 174). The question of whether or not to tape-record
interview was a problem. One of the first people whom I interviewed
seriously expressed the desire not to be tape-recorded. For a
while after this I thought it better not to tape-record respondants
for fear that it would inhibit them, but I found that I did not feel
sufficiently confident about material which I had memorised or noted
during an interview and copied-up afterwards. I subsequently made it
a practice to ask all respondants if they were willing to be tape-
recorded; none refused, and if there was any part of the interview
which they did not wish to be recorded it was a simple matter to turn
the machine off. Some respondants had no inhibitions about
discussing sectarian issues, Indeed, a few raised the subject
themselves; however, in general I found that people were more
forthcoming in the second or third Interviews. Undoubtedly, this was
a question of my respondants and myself getting to know each other
better: although I attempted to empathise with each of my
respondants' particular opinions, I never masked my own identity.
Moreover, as Thompson says (1978: 180) 'you need to give a little of
yourself' in an Interview, and once the interview was over and the
tape-recorder switched off I, like him, often found myself being
given tea,	 sandwiches,	 cakes,	 and engaging in wide-ranging
conversations, There were few people with whom I was unable to
establish a rapport, but If someone preferred not to be Interviewed
or not to talk about a particular subject I did not force It.
1.6 Conclusion
There Is a widely held belief - promulgated mainly, and
certainly most coherently, by traditional Irish marxists - that trade
unionism in Northern Ireland has been thwarted by sectarianism within
the working class; however, with the partial exception of Belfast in
the period before 1920, there are very few studies of the effect of
sectarianism on the development of particular unions. My thesis is
such a study; the unions concerned are those which organised in the
Derry shirt industry between 1920 and 1968. I will use this case
study to call into question the general validity of many of the
(LONDIN
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assertions which have been made about the relationship between
sectarianism and trade unionism. It seems to me that the difficulty
with these assertions is not simply that they are based on limited
evidence, but that, particularly in the case of traditional Irish
marxists, they are rooted in evolutionist and reductionist views of
social reality. I will argue that to understand the effect of
sectarianism on trade unionism it is necessary, first, to recognise
that unions, as all other social institutions, are created and re-
created by actual individuals and, second, to take account of the
meanings which those individuals attach to their situations and the
intentions which they ascribe to their actions.
This kind	 of approach involves an attempt to assess the
causal significance of sectarianism as one factor among many. In
identifying the factors which affected the development of trade
unionism in the Derry shirt industry I have been mindful not only of
my respondents' recollections and experiences but also of studies of
trade unionism and industrial relations in Britain. However, I do
not systematically seek to examine my material in relation to
mainstream British writing on trade unionism and industrial
relations. First, because the problem with which I am concerned is
not one which has exercised many British scholars. Second, because,
much of the literature on trade unionism and industrial relations in
Britain is based on theoretical assumptions which I do not share.
Apart from empiricism, the most infuential theory underpinning
studies of British industrial relations is that elaborated by Dunlop
(1958) and subsequently developed by Flanders (1965). Dunlop's
theory of the 'industrial relations system' is based on Parsonian
sociology, and Dunlop shares his mentor' s tendency to reduce human
agency to the mere enactment of rules. Following Dunlop, Flanders
defined the study of industrial relations as 'the study of the
institutions of job regulation' (1965: 10), and, as Hymen points out
(1979: 13), this led to a strong tendency towards reification in the
literature: a focus on the formal or Institutionalised aspects of
industrial relations to the exclusion of informal processes and
concrete individuals. This began to change following the publication
of the Royal Commission on Trade unions and Employers' Associations
(Donovan,	 1968) which highlighted the importance of informal
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relationships in British industrial relations. And recently, as
Watson (1988: 7) has noted, there has been a growing recognition of
'the need to pay more attention to the individuals who "people" the
industrial relations system.' Thus, although I do not systematically
seek to examine my material in relation to mainstream industrial
relations theory, my approach is consistent with, and an addition to,
an emerging school of though? within the discipline. Moreover, I
have found a few debates about trade unionism in Britain especially
illuminating - those relating to gender, union government, and
breakaway unions, for example - and, when appropriate, I will seek to
use my material to comment on these.
I have found it useful to make an analytical distinction between
trade unionism and socialism and to divorce the question of the
effect of sectarianism on trade unionism from the question of the
production and reproduction of Northern Ireland's sectarian political
system wherein most Protestant workers vote Unionist and most
Catholic workers vote nationalist. In practice, however, several of
the trade union officials whom I interviewed were also prominent
labour politicians, and as part of my conclusions I will attempt to
use the material presented in the course of this thesis to say
something about the nature of sectarianism and about the relationship
between Unionism, nationalism, socialism, and progressive politics
in Northern Ireland.
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CHAPTER 2: DERRY/LONDONDERRY ANI) ITS SHIRT INDUSTRY
2. 1 Introduction
My thesis is first and foremost an anthropological contribution
to a debate about sectarianism and trade unionism in Northern
Ireland, but it also has an intrinsic historical value: Derry is not
just another Northern Irish provincial town, it is Northern Ireland's
second city and a place of considerable symbolic significance, and
shirtmaking was, for many years, its staple industry. My purpose in
this chapter is to locate my study of trade unionism in the Derry
shirt industry in time and space, as it were. Chronologically, my
thesis is defined by the years 1920 and 1968; I did not choose these
years arbitrarily: they were turning points in the history of Derry -
indeed, of Ireland as a whole - and they delimit a specific period.
In section 2,2 of this chapter I will explain the importance of the
years 1920 and 1968 and describe relations between Derry's Protestant
and Catholic communities during the years in between. In doing so I
will show how the city came to have a symbolic significance, not just
within Ireland but further afield. In the section 2.3 I will examine
the origins and early development of the shirt industry and discuss
its social and economic importance to the city. In section 2.4 I
will present a preliminary analysis of the religious and political
composition of the shirt industry.
Notwithstanding the argument of the previous chapter I will not
attempt to discuss Derry society as it was produced and reproduced by
concrete individuals, 	 Rather I will identify some of the main
institutional patterns of life in Derry, and discuss their form and
how they relate one to another in abstraction from their production
and reproduction. The discussion presented in this chapter, although
it owes alot to the knowledge I acquired during the time I spent
living in Derry and to the conversations which I had with the people
I met there, is - necessarily - based mainly on secondary sources and
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my own study of local newspapers and government statistics. This
mode of exposition is dictated by practical necessity: it would not
be possible to discern the overall pattern of relations between
Catholics and Protestants in Derry, or to trace the history of local
politics or of the shirt industry on the basis of my sample of
respondants (they were choosen because they were officials or
activists in particular trade unions, not because they were
representative of the different strands in local political opinion).
However, it can be justified on theoretical grounds: in the previous
chapter I argued that to begin to comprehend the question of the
effect of sectarianism on trade unionism it was useful and valid to
distinguish it from the question of the origins of sectarianism, and
from the question of why Protestant and Catholic workers have tended
to vote for socially conservative Unionist and nationalist parties
rather than progressive socialist ones. Moreover, it is consistent
with Giddens's (1979: 80 and 95) 'methodological tactic' of opting
for 'institutional analysis' rather than 'strategic conduct.'
22 Doire, Derry, Londonderry
Several events combined to make 1920 a momentous year in the
history of Derry and of Ireland. It was the year that the
legislative framework for the partition of Ireland was introduced.
It was the year when, for the first time, nationalists won control of
Derry Corporation. And it was a year in which relations between the
Catholic and Protestant communities in Derry degenerated to a point
just short of civil war. Catholics had constituted a majority of the
city's population since the middle of the nineteenth century: in 1871
there were 13,821 Catholics to 11,421 Protestants (Curran, 1986: 5),
and in 1920 56.2% of the city's population was Catholic (Farrell,
1980: 24). Protestants had retained control of the Corporation until
1920 because the franchise was restricted to people who owned
property valued at more than £10, and through a manipulation of
electoral ward boundaries which was introduced in 1896 (Curran, 1986:
6).	 Irish nationalists won a majority of Council seats In 1920
because the election had been conducted under proportional
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representation. By voting nationalist, the majority of the city's
population had expressed a desire for the city to be part of what was
to become known as the Free State. However, when partition came into
effect in June 1921, Derry was included within the boundary of the
new state of Northern Ireland; this was confirmed by the Boundary
Commission in 1925.
In 1922 the Unionist dominated Parliament of Northern Ireland
(later to become known as Stormont) abolished proportional
representation, and in the next local government election, held in
1923, the exclusively Protestant Unionist Party regained control of
the Corporation. The Party was to retain control until February 1969
despite an ever increasing Catholic majority; in 1950, for example,
62% of the city's population was Catholic (Hamilton, 1955: 45), today
it is nearer 70% (Kettle, 12 July 1979). The means by which the
Unionists retained control of the Corporation was a further change in
the electoral wards - the infamous 'gerrymander.' In 1936 the number
of wards was reduced from five to three: the North and Waterside
Wards - with approximately 8,000 Unionist electors - sent 12
representatives to the Council, while the South Ward • - which
contained more voters than the other two wards put together -
returned only 8. The Northern Ireland Minister of Home Affairs
described the situation (in a letter to the Prime Minister of
Northern Ireland) in the following way:
The Derry Unionists find increased difficulty... in getting
suitable people returned to the Corporation and therefore
they are promoting a scheme for the alteration of the wards
and reducing the number of members... I have warned them
that any publicity at the present time or speeches on the
subject would only add to difficulties which I must always
have in dealing with the alteration of wards where the two
Parties are closely effective.., if proper steps are taken
now, I believe Derry can be saved for years to come. (Cited
by Arthur, 1987: 48).
Evidently, Ulster Unionists had a keen desire to retain
political control of Derry.	 This is linked to the city's symbolic
importance. For Unionists the city is Londonderry, built and
fortified by the companies of the City of London between 1609 and
1640, and settled by English and Scottish Protestants who in the
siege of 1689 resisted the Catholic forces of James II and thus
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played an important part in securing the success of the Protestant
plantation of Ulster. The lifting of the siege - the Relief of Derry
- is celebrated every year on the 12 August by the Apprentice Boys,
an organisation similar to, and overlapping with, the Orange Order.
As O'Brien (1974: 141) suggests, 'Northern Ireland lives a siege: the
image of besieged Derry, with the promise of its deliverance, is a
far more poignant symbol for it than the wilted glory of the Boyne.
But Derry also has considerable signficarice for Irish
nationalists. For them Derry originated not in the plantation of the
seventeenth century but in a fifth century monastic settlement
founded by St Columba and called Doire Columbcille (Derry is an
anglicisation of Doire which means oak grove). However, Derry's
significance for Irish nationalists is not so much the dispossession
of the native Irish in the seventeenth century, but as, in the words
of John Hume - the best known of the city's two current MPs,
the living symbol of what they perceived to be wrong in the
Northern Ireland that was created in the 1920s, the place
where the injustices of the unionist state were at their
most blatant. (Foreword to Curran, 1986: 1).
For Catholics the injustice was manifold. Partition was resented not
just because it excluded them from the Irish Free State to which they
had given their allegiance and included them In a state of which they
wanted no part but because of its perceived effect on the city's
economy: the border separated Derry from the hinterland with which it
had previously traded, and threw the city into 'an uneven competition
with Belfast' (Arthur, 1987: 35; cf Curran, 1986: 8-9). Moreover,
the Belfast based Unionist authorities were blamed for the subsequent
lack of industrial development and high male unemployment in the area
(see Curran, 1986: 8-9, and McCann, 1974: 21). In fact, the lack of
male employing industries In Derry - the shirt industry employed
mainly women - was a problem which pre-dated partition. According to
Ireland Industrial and Agricultural
	
(Department of Technical
Instruction for Ireland, 1902: 418):
many of the [shirt] manufacturers complain that they cannot
get a sufficient number of workers. This difficulty is to
some extent inherent in the trade itself, for this reason -
that considerably over 80 per cent of the persons engaged
are females, and It is always difficult to get a large
supply of female labour unless there is work in the
neighbourhood for their male relatives.	 In this respect
Derry compares very unfavourably with Belfast. 	 Belfast is
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indeed singularly fortunate, for whilst women and girls are
employed in the linen trade, the males of the various
families find occupation in the shipbuilding and allied
trades. Derry, on the other hand, though there are
shipyards and railway works, cannot provide work for many
men.
However, although the lack of jobs for men cannot be attributed to
partition, It Is true that Derry's Industrial position deteriorated
In the 1920s: the shipyard shut down in 1924 making 2,000 men
redundant (DS: 21 February 1919), and Watt's distillery closed in
1921 making 200 men redundant (DJ: 13 June 1921). It Is also true
that Derry fared badly under the Northern Ireland government's post-
war policy of attracting new industries to the province. By 1966 217
new firms had been established in the province, but only 20 (9Z) were
located west of the river Bann, and only seven in Derry (Robinson
1967: chapter 5 passim, and Kettle, 12 July 1979). Of these seven
firms the largest employers were Birmingham Sound Reproducers and
DuPont; the latter Is still in production, but the former closed in
1967 making 1,600 men redundant (DJ: 24 January 1967). Many of
Derry's industrial diffculties can be attributed to it's peripheral
position (it is the most westerly city in the United Kingdom), but
local nationalists believed that it was the result of a systematic
policy to encourage Catholic emigration, 'thus helping to neutralise
the natural Increase in the potential Nationalist vote.' (Curran,
1986: 25).
Catholics resented Unionist domination of local government not
just because it denied them power and was undemocratic, but because
of the effects of the gerrymander on housing conditions. These two
issues were inextricably linked. On the one hand the gerrymander of
local government boundaries was contingent on a pre-existing pattern
of religious segregation in housing. On the other hand, the
maintenance of the gerrymander depended on the perpetuation of this
pattern. Derry is bisected by the river Foyle. On the east bank Is
the Waterside, which, as I have already pointed out, is mainly
Protestant.	 On the west bank of the river is the old walled city
centre, the Bogside, Creggan estate, Fountain area, and the Northern
suburbs. The latter developed as a mixed community, and together
with the Fountain area - in which is housed an old established
Protestant working class community - was constituted as the North
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Ward after the 1936 electoral boundary change. The Bogside, situated
just outside the city walls, was the first Catholic settlement to
develop after the plantation, and formed the core of the South Ward
after 1936; the Creggan estate, exclusively Catholic and adjacient to
the Bogside, was built in the early 1950s and became part of the
South Ward. Originally, religious segregation in housing 'reflected
more the impact of history and geography than communal discord'
(Murphy, 1981: 40). By this Murphy means that when Catholics began
to migrate to Derry in the nineteenth century they were not permitted
to live within the walled city, and the Bogside was convenient to
County Donegal whence most of the migrants came. There was some
communal disorder in Derry in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries - I shall examine several examples in the next chapter; but
It true that Derry was much less prone to sectarian rioting than
Belfast (Curran, 1986: 27). There is little doubt that the existing
pattern of religious segregation in housing was perpetuated by the
exigencies of the gerrymander.	 Certainly, it is true that the
Corporation's house building programme did not meet the needs of the
city's growing Catholic population, 	 and that, by the 1950s,
overcrowding in the Catholic South Ward of the city was intense
(Robinson, 1967: 191, and Purdie, 1987: 18). It was widely believed
by Catholics that the Corporation's housing policy was determined by
the need to maintain the existing political balance in the city: to
re-house the expanding Catholic population outside the South Ward
would threaten the Unionist's electoral majority (see the Cameron
Commission, 1969: para 139, and Curran, 1986: 21 and 59).
The Unionist electoral strategy was based not only on the
residential segregation of Catholics and Protestants, but even more
fundamentally on the assumption that the former always voted anti-
Unionist and the latter Unionist. For the most part this assumption
held true: Catholics voted for the Nationalist Party, and Protestants
for the Unionist Party. However, the Nationalists shared the
Unionist's assumption about voting behaviour: they canvassed only
Catholics. McCann (1974: 11) describes his childhood experience as
an election worker for Eddie McAteer - 14? for Foyle 1953-1969 and
leader of the Nationalist Party in Northern Ireland from 1958 - as
fol lows:
Beside every name on the [electoral] register was either an
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orange or a green mark.
	
One was pleased to turn over a
page with a preponderance of orange marks. Such pages were
easily done.	 Orange marks denoted Protestants, and Mr
McAteer did not send polling cards to Protestants.
Thus, Derry in the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s was characterised
by political stalemate. In this situation Catholics saw little hope
of remedying their grievances short of a united Ireland, and this
became their political touch-stone. 	 But McCann (1974: 188) and
Curran (1986: 9) - both of whom grew up in Catholic Derry - describe
a mood of hopelessness and impotence. The Nationalist Party
responded to the abolition of proportional representation in 1922 by
boycotting the Corporation; they returned in the early 1930s, and the
Corporation became the main arena for the airing of Catholic
grievances. Politics became parochial. Given the in-built Unionist
majority of Corporation seats, the Nationalists had little chance of
redress, and, consequently, the debates often degenerated into petty
sectarian wrangles (see Purdie 1987: 6-7, and Murphy, 1981: xiv).
According to McLenaghan (1985), the Nationalist Party in Derry was
not, as scholars often suppose, an exclusively middle class Party,
but its members were cautious about political tactics and
conservative in their social outlook. Only twice did they try more
militant forms of protest: on St Patrick's day in 1951 and 1952 they
organised marches routed through the walled city; on both occasions
the marches were blocked and dispersed by the police (Curran, 1986:
12).
There were forms of political life other than Unionism and
nationalism in Derry during the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s; Sinn
Fein and various brands of labourism were the main ones, but they
were never strong enough to break the stalemate. In the summer of
1920 the IRA had attempted to extend their guerrilla war to Derry,
but they had been out-gunned by the UVF and the British army (Murphy,
1981: 254-255). McCann (1974: 11) notes that there was always a
residual sympathy for Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA, in
the Bogside, but, despite the failure of the Nationalist Party's
tactics, Sinn Fein activists were unable to mobilise much electoral
support. For example, In 1933 the sitting Nationalist MP for Foyle,
Mr McCarroll, was challenged by Sinn Fein, but 'Mr McCarroll with the
solid support of the Clergy had a comfortable victory' (McCann, 1974:
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198). The Catholic Church was very Influential in many aspects of
Derry life (see Murphy, 1981: Ix-xv), and was strongly supportive of
the Nationalist Party; indeed conventions called to select candidates
were usually chaired by the local parish priest (McCann, 1974: 12;
see also Curran, 1986: 13).
	 In 1956 the IRA resumed the 'armed
struggle. ' In the subsequent 'border campaign' several bombs were
set-off in Derry, but the campaign evoked little response from the
Catholic population, and It was called-off in 1962 (Curran, 1986: 15;
McCann, 1974: 213; and Bell, 1979: 333). Socialists fared little
better, but it Is worth examining their political endeavours in more
detail: several of them are among the leading protagonists in the
history of trade unionism in the shirt Industry.
The first labour candidates to contest elections in Derry were
sponsored by the Derry Trades and Labour Council'', The Trades
Council was formed in 1887 by Catholic and Protestant tradesmen
(Murphy, 1981: 172; see also DJ: 9 November 1886, 3 February 1905,
and 4 March 1904). The most prominent member of the local labour
movement in its formative years was a tailor by the name of James
McCarron; as will become apparent (see chapter 3), he played a
significant role in the first attempts to organise shirt workers.
McCarron, like the other members of the Trades Council, placed a high
value on the fact that the Council included Unionists and
nationalists, Protestants and Catholics (DS: 22 September 1890), and
was hesitant about engaging in municipal politics for fear that this
unity be disrupted: for instance, during a discussion about the
municipal election of 1896, McCarron intervened:
the labour movement. .. sould be a power outside politics
altogether. They should be a power within themselves, not
knowing either politics or religion. (DJ: 9 November 1896).
Nevertheless, McCarron permitted himself to be nominated as a
candidate; he claimed that,
I could have been selected as a Nationalist candidate, but
I would never accept a seat from any political party and
will represent workers irrespective of politics or religion
(DJ: 20 November 1896).
McCarron was not successful in 1896, but he was elected as an
alderman in 1901.	 He was joined by another member of the Trades
Council in 1902.	 In 1905, the members of the Trades Council
nominated one of their Protestant colleagues, Sam McGulnness, to
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contest the predominantly Protestant East Ward. This election
illustrates the kind of difficulty which was to beset subsequent
attempts to secure secular labour representation in the Corporation.
McCarron and Doherty faced strong pressure to sign the United Irish
League (UIL) pledge, and McGuinness faced accusations of being a
'stooge' of a nationalist dominated Trades Council which wanted to
split the Unionist vote (DJ: 4 January 1905). McCarron and Doherty
expressed sympathy with UIL but refused to sign their pledge;
McGuinriess appealed to the electors as a 'as a worker and as a
Unionist,' but failed to get elected; however, he said that he would
stand again on the same principles and with the motto 'Derry and No
Surrender' (DJ: 18 January 1905). 	 McGuinness was elected to the
Corporation on a labour ticket in 1906 (McLenaghan 1985).
In the period after the Easter Rising in 1916, Derry Trades
Council, like the ITUC, found it increasingly difficult to avoid
becoming embroiled in the burgeoning national conflict, and the
carefully constructed unity which characterised its early years fell
by the way side. To be sure, the Trades Council, like the ITUC,
distanced itself from Sirin Fein, the Easter Rising, and the
subsequent struggle between the IRA and the British forces but
it opposed conscription in 1918 and supported the general strike in
support of republican prisoners in 1919: in the eyes of Unionists it
became identified with the nationalist cause (cf McCarthy 1977:
chapter 2; Patterson 1980: 106, and see chapter 3 of this thesis).
By 1925, however, the feeling in the Trades Council was that, in the
words of one its members quoted in the Irishman (12 May 1928), 'the
hatchet was buried between Orange and Green', and a new Labour Party
was formed. According to the Irishman (ibid),
The idea of sending a Labour Group to the Derry City
Council was conceived by the Trades and Labour Council
about the end of 1925. From 1923 there had been no popular
representation on this very important public body, the old
Nationalist members refusing to take their seats after the
gerrymandering of the city by the Northern Government
whereby the majority of citizens were placed in a minority.
For several years up till 1926 the representation of the
city was solely in the hands of the property owning class.
The Party contested all wards in the 1926 electIons: the candidates
In the mainly Catholic wards were returned unopposed, but none were
elected in the mainly Protestant wards. The 16 Labour members in the
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Corporation were subject to intense criticism. The local Unionist
paper, the Londonderry Sentinel, referred to them as 'Labour-
Nationalists', a title which seemed to be confirmed when a leading
member of the Party chaired an election meeting for the Nationalist
Party Candidate In County Londonderry. On the other hand the local
nationalist paper, the Derry Journal, referred to them as 'so-called'
or 'fake' Labour and denounced those Labour councillors who attended
a reception for the Duke of Abercorn, a member of the Unionist
establishment (see also DJ: 18 October 1926). When the Nationalist
Party returned to active politics in the early 1930s, none of the
Labour councillors were re-elected.
The labour tradition was kept alive during the 1930s by a small
group of workers and socialist intellectuals.
	 In early 1940s two
rival Labour Parties were formed.
	 One was the Londonderry Labour
Party (LDLP) which was affiliated to the Northern Ireland Labour
Party (NIL?). The LDLP, like the NILP, was neutral on the national
question; however, although its leading members were Protestants, the
LDLP was strongly opposed to the gerrymander 3 '. The other was the
Derry Labour Party (DLP), its leading members were Catholics and they
articulated an anti-partitloriist policy. 	 Both Parties focused their
activities around elections, but neither had much success. The
chairman of the LDLP, Mitchel-Gordon, the son of a shirt
manufacturer, contested the 1945 General election; according to one
of my respondants, George Hamill, who was a member of the DL? at this
time, 'he got a vote of 2,500, he was the only labour man in the
British Isles in 1945 who lost his deposit.' In the June 1945
Stormont election Paddy Fox, chairman of the DL?, challenged the
Nationalist candidate in the Foyle Consituency, and Willie Irwin, a
leading member of the LDLP, challenged the Unionist candidate in the
City Constituency. Neither was elected. Prior to the 1946 Council
elections, Fox entered into an electoral pact with the Nationalist
Party; he succeeded in being elected as a councillor, but the pact
caused two prominent members of the DL? to defect to the LDLP. One
was George Hamill, the other was Stephen McGonagle; both men are
among the main protagonists in this study: the former was appointed
as a full-time ATGWU official in 1950; the latter was appointed local
NUTGW Branch secretary in 1947 and instigated the breakaway in 1952.
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The NILP split in the late 1940s. Tensions had developed
between Unionist and anti-partitionist members of the Party. Some of
the anti-partitionists were expelled in 1948; the remainder left in
1949 when Party policy on the border changed from neutrality to
support for the Union with Britain. The anti-paritionists formed a
Northern Ireland section of the Eire-based Irish Labour Party (IrLP).
McGonagle and Hamill left the LDLP and helped set up a Branch of the
IrLP in Derry. The Branch contested Council elections in 1949,
failed to get any members elected, and faded out. Thereafter, in the
1950s and 1960s, as a veteran labour activist told a friend in a
letter dated 1 October 1962 (UCD p29a/158 (2)), there was no Labour
Party in Derry,
just a small group that [Stephen] McGonagle rnobilises at
election time.	 There is no forward movement, nor does
there appear to be any prospect for the future.
In 1958, and again in 1962, McGonagle challenged the Nationalist
Party leader in the Foyle consituency; in 1958 he was defeated by
6,953 votes to 5,238 (LS: 22 March 1958) and in 1962 he was defeated
by 8,720 votes to 5,476 (LS: 6 June 1962). A common story in Derry
among people who remember these elections is that on polling day
McAteer's election van toured the Bogside broadcasting the claim that
'the Protestants of Belmont are voting for McGonagle,' as McCann
comments, this was 'enough to clinch the matter' (1974: 12). In the
1967 election Seamus Quinn, McGonagle's subordinate within the ITGW1J,
contested the Foyle Constituency; he too was defeated (he received
4,300 votes).
To sum up. Politics in Derry during the period between 1920 and
1960 were characterised by a political stalemate between Unionism and
nationalism. Labour parties with varying religious compositions arid
policies on the border tried and failed to break the deadlock. Given
the importance attached to electoral majorities in Derry, labour
candidates were vulnerable to allegations of splitting the Unionist
or nationalist vote. The various labour parties were also vulnerable
to internal splits caused by differences arising from the salience of
the national question. But these were not the only problems. Labour
candidates were often faced by the allegation that they were
communists. For example, George Hamill recalled an occasion when he
and McGonagle stood on an LDLP ticket against Nationalist Party
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candidates in the South Ward:
I never seen a more vitriolic, a more personal
assassination as the [Derry) Journal carried out against
the ILDLP) candidates just because they happened to be
fighting the Nationalists. They accused us of all sorts of
things from Marxists to Leninites to Trotskyites to having
been subsidised by Moscow. It got that bad... that even my
own father would sometimes hardly look at me!
Needless to say, these allegations were unfounded - the Communist
Party of Ireland never had a branch in Derry - but they were very
damaging: anti-communism was very potent in Ireland in the 1930s,
1940s, and 1950s; no less so in Derry. McCann, for example, writes
(1974: 14):
It was not only in Ireland that the church was
persecuted... The Hungarian rising of 1956 was seen as an
attempt by the Hungarian people to end oppression of the
church. Collections were taken up at masses... communism
was seen as an international movement fanatically seeking
to destroy the church.	 That, one gathered, was what
communism was about... some of this one learned at home,
a].ot of it at school. 	 The church controlled our
eductat ion.
Local newspapers record many occasions on which the Catholic Bishop
warned workers against the dangers of communism and urged them to
ensure that labour organisations were run on christian lines (see DJ:
5 July 1946, 2 May 1955, and 3 May 1957). Protestant church leaders
also warned about the dangers of socialism (see DJ: 10 July 1946).
The political stalemate did, however, begin to breakdown in the
1960s, and, following a demonstration by the Northern Ireland Civil
Rights Association (NICRA) in Derry on 5 October 1968, the city
became the 'crucible' (Purdie, 1987: 1) or 'main arena' (Curran,
1986: 55) of the Civil Rights Movement (CRM). How did this small
city in which politics had hitherto been characterised by stasis,
conservatism, and parochialism become the main host for a new social
movement? Several developments within Northern Ireland in the early
1960s combined to create a degree of common interest between
Catholics and Protestants in Derry. First it became apparent that
the industrial development plans outlined by the new Unionist Prime
Minister, Terence O'Neill, favoured the east of the province rather
than Derry and the north west. In 1964, came the news that two of
Derry's rail links and two of its cross-channel ferries were to be
closed down. Then, in 1965, the Lockwood Report recommended that the
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New University of Ulster be located at Coleraine rather than Derry.
Coleralne Is a small, mainly Protestant, market town In County
Londonderry which had no academic tradition. Derry is Northern
Ireland's second city, and it already had a potential basis for a
university in Magee College. Unionists and nationalists In Derry
were equally aggrieved by this decision, and the Action Committee
which was formed to combat it created an unprecedented degree of
unity. The high point of the campaign was a 'motorcade' of some
25,000 people (Curran, 1986: 33) to Stormont led by Eddie McAteer and
the Unionist Mayor in the latter's official car.
The University campaign failed, but it signalled the emergence
of a new political strand in the Catholic community. It Is best
represented by John Hume who was the chairman of the 'University for
Derry Action Committee.' Hume was teacher who had made a name f or
himself through the local Credit Union. Critical of the Nationalist
Party, he was an advocate of what Curran (1986 p44) describes as 'the
new notion' that,
social problems and the establishment of mutual civil
rights for all the people of the North was a more practical
path than the Nationalist insistence on the removal of the
border, with the resolution of all other issues to be left
until after reunification.
In fact, this was not a completely 'new notion' in the Catholic
community; something like it had long been a central to the politics
of labour men like Hamill, McGonagle, and Quinn. To be sure,
McGonagle was more firmly located within the anti-partitionist camp
than Hume, but in 1949 the former had told a meeting of the IrLP:
you are obsessed with the national question and think if
the border was removed all things would be well. The Anti-
Partition Party Ne the Nationalist Party] say they are not
interested In economic matters, they have used sectarian
catch-cries and have hardened the solidarity of Unionist
workers. The Northern leadership of the Irish Labour Party
Is mainly presbyterian.., you must not continually denounce
the Northern Unionist working class.., even if the border
was removed you would still have your day to day problems.
(DJ: 12 November 1949).
And during his 1958 election campaign against McAteer, McGonagle
said,
if the border disappeared over night and the Unionists
agreed to it we would be presented with problems far more
serious than those existing at present. On the question of
employment, It is not enough to denounce the border. (LS:
- 64 -
18 March 1958).
Nevertheless, whereas McGonagle lost to McAteer, Hume, in the
Stormorit election of 1969, won. What was the difference? This
question can only be answered by reference to developments which took
place in Derry between 1965 and 1969, but it is useful to note two
contrasts.	 Firstly, Hume was not a socialist, and was not, unlike
McGonagle, vulnerable to allegations of communism. Second, all of
the writers who deal with the period stress that during the 1960s a
new constituency emerged within the Catholic community: Catholics
who, as a result of the 1947 Education Act, had received a University
education were coming of age (Curran, 1986: 39; McCann, 1974: 15-17;
Purdie, 1987: 6-7; and Arthur, 1987: 102-103).
During the three years after the University campaign, the
initiative was siezed, not by moderates such as John Hume, but by
left-wing activists (Purdie, 1987: 9). The pioneers of left-wing
protest in Derry in the 1960s were young republicans: after the
failure of the 'border campaign' 1956-1962, the mainstream of the
republican movement had moved away from physical force towards
agitation on social issues (see Bell, 1979: 339-342). The young
republicans had some initial success with a campaign which focused on
the issue of unemployment and Derry's industrial decline, but the
campaign which attracted most attention and support was centred
around the issue of housing.	 'Derry Housing Action Committee'
(DHAC), formed in 1967, was an alliance of young republicans and some
members of the Derry Branch of the NILP.	 The latter is not to be
confused with the older tradition of labourism represented by Hamill,
McGonagle. As we have seen, these two men left the LDLP in 1949
because of its Unionist stance. The Derry Branch of the NILP ceased
to function in the 1950s, and when it was re-established in 1965
McGonagle and Quinn did not re-join. The new Branch of the NILP had
a more left-wing flavour than had previous labour groupings in Derry;
Eamonn McCann, who returned to Derry early in 1968 after several
years in London where he had become a member of the Trotskyist Irish
Workers Group, was to become its most prominent activist. It was the
members of the DRAG who invited the NICRA to march in Derry on 5
October 1968 (Curran, 1986: 79). 	 Five thousand people defied a
Government ban, and participated in the march. The police responded
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violently (Cameron, 1969 para 229: 14), and, later in the day, rioting
ensued in the Bogside.
The success of the young radicals presents something of a
paradox. Anti-communism was, as has been shown, potent in Derry, yet
the members of the DHAC articulated, what Purdie (1987: 26) describes
as, a 'quasi-marxist' rhetoric. The movement for civil rights was
presented in the language of class struggle: Protestant and Catholic
workers were urged to unite against toryism, 'orange' and
'green,' North and South. Purdie (1987 passim) has illuminated this
apparent paradox in a number of ways. He argues that there was never
very many left—wing activists, and that their impact was out of all
proportion to their numbers because they found new methods of protest
which caught the imagination of a much larger group. Despite their
militant rhetoric, the young socialists were merely echoing long
standing grievances among Derry Catholics, and the main target of
their criticism was the traditional target of the Unionist-led
Council. Moreover, the left-wing ideas of the DHAC did not go
unnoticed: its original chairman had been forced to resign following
allegations made by a Nationalist councillor about communist
influence on the Committee (see also DJ: 2 April and 19 November
1968).	 And, shortly after the 5th October demonstration, the
moderates grouped around John Hume regained the initiative from the
radicals.	 This was achieved through the formation of the Derry
Citizens Action Committee (DCAC); Curran (1986: 85) explains:
The new situation presented all the leaders with a large
and looming problem - how to harness the energies and
enthusiasm of the people in a disciplined manner. Unless
the growing spirit of the movement could be harnessed
coherently, mob rule would replace Unionist minority rule.
Clear leadership was essential, and quickly... Eamonn
McCann - who had presided [over the meeting at which the
DCAC was established) - refused to accept membership of the
Committee, and then publicly casitgated it as 'the kiss of
death for the developing radical movement in Derry, middle
class, middle aged, and middle of the road'.
In the months which followed the 5th October, the DCAC organised
a series of demonstrations. Their biggest success was on 15 November
when 15,000-20,000 people marched peacefully through the walled city.
This was a symbolic victory: not only had marches within the city
walls been banned by the Home Secretary, William Craig, but only
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Protestants had been permitted to march there in the past. At the
end of November O'Neill, the Unionist Prime Minister, made a number
of concessions to the protestors: Craig was sacked, and, more
importantly, the hated Derry Corporation was suspended. In response,
NICRA and DCAC 'decided to give O'Neill one last chance and they
declared a "truce" f or one month without marches or demonstrations'
(NICRA, 1979: 15), The truce lasted until 1 January 1969 when the
Peoples Democracy - a student organisation whose leaders, including
Michael Farrell and Bernadette Devlin, shared the same ideas as the
Derry young socialists - set out on a march from Belfast to Derry.
As the organisers expected, the marchers were attacked by extreme
loyalists en route, and their arrival in Derry triggered a police
riot in the Bogside. According to Curran (1986: 108):
this was the weekend which finally shattered Protestant-
Catholic relations in Derry, and crystallized the mutual
hostility between the police and the Catholic community.
Sporadic rioting continued throughout 1969, and on the 12 August the
annual procession of Apprentice Boys was attacked by Catholic youths.
A full-scale battle between police and rioters developed in the
Bogside. It continued through the night and into the next day; the
rioters were getting the upper hand, Then, at five o'clock on the
13 August 1969, British soldiers were deployed on the streets of
Derry; 'at the time', Curran writes (1986: 35), 'it seemed like an
end, but it really was a beginning.'
In actual fact, it was both an end and a beginning: the end of
one era and the beginning of another. I will not attempt to examine
developments in Derry since August 1969: they are not directly
relevant to my thesis, and are so fraught with controversy as to defy
any hasty analysis. However, it is worth delineating some of the
main changes which set off the period 1920-1968 from the one which
followed. One of the dominant features of Northern Ireland in the
1970s and 1980s has been armed conflict, and Derry has suffered the
consequences more than most other places. The main parties to this
conflict have been the various state security forces and the IRA.
The latter is not just a military organisation; it has become a
potent political force. Yet Derry remains a nationalist, rather than
a republican, city: the majority of its inhabitants vote for the
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) which supplanted the old
- 67 -
Nationalist Party. There has also been a re-alignment in Unionist
politics. The Unionist Party fragmented in the wake of the CRM, the
suspension of Stormont, and the imposition of Direct Rule from
Westminster. The Protestant vote is now divided between the Official
Unionist Party and Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party.
Since 1968 there has been an attempt to reform Northern
Ireland's sectarian social structures. The efficacy of reformist
policy is disputed (eg O'Dowd et al, 1980). However, in the case of
Derry there have been some successes. 	 Perhaps the most notable
success has been in housing, but it is also worth pointing out that
local	 government	 is more democratic:	 in	 1973 proportional
representation was introduced for local elections, and since then
Derry City Council has been controlled by the SDLP. 	 In other
respects reform has failed. 	 Many of the new firms which were
attracted to Derry in the early 1970s did not survive the economic
recession, and male unemployment remains very high. Moreover,
Protestants and Catholics in Derry are more divided than ever before.
As John Darby (1983: 9) remarks,
it seems likely that more than 2,000 deaths, including a
number directly resulting from violence between Catholics
and Protestants, could not but have affected relationships
between the two communities.
One of my sample of respondants, George Hamill, recalled his youth
and contrasted it with the present in the following way:
The religious thing, It was in the Guildhall tie the
Corporation] where you had the clashes of the two Parties
and the domination of the Unionist Party; with regard to
any jobs going down there for Catholics, it was just a
stone wall... There weren't a bitterness that's grown up
with this [recent] trouble and the separation [of the two
communities]. The part of town I was reared in was a good
[religious) mixture, and half my play mates and chaps I
knocked about with was of a different religion to my own
and any question of bitterness never occurred to us... Some
of them (Protestants) were not any better off than
ourselves. I knocked about with a Protestant chap, and he
must have been idle for about 10 years... they had a better
chance, a Protestant chap, of getting in somewhere with [ie
if they had) influence... It was difficult for a Protestant
chap to do, especially if the Protestant chap had nothing
to do with the Orange Lodge, or the powers that be, or the
masonic, he [was] a bit ostracized too.
The 'separation' to which George Hamill refers is a physical
separation which has become even more marked than before: Protestants
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have tended to leave their homes in the city and move to the
Waterside, and Catholics tiave moved in the other direction (Kettle,
12 July 1979).
The intensification of communal divisions has meant that
although socialism nolonger attracts the calumny which it once did"
left-wing politics have become even more marginal than before.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that although Derry is nolonger
controlled by the Unionist Party and although most Protestants now
live on the Waterside, the city has retained its symbolic importance
for many Unionists5'.
2.3 The Origins of the Shirt Industry in Derry
I will begin this section by tracing the origins and early
development of shirtmaking in Derry. I will then examine some of the
reasons which have been given to explain Derry's initial pre-eminence
as the main centre of the shirt industry in the United Kingdom.
Lastly, I will give some consideration to the significance of the
industry to the social and economic life of the city.
The origins and early development of the Derry shirt industry
have been much studied (see Scott, 1928; Slade, 1937; Hamilton, 1955;
and Grew, 1987). It is generally agreed that the manufacture of
ready-made shirts was initiated by William Scott, a Derry born linen
weaver. Scott began making shirts for a Glasgow wholesaler in 1831.
His work force was the immediate members of his family. As demand
for his shirts increased, Scott began to employ seamstresses in Derry
and in the surrounding rural area to assemble shirts in their own
homes. This method of production proved effective, and Scott
established outstations in County Donegal and County Londonderry for
the distribution of materials to homeworkers and the collection of
finished garments. In the 1840s a number of entrepreneurs, mostly
Scottish, set up agencies and outstations for the manufacture of
shirts in and around Derry; some of these were the wholesalers to
whom Scott had originally sold his shirts, and they were presumably
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attracted to Derry by Scott's success (Grew, 1987: 35). By 1845
there were approximately 500 female outworkers in Counties Donegal,
Londonderry, and Tyrone (Grew, 1987: 1).
As the outworking system became established, manufacturers built
premises in Derry where the cloth was cut and got ready for
distribution to outstations. This tendency towards centralisation
intensified following the introduction of the sewing machine in 1856,
and several of the Scottish entrepreneurs erected large factory
premises in and around the city centre in the late nineteenth
century.	 But the introduction of the sewing machine did not
immediately result in a complete switch from domestic to factory
production. To be sure, the numbers employed in factory premises
increased, but so too did the number of outworkers: in 1876 the
former numbered between 4,000 and 5,000, and the latter between
12,000 and 15,000 (Grew, 1987: 1). Several tasks in the assembly of
shirts which could not be adequately performed by machines in factory
premises remained In the hands of outworkers, but by the turn of the
century outworking was in decline, and by 1920 there were very few
outworkers (Hamilton, 1955: 16). Grew lists a number of reasons for
the increasing concentration of shirtmaking in factory premises
located in Derry. One reason was improvements in sewing machine
technology; for example, button holing was one task which the early
machines could not do adequately. Another was that with Increasing
competition in the shirt trade the time taken to complete orders
became increasingly important, and it took longer to have shirts made
by outworkers than it did to produce them in the factory (Grew, 1987:
245).	 A third reason was a shift in fashion from white to coloured
shirts. The white shirt was stitched and laundered in the factory,
but assembly was completed by outworkers; with the coloured shirt all
processes could be carried out in the factory (Grew, 1987: 244-245).
By 1914 there were 26 factories in the city (Grew, 1987: 41, Table
No. 32).
Since the introduction and refinement of the sewing machine In
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the shirt
production process has undergone many changes. For the most part,
these changes have not been due to innovation in the machinery used.
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Rather, they have been the result of reorganisations in work methods
and extensions in the division of labour (cf Coyle, 1982: 11). Thus,
prior to the automation of some processes in the late 1970s and
1980s, the most significant changes in the shirt production process
followed the introduction of conveyor belts in the 1930s and the
advent of work study in the late 1940s and 1950s. I will discuss
these and other changes in the production process in detail in
chapters four and five of this thesis; for the moment, it is worth
pointing out that conveyor belts and work study techniques were only
deployed in factories owned by firms manufacturing shirts on a large
scale.
Scholars who have attempted to trace the development of the
Derry shirt industry have immediately run up against a problem: a
dearth of information (see Grew, 1987: 1-8). Most serious from my
point of view is the absence of a series of consistent figures for
the numbers employed in Derry shirt factories during the period with
which I am concerned. The figures published in official reports of
population censuses are limited in two ways: successive reports
classify garment workers in different ways; and they refer only to
shirt workers resident in the city, and therefore exclude workers
resident in County Donegal. These constituted up to 15% of the
workforce in some factories until the Safeguarding of Employment Act
(Northern Ireland) of 1947 Imposed restrictions (Hamilton, 1955: 32).
Shirt manufacturers did not themselves publish employment statistics.
An exception is the figures cited by Grew for 1896 according to which
there was 619 men and 11,662 women employed by Derry based firms
(1987: 43, Table No. 34; see Table 1 in appendix 2 of this thesis).
The Boundary Commissioners of 1925 (6) were also struck by the dearth
of statistics relating to the Derry shirt industry; the chairman of
the Londonderry Shirt Manufacturers' Federation (SMF; founded in
1913), Mr R. P. Harrison, was asked about It, he replied: 'we are
very provincial.., we like keeping our business to ourselves.' He
added that official statistics could not be trusted: 'the Board of
Trade used to collect statistics, but there was no compulsion and you
could not depend on them.' Nevertheless, Harrison was prepared to
tell the Boundary Commission that 8,000 people - '10 per cent' of
whom were male - were employed in Derry's 30 shirt factories In 1925
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and up to ' 15 per cent' more during World War One. These figures are
probably inflated: Hamilton 'A955: 17-18) notes that the 1924 Census
of Production indicates that Derry factories employed only 4,600.
Shirt production was adversely affected by the general economic
depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s though not so much as
other industries (DJ: 19 May 1926). Employment was at a lower level
than it had been during World War One or was to become in the 1940s.
The manager of Londondery Labour Exchange told the Derr y Journal (2
January 1933) that 'atleast 4,000 girls and women found continuous
employment' during 1932. But he added that there had been more
'short-time' working in 1932 than there had been in 1931, and that
many employers preferred this system to laying off a proportion of
the workforce, Short-time working was not restricted to recessions:
demand for shirts was seasonal, and my respondants told me that
during the slack season - January/ February and August/September -
it was common for workers to be put on short-time even in 'good'
years. According to the Garment Worker (GW: February 1934), 1933 was
the best year industrially for atleast five years [in
Derry]. This is due entirely to the improvement in the
shirt trade in which 200 men and 5,000 women are at present
employed in Derry City alone.
No figures are available for the numbers employed in Derry's
factories in the late 1930s and early 1940s, but, the workforce
certainly increased to meet the demands of the armed forces in World
War Two 7 '. Expansion continued throughout the war and was sustained
afterwards: employment in the industry reached a peak in 1951, when,
7,252 workers were employed in 30 factories (Hamilton, 1955: 27).
The industry experienced a 'short, sharp recession' in 1951
(Hamilton, 1955: 18); thereafter shirt manufacture in Derry has been
in a secular decline. 	 By 1961 six factories had closed and the
workforce was down to 5,000 (Guckian, 1963). In 1971, 5,000 workers
still found employment in approximately 25 factories (Belfast and
Northern Ireland Directory), but this was a boom year for the
Industry (LS: 2 June 1971). In the early 1980s between 2,000 and
3,000 workers were employed in 13-15 factories (see also Londonderry
Teachers' centre and North West Archaelogical and Historical Society,
1979: 64).
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In 1871 the 2,229 operatives employed in Derry's 16 factories
constituted 'the greatest concentration of hands in the shirt and
collar industry of the United Kingdom' (Grew, 1987: 114). In 1948,
Derry shared this position with Manchester: each city contained 21%
of the total number of shirt workers in the United Kingdom; the
second largest concentration of shirt workers was in London which had
16% of the total (Hamilton, 1955: 41-42). I now want to consider
some of the factors underlying Derry's position as the main centre of
shirt production in the United Kingdom.
A market for ready-made shirts first developed in the early
nineteenth century; prior to that they were made as required within
the household of the wearer (Hamilton, 1987: 6)°, According to Grew
(1987: 35), William Scott was not the first
to recognise the potential demand for the ready-made shirt.
He was, however, possibly the first to introduce the
production of this garment to Ireland.
Slade, Hamilton, and Grew more or less agree on the factors which
gave Derry an early lead in shirtmaking. First, the growing demand
for ready-made shirts coincided with the demise of linen spinning and
weaving as a domestic industry in the rural areas of the north
west of Ireland and the consequent unemployment of a large number of
women. Second, many women in the north west had acquired stitching
skills through their involvement in the 'sprigging' industry - the
sewing of patterns onto muslim; it too began to decline in the mid-
nineteenth century. It has been claimed (see Hamilton, 1955: 7 and
Slade, 1937: para 1. 1. 4) that the local water gave white shirts a
singular finish, but Grew points out that local manufacturers only
began to launder shirts in 1901; prior to that they had been
laundered in England and Scotland (1987: 204).
As has been shown, the local industry expanded rapidly after the
introduction of the sewing machine. But the sewing machine was also
available for use by manufacturers elswhere; and, indeed, Grew and
Hamilton note that during the 1880s and 1890s Derry lost its markets
in Australia, North America, the East and West Indies because of
local competition and the introduction of tariffs in those countries.
Nevertheless, Derry prevailed against competition in what became its
main market, the United Kingdom and the British Empire (Harrison told
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the Boundary Commission that 98% of shirts produced in Derry were
sold in Britain and Its colonies, and in 1950, according to Hamilton
(1955: 39), 89% of shirts made in Northern Ireland were sold in
Britain, Hamilton: 1955: 39). The major factor which enabled Derry
manufacturers to prevail against their competitors in Britain was
that wages were lower in Derry. Grew writes (1987: 120):
Wages earned in the shirt and underclothing industry of
Ireland in 1906 were lower than those received in England
and Scotland... the low wages accepted by the skilled Irish
female population was an important contributory factor in
the succesful establishment and development of the shirt
industry in this country.
From 1914 minimum wages in the Northern Ireland shirt industry were
determined by the Shirtmaking Trade board, and after 1945 by the
Shirtmaking Wages Council (Northern Ireland); nevertheless, the wages
paid to Northern Irish shirt workers were to remain significantly
lower than shirt workers in the rest of the United Kingdom. In 1915,
following representations from the SMF, the Shirtmaking Trade Board
cut minimum wage rates in the Irish shirt industry and thereby
instituted a wage differential between Britain and Ireland. The
employers' argument was that the wage differential would offset the
the cost of transporting finished garments to British markets, and
thus enable local manufacturers to hold their own against competitors
in Britain who were not burdened with transport costs. For example,
when Mr R, P. Harrison was asked during his interview with the
Boundary Commission in 1925, 'are wages [in the shirt industry]
deliberately fixed to counter balance the cost of transport?' 	 he
replied:
Yes, what happened was when the Trade Board was formed we,
of course, put up our cost. We were handicapped with these
extra charges. We finally got an understanding and a d an
hour less was granted to us, and later increased to d an
hour for wonen, id for men. It was recognised that with
the competition we had to meet it was necessary f or us to
get consideration... our Trade Board met just before the
war... I fancy it [the allowance to the SMF] was in 1915.
The wage differential, and the reasoning which underlay it,
persisted throughout the period covered in this thesis. It remained
a long standing grievance among Derry shirt workers - for example, it
caused the 1920 strike - and I will discuss it further in subsequent
chapters, but, for the moment, it is sufficient to note that Harrison
told the Boundary Commission that the Trade Board's decision was 'a
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very extraordinary thing', that the shirt workforce accepted the wage
cut only 'after a great deal of trouble', and that even now, in 1925,
they were still trying to 'wipe away' the differential with Britain.
The main cause of the decline in the Derry shirt industry in the
late 1950s and 1960s seems to have been the importation to Britain of
cheaper shirts made in Third World countries particularly Hong Kong.
Wages in Derry were lower than British standards, but the wages paid
to shirtmakers in Hong Kong were lower still (Guckian, 1963: passim;
GW: July 1963). Another aspect of the decline of Derry as the
centre for shirt production was the location and re-location of units
of production in rural areas of Counties Londonderry and Down. This
trend could be discerned in the 1950s: Hamilton (1955: 43) notes that
in 1930 only 8% of Northern Ireland's shirt workforce was employed in
areas outside Derry and Belfast; in 1951 the figure was 16.6%. The
trend continued into the 1960s (GW: December 1964).
To conclude this section I want to give some consideration to
the economic, social, and cultural significance of the shirt industry
to Derry. Some of the employment figures mentioned above can be used
to give an indication of Its economic importance: in 1951 when the
population of Derry was less than 50,000 the shirt industry was
employing more than 7,000 people; according to Hamilton (1955: 44),
the shirt workforce constituted approximately 33% of the total number
of economically 'occupied' persons in the city. Indeed, several
scholars have suggested a correlation between the growth of the
city's population in the late nineteenth century and the expansion of
the shirt Industry.	 Grew notes (1987: 126) that in 1864, a shirt
manufacturer commented on the 'large Importation of female labour to
Derry.' Hamilton (1955: 21-22) points out that Derry's population
grew rapidly during the years of the famine, from 15, 196 in 1841 to
19,727 in 1851; increased more slowly between 1851 and 1861; and
increased by 4,000 per decade between 1861 and 1891 - the period when
the shirt industry was becoming increasingly centralised in Derry.
According to Grew (1987: 126-127) most of the migrants came from
Donegal and most were female; for example, the census report for 1911
enumerates 4, 122 female migrants and only 1, 779 males.
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The economic, social, and cultural significance of the shirt
industry was heightened because of the chronic shortage of jobs for
men in Derry.	 According to the figures mentioned above, and all
estimates, only about 107. of the shirt workforce was male. In the
last section it was shown that even in 1902 the shortage of jobs for
men in Derry was evident to commentators; that male unemployment
became even more of a problem during the inter-war period following
the closure of two of the citys largest employers of men -
shipbuilding and distilling; and that comparatively few new
industries located in Derry during the 1950s and 1960s. The contrast
between the large female workforce in the shirt industry and the lack
of jobs for men did not pass unnoticed by social observers of various
kinds, and it came to be widely believed that in Derry women were the
family breadwinners and that their unemployed husbands looked after
the home and the children.
In 1925 a member of the Boundary Commission asked the shirt
manufacturers' representative, Mr R. P. Harrison, the following
quest ion:
It is rather difficult to make out where the men of Derry
find employment.	 You say there are 8,000 persons in the
factories. We arrive at 800 men out of 8,000. With the
shipbuilding industry which employed 1, 200-2, 000 men closed
down, where do men get employment here. Are their families
supported by the earnings of the woman?
Mr Harrison replied:
Certainly, to an extent. There is carting and engineering
and all that sort of thing.
After 1945 the notion that it was common in Derry for women working
in the shirt industry to be the main family breadwinner and for their
unemployed husbands to be responsible for child care and housework
was promulagated by several authors. A good example is an article by
Woodrow Wyatt in the Picture Post (17 December 1955). The subject of
the article is the level of unemployment in Northern Ireland,
something which Wyatt saw as an anomaly in comparison to the
relatively full employment in other regions of the United Kingdom. A
large section of the article is devoted to Derry:
There was not only hopelessness in the air, there was fear.
After unemployment benefit has run out you must switch to
the National Assistance Board... in Londonderry they are
tough. .. it can be cut if the authorities think they are
not looking for work hard enough. But... there are no jobs
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to be had.. . In many families the wife has a few hours work
to do a day. The husband stays at home puts on an apron
and does the cooking and the housework, cleans and baths
the children.
He tried to Interview some of these 'housewife men' for television,
but they were 'alarmed'; one said, 'if my face appeared In a picture
the public assistance people would cut me off because I am not
eligible for work when I'm looking after the home.' One of the
pictures used to illustrate the article showed a young woman:
the only breadwinner in S. Holden' s house... his unmarried
daughter... has worked since she was 14. In this situation
It Is hard for a father to keep his dignity.
Further publications In which the theme of role-reversal in Derry is
stressed include: the Economist (7 January 1964), Jackson (1979,
first edition 1971), and Fraser (1979). Jackson suggests that the
situation resulted in an 'embryo matriarchy', an erosion of 'the
traditional dominance of the male', and that the rioting in Derry in
the late 1960s was, in part, an expression of Derry men's need to
assert their masculinity (1979: 5). The idea was also incorporated
into local anti-Unionist ideology: according to a republican critique
of a report by the Equal Opportunities Commission (AP/RN: 19 November
1984),
The report does not mention once the effects on Nationalist
women and their families of sectarian discrimination, the
essential prop that has maintained British domination of
the six counties. For example, the report omits to point
out that the recent redundancies among women in the
clothing Industry have had particularly severe consequences
in Nationalist Derry, where women working as cheap labour
in the shirt factories have traditionally been the main
breadwinners because of the chronic high unemployment among
Nationalist men.
However, the theme of role-reversal finds its most popular and
sentimental expression in a song written by a Derry born song writer
in the 1970s:
In the early morning the shirt factory horn
Called women from Creggan, the Moor and the Bog
While the men on the dole played a mother's role
Fed the children and then trained the Dog
(Coulter/Mews Music: no date).
To sum up. In the late nineteenth century Derry emerged as the major
centre for shirt and collar manufacture in the United Kingdom.
Scholars have given a number of reasons for the city's pre-emirience
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in this industry, but, from my point of view, the most important one
is that wages were lower than elsewhere in Britain. Throughout the
period covered in this thesis, a remarkably high proportion of the
city's working population was employed in shirtmaklng, and the
industry was of enormous importance to the local economy. Over 90%
of the shirt workforce was female, and this, together with the fact
that jobs for men were scarce in Derry, gave rise to a popular belief
that in many local families it was the women, working the shirt
industry, who were the main breadwinners and the unemployed men who
took responsibility for house work and child care.	 I will explore
this belief further in chapter four.
2.4 The Religious and Political Composition of the Shirt Industry
My purpose in this section is simply to trace the patterns of
religious affiliation among employers and employees In the Derry
shirt industry; however, to do this it Is first necessary to take a
closer look at factory ownership. In what follows, and throughout my
thesis, I refer to two firms by pseudonym, these are: 'McCarthy and
Company' (McCarthy's) and 'Harrison and Company' <Harrison's). I
have done so to preserve the anonymity of respondants who worked in,
and were prominently associated with, the factories owned by these
firms. Many shirt factories in Derry were customarily called after
their original owner or owners and this designation continued even
after a change in ownership; for example, Harrison's was still known
as Harrison' s even after it become part of the British Cotton Mills
Trust in the 1960s, and McCarthy's is still referred to as
'McCarthy's' even though it is now owned by large British-based
transnational company.	 For the sake of consistency, when referring
to the original owners of these two factories I use the pseudynoms
'Mr McCarthy' and 'Mr Harrison.' Customary appellations were also
based on factory locations; for example, the factory which was
established by A. B. Grant was named after the area In which It was
located: Rosemount; similarly the Ebrington factory, built by Young
and Rochester, got its name from a nearby street.	 According to
Messenger (1981: 222-223) the customary names of Belfast's linen
- 78 -
mills followed the same two principles, orignal ownership and
location. In Derry, however, there was another kind of customary
appellation: some factories were called after the brand of shirts
and/or collars which were made in them; examples include the Black
Bear factory, and the Star factory.
The pioneers of the factory production of shirts in Derry were
William Tillie, Peter McIntyre, Mr 3. J. McCarthy, and David
Harrison. The factories established by these men were to remain
among the largest employers In the Derry shirt industry until the
1970s.	 In 1886 there were approximately 16 factories. Tulle and
Henderson employed 4,522; McIntyre, Hogg, and Marsh 2,442; McCarthy
2,350; and Harrison 486. Of the remaining 12 manufacturer s one
employed 495, 5 employed between 200 and 400, and 3 between 100 and
200 (these figures include outworkers and factory operatives, see
Table 1, appendix 2). According to Hamilton (1955: 27) of the 30
factories In production in Derry in 1951, 1 employed 900 workers, 5
employed more than 500, 2 employed between 350 and 400, and 6
employed more than 200; the remaining 16 employed less than 200.
Hamilton writes that he took no account of an additional,
unspecified, number of factories which employed less than 15; these
tended to have an ephemeral existence: they closed down in a
recession and re-opened when demand increased.	 He does not name
individual factories, but I can state, on the basis of respondants'
recollections, that the six firms which he mentions as employing
upwards of 500 workers included those established by William Tulle,
Peter McIntyre, 3.3, Mccarthy, and David Harrison; the other two were
probably the Ebrington factory, and Desmond and Co. On the question
of the ownership of factories in production in 1951, Hamilton writes
that approximately 50% were owned by Derrymen,
but since these are generally the smaller ones they employ
about 25% of the total [number] engaged in the industry in
the city.., the rest [of the factories], which include all
the biggest factories but one, are under the control of
large English or Scottish limited liability companies.
They generally have a head office in Glasgow, Lancashire,
or London. Thus... 75% of the industry (in terms of
employment) is directed by GB [le from Great Britain)...
This is not a recent development, from the beginning the
Scotsmen were the original visionaries, the shareholders,
the directors, and the brains behind the industry. 	 The
Irish, in the main, provided only the workers. (1955: 29).
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The last sentence has an unfortunate tone, but an examination of
the company records of several of the shirt firms in Derry tends to
support Hamilton's assertion about ownership and control: Tulle and
Henderson; McIntyre, Hogg, Marsh; and Young and Rochester all became
limited liability companies in 1908; McCarthy's became a limited
liability company in 1911 (see PRONI T.3377/1, and Companies
Registration Office files: 97,241, 96,651, and 113,864).
Nevertheless, it would seem that many of Derry's shirtmaking
companies - large and small - retained something of the character of
family firms well into the twentieth century.	 For example, the
immediate descendants of William Tillie retained control of Tillie
and Henderson until 1926 (PRONI 1.337/1); an immediate member of the
McCarthy family retained a significant interest in McCarthy's until
his death In 1967, and a Mr Morrish, whose father had married into
the McCarthy family, was chairman of the company until 1962
(McCarthy's and Company, 1972, and Companies Registration Office
file: 113,864); the grand nephew of Mr R. P. Harrison was managing
director of Harrison's until the early 1960's; Desmond's was, and
still is, owned and by members of the Desmond family (LS: 9 July
1969); and a smaller, but well known firm, Hamilton and Sons was
managed by the great grandson of the founder until the mid 1980s. In
the 1950s and 1960s most of the old established firms were gradually
acquired by large, British based, transnational clothing and textile
companies (GW: April 1965). McCarthy's, and Harrison's, were taken
over by the Viyella group In 1968; Viyella acquired the Ebrington
factory in 1971 (AP/RN 26 November 1981); and, McIntyre, Hogg, Marsh,
and Company is now part of the Tootal group.
Most shirt manufacturers were Protestants, Certainly, of those
firms which employed more than 500 in 1951, only one was owned by
Catholic family, that was Desmond's. Historically, however, the
commitment of shirt manufacturers to local Unionism was uneven. Most
of the original pioneers of factory production were, as we have seen,
Scottish. They were Presbyterians who did not easily fit into the
mainly Episcopalian and land-owning ruling class of late nineteenth
century Derry. In the 1860s they supported an evangelical brand of
Presbyterianism and helped to establish a Presbyterian City Mission.
Religious opposition to Episcopalianism became political opposition
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to toryism: members of the Mission were instrumental in the formation
of a Liberal Party in Derry in 1865, and in the development of an
electoral alliance with local Cathlolics. The alliance was
successful for a time, but began to breakdown in the 1870s (Murphy,
1981: 112-128). Nevertheless, David Harrison of Harrison and Company
stood as a Liberal candidate in Derry in the 1880 general election,
and as the Home Rule candidate in the 1913 general election (Murphy,
1981: 128 and 179). The Derry Journal (9 November 1908, cited in
Grew, 1987: 166) noted that shirt manufacturers had been criticised
for not subscribing to the Londonderry Unionist Association, and that
they had been described as 'squatters and settlers' and 'rotten
Presbyterians', traditionally a 'rotten prod' is one who defaults
from the Unionist position.
Despite this early radicalism, all but a few small shirt firms
owned by local Catholics were conforming to the Unionist position by
1925. This is clearly revealed in the SMF's submission to the
Boundary Commission. The SMF's written statement expressed alarm at
any suggestion of interference with the boundary of County
Londonderry so as to remove the city from the jurisdiction of
Northern Ireland to that of the Free State. The statement was signed
by the 25 firms listed in Table 2 (appendix 2), and followed the
appearance of Mr R. P. Harrison (son of the Harrison who had been a
Home Rule candidate in 1913) and Mr J. 3. McCarthy as witnesses
before the Commission. Both men also made individual written
statements. Mr R. P. Harrison argued that his concern with the
boundary was an expression of his business interests rather than of
his religion or politics: he refused to respond to representations to
the Boundary Commission made by nationalists because these were,
almost exclusively confined to the religious and political
aspects of the question. In common with other shirt and
collar manufacturers I am interested in my particular
business... I state... that any such transfer Lof Derry
into the Free State] would not only seriously interfere
with that industry, but probably drive it out of Ireland
entirely.
However, when he was cross questioned, Harrison - notwithstanding a
claim that 'he did not go into politics at all' - admitted that only
one member of the SMF was nationalist and that most of the other
members were Unionist; he explained that, 'the great majority of the
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employers are of the Unionist persuasion. ' 	 Only five shirt
manufacturers gave evidence to the Boundary Commission on behalf of
the Derry Nationalist Registration Society. One of these, James
Sweeney, employed 350 workers; the others employed between 20 and 40
(1926, PRONI MIC 288 Reel 12).
The political allegiances of Derry shirt manufacturers in the
1930s, 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s are obscure: never again did they
collectively identify themselves with the Unionist position as in
1925. One potentially illuminating source is the minutes of the SMF,
but my attempts to gain access to these were frustrated'°'.
However, it would seem that although few manufacturers engaged
directly in local politics, they retained a broadly Protestant and
Unionist identity throughout the period they were certainly
perceived as such by my respondents. The few who were involved in
local politics tended to be local Protestants who owned smaller
factories; men like James Hamilton, W. J. Little, S. Kennedy, Mr
Swann (Belfast and Northern Ireland directory 1935, 1944, 1949, and
1953; see also the recollections of Seamus Quinn in chapter 4 of this
thesis). Of the larger manufacturers, only Mr Mccarthy seems to have
been politically active: he was an alderman in the Unionist East ward
in the 1930s. The members of the SMF elected their first Catholic
chairman, Mr Guckian, in the late 1960s (LS: 21 August 1968). He was
succeeded by another Catholic, Mr J. F. Desmond the managing director
of the largest of the locally owned shirt firms (LS: 31 December
1969). Without access to the minutes of the SMF, it is unclear
whether any significance should be attached to this development:
Seamus Quinn, local organiser of the ITGWU in the 1950s and 1960s
told me,
I wouldn't read anything into that... Guckian was a kind of
Unionist anyhow, and the Desmonds were half and half - one
or two of them were great Mchteer supporters when it suited
them.
Nor, incidently, can it be interpreted as evidence to support the
traditional Irish marxist argument according to which the influx of
foreign multinational capital to Northern Ireland in the 1960s led
to the displacement of 'old', mainly Protestant, 'Ulster industrial
families' by a 'new class of managers' (Farrell, 1980: 329; cf Hall,
1979: 8-10 and O'Dowd, 1980b: 63). When the Viyella group acquired a
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number of Derry shirt firms in the late 1960s the existing directors
and senior managers were not simply made redundant. Harrison's was
amalgamated with another local shirt firm - James Burnside Ltd - to
produce a single brand name in two separate factories, one in Derry
and one in Magherafelt; Arthur Harrison remained the manager of the
Derry factory, but left in the early 1970s because he did not like
working under the new regime. However, The son of the founder of
James Burnaide Ltd became managing director of the two factories. In
the case of McCarthy's the existing - all Protestant - senior
management were retained to manage the Derry factory 1 '.	 These
developments took place after the period with which I am concerned
and are, therfore, not directly relevant to my thesis. Rather than
explore them further 1 I now want to examine the religious
affiliations of the people employed in the Derry shirt industry.
There are no available statistics on the religious composition
of the shirt workforce in Derry between 1920 and 1968: after the 1911
census none has tabulated occupation and religion such that the
relevant figures can be extracted. In the 1901 and 1911 censuses the
religious affiliations of people in each of the various occupational
categories are tabulated, but these are only of limited use from the
point of view of this thesis because, first, 'seamstresses' are
included with female 'shirtmakers'; second, and more importantly,
shirt workers who worked in the city's factories but who lived
outside the city are not counted. Thus Table 3 and Table 4, which
detail the religious affiliations of male and female shirtmakers and
seamstresses in 1901 and 1911, are only a rough guide to the
religious composition of the shirt factory workforce in Derry.
However, the figures suggest that Protestant men and Catholic women
were over-represented in the Derry shirt industry, and, conversely,
that Catholic men arid Protestant women were under-represented. At
the 1911 census, for example, Protestants of all denominations
(Episcopalian, Presbyterian and Methodist) made up 43.8% of Derry's
total population (Farrell, 1980: viii), yet 65% of male shirt
workers, and only 32% of female shirt workers, were Protestants.
Catholics comprised 56.2% of Derry's total population, but 67% of
female shirt workers, and only 32% of male shirt workers, were
Catholic.
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What kind of workers would have been included in the census
categories of male and female ' shirtmaker''? Large shirt factories
were each divided into separate departments each of which dealt with
a different type of garment (some factories produced pyjamas and
underclothing as well as shirts and collars); a different type of
fabric; or a different stage of the production process, for example
shirt cutting, shirt assembly,	 finishing (laundering, pressing,
folding), and inspection (see The North of Ireland (Illustrated) Up-
to-date. Londonderr y. N.D. c1900: 17-18, and Grew, 1987: 110).	 Each
department had its own manager. Judging from my respondants'
recollections, most department managers were men'. Aside from the
latter, the only significant concentration of male shirt workers were
those involved in shirt cutting; most other jobs were done by women.
I will examine the sexual division of labour in the .Derry shirt
industry much more closely in chapter five; for the moment I am
concerned with the religious division of labour, and wish only to
point out that the figures in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that Protestants
predominated in management and shirt cutting, and Catholics in shirt
assembly and finishing.
I do not wish to anticipate the finding of my own research, but
it is important to point out at this stage that my respondants'
recollections indicate that the pattern whereby Protestants
predominated in the cutting room and in management, and Catholics in
shirt assembly and finishing was perpetuated throughout the period
covered by this thesis. 	 Moreover, they suggest another form of
religious segregation: between factories. Many of my respondants -
Protestants as well as Catholics - identified McCarthy's and the
Ebrington factory as 'Protestant factories' in the sense that their
workforces were mainly of that religion; several respondants added
Hamilton's and Little's to the list.
	
Some respondants also
identified several factories as employing mainly Catholic workforces
- particularly Tillie and Henderson's and Rosemount. However, the
tendency to identify factories as 'Catholic' was less marked than was
the case with 'Protestant factories'; this seems to reflect the fact
that, in an industry which employed mainly Catholics, the latter were
the exception.	 It was, and still is, not uncormnon for factories in
Northern Ireland to be identified with one or other community: Gibbon
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(1975: 80) and Morgan (1978: 30-32) describe a similar situation in
the Belfast linen industry in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, and Barritt and Carter (1972: 100-104) found several
examples in the 1960s. The latter also note that in some factories
with a mixed workforce Catholics and Protestants were segregated into
different departments. Several instances of this kind of segregation
were mentioned by my respondants, and are suggested by newspaper
reports of particular events - these will be discussed where
appropriate in the text. Morgan (1978: 30-32) suggests that the
different female trades in the linen industry were divided up on a
religious basis. Alhough, as I have already pointed out, there was a
tendency for Protestant men to be over-represented in shirt cutting,
I found no evidence that the different 'trades' involved in shirt
assembly and finishing were divided up in a similar way - several
respondarits specifically told me that, in their experience atleast,
there was no such tendency.
2. 5 Conclusion
The years 1920 and 1968 were both watersheds in the history of
Derry, and indeed of Ireland. In 1920, the legislative framework for
the division of Ireland was Introduced, and Derry - despite the
wishes of the the Catholic majority of its population - was included
within the jurisdiction of the new state of Northern Ireland. In
1968 the Unionist regime which had been established in 1920 began to
crumble, and it was on the streets of Derry that mass opposition to
government policies first emerged.
For most of the period between 1920 and 1968, life in Derry was
characterised by economic and political stagnation. The Unionist
minority revealed a deep seated desire to retain political control of
the city, and the nationalists were unable to effectively challenge
minority rule. It was a stalemate, and local politics assumed a
parochial form in which petty communal issues came to the fore. The
Catholic sense of injustice was fueled by poor housing and a shortage
of jobs for men.	 In this context the shirt industry, Derry's only
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large scale manufacturing industry, assumed enoromous importance; so
much so that it was widely believed that female shirt workers were
the main family breadwinners in the city.
By 1955 most of the largest shirt manufacturing firms were owned
as limited liability companies with their main headquarters in
England or Scotland. However, many of these firms remained under the
control of their founders' descendants well into the twentieth
century. These men were, in the main, Protestants, and, although few
of them engaged overtly in Unionist Party politics, they were not
generally regarded as politically neutral. Both statistical and oral
sources indicate that Protestants were over-represented among
managers and among shirt cutters. Both jobs were mainly done by men
and were, as will be shown, better paid than the other jobs in the
shirt industry most of which were done by women. Catholics
predominated among the latter.
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CHAPTER 3: THE EARLY HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM AND THE STRIKE OF 1920
3. 1 Introduction
This chapter deals with the history of trade unionism in the
Derry shirt industry from the 1880s to the mid 1920s. The sources
relating to this period are few and uneven in quality. The main ones
used here are local newspapers, especially the Derry Journal and the
Londonderry Sentinel; the annual reports and monthly Journal of the
Amalgamated Society of Tailors and Tailoresses the monthly Journal
of the United Garment Workers' Union, (The Garment Worker)' 1 ; and
the records of the Registrar of Friendly Societies in Dublin. I was
able to trace only two respondants who were involved with trade
unionism in the shirt industry during the years under consideration,
and their experience relates only to the latter part of the period;
that is, to the early 1920s.
Despite this dearth of information it is possible to piece
together the following pattern of development. The early history of
trade unionism In the Derry shirt industry conforms, In its main
outlines, to the pattern identified by historians of the labour
movement in Belfast and elsewhere: the organisation of women workers
lagged a long way behind that of the men in the industry. The local
newspapers rarely mention the men's organisation, but the Registrar
of Friendly Societies in Dublin lists the Londonderry Shirt, Collar,
and Underclothing Cutters' Union as having been registered as a trade
union in 1890. Unfortunately neither its original registration
documents, nor its response to the registrar's annual request for
information about its membership and accounts have survived, but the
list of files held in the Registry indicate that the Londonderry
Cutters' Union had a continuous existence until 1915 when it
amalgamated with the Shirt and Collar Cutters' Union of Ireland
(files No 114 and 2551 in the Registrar of Friendly Societies,
Dublin; see also Devine, 1986: 97).	 The latter union amalgamated
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with the British based United Garment Workers' Union (UGW) in 1919
(GW: July 1926). In contrast, women shirt workers were not
successfully organised until 1917/1918 when more than 3,000 of them
joined a 'Female Factory Workers' Branch' of the Amalgamated Society
of Tailors and Tailoresses (ASTT; see Table 5, appendix 2).
It would seem, moreover, that the women found it more difficult
than the men to organise: the local newspapers report a series of
failed organisatioris prior to 1917/18. The first organisation
catering for women shirt workers, established c1891 and initially
known as the Female Labourers' Union (DJ: 18 November 1891), did not
attract many members, and did not survive the nineteenth century: it
was not mentioned in newpaper reports of strikes in two of Derry's
largest shirt factories in 1904 and 1905 (DJ: 3 February 1904 and 8
December 1905). In 1906, a Branch of the Textile Operatives' Society
of Ireland - a union which organised female linen workers in Belfast
- was established in Derry following a public meeting addressed by
the union's organiser, Mary Galiway (Grew, 1987: 223; see also DJ:
10, 17, and 24 August 1906). During the first year of its existence,
the Branch affiliated to the Women's Trade Union League and to the
National Federation of Women Workers (NFWW); Mary McCarthur, the
secretary of the former organisation and the founder of the latter
held a number of meetings in Derry in 1907 (DJ: 24 and 26 July 1907).
However, Grew (1987: 223) suggests that no more than one-seventh of
the total factory workforce joined the union, and it was not listed
among affiliates of the NFWW in 1910 (Annual Reports of the Women's
Trade Union League 1907, 1908, and 1910c2)). And, in August 1917, a
leading local trade unionist is reported to have told the ITUC, which
held its annual meeting in Derry in that year, that all male workers
in the city were now organised but the women were not (DJ: 10 August
1917).
Nevertheless, by 1919, it would seem that trade unionism had
become firmly established in the shirt industry: between 200 and 300
male shirt cutters were members of the UGW (LS: 15 June 1920), and
3,352 women shirtmakers were members of the ASTT (see Table 5,
appendix 2); however, this pattern of organisation was not to last.
In the summer of 1920 the shirt cutters struck for wage parity with
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British shirt cutters. The strike lasted for 10 weeks during which
time relations between the UGW and the ASTT deteriorated and the
industrial conflict became embroiled in the struggle between
Unionists and nationalists In the city. After the strike trade
unionism in the shirt industry fragmented. The permutations were as
follows: the ASTT lost all but 200 of its members in Derry (see Table
6, appendix 2); up to 3,000 women joined the UGW; 'several hundred
women' (DJ: 27 August 1920) joined the Irish Transport and General
Workers' Union (ITGWIJ); and the UGW lost some of its male members to
the Amalgamated Transport and General Workers' Union (ATGWIJ). It had
taken three decades f or the Derry Branches of the UGW and ASTT to
develop, but no sooner had they become established than they was
split asunder
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first, section
3. 2, deals with the development of trade unionism in the shirt
industry in the years prior to 1920; I am unable to say more than I
have already said about the organisat ion of men, so the focus is on
the women. The second, section 3.3, deals with the 1920 strike; the
third, section 3.4, with its aftermath. In each of these sections I
will attempt to pursue the question whch lies at the heart of my
thesis: to what extent and in what ways was the development of trade
unionism in the Derry shirt industry influenced by sectarian
divisions within the workforce? However, as will become apparent,
the results are uneven: the dearth of information prevents one from
adequately identifying the causal significance of sectarianism in the
early history of trade unionism. 	 This is particularly true for the
decades before 1920, a period for which It proved Impossible to trace
any living veterans.	 But it also applies - all be it to a lesser
extent - to my analysis of the 1920 strike and Its aftermath. The
recollections of the two participants in the strike whom I
interviewed are extremely valuable and Illuminate much, but they are
limited in various ways which will become apparent, and it was not
possible to trace any other veterans: most were dead at the time when
I conducted my research. These are additional reasons (additional,
that is, to those discussed in the last chapter) why I have defined
my thesis In relation to the period after 1920.
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However, the available evidence is sufficient for me to pursue
two other aspects of my project, namely, the critique of current
theories about trade unionism in Northern Ireland - especially
traditional Irish marxism - and the argument about the necessity for
social analysts and historians to recognise the importance of human
action, intention, and meaning. Thus, in section 3.2 of this chapter
I will compare the evidence relating to the organisation of women
shirt workers with some of the historical gerieralisations made by
Rolston (1980) and Munck (1986), and in section 3.3 I will question
Desmond Greaves' (1982) analysis of the shirt cutters' strike;
Greaves is another major exponent of the traditional Irish marxist
perspective. In all three sections I will be concerned to illustrate
the dangers and difficulties inherent in attempts - whether made by
marxists like Greaves or non-marxists such as Murphy (1981) - to
infer actors' intentions and meanings from the structure of
situations in the absence of appropriate forms of evidence. Another
purpose underlying this chapter is simply to provide the reader with
the knowledge necessary for a full understanding of subsequent
chapters: many of the ramifications of the 1920 debacle were felt,
and alluded to, by the later generation of trade unionists from whom
I drew most of my sample of respondants.
3.2 Trade Union1si in the Derry Shirt Industry 1889-1919
Above, it was shown that the development of trade unionism among
women shirtmakers lagged a long way behind that among male shirt
cutters. This is a similar pattern to that identified by historians
of the Belfast labour movement. Traditional Irish marxists have
argued that the development of trade unionism among unskilled workers
and women linen workers was inhibited by sectarianism; in this
section I will explore whether the arguments which they adduce are
relevant in the case of Derry shirt workers.	 The arguments were
discussed in detail in chapter one but I will repeat them for the
sake of clarity.	 Sectarianism is said to have worked against the
unionisation of unskilled and women workers in two ways. 	 First, it
is argued that the organisatlon of unskilled and female workers was
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inhibited by what is variousl y described as the 'contempt',
'exclusivisin', or 'indifference' of the skilled tradesmen who
constituted the trade union movement In Belfast in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Rolston (1980: 72) and
Munck (1986: 86) stress that most organised skilled workers were
Protestants and that many of the unskilled and women were Catholics,
and imply that sectarianism played a part in the 'contempt' of the
former for the latter. However, lacking the necessary evidence, and
mindful of the kind of analysis offered by Patterson (1980: 30-31,
and 1984: 175) and Reid (1980: passlm), they concede that the
'contempt' may have expressed 'sexism' or routine trade union
sectionalism. Nevertheless, both authors claim that irrespective of
the meaning behind the 'contempt' of the skilled towards the
unskilled, 'the effect of exclusivist practices (whatever their
origin) was felt predominantly by one section of the working class
Lie Catholics]' (Munck, 1986: 86), and resulted in the development
of, in Roiston's words (1980: 72), 'Sectarian Trade Unionism.'
	
The
second argument made by traditional Irish marxists is that sectarian
divisions within particular workforces undermined solidarity. 	 For
example, Munck (1986: 86) argues,
where there is little disagreement is on the fact that
trade union organisation was thwarted by sectarianism. A
prime case of this was the linen mills, where a mixed
workforce proved remarkably difficult to organse right into
the twentieth century.
I will now consider the case of Derry shirt workers in the light of
each of these arguments starting with the first.
The development of trade unionism In the Derry shirt industry
was not - unlike the case of trade unionism among Belfast linen
workers - inhibited by indifference on the part of the leaders of the
trade union movement. On the contrary, the first attempt to organise
shirt workers seems to have been initiated by the local trade union
establishment as represented by the Trades Council. At a meeting of
the Council held at the beginning of 1889, the delegates decided to
adopt similar principles for the organisatlon of shirt factory
workers as those adopted by London Trades Council in the organisation
of women match workers (DJ: 1 February 1889). And in 1891 the
members of Derry Trades Council helped to arrange a visit to the city
by Eleanor Aveling (Karl Marx's daughter). The purpose of her visit
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seems to have been to reconstitute the pre-existing Female Labourers'
Union as part of the National Union of Gasworkers and General
Labourers; she also addressed a public meeting which it was hoped
would encourage more shirt workers to join the organisation. At the
public meeting Mrs Aveling specifically commended the local Trades
Council for helping women factory workers to organise and contrasted
it to the lack of help extended by Trades Councils and skilled
workers in Britain to women and to unskilled workers (DJ; 2 November
1891). According to the Derry Journal, it was also members of the
Trades Council who invited Mary McArthur of the NFWW to organise in
Derry (DJ: 24, 26 and 29 July 1907, and Grew, 1987: 223).
Derry Trades Council was, as we have seen, formed in 1887. Like
Belfast Trades Council it was composed exclusively of skilled men who
were members of the smaller craft societies (cf Patterson, 1980: 24);
newspaper reports of the time mention bricklayers/masons, tailors,
bakers, coach builders, cabinet-makers, railway workers, carpenters,
painters, boot-makers, plumbers, plasterers, and engineers. The
bakers and some of the masons/bricklayers were members of Irish based
organisations, but the rest were members of British ('amalgamated')
trade unions, or purely local associations (see DJ: 1 February 1889
and 22 September 1890). What, then, was the difference between Derry
Trades Council and Belfast Trades Council which apparently made the
former more helpful in relation to the organisation of female factory
workers than the latter? It is difficult to answer this question
without having at least had access to the Derry Trades Council's
minutes for the period. But it is worth reiterating the point that,
in this period, Derry Trades Council included Protestants and
Catholics, Unionists and nationalists; contrasting it to Belfast
Trades Council the members of which were, in Patterson's words (1980:
26), 'staunchily Unionist'; and asking the question: was the
apparently more sympathetic attitude of the members of Derry Trades
Council towards the organisation of women shirtmakers linked to the
fact that many of them shared the Catholic religion, and a
nationalist political outlook?
The local trade union leader who took most to with the
organisation of shirt factory workers between 1889 and 1917 was James
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McCarron. McCarron was, to remind the reader, the first chairman of
the Trades Council; he was a Catholic and, though a self professed
nationalist, was one of the small number of labour members of the
Corporation'. His concern for the organisation of shirt factory
workers is evident in the work which he carried out on their behalf.
Indeed, he seems to have been concerned with the conditions of
unskilled and unorganised workers in general: during the 1896
election campaign he highlighted the difference between labourers'
wages in Derry and Belfast, and stressed the need for them to combine
so that they could negotiate
a fair days pay for a fair days work... true political
economy involves employers trying to get as much work as
possible for their money against workers trying to get as
much pay as possible.. . Live and let live, employers were a
class they were bound to respect and support if they
treated workers fairly. (DJ: 20 November 1896).
The available sources do not permit one to establish a
connection between McCarron's religious and political affiliations
and his efforts on behalf of the women shirt workers. What can be
stated is that it is possible to trace something of the craftsman's
frustration with unskilled and unorganised workers in a comment which
he made about Eleanor Aveling's speech in Derry. He expressed doubt
that she had received the full information about unskilled workers in
Derry; told her that, 'it was no use speaking to the unskilled
labourers in Derry' because they had Joined unions in the past and
deserted them after they had gained their demands; and singled out
the Knights of Labour, a militant organisation of unskilled labourers
in Derry, for special criticism (DJ: 20 November 1891). McCarron was
the local secretary of the ASTT, and as such had been prosecuted for
his alleged involvement in the intimidation of blacklegs during a
dispute with local tailoring establishments in 1890 (DS: 2, 23, and
26 May 1890, and 1 October 1890). But the ASTT was a conservative
organisation, composed exclusively of handicraft tailors, which
attempted to protect its members' craft interests against the
application of mass production techniques to the clothing industry
(Stewart and Hunter, 1964: 15).	 To this end, the ASTT refused to
recruit workers in British clothing factories until 1913 at the
earliest.	 And, although Derry shirt factory workers posed no direct
threat to local tailors, this craft exclusiveness may explain why
- 93 -
McCarron - despite his evident concern for the organisation of
factory workers - did not encourage them to join his union until
1913,
However, once the ASTT Executive decided to admit clothing
workers employed in factories into their organisation, McCarron seems
to have been exceptionally successful: female ASTT membership in the
British Isles increased by 7, 852 in 1917, 3, 154 of these new members
were in Derry (Annual report of the ASTT, 1917: 4 and 81; also see
Table 5, appendix 2). In 1933, Agnes Flynn, a retired ASTT notable
in England recalled:
The workers in Londonderry were organised by the late James
McCarron, and a splendid Branch of over 4, 000 female
workers was formed... the loss of Mr Lynch and Mr McCarron,
who went down in the topedoed Leinster [A cross-channel
ferry sunk by a German submarine] in 1918 was a blow from
which our organisation in Ireland has never recovered and
was a cruel blow to myself (GW: March 1933).
McCarron was helped in the organisation of women factory workers by
another nationalist tailor, Con Doherty. According to the latter's
obituary (Journal of the ASTT June 1924):
It was for his activities in the Labour movement, in which
he took a leading part, being prominently associated with
the late Alderman McCarron in organising the factory
workers, he was best known. He was president of the local
Branch connected with the Amalgamated Society of Tailors
and Tailoresses, on behalf of which he rendered valuable
service... A Nationalist who remained faithful to the
constitutional policy, he was for many years a member of
the Derry Corporation, and had the respect and confidence
of all the members.
In accordance with the policy decided upon following the
abolition of P.R. he did not seek re-election in January
1923, but there being no nominations for the ward for which
he sat he was one of the Nationalists deemed to be re-
elected. He did not, however, take his seat, but while his
health permitted he continued to serve on the committees of
management of the Asylum and of the City Infirmary. He was
also an active member of the Local Employment Committee...
Thus, while it is possible to detect in McCarron's utterances
and behaviour something of the exclusiveness common to craftsmen of
the period, neither he, nor other trade union leaders can be said to
have been indifferent to women shirt workers. But, if the
development of trade unionism in the snirt industry at the turn of
the century was not inhibited by neglect on the part of the trade
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union establishment, was it undermined by sectarian divisions within
the workforce itself? According to Murphy, the answer is yes; he
writes (1981: 173):
The main obstacle to the growth of unionism was the
attitude of the shirt-factory girls who constituted the
bulk of the local labour force. Eleanor Aveling had stated
the problem clearly in her rallies but had achieved little
progress. Class deference in the factories supplemented
religious divisions and in times of acute political
excitement in 1883 and in 1899 this led to sectarian
conflict between different workforces. Paradoxically acute
sectarian tension in the labour force co-existed with
toleration on the part of management toward an extended
function in the factories for the local Catholic clergy who
were extremely active in protecting the moral/social
outlook of rural immigrants by setting up in the workplace
sodalities and other educational clubs. The feeling of
solidarity conveyed by these societies heightened the sense
of corporate identity among workforces in the shirt
factories and made it easier for employers to resist the
first onslaught of trade unionism in the 1890s.
There is some evidence of 'sectarian tension' among shirt
workers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and
there was 'sectarian conflict' in 1883 and 1899. On the former
occasion 1,000 of Tillie and Henderson's 'factory girls' struck f or
three days when Marshall Tillie, the managing director, refused a
demand by machinists in the shirt department - 'the vast majority of
whom are Roman Catholics' (DS: 5 November 1883) - to replace the
factory doctor.	 The strikers wanted the doctor replaced because he
had voted against the Corporation allowing the Lord Mayor of Dublin
to hold a National League rally in a municipal hall. The strikers
were reported to have attacked the police, a Salvation Army hail, a
soldier walking on the bridge, Jury's Hotel, and several private
houses. The Derry Standard described these incidents as, 'one of the
most extraordinary manifestations of the party spirit [occasioned] in
Derry by the visit of Lord Mayor Dawson' (DS: 8 November 1883). In
August 1899, following the Relief of Derry celebrations, there was a
confrontation between some women who worked in McCarthy's - who we
can safely assume were Protestants - and others who worked in TUlle
and Henderson (Grew, 1987: 170). August seems to have been a
particularly tense time and Grew (1987: 37, Table No. 28 ) notes that
there were minor clashes in various shirt factories in 1877, 1880,
1900, and 1913.
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Attempting to infer the meanings of events or the attitudes of
actors from the structure of situations is a risky matter in any
case, but for Murphy to write that sectarian 'attitudes', 'feelings',
or 'sensels]' constituted 'the main obstacle to the growth of
unionism' in the shirt industry on the sole basis of these relatively
few and isolated incidents of sectarian conflict is pure speculation.
The only link which can be established between the phenomenon of
sectarianism among shirt workers and attempts to unionise them is a
remark attributed to Eleanor Aveling in the local press. But Eleanor
Aveling did not, in Murphy's words, 'state the problem clearly in her
rallies.' All that she did was to warn workers against attempts by
employers to exploit party and religious prejudice, and express some,
unspecified, criticism of the clergy (DJ: 20 November 1891). It is
true that Aveling's speech evoked a strong response in the local
newspapers; for example, one correspondant expressed indignation that
the Catholic women of Derry did not leave the rally when the Pope and
the Catholic Church were criticised for dividing the workers (DS: 20
November 1891, and DJ: 25 November 1891). For its part, the Trades
Council stood by Aveling's description of conditions in the
factories, but they clearly regarded an anti-clerical statement made
at the rally by another speaker, Mr Farren, as potentially damaging:
they held another public meeting f or the purposes of condemning and
disassociating themselves from his remarks, and making it clear, once
again, that the Trades Council was composed of 'all classes and
creeds' and that political and religious issues had never been
brought before the Trades Council from its inception (DJ: 4 and 7
December 1891). All this suggests that local trade unionists
perceived sectarian divisions as a potential threat to their efforts
to organise shirt workers; it cannot, however, be used as evidence
that sectarianism was the main factor which caused them to fail.
Indeed Avelirig's speech, and the reaction to it by shirt
manufacturers and others, is more significant as a clue to what may
have been a more serious obstacle to trade unionism: employer
hostility. Although it was not reported in the papers, it seems that
Aveling accused a foreman mechanic who worked in Sinclair's factory
of spying on those women who were members of the union, and quoted
him as saying that 'he would break the back of the union in Derry.'
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This came to light only because the foreman against whom the
allegation was made, Dan Frew, wrote to the Derry Journal to deny the
accusation of spying, and to deny that he had made the comment which
Aveling had attributed to him. He admitted, however, that he had
advised workers in his own, and other, factories against joining the
union, and boasted that he had prevented more workers from joining
the society than it presently had as members (DJ: 25 November 1891).
Other attacks on Aveling were published in the local press: William
Tulle claimed that wages in Derry were higher than in the rest of
the United Kingdom, and an article in the Derry Standard defended the
system of fines levied in many of the city's factories by arguing
that the money collected went to a medical fund for shirt workers.
The latter article ended by congratulating local employers for not
'resorting to the sweating system of the East End of London',
claiming that employers and employees in Derry had hitherto enjoyed
good relations, and attacking Aveling as an 'outsider' who was not
wanted in Derry.
To sum up. Women shirt workers in Derry, like their counterparts in
the Belfast linen industry, seem to have experienced considerable
difficulty in sustaining trade union organisation during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But, in contrast to what
traditional Irish marxists have written about the labour movement in
Belfast, Derry Trades Council was heterogeneous in Its religious and
political composition, and its members cannot be described as
indifferent to the organisation of unskilled and female workers. The
two local trade unionists most prominently associated with the
organisation of women shirt workers, McCarron and Doherty, were, in
common with the majority of the women, Catholics and nationalists,
but exisiting sources do not enable one to establish shared religious
and political identity as the causal factor which differentiated
Derry from Belfast. Moreover, McCarron, despite his evident concern
for the organisation of shirt workers, reveals something of the
exciusivism common among craft unionists of the time. Neither is it
possible to assert with any degree of certainty that early attempts
to unionise the shirt factories were frustrated by the prevalence of
sectarian feeling among the women themselves. All that can be said
is that local trade unionists seem to have regarded sectarian
- 97 -
antagonism among shirt workers as a potential threat to union
organisation in 1891. However, it is worth pointing out that reports
of the estabishment of a Textile Operatives Society in Derry in 1906
contain no reference to the subject. One factor which may have
inhibited the organisation of women for which there is some evidence
is employer hostility.
Irrespective of the difficulties which female shirt workers may
or may not have experienced in the formation of trade unions, I have
firm documentary and oral evidence, to be presented in the next
section, that both of the two unions which had, by 1920, attracted a
significant membership in the factories, the UGW and ASTT, included
Protestants and Catholics, Unionists and nationalists. And before
leaving this section it is worth noting two further pieces of
documentary evidence, The first is a 'Female Organisation Report'
published In the Journal of the ASTT in June 1918 which suggests that
sectarian differences were less of a problem in the unlonisation of
women shirt workers In Derry than they were in the Belfast clothing
Industry:
Having successfully steered Derry through the arbitration
for the 15 per cent. Increase and bonus, I started in
Belfast to help strengthen organisation there. Belfast is
particularly difficult from the view of organisation: in
spite of the great wave In favour of trade unionism the
women here are slow to take advantage of the position.
This is largely due to the feeling of distrust of each
other, created and fostered in the past; however, there are
signs of improvement in this respect. Some of the women
are beginning to realise that the employers do not engage
them for their particular or Individual religious or
political view, but because he makes a profit out of their
labour. This has been made more clear than ever to them
since August 1914, when the war started, and in consequence
the cost of living has repeatedly increased, without
bringing any general increase in wages in its train
commensurate to the Increased prices of the necessities of
life, and certainly no voluntary increase from employers,
although they were not slow to increase the articles in
price that they were engaged in making. 	 In this respect
the dressmakers found themselves very severely handicapped.
The second is a tribute to James McCarron published In the Derry
Journal (14 October 1918), which, If it is possible to judge from
tributes paid to a dead person, suggests that he had won the respect
of the local Unionist establishment. For example, Sir Robert
Anderson, Lord Mayor of Derry and hosiery manufacturer, attended
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McCarron's funeral and is quoted as saying that, although he did his
utmost to help the workers, he was reasonable and had won the
confidence of employers. Such goodwill across the sectarian divide
and between trade unionists and employers in the city's clothing
industry was to become, as will be shown in the next section, an
increasingly scarce commodity in the next two years.
3.3 The Derry Shirt Cutters' Strike
This section is ordered according to two main purposes. The
first is simply to provide an account of an unusual and historically
significant event in the development of trade unionism among shirt
workers. The 1920 strike is unusual because it was the only
industry-wide strike and the only sustained conflict between workers
and employers in the history of shirt production in Derry. Between
1872 and 1913 there were, according to Grew (1987: 215-219), only two
strikes in the Derry shirt industry which lasted more than a week:
one in which cutters in McCarthy's factory held-out against the
introduction of piecework through September and October 1906; in the
other, 36 sewing machinists in Tulle and Henderson's resisted a
wage-cut for four weeks in November 1907. 	 Neither strike was
successful. Between 1921 and 1968 there were - judging from my
respondants' recollections and the various documentary sources - only
two strikes of more than a few days duration; both involved the issue
of union recognition and were part of an ongoing inter-union rivalry,
and both will be examined in detail in later chapters. The 1920
strike is historically significant because its consequences - the
fragmentation of the ASTT and UGW - have reverberated down to the
present day: to understand the consequences it is necessary to
understand the course of the strike.
As I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the
protagonists in the 1920 strike became embroiled in the conflict
between Unionism and nationalism in the city. My second purpose,
therefore, is to examine the role of religious and political
differences and prejudices in the dispute. Desniond Greaves, an Irish
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marxist of the old school, has commented on the relationship between
industrial and political conflict in Derry during the summer of 1920,
and I will organise my account around a critique of his analysis.
Greaves (1982: 279-280) presents the cutters' strike in the context
of,
the growing isolation of Unionism... the Unionist position
was being... rapidly eroded. Protestant workers in
milling, malting and timber working were benefiting from
national settlements in which the ITGWIJ was the driving
force... The effect of this work was to galvanise other
unions into action. When a shirt-cutters' strike took
place in Derry and the leadership proved ineffective the
workers turned to Paeder O'Donnell. Sectarianism was at an
ebb and Labour morale was at its highest since 1907 (when
Larkin, the founder of the ITGWU led a strike by Protestant
and Catholic dockers and carters in Belfast]... at this
point the reactionaries took alarm.
In Greaves' mind, the reactionaries became alarmed because in the
course of the strike a mainly Protestant group of workers was being
radicalised: O'Donnell, a former school teacher from the Irish-
speaking area of Donegal who had been appointed Ulster organiser for
the ITGWiJ in the autumn of 1918, was a socialist republican in the
Connolly mould and a leading member of the IRA in the north west of
Ireland. Greaves details an instance in which two 'reactionary'
organisations, 'the Ulster Workers' Union' and the 'Ulster Protestant
and Unionist Workers' Association' (Greaves refers to these as the
'yellow' union and 'yellow' Labour Party respectively) sought to
break a strike led by O'Donnell and involving Protestant and Catholic
workers in Fulton's blanket factory in Caledon; then he continues
(1982: 280-281):
Within a few days sectarian riots turned the city of Derry
into a shambles. The orgy of rioting and murder, which put
a stop to all business for nearly a week, was instigated by
the 'yellow' Labour Party under the pretext of defending
Protestant ex-service men from Catholics who had taken
their jobs.
He also mentions that (1982: 283)
The ITOWU was singled out for attention by all the forces
of reaction... An advertisement placed in the Derry edition
of the Belfast Telegraph by the Ulster Unionist Labour
Association urged all Protestant workers to refuse to have
anything to do with the ITGWU, 'which preaches
republicanism', and to join their amalgamated tie British
based] unions.
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The three main agents in Greaves' account of the strike are: the
strikers themselves, O'Donnell and the local labour movement, and the
Unionist 'reactionaries'. I will analyse each of these groups and
attempt - insofar as my sources of information permit - to identify
who they were and to discern the reasons underlying their behaviour.
Apart from the usual sources - local newspapers and the Journal of
the Amalgamated Societ y of Tailors and Tailoresses - I have at my
disposal the recollections of two participants in the strike. One is
Paeder O'Donnell; the other is John McCorkell. 	 ODonnell needs no
further introduction, but it is worth saying something about the
nature of my interview with him. O'Donnell died in 1986; I
interviewed him in 1983 when he was 90 years old. My interview with
him was less intensive than with other respondants: because of his
age I did not want to tax him. O'Donnell was both a leading
socialist in the republican movement in the 1930s and an Irish
literary figure; as such, he was much in demand as a public speaker
and had been interviewed many times. I found that his memory of his
time as a union official in Derry in the early 1920s was dim -
perhaps because, as will become apparent in the next section, he was
not altogether happy about his role - and that he preferred to talk
about other episodes; happier episodes which he had also talked about
on the two occasions I heard him speak in public. Nevertheless, what
little O'Donnell had to say abut the 1920 strike is, as I hope will
be apparent, very valuable. 	 John McCorkell is a Protestant who was
born in Donegal.	 In 1920 he was a 15 year-old apprentice in
McIntyre, Hogg and Marsh's 'City' factory. He remembers the strike
clearly, but his recollections of trade unionism in the period after
1924 are more vague: he left Derry c1924 to work in a shirt factory
in Warrington, returned for a year or so while his mother was ill,
and left 'for good' c1927. He subsequently worked in various
factories in the west of Scotland where he was eventually appointed a
full-time official in the NUTGW.
I will begin with an examination of the strikers, but, for the
sake of clarity, it is first necessary to draw attention to the most
glaring empirical flaw in Greaves' analysis. It is a matter of
chronology: the inter-communal violence which, in Greaves' words,
'turned Derry into a shambles' - up to 40 people were killed - began
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almost two months before the start of the cutters' strike, not after
it as he implies. The cutters' strike began on Monday 14 June 1920.
According to Murphy (1981) and McCann (1974) sectarian rioting began
in Derry in mid April 1920, continued through May when the first
fatalities were recorded, and climaxed in sporadic gun battles
between the IRA and the UVF between 19 June and 25 June 1920;
thereafter the gun battles ceased, but 'hooliganism' continued
(McCann, 1974: 162-164; Murphy, 1981: 254-256; and DJ: 26 June 1920
and 17 August 1920). Thus, contrary to what Greaves writes, the
cutters' strike did not take place at a time when sectarianism was
'at an ebb'.
My sources do not give much information on the build up to the
strike, but the original purpose behind it was wage parity with shirt
cutters in Britain. The strikers claimed that they were paid only
the Trade Board minimum rates and that this was 2d an hour less than
for shirt cutters in the rest of the United Kingdom (DJ: 16 July
1920). In chapter two it was shown that c1915, the SMF had persuaded
the Shirtmaking Trade Board to reduce minimum wages rates in the
Irish shirt industry to a lower level than in Britain, and that this
decision had been strongly resented by the workforce (The Boundary
Commission Papers, 1926: PROWl MIC 288 reel 11).
O'Donnell and McCorkell confirm the accuracy of Greaves'
suggestion that most of the strikers were Protestants and Unionists.
However, McCorkell told me that a significant number of shirt cutters
did not join the strike.
One of the factories that stands out in my mind - there
were others - because of its Protestant element: Ebrington,
they didn't come out [on strike].
I asked him if the tensions created by the riots affected the course
of the strike, he replied:
There was the curfew. Kennedy's, one of the factories I
mentioned [which were not strike-bound] and there was
others too, what they used to do was the boys who were
cutters and doing other jobs in the factory - packing and
all that sort of thing and opening the bails of cloth when
they came in, general storemen - were probably members of
the B Specials. They stayed in at night and loaded the
lorries and in the morning.., and big vans and sent them
through to... Lame or the Belfast boat, because the
dockers wouldn't load them on to boats [le in Derry]. 	 I
can well remember that. That was the strain you were under
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and you couldn't picket... well we went and stood you know
outside and the police didn't bother, there were no stones
nothing like that
He referred to another factory:
there was one... I can't remember the name of it , a farmer
opened it up, from Inch Island. There was a small coterie
of cutters working there - the Rosemount, it continued
(through the strike].	 There was a wee bit of a problem
there strange to say.	 When you look at Rosemount now
(Rosernount is now a strongly nationalist area], I say, 'did
I live through that?' Because in fact there was the
Rosemount flute band, I don't know if there was an Orange
Lodge.
McCorkell explained the refusal of some Protestant cutters to
support the strike in terms of the fact that they were not unionised:
There was no such thing as a closed shop, this strong
religious quality, they had a grievance, but they were not
members of the union, so they could evade Joining the
strike.., you had as much chance of getting them into a
union as as you had of getting them into heaven.
But, for McCorkell, what seems to have been the crucial difference
between those Protestants who joined the strike and those who did not
was that the latter had particularly strong connections with loyalist
institutions. Thus he describes the storemen in Kennedy's as
'probably' being members of the B Specials. At another point in the
interview he told me that 'the big problem was a tremendous number of
the managers in (the] factories (were] B Specials.' The B Specials
were a part-time, armed, and entirely Protestant auxilliary to the
constabulary. In fact, it is not possible that the men to whom
McCorkell referred were B Specials at the time of the cutters'
strike: the establishment of the B Specials was announced in October
1920 and recruiting did not begin until November.	 However,
McCorkell's recollection suggests that	 there was a special
relationship between managers and shirt cutters in some factories,
and, in his regard, it is worth noting three further items. The
first is a characteristic of B Special organisation noted by Farrell
(1980: 35):
The B Specials retained the hierarchical structure of the
old 1JVF, based on the 'big house' or the local linen mill,
with the landlord or linen boss as the commander and his
tenants or workers making up the ranks.
Second, there is corroboration for McCorkell's assertion that some
shirt factory managers were involved in the B Specials: in 1922 Mr W.
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K. Tillie was given 'leave of absence' from his position as managing
director of Tulle and Henderson's Derry factory to take up a
position which involved the organisation of the police force for
'certain' counties in Northern Ireland (Minutes of the Board of
Directors, PRONI T.3377/1)c. The third item is a comment made by
the owner-manager of Hamilton's shirt factory, James Hamilton junior,
during the short interview which I had with him '. James Hamilton
junior inherited the factory from his father; father and son had both
been Unionist aldermen and the son had also been High Sheriff of
Derry; their factory was, as I noted in the last chapter, identified
with the Protestant community. Hamilton junior recalled the 1920
strike, and despite a general reticence, told me that none of his
father's workers joined the strike: they had been told 'look,
whatever is agreed to you' 11 get the same, ' and, 'they accepted this
- they were that kind of worker.'
McCorkell also suggests that a cutter's membership or, more
importantly, non-membership of the Orange Order or the masons was an
important factor affecting his attitude to the strike. He explained
his own support for the strike and that of his workmates in McIntyre,
Hogg, and Marsh's factory in terms of their lack of involvement In
such 'secret societies':
The fella who got me into the union [Willie Roiston], he
came from a town outside Letterkenny, a couple came from
Carndonagh [both places are in Donegal]. They were
Protesants, but they hadn't been gripped by the Derry and
Belfast kind of thing, sure they had their secret societies
in Donegal, but there wasn't the Orange element in It.
Likewise, when explaining his own involvement in the strike and his
sympathy for the labour movement which later led him to support the
local Labour Party he stressed that although he came from a Unionist
family he had spent his infancy in Donegal; that, after the family
moved to Derry, he had been brought up in a Catholic street and been
sent to a Catholic school; and that he had never, therefore, joined
the Orange Order or other 'secret societies. '	 For example he told
me:
I wasn't much interested in religion, never joined the
masons or the Orange Order, just the labour movement which
was unusual at that time - I'm not looking for medals.
When I asked if he knew anything about the UULA in Derry, he was
concerned to distance himself:
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I never got connected with that because I joined the Labour
Party much to the detriment of my mother - she was a good
Unionist. I never joined any secret societies like the
masons or the Orange Order. . . I was a wandering boy 1 LI do
not know] whether it was the influence of the Christian
Brothers [who ran the school he had attended]... I don't
know a great deal about that one [the UULA], because I
never got connected with it.
It might be thought that McCorkell's own political development
tends to support Greaves' suggestion that shirt cutters were
radicalised in the course of the strike. But this is not the case.
McCorkell regarded his involvement in the Labour Party as untypical
of Derry Protestants, and he recalled no other shirt cutter who was a
member. The main influence in his political development was Annie
Holmes, a UGW organiser who came to Derry after the strike was over.
And although he describes himself as a member of the Labour Party, he
did not engage In political activity and seems mainly to have been
Interested in the 'educational side' of things.
Why, then, did this mainly Protestant and Unionist group of
strikers 'turn to' Paeder O'Donnell, a socialist republican and an
active member of the IRA? In fact, McCorkell denies that the
strikers sought help from O'Donnell or that he played any significant
role in the strike. O'Donnell himself claims that he represented the
cutters in the negotiations which ended the strike, but he thought
that they approached him inspite of his politics not because of them:
he told me that strikers were interested 'purely in wages, [the
strike had] no political content, ' and that they turned to him only
because 'I had friendly contacts with one or two shirt manufacturers
and I was able to use my influence.' I will examine this discrepancy
further below, but the most important point about McCorkell's and
O'Donnell's recollections is that they both undermine Greaves'
suggestion that the strike was symptomatic of a general erosion of
Unionism.	 I now want to consider the response of the local labour
movement to the strike.
The picture suggested by Greaves' account is of a united labour
movement with a high morale rallying around the striking shirt
cutters. It is true that dockers and carters, all members of the
ATGWU, supported the strike by refusing to transport goods to and
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from the factories (DJ: 16 July 1920). McCorkell recalls:
We got marvellous support from the dockers. Thats the only
thing I have in common with the Transport and General
[Workers' Union) today.	 I fight them: right 1t of comms
[communists]. The wee Scottish secretary, a nice wee
fella, he's a communist, but I still have a great softness
in my heart for them 'cause they did us no harm, they
backed us till their nose bled.
This support was all the more significant because in Derry the
dockers and carters - despite their membership of a British union -
were a mainly Catholic and nationalist workforce. However, other
trade unionists in the city were less forthcoming; indeed, contrary
to Greaves, the evidence suggests that the strike gave rise to
dissension within the local labour movement and that the response of
labour activists to it was mixed.
Apart from the dockers and carters, local trade unionists appear
to have taken little interest in the cutters' strike until it began
to affect women shirtmakers. On 17 July 1920, five weeks after the
strike started, the factories affected by the strike ceased
production and layed off their female workers, between 5,000 and
8,000 women in all (DJ: 19 July 1920, and LS: 5 August 1920). This
created a crisis for the labour movement in the city because the
ASTT, of which nearly 4,000 of the unemployed women were members, was
unable to meet the bill for out-of-work benefit. The female members
of the ASTT were clearly extremely dissatisfied with their union's
failure to pay them: the Londonderry Sentinel (5 August 1920)
reported an incident when 'hundreds' of women factory workers
besieged the offices of' the ASTT, and when no out-of-work benefit was
forthcoming part of the crowd grabbed bread from a passing bread
lorry, and later marched in procession to the shipyard shouting 'up
the rebels!' and 'down with the shipyard!' McCorkell recalled
another incident which indicates not only the volatility of the
situation but also the important role played by members of the ATGWU:
the UGW seems to have made some contribution to the support of the
unemployed women,
the payout was in St Columb's Hall... I'm sure there was a
couple of thousand women lined up right around waiting for
their pay. Cheque came from head office, everything was in
order, the bank refused to pay [It was suspected that the
bank had been pressurised by the employers). So, oh my
God. . . wall ripped down there was a riot started. 	 We got
it quietened down,	 There was a big fella called Kelly of
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the dockers' union [McCorkell described him as being
dressed in a great coat and puttees In the fashion of IRA
men in the period]... He said 'give me the cheque and I'll
damn well soon get you the money, ' and it was only with his
intervention that he saved the face of the union. Because
I'm quite sure to this day that the Garment Workers'
[Union] could jump into the Foyle so far as membership was
concerned if we hadn' t been able to honour that.
Mr Flynn, the ASTT national official who was sent to Derry to
deal with the crisis, was aggrieved at the situation in which his
union had been placed by the cutters' strike and reported to the
Derry Journal an allegation that many of the strike-bound firms had
diverted work to their English factories where members of the UGW
were working overtime: Derry shirt workers were being 'duped' by
their union. The anonymous columnist, 'Veritas', who reported these
allegations added that the strike had been precipitated for political
reasons and claimed that It was a 'plot' (DJ: 2 August 1920).
The strikers replied to the allegations in the next Issue of the
Derr y Journal (4 August 1920). Their spokesman stated that the
'rumour' about English workers doing Derry work was an employer
inspired attempt to divide the workers, and that Flynn, by
propagating it, was supporting the employers and attempting to divert
the women's attention away from the ASTT's failure to pay them more
than two weeks unemployment benefit. He expressed regret that women
workers were suffering because of the strike, and appealed for them
to join the UGW, claiming that if they had been members they would
have been paid out-of-work benefit. He denied an unattributed
allegation that the UGW had previously refused to accept women as
members: the UGW had brought an organiser to Derry to recruit
unorganised female shirt workers, but his efforts had been
frustrated 'because of the lying propaganda of people afraid of
losing their grip on the girls.
It was at this point that O'Donnell made his first public
intervention in the dispute - he wrote a letter to the Derry Journal
(DJ: 6 August 1920). This letter clarifies O'Donnell's position with
respect to the strike and reveals some of the tensions in the local
labour movement. He expressed admiration for the shirt cutters'
'stand', but the main purpose of his intervention was to dissuade the
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women from responding to the UGW's overtures and to encourage them to
join his union - the ITGWU. To this end, he criticised the UGW
alleging that they had deliberately choosen to fight in Derry because
it was 'cheap': unlike in Britain, cutters and machinists in Derry
belonged to different unions so the UGW was not responsible for the
women's strike pay. He argued that Derry women would not gain by
joining the UGW - 'they are fed up with cross-channel unions' - and
admonished the strikers for deluding women about cross-channel
unions. He also attacked the Trades Council for not having done
anything to support the women who had been locked-out. At a meeting
of the Derry Branch of the ITGWU held one week after the end of the
strike (see DJ: 27 August 1920), O'Donnell, while again
congratulating the cutters on their struggle, sought to take
advantage of the disappointing outcome of their strike: he appealed
for them, and female shirt workers too, to join the ITGWU; he
criticised the strike as being 'inopportune'' 7 '; and he attacked the
the English members of the UGW f or continuing to work throughout the
Derry cutters' strike, and for contributing little to strike funds -
he claimed that only Irish workers in Glasgow responded effectively
to the deputation sent to Britain to collect money.
	 At the end of
the speech O'Donnell is reported to have said that he wanted to
'smash every British based union in Ireland.' When I interviewed
him, O'Donnell expressed contempt for the men who, as the local
officers of the British trade unions which predominated in Derry, led
the local labour movement: 'they were infected by the vapid socialism
characteristic of the British Labour movement'.
A spokesman for the shirt cutters responded to O'Donnell's first
intervention in the following way (DJ: 9 August 1920). He rejected
O'Donnell's allegation about the lack of support for the strike among
English cutters, and argued that they had no reason to strike. He
wrote that the shirt cutters had not known when they started the
strike that women workers were going to be 'put out of work,' and
claimed that a 'large number of women' had told him that they had
made a mistake by not striking in sympathy with the cutters but that
their union officials had 'barred their way. '
	
He further claimed
that many of 'the girls' now appreciated the value of belonging to a
single union which 'knows the industry. '
	
Finally, he agreed with
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O'Donnell's claim that the Trades Council had done little to support
the women, but he added that they had not done much to support the
strikers.
As was shown in the last chapter, Derry Trades Council was in
1920, like the Irish labour movement as a whole, becoming
increasingly identified with the nationalist cause, and there is some
evidence that its tardy response to the cutters' strike was an
expression of the view that the strike was part of a plot to destroy
an Irish based industry - this is presumably what the Derry Journal
columnist 'Veritas' was referring to when he or she alleged that the
strike was precipitated for political reasons.	 The evidence is
Flynn's reports to the Executive of the ASTT:
The shirt cutters (Garment Workers' Society) in the North
of Ireland and Dublin came out on strike for an increase of
15s. per week. As Londonderry is the head and centre of
the shirt industry in Ireland, the effects of this action
at once became a matter of vital consideration. A special
meeting of the Trades Council was held, at which the
Executive of the Trades Council was instructed to take
immediate action, with the object of referring the whole
dispute to arbitration... They were... influenced by the
fact that the Irish Department of the Board of Trade had
already taken an active interest in the dispute, several
meetings under an independent chairman having been held
without result, the employers declaring that the rates
asked for were an Increase on those which obtained in
England, and from that standpoint could not be considered.
The situation was further complicated by the fact that,
although only some 200 shirt cutters struck work, their
action entailed the closing down of all the shirt
factories, and the throwing out of work of 5,000 of our
members, together with a certain loss of from £10,000 to
£12,000 weekly to the business establishments of the city.
A further curious fact was strongly emphasised at the
Trades Council. Shirtmaking firms in Londonderry employing
two-thirds of the workers had also factories in England and
Scotland, and while the Londonderry workers were encouraged
to strike, no dispute was allowed in the factories outside
Ireland, This action was strongly condemned by members of
the Trades Council, who stated that those behind the strike
were not animated by a desire to increase wages, but were
endeavouring to seriously destroy a native Irish industry
which by sheer merit of the productions had won a foremost
place in the world's markets. Serious disturbances in the
city, and its occupation by the military, hindered the
Trades Council in its contemplated action. The strike was
still maintained, nor was any real attempt made to bring
about a settlement. A Citizens Committee composed of
leading men of all parties made three attempts to effect a
settlement, but the men on strike refused to attend or to
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help in any way those looking for an honourable peace. The
strike was now entering upon its tenth week, and up to the
present there is no evidence that those who engineered it
have any real desire to promote a settlement. 	 Resolved:
that the report be accepted. 	 (Journal of the ASTT
September 1920).
It was further reported that Messrs Byrne, Rowlerson, and Flynn had
approached
the Parliamentary Committee of the TUC... to... force a
settlement on reasonable and recognised lines. It was
pointed out that in England negotiations had taken the
place of a strike weapon, and that this method should have
been used in Ireland. The position was further complicated
by the fact that the following firms having shirt factories
in Londoriderry, had also establishments in England and
Scotland: -
McCarthy' s,
Bryce & Weston,
Young & Rochester,
Grant & Sommerville,
Hogg & McIntyre,
Lloyd, Attree, & Smith,
Rodgers, Coleraine,
Lawrle & Porter,
Tulle & Henderson.
It is beyond doubt, and is, in fact, not disputed, that
strike trade has been made on this side of the Channel,
during the ten weeks which, up to the present, the dispute
has lasted. The Londonderry Trades Council were very
emphatic on this point that it was a deliberate attempt to
strangle a native Irish industry in favour of English
factory workers. (Journal of the ASh September 1920).
It was only after O'Donnell's letter to the Derry Journal that
members of the Trades Council took action to help local shirt
workers. Within a matter of days Logue, chairman of the Trades
Council and a nationalist member of the Corporation, announced that
the Trades Council had joined with two unnamed committees to collect
money for the relief of women shirt workers who had been locked-out,
and that a flat rate benefit would be paid at the end of the week
(DJ: 9 and 11 August 1920). Apart from Logue, the Committee set up
to administer the fund included Edward McCafferty, a member of the
shipwrights' trade union and a nationalist councillor; Charles
McGrellis who was local secretary of the UGW; and a Mrs Burke from
the mainly Protestant Waterside of the city - the ASTT was
unrepresented.	 The Committee advertised its appeal in both the
Londonderry Sentinel and the Derr y Journal.	 The text of the advert
was as follows,
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Derry and District Trades and Labour Council Appeal on
Behalf of The Factory Workers.
Fellow citizens, as you are aware a lock-out of the factory
employees of the city has been going on for some three or
four weeks, the result of which is a great many cases of
distress. In making this appeal we hope that the
merchants, trade societies, and citizens generally will
give to the factory workers the support which they are
entitled to, for they [ie the factory workers] have been
foremost in any good work of relieving distress. (LS: 19
August 1920).
Contrary to what Greaves (1982) suggests, it was only at this
stage - when the strike was nearing its end - that local Unionists
intervened.	 I will now examine that intervention, but first I want
to reconsider the question of the riots. It has already been shown
that the Derry riots cannot be seen as the response of local
Unionists to the shirt cutters' strike: inter-communal violence began
two months before the strike started. Moreover, Greaves fails to
cite sources for his argument that the riots were 'instigated by the
"yellow" Labour Party,' otherwise known as the 'Ulster Protestant and
Unionist Workers Party' (1982: 280-281). Certainly, I found no
reference to such an organisation in the local newspapers of the
period; nor, it seems, did Murphy (1981) or McCann (1974) both of
whom give quite detailed accounts of the violence. According to the
former, the trouble was triggered by the arrival of republican
prisoners at Derry jail, and was sustained by the 'enthusiasm of the
local IRA men' (1981: 254). For the latter, the troubles were caused
by the police, the military, and loyalists who embarked on an assault
against the Catholic community as a reaction to the nationalist
victory in the local government elections held earlier in the year
(1974: 162-164).
The first public statement relating to the cutters' strike made
by any Unionist organisation came in the form of a UULA advert
published in the Londonderry Sentinel on the 17 August 1920 (see also
DJ: 18 August 1920) - only four days before the dispute ended. It
was a specific response to O'Donnell's intervention and the Trades
Council's decision to participate in the collection of funds for
unemployed women factory workers; the text of the advert reads as
fol lows:
Unionist Labour Association, City of Derry Branch.
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Members of this association and all Protestant workers are
earnestly requested to refuse to have anything to do with
the ITGW1J.
	
It preaches republicanism and is used for
political purposes. We strongly urge all Unionist workers
to get into and remain in their respective amalgamated Lie
British based) unions.
The attention of female factory workers is specially
directed to this matter.
We also beg to announce that a fund for the relief of
factory workers has been established; that collectors will
be out with books bearing the stamp of the Unionist
Association and we earnestly appeal to our fellow citizens
to respond generously. (By order).
It is perhaps significant that the warning about the ITGWU contained
in this advert was directed towards women shirt workers, not to the
striking shirt cutters who, according to Greaves, were most
susceptible to O'Donnell's advances.
Something of the thinking behind the warning to women shirt
workers and the decision to set up a relief fund for them is revealed
in the row which the advert generated. A Trades Council spokesman
described the UULA intervention as an attempt to divide the workers,
asserted that the Council's relief fund had been distributed
irrespective of religion, and asked the UULA to co-operate with them;
his statement was echoed by the Derry Journal (18 August 1920). The
next issue of the Londonderry Sentinel contained an editorial in
which it was argued:
If heads be counted the largest bodies of Derry workers out
[of work] are the shirt factory hands. Their plight cannot
be exaggerated. The organisatiori which they were induced
to join, the Tailors' and Tailoresses' Society LASTI] is
unable to stand the strain on its funds of 7,000 [sic]
members out of work, but not on strike. In the
circumstances public charity has been solicited... It is
impertinent of the Derry Journal to deny the right of the
ULA Lie UULA] to issue an appeal on behalf of Protestant
workers or describe it as 'an attempt to arouse sectarian
animosities'.., but for Councillor Logue there would be no
need for a ULA. It was from his ruling as chairman of the
Trades Council that the ULA sprang. He ruled against
discussion of the Londonderry Improvement Bill on the
grounds that it was political [this was a Bill for the re-
drawing of electoral ward boundaries supported by the
Unionists].	 Yet he also ruled that conscription could be
discussed as not being political. After inconsistencies
like this is it any wonder that Unionist trade unionists
should lose faith in the Trades Council.
The editorial writer repeated his rejection of the Derr y Journal's
criticism of the UULA reilief fund, described the ITGWU as a 'purely
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republican' organisation, and asserted that the Trades Council relief
fund was 'an attempt to get Unionist factory girls into that
association [the ITGWU).
The UULA advert did not mention the shirt cutters' strike at
all. Indeed, the only public comment on the strike from a Unionist
point of view seems to have been that given at the beginning of the
Londonderry Sentinel editorial quoted above (19 August 1920). The
writer did not condemn the strikers or criticise the way in which
they had conducted their dispute; rather it pointed out that
'probably one-fourth' of the city's workforce - including not just
shirt workers but box-makers and transport workers - was workiess,
and stressed the 'serious' effect of the situation on the city's
'prosperity' and the 'moral effect of men and women spending their
days wandering the streets, while they live on whatever doles they
may receive from their organisat ions or from charity.' However, the
editorial writer elaborated on a contrast between the position of the
striking shirt cutters and that of striking railway workers:
the railway men, whose refusal to carry troops and
munitions has resulted in their suspension, have been
assured by a Catholic Bishop that the whole resources of
the country are at their back, and are probably satisfied
with the assurance. The case of the shirt cutters is
curious. They are members of an English trade association,
but the English members of this association have not been
called out.	 On the contrary, they are working at top
speed, executing orders, many of which in the ordinary
course would have come to Derry. Thus they are opening
avenues of trade which may permanently remain open to
Derry's loss. This has been stated by the secretary of the
Tailors'	 and	 Tailoresses'	 Association. ..	 and	 not
contradicted.	 The purpose of the English members of the
UGW is fairly obvious. They are keeping their Derry
members out on strike with the knowledge that if the Derry
men have their demands conceded the English members will
get the increased wages without having had to strike.
The Derry branch of the hULA may have had some role in the
negotiations which ended the dispute. McCorkell, as I have shown,
denied that O'Donnell played any significant role in the ending of
the strike; instead, he ascribed the major role in arranging the
talks which ended the dispute to Sir Robert Anderson who was - though
McCorkell does not identify him as such - the chairman of the hULA in
Derry (DS: 14 February 1919). According to McCorkell, Anderson acted
- 113-
on his own initiative, but
he was accepted [by the cutters] because he owned a
knitting factory. Ach, he was a tory and a Unionist, but
he was a fair man, accepted by both sides as a reasonable
employer... He had been mayor of the town, I don't know
whether he became an MP... a very nice fella, very nice
man. He took a very conciliatory point of view and tried
to get the employers to see reason. Now the employers had
the difficulty - they had to bring the cloth in. They had
to pay for the transport of the cloth to Derry... they also
had to send the finished gaments out, and there was this
expense on the Northern Ireland manufacturers... this was
the big problem, you see. Looking at it sitting here now I
could say 'my God, they had a case,' but I wasn' t going to
say that then, I was just as wild as the rest of the young
fellas. Oh Christ, we couldn't listen to that at all... It
came to the conclusion that Sir Robert Anderson called a
meeting of the employers and said, I can remember some of
the things he said: 'this town has nothing left but
shirtmaking,' we were probably the greatest shirtmakers in
the world at this time... 'you've got to come to your
senses and make some agreeable overtures to the union.' He
called his own side together, though he was in knitting..
alot of sensible work done by Sir Robert on that.
On the other hand, there is evidence to support the argument that
O'Donnell had a role in negotiating the end of the strike. Not only
is there O'Donnell's own testimony in interview, but the Derry
Journal (DJ: 18 August 1920) reported that he was negotiating on
behalf of the strikers, and at a public meeting held after the strike
he is reported to have claimed that he had got the cutters a 'few
extra bob' thereby enabling them to return to work (DJ: 27 August
1920).
It is not possible to arbitrate on the conflicting claims of
McCorkell and O'Donnell; it is even possible that both are true
because, prior to the final settlement of the strike, there seems to
have been several rounds of negotiations in which a variety of people
were involved (see report in the Journal of the ASTT September 1980
cited above). In any case, for my purposes, the two most important
points are, first, that the Unionist intervention in the strike was
much less sinister than Greaves suggests. It was a specific response
to the Trades Council's decision to set up a relief fund for out-of-
work female factory workers - a decision which the UULA and the
Londonderry Sentinel regarded as an attempt to induce them to join
the ITGWU.	 It did not express a fear that the shirt cutters' strike
portended what Greaves describes as the 'eclipse' of local Unionism.
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However, notwithstanding McCorkell's comments on Sir Robert Anderson,
there is little doubt that the UULA's intervention was divisive. For
example, the Londonderry Sentinel (19 August 1920) published a letter
from a 'factory worker' which contradicted the Trades Council's claim
that it was the formation of the huLA relief fund which had
introduced a religious element:
The first to introduce religion and politics were the
Catholic factory girls themselves. When I went down to the
Guildhall last week to get my share of relief, the Catholic
girls wanted to know what Protestants were coming there
'looking for Catholic benefit 	 for'	 and they kept
continually shouting 'up the rebels' and 'up Dublin'. The
committee say they have distributed the money irrespective
of creed and politics, but I know cases of families where
there are two girls in each belonging to the Tailoresses'
Society and only six shillings was given to each family.
The allegation that Protestant factory workers were being denied
money collected in by the Trades Council appears to have been used as
part of the wider propaganda battle being waged by Unionists and
nationalists in Ulster. It was reprinted in a leaflet which was
distributed in Belfast asking for contributions for the Protestant
workers of Derry 'out' due to the cutters' strike (DJ: 3 September
1920).
The other important point is, that the strike ended on 20 August
1920 and, although the terms of the settlement and the process by
which it was reached are obscure, it is clear that the cutters did
not achieve their original aim, parity with English cutters, and were
disappointed with the outcome. According to the Lridonderry Sentinel
(19 August 1920), the final round of negotiations began c17 August
when a UGW representative submitted an amended wage claim to the SMF.
The amended claim was described as less than the original demand but
more than the SMF had offered, and as a 'sacrifice' by the cutters
for the sake of the women factory workers. The Londonderrv Sentinel
(21 August 1920) reported that a settlement had been concluded on the
19 August 'when a small concession' was granted to the cutters, and
that the the SMF had agreed to re-open the factories the following
day.
To sum up. The shirt cutters strike cannot be understood within
Greaves' framework: his argument that the strike was indicative of an
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'ebb' in sectarianism and high 'Labour morale', and part of a process
which threatened to 'eclipse' Unionism is to misunderstand the strike
and exaggerate its political significance. The strikers were
motivated by a purely economic grievance, and even if they did 'turn
to O'Donnell' - and it is doubtful whether they did - it was in an
effort to reach a satisfactory aggreement with their employers and
did not imply support for his socialist republican politics. Some
solidarity across the sectarian divide was displayed during the
strike: the strikers were mainly Protestants but included some
Catholics and they received remarkable support from the dockers and
carters - a mainly Catholic and nationalist workforce. However,
there is evidence to suggest that support for the strike from some
shirt workers and from other sections of the local labour movement
was less forthcoming and that this was linked to political
considerations: a minority of Protestant cutters and packers with
particularly close links with Unionist institutions did not join the
strike, and the slowness of the Trades Council to respond to the
strike seems to have been linked to a concern that it was part of a
'plot' to destroy a 'native' Irish industry.
It seems to me that the problems with Greaves' analysis are not
simply casual errors of judgement on the part of one historian: his
analysis of the 1920 strike in Derry is redolent of the traditional
Irish marxist analysis of a more infamous series of events which took
place in Belfast at about the same time, In 1919 the mainly
Protestant workforce in Belfast's shipbuilding and engineering
complex struck for four weeks in pursuit of the 44 hour working week.
It was, in Patterson's words (1980: 92), the 'first major conflict in
which these groups of workers had been involved since 1895, ' and it
'assumed a novel militant form. ' 	 The following summer, this same
group of workers participated, or acquiesced, in the expulsion of
many Catholic, and some socialist, workers from the shipyard. For
Farrell (1980: 27-28, see also Gallacher, 1936) the strike was an
instance when Protestant shipyard workers began - atlast - to
discover their true class interests; the expulsions were a product of
manipulation by the Unionist ruling class who, fearing the emergence
of socialism among Protestant workers, had, in the period after the
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strike, stirred-up religious hatred and denounced socialism as a Sinn
Fein plot.
Patterson (1980) has argued that Farrell and Gallacher
misunderstand the Belfast events:
A major weakness of the traditional accounts is their
tendency to exaggerate the political significance of any
demonstration of an awareness of economic class interest on
the part of the Protestant workers. The forty-four hour
strike showed that the militant pursuit of an economic
demand by a strategic section of Protestant workers had an
insignificant effect on their political position. On a
more general level, the idea is incompatible with a basic
aspect of the labour movement recognised in many different
works: that militant trade union consciousness is
compatible with a conservative political affiliations.
(1980: 118).
A related weakess of such analyses is that they present an,
overly conspiratorial view of Unionist reaction to the
strike.	 Clearly the cunning bourgeoisie and its political
representatives who feature prominently in the
interpretations of Gallacher and Farrell are caricatures of
reality. (Patterson, 1980: 113).
I have made similar criticisms of Greaves' analysis of the shirt
cutters' strike. However, it seems to me that these
misunderstandings follow logically from the - mistaken - view of
social and historical reality implicit in traditional Irish marxist
perspective. I am referring to the tendency to conflate trade
unionism and socialism in an evolutionary schema, whereby militant
forms of the former are seen as a prelude which normally leads to the
latter; and to the related tendency to define the meanings of
struggles according to this evolutionary schema and without reference
to the way in which these struggles are perceived by the people who
participate in them (cf Geldhill 1988: 3-4 and Laclau 1985: 27).
3. 4 The Aftermath of the Strike: the Fragmentation of the ASTT and
the UGW
The break up of the ASTT and of the UGW began during the strike,
but the shifts in trade union allegiance did not crystallise until
afterwards. The permutations were as follows: the ASTT lost all but
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200 of its members (see Table 2, appendix 2); up to 3,000 women
joined the UGW (Stewart and Hunter, 1964: 173); 'several hundred'
women joined the ITGWIJ (DJ: 27 August 1920); and the UGW lost some of
its male membership to the ATGWU. To judge from the situation
described in the previous section, one might expect that these shifts
in union membership reflected sectarian divisions. After all, the
strike took place at a time when relations between Catholics and
Protestants in Derry were extraordinarily tense; the common struggle
by Protestant and Catholic shirt cutters to redress a shared
industrial grievance does not seem to have significantly altered
their identities as Unionists and nationalists; and the acrimonious
nature of the controversy between the UULA and the Trades Council
could only have exacerbated political differences between women
shirtmakers. However, although sectarian tensions posed a problem
for some of the trade union activists and officials seeking to pick
up the pieces after the strike, the organisations which emerged were
not, for the most part, sectarian in their composition, nor, it
seems, did most trade unionists choose to join one organisation
rather than another for primarily sectarian reasons. In this section
I will seek to elucidate the reasons behind these choices, examine
the sectarian composition of each of the unions involved, and discuss
some of the problems posed to union organisers and activists by
communal tensions and divisions.
Stewart and Hunter (1964: 172) explain what they describe as the
'disintegration of the ASTT' in the aftermath of the strike in the
following way:
The ASTT spent no less than £4,000 from its permanent fund
in supporting those of its members locked-out. The failure
[of the ASIT] to take any positive attitude towards the
wage claim and the refusal to give grants to those who had
joined unofficially in the strike destroyed confidence in
the Society in spite of this heavy expenditure. The
Amalgamated Society in Ireland disintegrated and left the
United Garment Workers' as the only union organising
factory workers.
While it is undoubtedly accurate to say that female shirt workers
lost confidence in the ASTT, and that this loss of confidence was
expressed in the mass exodus of women from the ASTT, Stewart and
Hunter's analysis Is inaccurate in several respects. First, the
union did not spend 'no less than £4,000 from its permanent fund
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supporting those of its members locked-out. ' The union' s annual
report reveals that it spent £4,052 from its 'central or permanent'
fund on strikes and lock-outs throughout Britain and Ireland in 1920,
of which only £1,250 was spent on 'Londonderry Shirtmakers' (ASTT
Annual Report 1920: 185-187). However, an additional amount of money
was raised for the relief of Derry workers through an appeal to ASTT
branches in Britain (Journal of the ASTT June 1921); the Derry
Journal put the total amount spent by the ASTT at £3,000 (2 August
1920). A more important inaccuracy is their suggestion that it was
the ASTT's 'refusal to give grants to those who had joined
unofficially in the strike' which 'destroyed confidence in the
Society.' There is no evidence that any female members of the ASTT
joined the strike unofficially. In fact, the local press present the
female shirt workers as the hapless victims of the dispute; for
example, the Londonderry Sentinel (24 August 1920) refers to 'the
female workers idle through no fault or inclination of their own.'
It was the failure of the ASTT to provide sufficient money to support
the women who had been layed off which caused the loss of confidence;
though, if one was to treat as a statement of fact the claim made by
the strikers' spokesman that a 'large number' of women had said that
they had made a mistake by not striking in sympathy with the cutters
(DJ: 9 August 1920), then Stewart and Hunter's suggestion that the
ASTT's failure 'to take any positive attitude towards the wage claim'
contributed to the women's loss of 'confidence' in the ASTT probably
contains an element of truth.
Furthermore, it is not true that the disintegration of the ASTT
'left the United Garment Workers' as the only union organisirig
factory workers, ' In the first place, the ITGWU organised 'several
hundred' female factory workers (DJ: 27 August 1920), and as Table 6
shows, the ASTT retained 200 members and recouped some of its losses
throughout the 1920s. Moreover, the surviving minutes of the
Londonderry Female Factory Workers' Branch of the ASTT which begin in
May 1924 reveal that the union continued to represent shirt workers
in negotiations with employers held under the auspices of the Trade
Board (see also item 43 of the minutes of the Executive Council in
the Journal of the ASTT, September 1925). Incidently, item 43 of the
Executive Council minutes, makes it clear that the ASTT accepted the
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SMF's argument - resisted by the UGW in the 1920 strike - that Derry
shirt workers be paid less than those in England to offset the extra
cost of transport.
The secretary of the Londonderry Factory Workers' Branch of the
ASTT, Sarah Doherty, was a Catholic who - according to a NUTGW
official, Jack Macgougan, who knew her in the 1940s - was
uninterested in politics 'but [was) if anything a nationalist.'
Moreover, as has been shown, Flynn, the ASTT national official sent
to Derry to deal with the crisis, had criticised the cutters' strike
on a nationalist basis, alleging that the English members of the
cutters' union had being doing 'Derry work', and that the strike was
part of a plot to destroy a 'native Irish industry.' Nevertheless,
there is evidence to suggest that the Branch Included Protestants
aswell as Catholics: the surviving minutes reveal that the ASTT had
members in the strongly Protestant Ebrington factory (Minute: October
1926). The only insight into the politics of the activists which can
be gleaned from these minutes is that they agreed to lend their
support to the Trades Council's effort to secure labour
representation In the Corporation elections of January 1926 (Minute:
20 October 1925). This is a reference to the formation of the local
Labour Party which was discussed in chapter two, and it is
interesting to note that one of the Labour candidates who was
returned to the Corporation unopposed was a Mrs Simms (Journal of the
ASTT March 1926), who is noted in the Branch Committee minutes
(October 1926) as the ASTT shop steward in the Ebrington factory.
She was also one of those Labour councillors who attracted criticism
from nationalist politicians for attending the Duke of Abercorn's
reception (DJ: 18 October 1926, and see section 2.2).
Unlike the ASTT, the ITGWU was not successful In attracting
shirt workers from both sides of the sectarian divide: all of those
who joined were Catholics, This was not a consequence of any
sectarian intent on the part of O'Donnell or James Houston, the Derry
Branch secretary. During the strike, O'Donnell had made it clear
that he wished to organise Catholic and Protestant workers, and he
took pride in telling me how he had organised some Protestant workers
in a flour mill on the Waterside and gone Into a strongly Protestant
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area of the city to negotiate on their behalf'. And Houston is
quoted as telling a meeting of factory workers that the ITGWU was not
a sectarian organisation and that all religions were represented in
It (DJ: 27 August 1920). However, as I have shown, O'Donnell's
intervention in the cutters' dispute was accompanied by a bitter
tirade against British trade unionism, and, seemingly, it was to this
that those women who joined the ITGWU had responded: O'Donnell told
me that any women who joined the ITGWU did so on 'a nationalist or
sectarian basis.' Without the necessary evidence, one can only
speculate about the effect of the UULA's warning about the ITGWIJ on
Protestant shirt workers, but, in any case, it is hardly likely that
O'Donnell's views would have attracted Unionist shirt workers.
Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight, O'Donnell recognised that his
intervention was, in itself, divisive. At several points during my
interview with him he expressed regret about his period as a union
organlser in Derry. For example, he told me that 'I should not have
intervened [in the strike], should have left it to the unions
concerned,' and that the result of his intervention was to 'split the
workforce.
The ITGWU organistation in the shirt factories was still
functioning in 1921. For example, the Derry Journal reported that
the 'ITGWU (Girls Section) Derry' organised a picnic at Buncrana in
June 1921 at which 'Ireland Arise', 'The Internationale', and 'The
Red Flag' were sung. But It was not to last much longer. The
circumstances of the collapse of the Derry Branch of the ITGWU are
obscure - Derry was only one of more than 100 branches of the ITGWU
which collapsed in the period 1920-22 (Greaves, 1982: 304). Greaves
attributes this general disorganisatlon to the 'Anglo-Irish war and
the Black and Tan Terror' (1982: 304) durIng which the union's
headquarters in Dublin was attacked, and some members of staff
arrested; others left the union so as to take up full-time positions
in the IRA. O'Donnell was one of the latter, In October 1920 he
resigned from the union and became the commander of the Second
Brigade of the Northern Division of the IRA (Greaves, 1982: 292 and
Freyer, 1973: 30). But Derry does not seem to have been neglected:
Charles Ridgeway - former secretary of the Belfast Branch of the
ITGWU (Greaves, 1982: 279) - replaced Houston as secretary of the
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E)erry Branch,	 and,	 despite his commitment to IRA activities,
O'Donnell continued to take an active interest In local union
affairs. Thus, the collapse of the Derry Branch cannot simply be
explained in terms of the the exigencies of a guerrilla war, though
these may have been a factor; rather, it seems to have been
precipitated by a local industrial dispute.
The dispute was in Watt's distillery.	 On 3 June 1921, 130
workers, all members of the ITGWU, struck against an attempt by
management to introduce a wage-cut.	 The strikers were particularly
aggrieved because the management, who did not recognise the ITGWU,
had not consulted them about the matter. The National Amalgamated
Union of Labour (NAUL) which had 40 members in the distillery did not
join the strike because, according to Logue, local secretary of the
NAUL, nationalist councillor, and chairman of the Trades Council, the
wage-cut had been accompanied by a reduction in hours to the pre-War
level; because the ITGWU had not supported an NAUL wage claim for
distillery workers in November 1920; and because he wanted to avoid
the threatened closure of the distillery (DJ: 6, 10, 13, and 20 June
1921). An ITGWiJ spokesman explained that his union had not supported
the November 1920 action because the ITUC had urged that all wage
movements be suspended and that all trade union funds be put at the
disposal of the railway men who were refusing to move munitions; the
strike continued (DJ: 10 June 1921). 	 Meanwhile, the the distillery
closed and was never to re-open (DJ: 10 June 1921>.
According to O'Donnell many people in Derry held him as being
personally responsible for the closure of the distillery. He was
involved in the dispute but rejected the idea that he was in any
sense to blame for what happened: he told me that decisions relating
to the strike had not been taken by him but by a Strike Committee.
At the time (DJ: 17 June 1921) he defended the ITGWU's position by
arguing that no industry had the right to continue if it could not
pay a living wage and that if workers let a threat of closure
Intimidate them, then, the labour movement would be undermined. He
then went on to contrast the 'heroic' struggle of Irish workers
fighting the British blockade with the failure of the 'triple
alliance' of unions in Britain.
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However, local critics did not confine themselves to abusing
O'Donnell, they also attacked Ridgeway and the tactics used by
successive ITGWU organisers in Derry. One critic, who in his letters
to the Derry Journal (13 and 17 June 1921) signed himself 'Derryman',
accused the ITGWIJ of intimidating those who had continued working
during the dispute and alleged that the Interests of Derry workers
were being sacrificed for a bit of spite between two unions. He
continued:
The [Irish] transport union ruined labour in Derry by
splitting it up on religious and political grounds and need
not try to cover up its tracks now by having a Belfast
Protestant here as an organiser [a reference to Ridgeway].
'Derryman' regarded the fact that Ridgeway was from Belfast as
evidence of a plot: a Belfast distillery would get work which had
hitherto been done by Watt's. In a second letter 'Derryman' wrote
that the socialist ideas advocated by the ITGWU were a threat to
'faith and fatherland. ' Ridgeway claimed, in a reply to 'Derryman'
(DJ: 15 June 1921), that this was the third time that he had been
accused of being a Belfast Orangeman; on one of the other two
occasions the accusation had been made by an under manager In Watt's.
Mr M. McNaught, a member of the NAUL, claimed that the only reason a
section of the workforce in Watt's had joined the ITGWU was that its
'organiser came to Derry in June 1920 when sectarian feeling was at
its height... and criticised English based trade unions' (DJ: 22:
June 1921). According to O'Donnell the Derry Branch of the ITGWU had
also been denounced by a local priest; he added that the Church in
Derry was very Influential and strongly anti-socialist. Thus, the
ITGW1J was subject to criticism not just by loyalist organisations
such as the UIJLA, but also by sections of the nationalist community.
And it seems that the Derry Branch of the ITOWU could not withstand
either the criticism arising from, or the loss of membership
occasioned by, the closure of Watt's distillery.
O'Donnell spent most of the latter part of 1921 and most of 1922
in Dublin where he was a leading member of the anti-treaty faction of
the IRA. He was taken prisoner by the Free State forces after the
fighting in the Four Courts and remained in prison until March 1924.
He never returned to Derry as an industrial organiser, but spent the
rest of his life as a writer and a socialist republican activist in
- 123-
the South of Ireland. Ridgeway, was also involved in the Civil War
on the anti-treaty side, and he was arrested by Free State forces in
Monaghan in July 1922 (Greaves, 1982: 314).
Three main questions remain to be answered: the first concerns
those cutters who remained loyal to the UGW, the second concerns
those who joined the ATGWIJ, the third concerns the women who joined
the UGW. I will discuss the first two questions together. McCorkell
remained loyal to the UGW. He did so as a matter of course: he was a
young apprentice and the journeymen cutters in his cutting room all
remained members of the UGW. He first explained the defection of
some cutters to the ATGWU in relation to the help which the latter
had given to shirt cutters during the strike: for example, he
concluded his recollection of the occasion when Kelly, a member of
the ATGWU, persuaded the bank to cash a cheque for the relief of
unemployed women in the following way:
the Transport and General Workers' Union, I've always had
great respect for since, pulled us out of a hole... with
the result that an number of the cutters left and joined
the Transport and General Workers' Union.
However, it is clear from his recollections that many cutters were
unhappy with the settlement of the strike and blamed the UGW f or it:
as a matter of fact the sour members of the union in the
cutting room were more or less blaming it on the union - it
was a good by-pass: 'well we didn't get all we needed but
we'll blame the flaming union for that!' which was a wee
bit unfair because the union did, I thought, a reasonable
job, not an excellent job because it was an awkward
situation.
This was combined with a more long standing grievance held by some
local cutters against Andrew Conley, the general secretary of the
UGW:
Previous to [the strike] there had been a meeting between
Andy Conley and the old union... 	 the Tailor and
Tailoresses, and the meeting was held in the Guildhall.
Andy had a few drinks too many... and didn't give them [the
cutters] attention. .. and the cutters remembered this and
as soon as they got this opportunity they went out, said
Andy was so bloody drunk... that he didn't give them the
attention. I can't verify it, but thats what they said.
Additionally, McCorkell thought that 'the religious question
came into all these things. ' On the one hand he thought that
Catholic cutters were particularly dissatisfied with the settlement
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of the strike because of Sir Robert Anderson's involvement:
There was always the feeling, this Catholic/Protestant
thing, that he was in with the employers. But I always
thought he had done a very good job in getting them
together and saying, 'look you've got to get this thing
settled.
To remind the reader, Anderson was the chairman of the UULA In Derry
and, according to McCorkell, the prime mover in arranging the talks
which ended the strike. On the other hand, McCorkell thought that
some Protestant shirt cutters 'more from religious grounds than
anything else, stayed in the Garment Workers' [Union].' What he
meant by this was that they regarded the ATGWU was as being too
militant and left-wing:
Well the question was in the minds of a very very strong
conservative town that these fellas [the dockers] were
labourites or communists, no communists were mentioned at
that period, but, you know, there were left-wingers and
they [the cutters who stayed in the UGW] didn't want to
know them at all.
The fact that the core membership of the ATGWU in Derry, the dockers
and carters, was mainly Catholic was also a factor, McCorkell summed
up the attitude of some Protestant shirt cutters to the dockers in
the following way:
There was this majority of dockers Catholic - mind you,
there were a few Protestants. The other thing was that the
Protestants always felt they were a wee cut above the
Catholic: the Catholic was the peasant - that goes through
Irish history. .. and they wanted into a respectable job:
engineering or particularly into a [shirt] factory. It was
a nice clean, tidy job, you weren't going... emptying a
boat with timber.. . or carrying in bags of grain to
McCorkell's granary [no relation). That type of job was a
wee bit below, although there was Protestants in it, but
generally speaking they wanted to get their sons Into a
respectable job, a clean job.
However, on reflection, McCorkell thought that 'religious'
factors were not the most Important determinant of cutters' trade
union affiliations, and that, although those who remained in the UGW
tended to be Protestants, those who defected to the ATGWU included
both Catholics and Protestants. 	 Furthermore, he made several
comments which leads one to suspect that issues to do with sex and
skill were atleast as, and probably more, important. For example,
when he was explaining his own reasons for staying in the UGW and not
following those cutters who joined the ATGWIJ, he told me:
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and we weren't happy with some of the[ir] complaints - it
was this question of male chauvinism, this male thing, the
mother and the father and who was to do what, though they
wouldn't have known what that meant then.
This is an obscure and anachronistic remark which he did not
elaborate on, but on another occasion, after he had repeated his
assertion that one of the reasons that cutters left the UGW was that
they were dissatified with Conley' s drunkeness, he told me:
and the cutters were being undermined by women coming into
the cutting room and they didn't like that... the men felt
that they had been let down - the Garment Workers' [Union]
was a strong union of women as against the ATGWU
The significance of these remarks will be assessed at the end of this
chapter.
The UGW, despite the failure of the strike and the defection of
some men to the ATGWU, emerged as the union with the largest
membership in the Derry shirt industry - Stewart and Hunter (1964)
put the figure at 3,000. The political disagreements expressed in
the controversy over the relief fund, and the general political
tension did not prevent shirt workers from both communities from
joining the UGW: its membership included a small number of Protestant
men, and a much larger number of Catholic and Protestant women.
However, there is evidence that this heterogeneous membership created
problems for the full-time secretary who was appointed to reorganise
the Branch in the aftermath of the strike, and for the union's
activists. The new secretary was Annie Holmes; before becoming a
union official she had been a dressmaker in Leeds (GW: August 1926).
McCorkell gives some impressions of the gulf between Catholic and
Protestant members of the union and of the difficulties which Holmes
faced:
We weren't in the velvet period of trade unionism.., and
the contributions had to be collected. Willie Rolston from
Remelton, he was the shop steward in Hogg and McIntyre's
but I was the collector. So my job on Friday night was to
walk up and down Carlisle Road on the Protestant side and
get shouted from the other side 'theres a bob, thats my
contribution. ' That's one of the ways we collected the
money... When I tell that story over here [in Scotland],
they look at me as if I was mad. But they don't know that
[sic] days, the Protestants walked up the right side and
ne're the twain met...
	 you couldn't collect it [the dues]
in the factory except in the toilets [because the
employers] weren't happy about it. 	 Ralston was a married
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man, there were other married men that didn' t want to get
involved in that sort of thing. But I was an apprentice,
and there was others, thats were most of the collecting was
done.
McCorkell did not say whether he crossed the road to collect the
contributions or whether the Catholics threw the money to him on the
other side, but which ever was the case the story attests to the
depth of the division between Protestant and Catholic members of the
UGW.
Holmes quickly integrated herself into local political life - by
1926 she was assistant secretary of the Trades Council and treasurer
of the newly formed Labour Party (GW: August 1926). But McCorkell
suggests that she found it difficult to cope with local realities,
sectarian and otherwise. One of the problems which she had to deal
with was the fact that the UGW was not the only organisation with
members in the factories. To judge from reports in the ASTT Journal,
she did not deal with this situation very effectively.	 She is said
to have declared that,
all work not made by a member of their union [the UGW]
would be declared 'tainted goods'... the delivery of goods
to or from the factories [with workforces not organised by
the UGW] was to be held up if possible. (Journal of ASTT
June 1924).
Although the campaign against non members of the UGW did not succeed
- the plans were leaked to the employers - ASTT officials were, not
surpisingly, outraged by it; this together with a residual animosity
from the strike, and, perhaps, differing approaches to wage claims,
gave rise to considerable bitterness between ASTT and UGW activists.
This may be gauged by the fact that during a discussion about
amalgamation between the ASh and the UGW at the former's 1927
conference, Derry activists persisted in submitting a motion against
amalgamation despite being urged to withdraw it by the union's
leadership; Sarah Doherty told the conference: 'We had 5,000 members
in Derry and this splendid organisation was smashed by the other
society' [Journal of ASTT September 1927). Sarah Doherty also made
several complaints about the Derry Branch of the UGW in the ASTT
Journal, but no where is there any suggestion that sectarian
differences were a part of the inter-union rivalry. This is not
surprising, afterall, as we have seen, both unions appear to have had
a mixed membership. According to McCorkell, however, Holmes's action
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against non-unionists in atleast one factory did reveal an
insensitivity to local realities:
by God did she work, there wasn't a factory she didn't
visit, and she was courageous. .. Holmes was a great woman,
but she was English and she made the great mistake of not
appreciating [the strong Protestant element in Ebrington],
she got the ATGWIJ to stop deliveries of cloth, and that was
another grudge they held.
In a more light hearted vein, McCorkell recalled other aspects
of the local situation which Holmes failed to appreciate:
I can well remember that the unemployment question was a
very high one at that period in Derry. One meeting that
sticks out in my mind was Annie was asked to talk about
'back to the land'... I was seething because we'd just left
it. There was an old fella sitting at the back of the
hall... He said, 'I'll join that movement when I see her
sitting under a cow milking it!' the whole place just fell
to pieces.
3.5 Conclusion
There is ample evidence for the existence of tensions between
Catholic and Protestant shirt workers during the latter part of the
nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. However, I have
shown that, in relation to this group of workers, traditional Irish
marxist theories do not illuminate much about the the effect of
sectarian divisions on trade unionism, and that they may, as in the
case of Greaves' analysis of the shirt cutters' strike of 1920,
actually lead to a misunderstanding. It is certainly true that
female shirt workers found it difficult to organise; however, in
section 3. 2 I showed that, contrary to what traditional Irish marxism
would lead us to expect, sectarianism was not the main or only
obstacle to unionisation: the trade union establishment in Derry was
neither hostile nor indifferent to the organisation of female shirt
workers, and the history of their early attempts to organise in the
shirt industry suggests that while sectarianism among the women was
perceived as a problem it was not insurmountable. To understand the
difficulties experienced by women shirt workers in their first
efforts to organise, and to determine the extent to which
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sectarianism played a part in the process, would require much more
evidence than is currently available. Fortunately, such evidence is
available for later periods, and in the next chapter I will examine
the development of trade unionism among women shirt workers in the
1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and early 1950s.
It is also true, as was shown in sections 3.3 and 3,4, that the
Industrial conflict in the Derry shirt industry in the summer of 1920
became embroiled in the near civil war between Unionists and
nationalists which was then at its height, and that trade unionism
fragmented in the aftermath of the industrial conflict. However, we
have seen that Desmond Greaves (1982) fundamentally misunderstands
the relationship between the industrial and the political conflict,
and that his misunderstanding results from the misconceptions which,
as was shown in chapter one, lie at the heart of traditional Irish
marxism. Moreover, while it is true that some of the divisions which
emerged between shirt workers in the course of the strike had a
sectarian dimension, there were some remarkable - remarkable given
the context - displays of cross-community solidarity; and although
divisions between Catholic and Protestant shirt workers continued to
pose problems for union organisers after the strike, trade unionism
revealed a capacity to accommodate such divisions.
Finally, when one reconsiders the history presented in this
chapter In the light of John McCorkell's comments on why some shirt
cutters defected from the UGW to the ATGWU In the aftermath of the
1920 strike one begins to suspect that gender, rather than politics
or religion, was the main dividing line in the structure of trade
unionism in the Derry shirt industry. After all, in 1920 the Derry
Branch of the UGW was exclusively composed of men, most of them
Protestants, who embarked on the strike with no apparent thought for
the conditions of their female colleagues, Protestant and Catholic
alike, or for the effects which the strike might have on them. This
suspicion Is increased with the knowledge that the heemorrhage of
male shirt cutters to the ATGWU continued throughout the 1920s so
that by 1932 it was the union to which most shirt cutters belonged.
Nevertheless, it must remain merely a suspicion because the available
evidence is contradictory. Although the Derry Branch of the UGW was
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exclusively male in 1920, the union was overwhelmingly female in the
rest of the United Kingdom - in 1919 the membership figures were
79,000 women and 23,000 men (Stewart and Hunter, 1964: 172) - and it
had an ethos which 'claim[ed] a universality embracing Jew and
Gentile,	 craftsman,	 factory worker and home worker,	 without
distinction of age or sex' (Stewart and Hunter, 1964: 172).
Moreover, during the strike, as I have shown, the cutters' spokesman
rejected allegations that they had refused to accept women as members
of the UGW in the past, and urged them to join. However, in chapter
five I will explore this suspicion further in relation to the period
after 1920, a period for which the evidence neccessary to examine the
interplay of gender, skill, and sectarianism in the organisational
choices made by shirt cutters in Derry is available.
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CHAPTER 4: THE DECLINE AND GROWTH OF TRADE UNIONISM AMONG WOMEN
SHI RTMAKERS 1920-1952
4. 1 Introduction
The pattern of organisation among women shirtmakers in Derry
during the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and early 1950s appears to contradict
the view, predominant in the literature, that the growth of trade
unionism in Northern Ireland was thwarted by sectarianism. To be
sure, union membership in Derry shirt factories declined steeply
after the high point of 1918/1919, but so too did union membership
among women and in the United Kingdom in the 1920s and 1930s. And
after 1945 union membership among Derry' s women shirtmakers - as
among men and women workers in the United Kingdom - increased
prodigIously 1 '. In other words, fluctuations in union membership In
Derry shirt factories mirrored broader trends (see Mackie and
Patullo, 1977: 165). Furthermore, the density of union membership2'
in Derry factories In 1918/1919 and between 1945 and 1952 was
comparatively high by the standards of clothing workers in Britain.
So much so, that the Derry case seems to be an exception to the usual
picture of trade unionism among women in Britain. British labour
history tells us that 'women's hold on trade union organisation' has
been 'persistently weak' (Alexander, 1980: 141; see also Lewenhak,
1978: ix, and Turner, 1962: 293): generally speaking, the density of
union membership among women workers has been lower than that among
men, and women have tended to be under-represented among union
activists and officiols. 	 Shirtmakers in Derry conform to neither of
these two generalisations. In this chapter, I will discuss the
conjunctural factors influencing the fluctuations In union membership
among women shirt makers in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, and then
explore further the seemingly anomalous development of the Derry
Branch of the NUTGW In the late 1940s In relation to both traditional
Irish marxism and general theories about women workers and trade
unionism.	 However, before I can say anything more about the form
_1	 -
which the discussion will take it is necessary to detail the trends
in union membership and participation outlined above.
The available statistics relating to trade union membership
among men and women shirt workers are as desultory as those relating
to the numbers employed in the industry (see chapter 2.3).
Nevertheless, it is possible to discern trends in membership from the
descriptions and comments recorded in the minutes of the Branch
Committee of the ASTT/NUTGW or published in the union journals, and
calculate union densities for the odd years in which the necessary
employment and membership figures are available.
To recap on the figures presented in the last chapter. 	 In 1918
the Londonderry Female Factory Workers' Branch of the ASTT had 3,464
members. Following the 1920 strike approximately 3,000 of these
women transferred to the 0GW leaving only 200 in the ASTT.
Subsequently, ASTT membership revived to the extent that It had 819
members in 1927,	 After 1920 0GW membership in Derry declined to
about 2,000 men and women in 1926 (cf Mortished, 1927: 223). In the
late 1920s the organisers of both unions with female members in the
Derry shirt industry experienced difficulties in maintaining
membership levels. By 1930, ASTT membership had declined to 216 (see
Table 6) and activists were complaining that it was difficult to
'keep girls in the society' and about the unfairness of a situation
in which 'so many of the girls were not in the society and left the
burden to others' (ASTT Branch Committee Minutes: 26 March 1931). At
the same time, several of Annie Holmes' reports to the Garment worker
dwell on the difficulties of maintaining 0GW membership (April and
December 1926; see also March 1928).
Following a ballot of the membership in December 1931, the ASTT
and the 0GW amalgamated to form the National Union of Tailors and
Garment Workers. The Derry Branches of the two unions 'fused' on 10
October 1932. The new structure was as follows: the 'shirt section'
of the 0GW Branch Committee fused with the 'factory section' of the
ASTT Branch Committee to form the 'factory section' Committee of the
NIJTGW; like wise, the ASTT tailors' section fused with the 0GW
tailors to form a tailors' section Committee within the NUTGW.
	 It
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was decided that the two new Committees were to meet separately once
a month and jointly once every two months. A meeting of the members
voted in favour of this arrangement by 33 votes to 4 (Minutes of the
Londonderry Branch of the NUTGW': 10 October 1933).
Sarah Doherty, despite her previous hostility to the UGW, had
high hopes that the amalgamation of the two unions would solve the
membership problem. During the debate on the proposed amalgamation
at an ASTT conference in August 1931 she is reported to have said
that she:
supported amalgamation [because] for the past 11 years they
had been trying to re-organise the factory workers arid if
amalgamation took place they would be in a position to do
so. When they had a Branch in 1920 with one Society they
had 5,000 members (sic], and they hoped to have 5,000
members again with amalgamation. (Journal of the ASTT
September 1931).
In her first report to the Garment worker (GW: January 1932) after
being appointed secretary of the Derry Branch of the amalgamated
union, she wrote:
Our strength is at last united, and I have no doubt that
the result will be for the lasting betterment of the
working conditions in the clothing trade generally, as
better organisation is bound to follow the uniting of our
forces.	 Of course, it will take some time to set the new
machine In motion, but not very long. Our shop stewards
will now be able to deal more effectively with the mean
non-unionists who have for so long played one union against
the other and taken all the advantages which loyal trade
unionists obtain for them without contributing a single
penny for the upkeep of any trade union.
Her hopes were ill founded; union membership and Branch activity
deteriorated after amalgamation. Some male shirt cutters had, as I
have shown, defected to the ATGWU prior to amalgamation, and in June
1932 the newly formed NUTGW entered into a national agreement which
formally recognised the 'right' of the ATGWU to organise cutters in
Derry (see next chapter). 	 Only a few of the 200 or so male cutters
employed in the Derry shirt industry continued as members of the
NiJTGW. Male handicraft tailors remained loyal to the NUTGW, but,
although well organised, they were few in number: for example, in the
year prior to amalgamation there were only 48 members in the tailors'
Branch of the ASTT (see Table 6). The ASTT brought approximately 317
women into the amalgamated union; there is no figure for the number
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of women from the UGW.	 However, one indication of the decline in
Branch activity is the infrequency of Committee meetings after 1934:
no meetings were recorded between November 1934 and March 1936; only
two in 1936; and in 1937 there was one 'Yearly Meeting' and one
meeting of Tulle and Henderson workers. In 1938 there was only a
'Yearly Meeting' at which a decrease in membership was noted and the
secretary was reported as saying 'the workers did not seem to realise
how necessary it was for them to become members of the union'
(Minute: 3 March 1938).
The most telling evidence of the decline in Branch membership in
the 1930s is a report by Mr L. Hodson (GW: November 1935), a member
of the NUTGW from England, who 'acting on instructions from head
office... proceeded to Londonderry to give our Irish colleagues a
hand with the organisation of the shirt workers in that town.
Following an account of his consultation with the Branch Committee,
his propaganda work at factory gates, and a 'mass meeting in the
Guildhall', he concludes:
That, however, appears to be the sad end of the story, for
very few of the Derry shirt workers are in the trade union.
The mass meeting [was]... a little bit more encouraging...
for we had 200 workers, male and female. 	 Many of these
promised to fill up application forms. There is large
scope for organisation in Derry and if the girls would only
see things in their true light, our membership would run
into thousands.
The decline was halted in the early 1940s. The Branch Committee
met more regularly than before: there was an average of six Committee
meetings a year in each of the five years between 1939 and 1944
inclusive. Membership was still low and regarded as a problem by the
activists; for example, at the 'Yearly Meetings' held in 1941 and
1942 the main motion urged action to be taken against the 'thousands
of non-trade unionists employed in government work' - work which it
had been agreed by the government should be performed by trade union
labour. But it had increased from the low point of the mid 1930s:
one indication of the core membership of the union in this period is
that the Branch was supplied with 800 ballot papers for the Executive
Board elections held in 1943/44; members in arrears with their
subscriptions were not entitled to vote (Minute: 5 December 1943).
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Beginning in the summer of 1945 Branch membership increased
prodigiously. Almost every Branch Committee meeting and monthly
Branch report published in the Garment Worker through the second half
of 1945 and early in 1946 notes several hundred newcomers to the
union.	 In July 1946, Sarah Doherty told the Branch Committee that
local NUTGW membership was 2,144 - an increase of 1,000 since June of
the previous year. This was not a flash in the pan; as a NUTGW
estimate of 3,300 members in Derry in March 1948 shows, it was
sustained growth (see Table 7). These gains in membership were made
only among the women workers: in 1950 - the only year for which a
comprehensive sexual breakdown of membership is available - there
were 3, 335 female members in the Derry Branch of the NUTGW and only
59 men (Minute: 15 April 1950).
	 By all accounts, most of these men
were tailors.
I will locate these fluctuations in union membership among Derry
shirtmakers in the context of trends in union membership in the
United Kingdom in a moment, but first I want to consider the extent
to which women participated in trade unionism as activists and as
officials.	 Judging from my respondants' recollections, most NUTGW
shop stewards were women. A more useful measure of women's active
involvement in union affairs are the lists of Branch Committee
members and office holders occasionally noted in the minutes of the
ASTT/NUTGW.	 An examination of the sexual composition of the Branch
Committees relative to the numbers of men and women among the wider
membership reveals the following.	 In 1924, the Committee of the
Female Factory Workers' Branch of the ASTT consisted of 10 women
(Minute: 23 July 1924). 	 The chairman was a tailor even though the
tailors consituted a separate local Branch. As was pointed out
above, when the ASTT and UGW amalgamated in 1932 male membership was
very small: most cutters had defected to the ATGWU and there were, at
most, 60 tailors. Nevertheless, men had a majority on the full
Committee which was set up following the amalgamation: of the 10
Committee members 6 were men (2 cutters and 4 tailors) and 4 were
women;	 the chairman was a cutter - John Kilgore (Minute: 10 October
1933).	 The sexual composition of Committees elected in the late
1940s was more representative of the numbers of men and women among
the wider membership.	 Of the 13 Committee members elected in 1948
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only 1 was male, but the chairman was also male.
	 The former was a
shirt cutter in Tillie and Henderson's factory; the latter was a
tailor. The Committee which was elected to serve in 1950 consisted
of 3 men (2 cutters and 1 tailor) and 7 women (I do not know the sex
of two of the members) and a male chairman (the shirt cutter from
Tillie and Henerson's mentioned previously). Thus, despite a
tendency for men to be over-represented among Branch Committee
members and office holders, women always had a subtantial involvement
in the Branch Committee.
Judging from my respondants' recollections, it can be safely
assumed that the men and women who joined Branch Committees were
among the most active members of the union. However, to say that
women were usually well represented on the Branch Committees of the
ASTT and NUTGW is not to say anything about the extent to which they
influenced union decision-making. Several studies of union
government have questioned the significance of the branch committee:
some scholars emphasise the extent to which union power is
concentrated in the hands of a few full-time officials, others argue
that the branch committee is less important than unofficial or
informal, work-place based, shop stewards' committees (see James,
1984: 111, and Hyman and Fryer, 1975: 155). I will examine the role
of members of the Derry Branch Committee of the NUTGW in decision-
making and union government later in this chapter and in subsequent
chapters, but for the moment only two points need to be made. First,
although there were occasions when groups of activists met informally
and when factions developed, there was never any organised,
unofficial, work-place based shop stewards' movement: the Branch
Committee remained the only local arena in which activists could air
their views.	 And second, women were not so well represented among
the full-time officials of the union, As has already been shown,
prior to the 1932 amalgamation, the organising secretaries of both
the UGW and the ASTT were women: Annie Holmes and Sarah Doherty
respectively. The latter continued as secretary of the NIJTGW until
she retired in 1947. Her successor was a man, Stephen McGonagle. In
1928 the UGW executive created the post of Irish regional organiser,
and stipulated that 'the person to be appointed must be a journeyman
tailor' (GW: August 1928); the man appointed was Edward McCafferty.
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The NUTGW retained the post and it has always been held by a man:
Terence Waidron was appointed in November 1938, and Jack Macgougan in
1945.
I now wish to locate the pattern of union membership and
participation among Derry shirtmakers in a broader context. The
fluctuations in union membership among Derry shirt workers 1920-1952
follows the United Kingdom pattern. The years 1918/1919 and 1947-52
were high points for union membership among shirtmakers in Derry;
these years were also high points for union membership among women in
the United Kingdom: Mackie and Patullo (1977: 165) describe the
decline in membership - among men as well as women - in the 1930s as
of 'drastic proportions.' And according to Lewenhak (1978: 247):
Between 1946 and 1947 the number of women [trade union]
members in the country [Britain] as a whole rose by over
100,000. The proportion of women who were union members
also rose so that by 1948 it amounted to a quarter of the
total female workforce. Almost as high as in 1920.
Clegg (1979: 177) writes, 'total trade union density [ie men and
women in Britain] reached a peak in 1948 with 45% of the labour
force.
Within this over-all pattern of fluctuating membership, trade
union densities among female shirt workers in Derry were high in
comparison with clothing workers elsewhere in the United Kingdom. In
1918/1919 Derry factories employed between 5,000 and 8,000 workers;
membership of the Londonderry Factory Workers' Branch of the ASTT was
nearly 3, 500; therefore, the trade union density was atleast 50%. It
is not possible to calculate the trade union density among British
clothing workers in this period (see Lewenhak, 1978: 247), but the
reader may recall that of the 7,852 female members who joined the
ASTT in 1917, 3, 154 worked in Derry (see section 3.2). Judging by
the figures presented in Table 6, the density of union membership
among Derry shirtmakers in 1948 was approximately 50%. At the 1945
conference of the NUTGW, the delegates had set themselves the target
of recruiting 50% of the clothing workforce in the Britain - that is,
250,000 workers out of a workforce of approximately 500,000 (118,000
men and 434,000 women; see Eaton and Gill, 1981: 201); this target
was achieved in the 1970s, but certainly not the 1940s or the 1950s
(Stewart and Hunter, 1964: 219, and Coyle, 1982: 20).	 Indeed, on the
- 137
basis of membership figures published in the 1952 annual report of
the British Trade Union Congress (TUC) the density of trade unionism
among women clothing workers in Britain was only 30.3%. This figure
is probably an over-estimate: the membership reported to the TUC was
almost certainly exaggerated, and in September 1952, a member of the
secessionary Branch Committee of the NUTGW claimed that the union had
recruited only 15.5% of British clothing workers (DJ: 15 September
1952). Moreover, the density of union membership in Derry in 1948
was almost on a par with that among clothing workers in Leeds, a city
which was the original headquarters of the NUTGW and which, for many
years, contained its best organised branches (Stewart and Hunter,
1964: 198-199).
It is more difficult to find a standard against which to judge
the level of active participation by women in the Derry Branch of the
NUTGW. The only available comparisons relate to a much later period;
nevertheless, they do tend to confirm my suggestion that the level of
involvement by female NUTGW members in Derry was relatively high:
Coyle (1982: 20) describes union organisation in the British clothing
industry in the 1970s in the following way:
About half the industry's workforce is unionised and women
make up about 90 per cent of the membership. The
organisation of female labour has tended to occur in those
branches of the industry where men and women are employed,
whilst branches such as light clothing [of which the shirt
industry is a part], which has an almost entirely female
labour force, remain slow to unionise ('Garment Worker',
May 1970). Men dominate the union hierarchy both in the
National Executive and at local level.,. The scope for
women's participation is limited even if they were
interested. As well as branch meetings being held at times
which are difficult for women to attend, the Community
Development Project study of North Shields noted that
although five clothing firms in the area had 900 union
members, there was no union branch in North Shields. Not
surprisingly therefore, 'the union, despite membership, is
weak, and on the whole makes little difference to these
women' s
	 working	 lives. '	 (North	 Tyneside	 Community
Development Project, 1978: 42).
Boraston et al (1975: 109-113) studied three branches of the NUTGW in
a particular district in England in the early 1970s. Women
constituted between two-thirds and 90% of the clothing workforce in
the area. They found that
branches had almost disappeared, and business was conducted
either within the plant or between the shop stewards and
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the area officer. Attempts to stimulate branch activity
had met with little success in No2 and No3 branches, and
Nol branch met only twice a year.
Each of the large plants had a head shop steward, 3 were male and one
was female.
From my perspective, the most interesting questions to arise
from this preliminary analysis of the development of the NUTGW in the
1920s, 1930s, 1940s and early 1950s are those to do with the
comparatively high levels of membership and participation among women
shirt workers: was sectarianism not as a big a problem as the
traditional marxists suggest? And what distinguished women workers
in Derry from their counterparts in the British clothing industry?
However, before these general theoretical questions can be addressed,
it is necessary to consider the conjunctural factors underlying the
fluctuations in union membership during the period.
Having attached so much theoretical importance to the actor's
point of view, it is fitting that I should begin my discussion by
examining the experiences of, and explanations offered by, my
respondents. A few introductions are therefore required. Four of my
'strategic' sample of respondants were women factory workers; all
began working in the shirt industry at the age of 14. One, Miss
Cosgrave, began work in 1926; two, Miss Gallagher and Mrs Henderson,
began work in the 1930s; and one, Miss McMorris, began work in the
early 1940s.	 Miss Cosgrave and Miss Gallagher joined the union in
the 1930s; Mrs Henderson and Miss McMorris in the 1940s. Thus,
although none of the women are aware of the inter-union wrangles of
the 1920s - Miss Gallagher and Miss Cosgrave knew the first
organisation which they joined only as the 'Tailor and Garment
Workers' Union' - their collective experience covers the period under
investigation in this chapter. They also cover the religious and
political spectrum: Miss Cosgrave and Miss McMorris are Catholics and
nationalist in outlook; Miss Gallagher is also a Catholic, but pro-
British in outlook; Mrs Henderson is a Protestant and a Unionist. In
addition to these women I will also draw on the experiences and
recollections of Jack Macgougan, the Irish regional organiser of the
NUTGW 1945-68; Stephen McGonagle, the secretary of the Derry Branch
of the NUTGW from 1947; Seamus Quinn, deputy organiser of the
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breakaway union established in 1952, George Hamill, an ATGWU official
1950-1976; and Mr Matthews, one of the shirt cutters in my sample who
began working in the industry in 1926. Each of these men have also
been included in my 'strategic' sample (see Appendix 1).
When asked, none of my female respondants mentioned religious
and political divisions as having any great significance in the
union's development during the 1930s and 1940s; sectarianism was a
problem which they associated with the 1950s and the secession of the
Derry Branch of the NUTGW. They tended to explain the fluctuations
in memberhip of the 1930s and 1940s in terms of' other factors.	 In
section 4.2, I will examine my respondants' experiences,
recollections, and explanations, and attempt to locate them in the
context of the organisational structure of the NUTGW and the
development of the shirt industry as revealed in the documentary
record of the period.	 Having done this it becomes possible to
consider the reasons why union densities and levels of participation
among women were comparatively high. It is generally agreed among
labour historians that the main reasons for the underdevelopment of
trade unionism among women workers relates to their position in the
family and the ideologies which surround it. Therefore, in section
4.3 I will re-examine the development of the Derry Branch of the
NUTGW against the backround of available information about the family
in Derry.
In section 4.4 I will reconsider the question of sectarianism.
For although sectarianism did not feature in my female respondants'
own explanations of union development in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s,
a close examination of their experiences, their more discursive
recollections, and a cross-referencing of both with documentary
evidence relating to the composition of the NUTGW at different times
reveals a striking pattern of sectarian differentiation in union
participation. A pattern which is confirmed and illuminated by the
recollections of the union officials appointed after 1945.
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4.2 Fluctuations in Union Membership: the Institutional Context
All my female respondants were aware that union membership in
the shirt factories had been at a low level in the 1930s and that it
had improved dramatically in the the late 1940s. Miss Cosgrave and
Miss Gallagher, who were members of the NUTGW in the 1930s and the
1940s, explained the transformation of the union in terms of the
contrasting abilities of the two people who held the post of
organising secretary in the period. Sarah Doherty was the organising
secretary until 1947, Stephen McGonagle was her successor. Miss
Cosgrave, who worked in the Rosemount factory from 1926 to the mid
1960s, told me:
There wasn't a big membership in Sarah Doherty's time. And
there was no such a thing as when Stephen got in, the way
he organised it with meetings and all, and the committee
meetings and the general meetings. I wouldn't say those
meetings were in existence, there would have been general
meetings, but not the way it was organised when Stephen
went into it.
Evidently not wishing to denigrate Doherty, she added,
she was quite good you know.	 If you went to her with a
complaint she really went to town on it and investigated it
and did her best.	 Sarah was quite good, but she didn't
have the same drive as what Stephen had. She didn't go
round to visit (the factories] she only went if you had a
complaint.
Miss Gallagher, who worked in Richard's factory ('Ritchie's') from
1931 to 1940 and again in 1948/49 before moving to Harrison's where
she worked until she retired in 1974, told me,
There wasn't a great organisation then [in the 1930s]
because it was a woman the name of Sarah Doherty and she
only had pockets of members here and there and they weren't
as organised... I don't think she even had an office. When
she was near retiring it began to come you were asked were
you in a union... They said the employers didn' t want a
union.., they (the women] were afraid of their jobs... In
Ritchie's we joined the union and then it faded out again
until something happened and there was a dispute about the
[wage] increase, about working, or so many going to be paid
off, and that sort of strengthened it again. When Stephen
[McGonagle) took over, it began to come together. Even in
Harrison' s when I went in, there was some in the union,
some then not in the union, it didn't matter you see. But
my brother always said to me, 'you make sure you're in the
union, ' and this is why when the break up (le the secession
of the Derry Branch of the NUTGW in 1952) took place I
nearly hit the ceiling, because he [McGonagleJ wanted to
take us lock, stock, and barrel right over.
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As will become apparent, both of these assessments are shrewd,
but from a social scientific perspective they are not sufficient to
explain the fluctuations in membership among Derry's shirtmakers: by
attaching so much weight to the contrasting abilities and
personalities of Doherty and McGonagle both women fail to appreciate
important differences in the structural and institutional contexts in
which these two local secretaries worked - differences which
inhibited the work of the former but facilitated the work of the
latter, What were these differences? As Poole (1984: 1, 16, and
190) suggests, the 'determinants of fluctuations in so-called
"aggregate" unionism in any given society' have been well researched.
He notes that several studies indicate an association between trade
union membership and the business cycle. 	 Several aspects of the
latter seem to be important, but none more so than employment levels
and labour market conditions.	 Other studies suggest that the
institutional aspects of trade unionism and industrial relations are
also of crucial importance, particularly the development of
collective bargaining and the 'recognition' policies of government
and employers' organisations towards trade unionism (see also Clegg,
1976). The factors which underlie fluctuations in membership at
local branch level have not been so well researched, but the
variables which Poole lists as the main 'determinants' of union
growth at aggregate level also seem to have been important In the
case of Derry Branch of the NIJTGW. 	 In this section I will seek to
locate my respondants' recollections in the context of the
organisational development of the Derry Branch of the NUTGW, and to
relate both to changing labour market conditions in the local shirt
industry and to the changing relationship between union officials and
the shirt manufacturers. 	 I will begin with the labour market
conditions.
First, let us review what has already been established about
labour market conditions in the shirt industry during the period
under consideration (see section 2.2). In the 1920s and 1930s the
shirt workforce was significantly smaller than It than It was to
become in the years during and after the Second World War (or had
been during the First World War). 	 In the 1920s and 1930s the shirt
workforce fluctuated between 4 and 5,000. In the 1940s it fluctuated
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around 7,000. Moreover, within the context of the lower over-all
level of employment in the 1920s and 1930s, those jobs which were
available in the factories were unstable, and workers were subject to
periodic lay offs and short-time working. 	 By contrast the years
between about 1943 to 1951 were a period of uninterrupted growth in
employment.
The difficulties for union organisers created by the
unemployment and periodic lay offs in the 1920s and 1930s were the
subject of regular comment in the monthly journals of the UGW and the
ASTT arid in the meetings of the Derry Branch of the latter. The
following are some examples. Two national officers of the ASTT spoke
at an organising meeting in Derry in April 1923; they reported that
there was, 'every prospect of the Branch regaining its old position
when trade revives' (Journal of ASTT September 1923). The second
example is a report on the 'Londonderry Branch' published in the
Garment Worker (April 1926>:
Trade is now much better, we have no members on the
unemployed list, and for that reason before the next
unemployment slump comes along I want to ask our members to
please observe a few rules which will help themselves and
help office administration...
During the last slump in employment the office has been
besieged with members who have taken no trouble to provide
themselves with their cards, also by many lapsed members.
In our endeavour to build up the organisation we have been
somewhat indulgent with our members, and have seen them
through their difficulties, even when they had become slack
in their membership... but.. . our members are taking too
much for granted and assuming that the union will always be
there to help them. I want to drive it home as powerfully
as I can that a Trade Union exists on the contributions of
its members, and is not by any means a glorified benevolent
society just waiting for indifferent workers to come along
and get them out of their troubles...
We have made it easy for members to retain their membership
by allowing cards to be remitted during the period of
unemployment, there is no hardship therefore in the
foregoing words.
We welcome our members to the office when they are
unemployed, they are still our members, and can always have
our advice and help.
According to the Garment Worker (GW: July 1928), the Derry shirt
trade experienced another particularly bad spell in 1928. At the end
of the year Edward McCafferty, the newly appointed Irish organiser of
the UGW, reported that the Derry shirt trade was coming out of a long
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period of
slackness. . . I spent a few days there organising and
attending to members' grievances. I hope when members get
back to work again that they will help shop stewards to get
their old strength back. Shops become disorganised during
unemployment as members are out of touch with stewards and
fail to have their cards remitted during slackness... the
result is arrears and. . . that members drop out of the
union.	 (GW: November 1928).
In March 1932 Sarah Doherty reported:
During the past month, trade has not been good here,
although a couple of the leading firms have been kept
fairly busy. .. Most of the other firms have not been doing
well, but an improvement is expected before Easter,
particularly as new designs in men's shirts and collars are
to be placed upon the market.
Owing to the scarcity of employment, considerable apathy
exists mong the workers with regard to trade unionism.
They do not seem to realise that the period of bad trade is
the most dangerous time for wage earners, and is the time
of all others when they should rally to their union. We
are at present engaged in an organising campaign, and we
have been billing the factories, and hope that this will
have a good effect. (GW: March 1932).
Sarah Doherty's hopes that trade would improve and that the
organising campaign would have 'good effect' were not to be
fulfilled: at a meeting of the Branch Committee later in the year it
was agreed that 'owing to bad trade there was not much chance of
getting workers to join up' (Minutes: 9 June 1932). Thereafter, the
minutes of Committee meetings and Branch reports in the union journal
become increasingly sparce until the 1940s when Branch membership
began to revive. It is significant that none of the minutes and
Branch reports pertaining to the 1940s mention unemployment as an
organisational problem.
In explaining the contrast between union weakness In the 1930s
and union strength in the late 1940s in terms of the different
abilities of Doherty and McGonagle, Miss Cosgrave and Miss Gallagher
were also unaware of the very different institutional contexts in
which these two organising secretaries operated. During the early
1930s the union's network of full-time officials in Ireland had been
allowed to fall apart, and it was not until after 1945 that it was
reconstructed. Annie Holmes the UGW's full-time organiser in Derry
was transferred to the Cheshire Branch of the union at the end of
1929; she was not replaced.	 Edward McCafferty, who had been
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appointed as Irish regional organiser of the 1JGW in 1928, either
resigned or was made redundant in August 1931; he was not replaced.
As the reader already knows, Sarah Doherty was appointed full-time
organising secretary of the Derry Branch of the NUTGW after the
amalgamation of the UGW and ASTT in 1932. However, despite the
opposition of the Branch Committee, she was made redundant in
February or March 1934 (her last report in the Garment Worker was
April 1934). She continued as Branch secretary on a purely voluntary
basis.	 After 1934 the NUTGW had no full-time organiser at local or
regional level.
Between April 1934 and November 1938 there were only two
recruitment campaigns; both were carried out by English based
officials on 'flying visits' to Ireland. I have already mentioned Mr
P. Hodson's campaign in September 1935 when he reported that 'very
few of the Derry shirt workers are in the trade union' (GW: November
1935). Another recruitment drive was carried out by Mr P. Burns -
NUTGW organiser in the Yorkshire and Northumberland area - in the
summer and autumn of 1937. He claimed to have 'secured nearly 3,000
members' in Belfast, Coleraine, and Derry (GW: October 1937). This
claim is almost certainly inflated; Macgougan expressed doubt about
its accuracy, and affectionately described Burns as 'a great bluffer,
one of the old school, ' In any case, on the evidence presented
above, this level of membership was not sustained in Derry or
elsewhere.
Union activists continued to represent Derry shirt workers at
Trade Board level throughout this period, but workplace negotiations
were rudimentary and with little union involvement. An apposite
example of this general lack of consultation between managers and
union representatives is provided by the introduction of conveyor
belts to some factories in the early 1930s. It is apposite because
it contrasts sharply with the way in which time and motion study -
the second major innovation in methods of production and payment in
the industry - was Introduced in the late 1940s. 	 The latter will be
discussed later in this section.
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Prior to the introduction of conveyor belts the commonest method
of production and payment was piecework. In a piecework system
A price is set for each unit of output produced or for each
operation performed by an individual or a group of workers.
Thus gross weekly earnings depend on the level of piece-
rates, and the amount of work completed in a week.
(Manpower Working Party of the Clothing EDC, 1972: 3).
Shirtmakers were not given a quota of work which they had to complete
in a given time, they were simply paid according to the number of
items, usually calculated in dozens, which they produced. 	 Conveyor
belts involved a different method of production and payment. The
conveyor or 'speed bench' was 'manned by teams of 14... [and] the
shirt was passed from one worker to another until completed' (GW:
Febuary 1934). Unlike piecework, workers were expected to do a set
amount of work: they had to work to the pace set by the belt rather
than at their own speed, and they were paid a set 'time' rate.
According to Sarah Doherty:
The team system which is being introduced in some factories
is causing friction; the workers are only being paid the
bare minimum rate of 7d per hour. They themselves are
partly to blame for the unsatisfactory condiditons imposed
[my emphasis] by some firms and there will be no
improvement in the conditions of working until the workers
individually and collectively realise that their only safe-
guard lies in being members of a recognised trade union.
(GW: March 1933).
Another perspective on the introduction of the 'speed belt' is
provided by Miss Cosgrave. I asked her if she had been involved in
any strikes in the 1930s, she replied:
No.	 The biggest upheaval, I can't name the year, [was]
when they started the speed belts.
	 It would be in the
1930s. Alot of resentment then, but there was so much
unemployment, male unemployment, in the town that they just
had to take it and bear with it and do their work and do
the amount they had to do because they had no alternative.
Because most of the women... were married and their
husbands wasn't working and there was no such thing as
social security there.
According to Miss Cosgrave the main problem with the 'speed belt' was
that 'they [the workers] had a target and they had to do that target,
if not they were paid off.
Nor was the union involved in negotiations about more routine
industrial relations problems:
We were in the union, but didn't bother much about it. 	 If
there was something wrong, if we had something to complain
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about, a couple of the girls would go and see the manager.
The rest of us stopped work while they talked. They
usually managed to get it fixed up and we went back to work
in an hour or so. (anonymous shirtmaker quoted by by E.G.
Deans, 1975)
An even bleaker picture was described by Mrs Cosgrave,
Now, at that time, before Stephen [McGonagle] came along..,
it was all just piecework and it was whatever the girl
earned: the rate for the job. Now, in the Rosemount
factory nobody discussed a rate for the job, the manager
made the rate and you could either take It or leave it. He
made the rate, and it was up to you... if you wanted to do
it you did it, and if you didn't want to do it you could go
home - as simple as that.
The lack of a full-time local official clearly inhibited the
union in the performance of Its major role: collective bargaining.
But, the evidence suggests that employer hostility was also an
obstacle to organisation. The hostility of employers to the first
attempt by shirt factory workers to organise themselves was discussed
in section 3.2.	 Several of my respondarits 	 indicated that the
opposition of employers to trade unions was still a factor In the
1920s and 1930s. Mr Matthews who joined the ATGWU as an apprentice
cutter in 1926 told me that the cutters in his factory,
were expected [by the other cutters] to be in a union.,.
you were told, 'you can't stay on in here if [you do not
join a union].'... This was all done under cover, they
[journeymen cutters] would say to you, 'don't you be
discussing this with any of the bosses... if your asked any
questions just... play the game as if you know nothing
about It. ' But.. . I was never challenged by a boss.
Miss Gallagher has already been quoted as saying 'they [her
workmates] said the employers didn't want a union... they were afraid
of their jobs'. And according to Miss Cosgrave
If you were caught paying the union you would've got the
sack maybe. They [management] were death on the union. It
wasn't till later years - let me say this, I would say
Stephen McGonagle made the trade union in Derry.
She thought that the trade unions would have maintained an effective
presence in two or three of the larger factories in the 1930s:
Tillie's, the City, and Harrison's... I'm not so sure that
the smaller factories would have had much to do with the
union up to Stephen's time [because the] workers were so
well used, let us put it this [way], with the heel of the
boot on the back of their neck that they didn't realise
that they could've come out and fought against It or
rebelled against it. Thats my theory.
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In 1938, the Executive Committee of the NIJTGW took steps to
rebuild its organisatlonal infrastucture in Ireland, In November of
that year an Irish regional organiser, Terennce Waidron, was
appointed. According to the Garment Worker (November 1938),
The appointment of an organiser for Eire and the North of
Ireland has been a subject for consideration by the
Executive Board from time to time during recent years when
paying regard to the numerical position of the
organisat ion.
Macgougan told me that Waidrori was from Dublin, had previously been
the 'secretary of a sick pay scheme,' and was active in the ITIJC. In
May 1939 Sarah Doherty was re-appointed as organising secretary of
the Derry Branch
Waldron's appointment was not a success: he was less than
diligent in his work and he was sacked at the beginning of 1944 (GW:
February 1944). According to Macgougan who had met him at several
ITUC functions:
he wasn' t doing his job. He was transferred from Dublin to
Belfast because Dublin at that time a big agitation was
going on to be in an Irish based union; and Belfast, the
organisation was negligible. He came up on a Monday
morning from Dublin and went away on a Thursday evening
sort-of-style. The Executive appointed a delegation...
[to] survey the potential [for expansion in Ireland]. Dame
Anna Loughlin, then national organiser [and part of the
delegation]... said 'we'll go to the Albion' - the biggest
employer and fair core of membership [in Belfast] - he
couldn't find It! (laughs] 	 That was one of the nails in
his coffin. He was a great character, a Dublin Man.
Doherty made more impact at a local level than Waldron had done
at a national or regional level: regular Branch Committee meetings
were Instituted and the minutes of these meetings report her
involvement In negotiations concerning day to day problems at plant
level. Moreover, as was pointed out in the introduction to this
chapter, membership was increased. However, Macgougan's recollection
of his first experience of Derry after his appointment as Irish
organiser in 1945 partly confirms the assessment made by Miss
Cosgrave and Miss Gallagher which was quoted earlier. He described
membership at this time as falsely 'inflated'; the Branch Committee
as 'only a little clique around Sarah Doherty'; and Sarah Doherty
herself as 'a very nice old woman, but only a bookeeper - she didn't
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do any organising. '	 Furthermore - something which my female
informants did not appreciate - Doherty was only,
part-time, well, full part-time: she'd no other job. The
part-time secretaries were paid on commission... [but) she
had a flat rate because her membership wasn't good enough.
I think it was £4.00 per week... at that time a tradesman's
wages would have been £5.
By associating the decline of the union in the 1930s with
Doherty and the rise in membership of the late 1940s with McGonagle,
Miss Cosgrave and Miss Gallagher fail to aknowledge the changes
wrought in the union at local and regional level by Macgougan. In
Miss Cosgrave's case this omission reflects a hostility to Macgougan
which has its roots in the secession of the Derry Branch Committee in
1952. Miss Gallagher's failure to recall the impact made by
Macgougan probably reflects the fact that she was not working in the
industry during the year - 1946 - when Macgougan WaS most active in
Derry. In July 1945 Macgougan initiated a series of organising
campaigns in all centres of the clothing industry throughout Northern
Ireland; his intention was to build up NUTGW membership in particular
districts to a point were it would be viable to employ local full-
time organising secretaries. In Derry he promoted the union not just
through the usual meetings at factory gates, but by organising dances
and competitions in which female shirt workers competed for the title
of 'Shirt Queen. ' The criteria for the latter seem to have been a
combination of personality, union commitment, and beauty; the judges
were drawn from the local press. And it was in Derry that he had his
biggest success: 'Londonderry continues to be a most fruitful soil
for recruiting' (GW: August 1945), Prior to his appointment, NUTGW
membership in Derry was 800, at most; in July 1946 it was 2, 144.
Macgougan claims the credit for this success: he told me that he
spent alot of time in Derry during his first two years as Irish
organiser,
because I found it easier to organise there. They were
sitting there waiting to be brought in, I very quickly got
2,000 and 3,000 members, and it was at that stage the union
decided to appoint a Branch secretary for Derry, that was
when McGonagle was appointed.
This claim is supported by the documentary record. At a Branch
meeting in December 1945 Miss Doherty reported an increase in
membership of 836,
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these increases are due to the untiring efforts of Mr
Macgougan. .. Credit [is also due] to the the chairman and
Committee who had assisted in the campaign.
However, Macgougan readily conceded that McGonagle was effective in
consolidating and building upon this initial success.
The appointment of younger, more dynamic, and, most importantly,
full-time organisers was clearly one of the factors contributing to
the spectacular growth in union membership among women shirtmakers in
the late 1940s. Equally important was the advent of a major change
in the methods of production and payment in a large part of the Derry
shirt industry between 1948 and 1953. 	 This was known locally as
'work study', 'time and motion', or 'time and study'. Although work
study techniques were applied in only three of the city's 30
factories at this time - Harrison's; McIntyre, Hogg, and Marsh; and
McCarthy's - the effects were disproportionate: these were three of
the largest factories in the city with atleast 1,500 workers between
them, and their owners were mong the most influential members of the
SMF.	 The importance of this innovation from the point of view of
union organisation was twofold. 	 First, it was associated with a
significant change in the relationship between union and management.
It has been shown that in the 1930s management were
characteristically hostile to trade unions, that when the conveyor
system was introduced to some factories in the 1930s there was little
or no consultation with the local union official, and that even in
routine matters negotiation between union and mangement was not
highly developed. By contrast, when work study was introduced the
union was involved in unprecedented discussions with management, and
the union official was given unfettered access to the workplace
thereby facilitating organisation. Second, despite the unpopularity
of work study - and of the union official's enthusiastic response to
it - among the women workers its novelty made them even more
dependent on the union as the only guarantor of their interests.
According to Macgougan, the NUTGW was 'totally unprepared' for
both the application of work study techniques to shirt production in
Derry and the changes in the methods of production and payment which
followed. McGonagle, who had to deal with the problems it created,
was scathing about the amount of support he received from the union,
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'they sent me a penny pamphlet. ' In order to cope with the changes
McGonegle did alot of research into work study techniques, and he
used this research and his experience to write an article for
Christus Rex (1951; the article was reprinted in Liberty. February
1954). For the sake of clarity it is necessary to detail the changes
in production and payment which followed work study before examining
the associated changes in relationships between management and union
official and between union official and lay membership. In what
follows I will draw on McGonagle's published description (the page
references relate to the Liberty reprint) and the recollections of
those of my informants who experienced the changes.
The industrial consultants who introduced work study techniques
were known locally as the 'time and motion men' or 'work study men';
some of my respondants said they were American, others said they were
English. According to McGonagle,
after having replanned the department, re-deployed labour
teams and machines, introduced guides and gadgets to assist
operators, the time study man proceeds to study the
individual operations of the worker. (1954: 49).
On the basis of this study and of 'his judgement and experience,' the
time and motion man defined the time it would take a 'normal'
operative to complete a particular task. On the basis of this, and
allowing f or fatigue and contingencies, a 'standard value' is
determined; that is:
the time required by the normal worker to complete a unit
of work specified. The whole structure is based on time
values, the dozens of work used in the piece rate system
being now expressed as so many units, one unit being the
standard amount of work to be produced in one minute.
(1954: 50).
Using these standard values an incentive payment scheme was worked
out.
There are 480 minutes, therefore units, in an 8 hour day.
A worker who has credited to her 480 units is said to have
operated at 100 per cent, or normal... In setting up the
wages structure under the application of of the results of
work study it was agreed that payment for 100 per cent or
normal production should be the Wages Council basic rate
plus 33 1/3 per cent. Three principal reasons were
advanced in support of this:
1. It was considered a living wage and a fair return
for the production.
2. . .. that figure [is] the average wage in the shirt
industry
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3. This figure was necessary to give the operators a
share of the increased production. (1954: 50-51)..
Workers who were credited at more than 100% (normal production) were
paid a bonus.
According to McGonagie:
It has been found that actual motion study of shirt
machining is less necessary than the handling of work
between operatives, since years of work under piece rate
conditions had largely eliminated unnecessary movements on
the part of the worker.	 (1954: 50).
However, according to the women I spoke to, motion study had a
profound effect on particular operations. Mrs Henderson - who was
generally in favour of work study and was, as will be shown, very
involved in	 its introduction to McCarthy's factory - told me,
the shirt was cut down to very small pieces; I mean there
was a girl sewing on a label, a girl doing yokes, that was
ridiculous like, that was all in the 'fitting' [ie the one
job specification) previous.
I asked, 'particular operations were broken down?'	 Mrs Henderson
replied,
Oh, I couldn't tell you how many parts, there was the label
and the yokes - two, three, four, five, six - oh, there
must have been about 12 or 13 parts of a shirt were one or
two girls would have done it before.
I asked her whether this involved any diminution in an operative's
skill; she replied:
Very much so. Oh, I mean front stitching was nothing
compared to what it was in the old days.. . all that was
done was it was turned over like that there [showing me the
hem of her dress] and pressed with an iron. In the old
days you had to put in inters lie linings), double fronts
was set on... (the shirt] was skimped [after work study].
Another aspect of the system of production and payment ushered
in by work study which is not mentioned by McGonagle is that the
standard values or 'normals' established by the work study consultant
for the new, simplified, operations required the women to work harder
and faster than before. Mrs Henderson who prided herself on being a
fast worker - 'I was a 130% worker, I never went below 130, but I had
to work hard' - felt that the pace of work increased, and contrasted
the new system to working on conveyors: in the conveyor system,
a certain amount went down the line and you had to do it,
so many dozen, but conveyor work was nothing compared to
work study.	 You finished [the quota] and you could have
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sat and knit or you could have made patch work quilts or
you could have done anything.. . everybody had a set wage.
some of them Lie the faster girls] made patch work
quilts.., that's why I say conveyor work was nothing
compared with work study.
	 In work study every second
count ed.
Other women did not adapt so easily as Mrs Henderson. Miss McMorris
is one example. She began working in Harrison's as an unqualified
office clerk, but her mother pressurised her to take a job in the
factory where she could learn an easily transferable skill, and so
she became a folder of finished shirts. She remained in the job
until the late 1960s when she transferred to the Rosemount factory.
She was in Harrison's when work study was introduced, 'the whole
place became time study and then the job was halved. . . if you and I
were doing it up, you folded them and I pressed them. ' I asked her
how she felt about work study; she replied:
Oh terrific, everything changed drastically, [it] probably
was good for me, but it never appealed to me. The whole
thing where I was so easy, it [work] was so easy... and
then to an awful lot of pressure, physical. I was probably
using more physical strength, there was a knack of being
quick, but I hardly achieved that knack. There was some
people could do it and never were exhausted at all, whereas
I would have nearly fainted... [under time and motion you
had to work] much faster. And then I wanted back to the
original [clerical] job, but on account of the manager
relationship and... [my family's] friendship [with him], I
couldn't ask him, [and] there was another girl in it... I
wanted back - now that I knew the folding - to the desk job
Women who did not have, or could not learn, the 'knack' or skill of
working at the speed required to be 'normal' lost their job.
According to Mrs Henderson:
Work study was ideal for the quick worker, but the old
worker that was used individually working, it was a dead
loss to her, because she had to hit 75%, and if that girl
didn't hit it her job was lost.., the girls that brought
the work from the cutting room and the girls who tied the
work up, they were called 'indirects,' they were paid
[from] the bonus of the room and the room was ran at 100%
all over. So if anybody [worked] at 75%, that didn't pay
them to pay indirect workers. They had to hit that to keep
their job.
The result was that some older women left the factory,
ones couldn't take it... they hadn't the speed, it's your
hands with work study, it's not brains or anything like
that.
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Thus, work study involved not just a radical change in metnods
of production and payment, but a dramatic upheaval for a considerable
number of shirt workers; it was an experience which loomed large in
the memories of many of the women I spoke to. It is, therefore, not
surprising that work study should have had a significant affect on
relations between workers, union officials, and managment; it is to
these that I shall now turn.
There is some evidence that the relationship between some local
shirt manufacturers and NUTGW officials began to improve prior to the
introduction of work study. As I pointed out earlier,
representatives of the union and of the SMF met at Trade Board level
in the 1930s to discuss minimum piece-rates for the industry, but
they did not meet locally to discuss their implementation. Macgougan
claims, '1 developed meetings with the local trade association which
didn' t exist before. ' During his first organising campaign in Derry
he was not usually allowed into factories - meetings were conducted
at factory gates. Harrison's was an exception. Macgougan recalls
that he developed a good relationship with Arthur Harrison, the
managing director: 'Arthur came back from the Army with alot of
bright ideas, progressive ideas. ' For whatever reason, other
shirt manufacturers seem to have become imbued by this 'progressive'
spirit: at an NUTGW Branch Committee meeting in June 1948 Miss Moore
- one of the longest serving members on the Committee - described a
meeting with the SMF as being a 'step forward in recognition for the
Derry Branch when all the employers in the city met the union in this
way.
However, the introduction of work study was a watershed in
union-management relations. Prior to the deployment of a work study
team in Harrison's - it was the first factory to employ them -
McGonagle was invited to talks with management and the industrial
consultant. The extent of subsequent co-operation is evident in
McGonagle's published account:
The trade union operating in this particular industry co-
operated to the fullest extent in making this experiment. .
a success, and at the same time, safeguarding the wages and
conditions of the workers, as is its proper function. The
well informed trade unionist realises how important it is
to encourage or support schemes of efficiency in the
production of consumer goods. The conditions laid down by
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the union in this case were very clear and definite: access
from the start for their officials to all departments for
full investigation of every phase of the operations;
examination of all study sheets and element charts; the
trade union officer to be allowed to undertake time studies
and production studies on any standard values produced; all
findings to be tabled to the trade union before they were
applied; typed specifications of every job under the
application (included in these, speed of machines in R.P.M.
and stitches per inch) to be handed to the Union and posted
on notice boards in the departments; agreement for money
payment to be reached between the management and the union.
(1954: 50-51).
McGonagle was careful to avoid the impression that this level of co-
operation meant the incorporation of the union by management, for he
continued:
Time study men occupy a merely advisory capacity in this
last matter. The standard values when agreed to by the
union cannot be altered except by a change in method oi
production. This agreed clause alone smashes the charge
that the employer can cut rates, as he might have done
under the old piece rate system.. . The material results,
analysed	 after	 almost	 two	 years,	 are	 considered
satisfactory by all parties. More important, the
relationship between management and workers is improved and
everything points to it staying that way [my emphasis).
The pin-pricking causes of industrial friction and
misunderstanding have been to a great extent removed. Each
side realises the advantages of having a sharply defined
procedure for dealing with problems of production and
payment... Work study brought both sides closer together
and the responsibilities that had to be faced up to were
printed in unmistakable language. (1954: 51).
Further confirmation of the change in union-management relations
associated with work study is provided by the recollections of George
Hamill, local ATGWU official with responsibility for shirt cutters
and long-time friend of McGonagle:
He [McGonagle] made his name with the employers aswell,
because he sold the work study to the workers and he done a
great job for the employers aswell. It wasn't because he
had any liking for the employers, he felt - like a good
many forward thinking people, you haven't enough [of them]
in the trade union (movement] - he felt [the] introduction
of new technology and new methods and so forth that you' re
going to have to accept them if you're going to compete in
the international market, to hold on to your orders. . . As
well as that, he thought it was a fairer system of bonus
payments than they had on the old rule-by-thumb sort-of-
style of fixing a [piece) rate for so many dozen.
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Thus, it is clear that, uniie Doherty. both Macgougan and McGonagle
had the kind of access to the workplace and to management -
especially in those factories where work study was introduced - which
facilitates organisation and recruitment. However, the following
question remains: what effect did work study, and McGonagle's close
identification with it, have on the attitude of women workers to the
NUTGW?
As McGonagle was ready to concede, his enthusiasm for work study
was not shared by the women who were subject to it:
It would be untrue to say that the shirt workers hailed the
scheme with joy at the start,	 The record of the shirt
industry in years gone by is not good. It was a sweated
industry, one for which it was found necessary to set up a
Trade Board. That in itself is sufficient condemnation of
the conditions and also a display of the failure of the
workers to organise themselves. Those conditions are gone
but tradition dies hard. The workers saw in this 'new
business' an effort on the part of the employers to steal
away their bargaining power and cut their piece rates by
camoflage. They were wrong. In the first place the new
scheme of things is introduced by a third party, a business
firm, who cannot afford to run foul either of the employers
or the trade union... Secondly, the bargaining power for
payment is retained by the trade union. (1954: 49),
Assurances like this did not assuage the fears and suspicions of the
women. Band stitchers in the City factory (McIntyre, Hogg, Marsh and
Co.)- which introduced work study techniques shortly after Harrison's
- refused to accept the wage rate which McGonagle had recommended.
One Committee member, Miss Mclaughlin, is reported (Minute: 26
September 1948) to have said 'band stitchers knew more about the Job
than the secretary and the rate he recommended would not pay them,
McGonagle replied that,
the matter was finished as the firm had gone back to the
old system. But if the trade union was to hold its
prestige it must avoid the ridiculous position like that
created in this case.	 Piece rates must of necessity be
atleast tried.
Most of the Committee supported McGonagle's position. At a meeting
in November 1948, the Committee discussed the progress of the new
system in Harrison's factory. Mrs Darcy reported that her daughter
did not like the system, but added that she was satisfied with the
secretary's assurance that even the slowest worker could earn more
than under the old system.	 Julia kelly supported McConagle, saying
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that she 'detested the conveyor belt as unnatural and that in itself
was justification for its removal.'
	 The Committee approved 'any
scheme' for the abolition of the conveyor system. In October 1949,
however, workers in Harrison's shirt, white collar, and coloured
collar rooms struck in opposition to the new system and refused to
permit the secretary to carry out his own 'production study' (Minute:
2 October 1949).
Miss Cosgrave did not experience work study for herself but she
was a member of the Branch Committee in the late 1940s, and told me
that when it was introduced,
there was murder, there was strikes, and I couldn't tell
you what not... Harrison's, Hogg and McIntyre's Lie the
City factory), McCarthy's, Tillie's [work study was not
introduced in Tillie and Henderson's factory until the mid
1950]... he [McGonagle] got alot of stick. One time he
went up to McCarthy's, and he was walking up the floor,
they started to sing 'if we'd known you were coming we'd
have baked you a cake' [Miss Cosgrave attached no special
significance to this song other than it being generally
derogatory).	 That man took a terrible lot of stick from
the Derry girls.
Mrs Henderson has a keen recollection of the introduction of work
study to Mccarthy's factory. Work study consultants did not go into
McCarthy's factory until 1953 (though it was first mooted in 1951).
By this time the Derry Branch of the NUTGW had split. Mrs
Henderson's feelings about work study and McGonagle's role in its
introduction are tied up with a distaste for his behaviour during the
split.	 These different aspects will be disentangled in a later
chapter; for the moment we are concerned only with her recollections
of work study.	 I asked her, 'which aspects of work study did 	 your
work mates dislike?' She replied,
The whole outlook. Everybody was against it at the time.
It was the unknown... Mr Lowry [the factory manager] turned
round and said, 'I'm introducing this new layout and I can
guarantee you'll have a pound or maybe £2 more in your pay
envelope. '
	 Well I says, 'if thats the case I don' t see why
we shouldn't work it,' and that started an awful uproar in
the factory when I said that. But it was a fact, if we
were only earning only 30 shillings then or maybe £2 you
were going to get an extra £1 or £2, as he put it, for
nothing.	 Well, I couldn't turn round and say, 'well we're
not going to take it.' 	 I spoke up and said, 'if thats the
case I don' t see why we shouldn' t work it, '. . . they struck
and all, over it.	 The girls refused to work it.	 And that
was when ne [Mr Lowry] explained it... everything was
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stoppea ana me] got us all together and that was the start
of it Lie work study].
Despite tne women's suspicion of work study ana of McGonagle's
enthusiasm for it, union membership did not suffer.	 Indeed,
McGonagle consolidated and built on the gains made by Macgougan. One
answer to this apparent paradox was supplied by Miss Gallagher:
They had a conveyor belt in Harrison's and they [the
workers] would verse it that this English man was over.
time and study... and that sort of woke them up to the fact
that half of them were in no union... so they all had to
get their wits about them,	 I wasn't in Harrison's at that
particular time, but I was told about it when I went in..
but they said Stephen let them down badly on that occasion.
Whatever Stephen done, he wasn't in great favour at that
particular time. .. Well, of course it was progress and it
was coming and.. . I suppose he knew it was going to have to
[be accepted]... Definitely, it did [make women more trade
union minded], because they knew they had to have some
help, some advice because factory girls in those days
weren't very well versed. You left school at 14 and you
weren't just at that stage where you could cope with
percentages... and this was why whenever they started the
union that they tried to entice people to go and have a
course [of education]... but they weren't well versed and
they had to depend on the union. . . The older people,
whenever Mr Greenan [department manager] used to come with
the clipboard, [they said], 'I don't know what he's talking
about there. '... He was very straight forward. .. he was
very understanding, but they used to go to pieces when he
would come. One [women] thought she was doing the right
thing and she would go slow and stop and you tried to
advise them like just work normally... [according to] your
aptitude, everybody's different. Then some of them would
go like lightning - the nerves got the better of them - and
[later] they would say he's [Mr Greenan] got the wrong
reading. But he always explained it to them afterwards.
According to Mrs Cosgrave,
it took a long time... for Stephen to get through to them
that the time and motion was for their benefit, but at the
beginning some of them couldn't see it, but then they
realised it.
And despite the difficulties experienced by some women in meeting the
production targets set by the work study men, it is true that the new
system brought some improvements. According to McGonagle,
The trade union has performed its function so successfully
that earnings are considerably ahead of Wages Council basic
rates. .. The operatives are also guaranteed the basic wage
per hour Lie the Wages Council basic rate) irrespective of
output. This was considered a progressive measure for the
industry since no guarantee of any kind existed up to that.
This also covers lost time and machine breakdowns, every
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minute of which must be logged and paid for. .. From the
union's point of view if they had made a good agreement for
payment at 100 per cent, then 125 per cent or 130 per cent
was very good. A steady reasonable production over long
periods - and the worker's life is fairly long - is mucn
more beneficial for her than short bursts of high
production in between lay off periods due to overwork.
(1954: 51).
Mrs Henderson' s experience suggests another answer to the
paradox. She began to take greater interest in union work precisely
because she disliked the way in which Stephen McGonagle had dealt
with work study. She told me that it 'was more or less when this
work study started that I took a serious view of the union then. ' In
a later interview she elaborated further:
What made me really take on the union work was Stephen
McGonagle - his attitude. And I says... you're riot going
to climb over me and,.. he's not going to come in here and
fool the girls because he really sided with that [work
study], and he really went all out for that at the time and
we didn't know anything about it. And then when he came up
then and he started talking about it and all. .. you had to
produce then 495 units per day and that was your minutes
and I wanted to know... I put these [points] to Stephen
McGonagle, I says, 'well, if we work 495 units a day and if
we have to produce 495 units, where's our breaks, arid
where' s this, and where' s that and I think that.' 	 He
couldn't answer me then.	 I mind him lifting a paper like
that [gesture of him hitting her face whith a sheet of
paper], he says, 'you're too smart for me.' I thought I'd
question him because I knew that there was something about
Stephen McGonagle: he was a great man with the bosses and
at the same time he wasn't straight with the girls.
Moreover, she felt that work study encouraged more women in her
factory to join the union,
Oh, it definitely did, it was through that It did grow.
Because when I went into McCarthy's at the start I think
you could have counted them on your hand - the union
members in it. But it definitely grew in fact around all
the factories. . . it went into.
Mrs Henderson became an NUTGW shop steward in 1954. It Is worth
recording her recollection of the time she devoted to dealing with
problems created by the new methods of production and payment because
It reinforces my earlier points about how their novelty increased
workers' dependence on informed advice and how the amelioration in
union-management relations facilitated the work of trade union
representatives in the workplace.
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Two Americans came in and they introduced it [work study)
and then they took me into their confidence and they asked
me would I like to learn it and I said I'd be interested in
it and it went from that then on, . . It was an awful lot of
work, it was very, I was mentally tired with it because I
was everywhere. . . you were round every department because
the girls was all put-out about it and they couldn't
understand it. There was weeks I came out with no pay at
all hardly [she was compensated by the union]. At one time
Lowry [the factory manager] took me aside and said to me,
'would this not have to stop because, ' he said, 'you' re not
doing any work here at all only union work. I They weren' t
a bit pleased about it at the time. But I Just said to him
I says, 'well, ' I says, 'when I see things are right and I
think that things are going to work right,' I says, 'I'll
stop, but not until then because this is unknown to us, we
don't know nothing about it.'
To sum up. The structural and institutional factors which
feature in the industrial relations literature as the 'determinants'
of fluctuations in union membership at aggregate level were clearly
important in the case of the Derry Branch of the NUTGW. Unemployment
and employer hostility clearly made organisation more difficult in
the 1930s just as the full employment and the development of
specialised collective bargaining following the introduction of work
study facilitated recruitment in the 1940s. However, it is equally
clear that fluctuations in the membership of the Derry Branch of the
NIJTGW were crucially influenced by the status of the local organising
secretary and the time and resources at his or her disposal. The
most important factor in the decline in membership of the NUTGW in
the 1930s was the lack of a full-time organiser; conversely, the two
full-time officials appointed in 1945 and 1947 were instrumental in
the prodigious growth in membership during these years. Miss
Cosgrave's and Miss Gallager's stress on the extent to which union
membership was dependent on the local union official is thus partly
confirmed.	 The failure of industrial relations theorists to
recognise the role of the local union official in relation to
membership levels is, perhaps, not simply a result of their focus on
the macro, as opposed to the micro, level, but symptomatic of a
general theoretical tendency, noted in section 1.6, to invest
structures and institutions with the powers of agency - reification -
when it is really only people who act (see also Hyman 1979a: 16).
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4.3 Trade Unionism, Female Shirtmakers, and the Family in Derry
Having located the fluctuations in membership of the Derry
Brancn of the NUTGW during the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s and early 1950s in
the context of the union's institutional development and the changing
nature of the local shirt industry, I now want to consider why it was
that levels of union membership and participation among women
shirtmakers in Derry tended to be higher than among women clothing
workers elsewhere in the United Kingdom. But before we can
understand what was distinctive about Derry, we must first examine
some the reasons which have been given for the underdevelopment of
trade unionism among women in Britain.
Historians and sociologists of the British trade union movement
have tended to neglect women workers (see Bornat, 1977). A similar
neglect is also evident in Ireland where, as I have shown, writers
like Rolston, Munck, and Patterson refer to women workers, and raise
the question of gender differences but never seriously attempt to
answer it. Recently, however, a considerable amount of research
effort - much of it Inspired by feminism and the rise of the women's
movement in the 1970s - has been directed towards explaining what
Alexander (1980: 141) has characterised as 'women's persisently weak
hold on industrial organisat ion. ' The emerging consensus is that
women's weak hold on industrial organisation is a consequence of the
broader sexual division labour whereby it is - and according to
family ideology should be - men who provide for their families'
economic well being and women who take responsiblity for child care
and housework. The relationship between women workers' actual or
supposed position in the family and their involvement in trade
unionism is complex, but the arguments may be summarised in the
following way. One argument is that women themselves are less
disposed to union organisation because they are less concerned about
their employment and its conditions than they are about their role as
wives and mothers or as prospective wives and prospective mothers.
For example, Pollert argues (1981: 105) that, in the case of young
single women in the tabbacco factory which she studied,
The net result of the high turnover, the focus on marriage,
the entrenchement in romance, prejudiced the girls' chances
of getting to grips with strategies oi workplace
organisation, just at that time in their lives when they
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had the time aria the opportunity.
However, it is also recognised that women workers are usually
concentrated in precisely those insecure and low paid jobs which make
industrial organisation difficult (see Alexander, 1980: 143). But,
even if women are disposed to organise in trade unions and are able
to surmount	 the difficulties created by their occupational
segregation, they face additional obstacles. First, there are the
practical, physical, problems of reconciling the demands of actively
participating in a trade union with the demands of housework, child
care, and wage labour. Second, women trade unionists often face
hostility or indifference on the part of male trade unionists such
that their interests are marginalised within the organisation, Some
scholars suggest that the hostility or indifference of male trade
unionists to their female colleagues is related to the prevalence of
family ideology: male trade unionists assume that a woman's proper
place is in the home and that if she undertakes paid work her wage is
of secondary importance to that of her husband (Charles, 1983: 19).
Others suggest that it is related to occupational segregation by sex
and the way in which women have, historically, been incorporated into
the workforce. In the latter argument women - because of their
position in the family - are said to constitute a reserve of cheap
labour which has been used by employers to dilute the skilled male
labour force; male hostility to women workers is seen as a form of
class struggle or resistance (Cockburn, 1983: 151 and passim; see
also Beechey, 1983 and Barron and Norris, 1976 for different theories
of women's occupational segregation).
Judging from the material already presented in this chapter, the
case of the Derry Branch of the NUTGW appears to be at variance to
this consensus. As I have already pointed out trade unionism among
female shirtmakers in Derry was not underdeveloped: women were always
well represented on Branch Committees, 	 and,	 after 1945,	 the
proportion of the female workforce which was organised was
comparatively high. Moreover, although male shirt cutters choose to
be organisationally separate from their female colleagues, the two
men appointed as NUTGW organisers in the 194Os were patently far from
indifferent to the organisatiori of women shirtmakers. 	 A ready
explanation for both of these anomalies seems to be 	 at hand.
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As I pointed out in section 2. 3, role-reversal between the sexes was
popularly believed to have been common among Derry families: the twin
notions of the woman shirtmaker as the family breadwinner and the
unemployed father/husband as the person responsible for child care
and housework has been celebrated in song and cited in many articles
about the city. In this section I will re-examine this belief and
assess the extent to which it explains the anomalous aspects of union
organisation in the shirt industry. The issue of occupational
segregation by sex and its effect on relationships between male and
female shirt workers will be the subject of the next chapter; it will
not, therefore, be further developed here.
None of my sample of union activists and officials, and only one
of the many other women shirtmakers whom I talked to in the course of
my research, had any personal experience of role-reversal within
their extended families; nevertheless, most of them were sure that it
was common in Derry. There seems, however, to have been a difference
of interpretation between Catholics and Protestants. According to
Miss Cosgrave, a Catholic,
There was no work for the men. It was pitiful, and there
was no such thing as social security and it was outdoor
relief, and you had to be starving before you got outdoor
relief.	 And the women all worked out and the men all
looked after the yongsters in the home - that is true.
She did not think that it was as common today:
Not as much as it was then. In the '30s times were very
tough. There used to be a coal yard... in the Bogside and
the men would have been passing here with a bag of coal on
their back because it was half a crown cheaper than if
they'd bought it at the door... there wasn't any work for
the men... and the women had to go out and work.
Mrs Henderson, a Protestant, agreed:
Ach, gosh, there was hundreds [of shirtmakers] In that
[position of being the family breadwinner]. Their men
stayed in the house and watched the youngsters and they
came out to work. .. well, I would say after the [Second
World] War more so. I think the War started this where
women went out to work part-time and then after it [the
War] that was kept up.. . there was no work hardly for men
at that time.
However, she added,
alt hough. .. men didn' t go out and look for work. Now, why
I can tell you that, I was on the [Social Security] Boards,
and the men that came and the excuses they made that they
couldn't get work.., they had to go out and look for jobs
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and they had to bring for to let us see - you'd get a wee
chit to say they were there. . . and the stories they told
you they must have thought you were naive. The men didn't
seem to want to work. . . I would say an awful lot done work
on the sly.
Some women shirtmakers - particularly those whom I met as part of an
adult education group - expressed scepticism about the extent to
which the unemployed husbands looked after the children and the home,
and suggested that child care was left to grandmothers and aunts.
The popularity of
	
the idea notwithstanding, 	 there is
considerable evidence to suggest that it was not especially common
for a Derry shirtmaker to be the main family breadwinner. The
Londonderry Sentinel (13 January 1971) published a highly critical
riposte to Jackson's contentions about men, role-reversal, and
violence in Derry (see Jackson, 1979, and section 2.3 of this
thesis). The Sentinel article refers to the notion of women-as-
breadwinners as a 'legend' or an 'old story', and quotes Seamus
Quinn, the local secretary of the ITGWU which organised the majority
of unionised shirt workers in the 1950s and 1960s, as saying,
it would be very difficult to find an example of this lie
role-reversal]. The facts of life about supplementary
benefit are that if an unemployed man's wife went out to
work he could lose most of his benefit.
Lande (1978: 261-262) has pointed out that 'among unemployed men [in
the United Kingdom in the 1970s] the overall proportion with wives in
paid employement is low'. Like Quinn, she attributes this to a
social security system in which an unemployed man's supplementary
benefit is reduced to the extent that his wife earns:
there is therefore a substantial incentive for a woman to
give up paid work once her husband becomes unemployed,
unless she has high enough earnings to maintain the whole
family.
The one women snirtmeker whom I met in the course of my research who
had personal experience of role-reversal tends to confirm Quinn' s and
Lande's analysis. She started working in the shirt industry in 1969.
A few years prior to the time when I spoke to her, her husband was
made redundant. For most of the 18 months he was unemployed she
supported the family on her wage of £40 per week: her husband only
recieived '35p' in benefit. In an effort to get around this dilemma,
her husband told the 'dole' that he had been 'kicked out of the house
ana that he was living with a relative. '
	 This did not work because
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the Department of Health and Social Security sent inspectors to watch
her house. Eventually she gave up her job and returned to work only
when her husband became a self-employed window cleaner.
It would seem, therefore, that in the 1960s and the 1970s it was
not especially cormon for female shirtmakers to be the main
bereadwinners in Derry families, but what about the 1920s, 1930s,
1940s, and 1950s? Most census reports do not tabulate the figures in
such a way as to illuminate this question; for example, the report
for 1961 is the only one from which it is possible to calculate the
proportion of single to married women working in the shirt factories
- and then only for those workers resident in Derry city. According
to that report only 980 or 26% of the 3,709 women shirt workers
resident in the city were married (1964: 79). McLaughlin carried out
a social survey designed to try to assess the extent to which women
workers - irrespective whether or not they were shirtmakers - were
the main family breadwinners in Derry between 1926 and the present
day. The full results of this study are not currently available (her
thesis, published in 1987, has a five year embargo), but in a paper
read at a conference of the ILHS In Derry in 1985 she concluded that
there was little evidence to suggest that the female breadwinner was
an especially common phenomena in Derry during this period.
In short, despite the many affirmations that female breadwinner
was commonplace, and although the historical position of women
shirtmakers in the family in Derry remains somewhat obscure, it is
possible to state that the extent of role-reversal has been
exaggerated. It would be foolish, therefore, to suggest any
correlation between the comparatively high densities of trade union
membership among female shirt workers and their putative independence
within the family.
However, the fact that only one of my sample of female union
activists was married provides a clue to a potentially significant
insight: most trade union activists were single women. But my sample
includes only four women, and only one became a union activist
earlier than 1953; we are therefore left with two further questions:
does this generalisation also apply in the 1920s and 1930s? and, are
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my resporoants representative of union activists in tne 1940s ano
195t5s? An examination of the iists of committee members whicn were
occasionaly recoroed in the minute book of the Derry Branch of the
ASTT/NUTGW allow me to answer both questions in the affirmative. In
1924, there were ii women on the Committee; oniy 3 were married (see
Minute: 23 July 1924). There were 4 female members of the new Branch
Committee formed after the amalgamation of the local Branches of the
ASTT and IJGW in 1933; none of them was married (see Minute: 10
October 1933). In 1948 12 women Committee members, plus two shop
stewards who were the union's delegates to the Trades Council, were
listed; only 2 were married (see Minute: 3 February 1948). In a list
entitled 'Branch Committee 1950', there were 9 women; only 2 were
married. And of the 13 women who were members of the NUTGW Branch
Committee which was reconstituted after the majority of the
membership seceeded to another union, only 5 were married (see
Minute: 17 November 1953).
As many scholars have noted, the domestic commitments which
usually accrue to women when they marry makes it difficult for them
to participate in union management. For example, Turner (1962: 294)
points out that in the cotton industry, women union officers tend to
be spinsters or older married women whose children had left home.
The evidence which I have presented above suggests that - whatever is
the truth about role-reversal in Berry families - married women
shirtmakers were neither better able nor more inclined to actively
participate in trade union affairs than married women workers
elsewhere. Indeed, the lists of committee members discussed above
may over-estimate the extent to which married women were active in
the Derry Branch of the NUTGW: my respondants' recollections indicate
that all of the most active women were single. Mrs Henderson is an
exception which, to some extent, proves the rule. 	 She did not find
much difficulty in reconciling her commitment to the union with
family life because she was childless.	 Most of her union activity
took place,
while I was working [in the factory] and I was paid for
tnat time I stopped working... I didn't do it for nothing,
the union paid that.
I asked, 'but, what about union meetings in the evening?' 	 She
replied:
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I had no family you see, and then my husband. . . he was a
bread agent and he had long hours. He used to be in at 11
o'clock at night and I could have been at meetings and back
again before ever he came in., . and he never objected me
going away for weekends. .. even to England or anything like
that.	 He never objected... I enjoyed the work while I was
doing it.
The one way in which her two careers - as a wife and as a trade union
activist - clashed was that she had to refuse an invitation to attend
a long-term residential course for trade union activists at Ruskin
College: 'I would have gone if I'd been single.'
Regardless of the facts of family life in Derry, the idea of
role-reversal as a commonplace embodies a recognition of the
importance of shirtmakers' wages to their families and to the local
economy in general. Judging from the literature (see especially
Charles, 1983), this local recognition of the importance of women's
jobs is unusual.	 In most places women's employment is regarded as
marginal or, at least, of less importance than men's. Several
examples may be cited to illustrate the value placed on women's jobs
in Derry. One is a feature in the Derry Journal (14 March 1947). It
comprised of a photograph of women workers in Richard's 'Paragon'
factory entitled 'Derry's Mainstay Army'; the commentary reads:
Derry's 5,000 shirt workers hold tenaciously to the last
vestige of the city's erstwhile industrial greatness... by
their traditional skill.., the city's factory workers have
held for it, its premier place in the shirtmaking world.
Another example is a speech made by the Catholic Bishop of Derry, Dr
Farren, during the Feast of Saint Joseph the Workman. The notion of
a male family wage was enshrined in Catholic social thought (O'Dowd,
1987: 16); nevertheless, Dr Farren, specifically praised the
contribution of married women shirt workers to the local economy and
to their families t,DJ: 3 May 1957). An example of a different kind
was provided by a local historian '' who told me that the American
sailors who were stationed in Derry during the Second World War were
warned that because of the local employment situation Derry's factory
girls were of a 'better class' than elsewhere - the implication being
that they should be treated with more respect. 	 Against this
backround the evident concern of McGonagle and Macgougan for the
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organisation of female shirt factory workers can be seen to be less
of a paradox.
Prior to his appointment as Irish organiser of the NUTGW
Macgougan worked as personal assistant to the 'principle of a firm of
chartered accountants' in Belfast. He had been involved in left-wing
politics in Belfast from an early age, and had been instrumental in
the recruitment of accountancy clerks into the Clerical and
Administrative Union (see Appendix 1). His boss had been appointed
as 'Clothing and Equipment Conptroller for Northern Ireland' during
the Second World War, and 'part of my duties was to go to the trade
association, take the minutes, and do statistical work for them.
Consequently, he had some knowledge of the clothing industry in
Northern Ireland, and he thought that this 'gave me an edge' when he
applied for the NUTGW job. Initially, Macgougan was not concerned
one way or another that the NUTGW was a mainly female union: 'that
didn't worry me in the slightest'; his interest in the job was mainly
political,
When the job was advertised for the the Tailor and Garment
Workers' Union I was active politically,., being in
accountancy in a place like Belfast is not a good field for
left-wing politics, particularly with a republican stance,
particularly from a Protestant: you get labelled very
quickly.
Soon after his appointment, however, Macgougan was struck by the
importance of female employment in Derry's shirt factories. He still
is: several times during our conversations he repeated the employment
figures, '7,000 shirt workers, 35 factories [sic], and a population
of only just over 40,000... under 50,000.' He was so impressed by
the Derry situation that he wrote an article about it in 1948. This
article is the earliest published discussion of the theme of role-
reversal in Derry that I have come across; though Ma cgougan told me
that even at that time it was a familiar enough idea. He begins the
article thus:
This is the story of a one industry town, where almost
7,000 women find employment in the city's thirty shirt
factories. This bald statement does not adequately convey
the poverty and frustration occasioned by large families
being brought up on the inadequate earnings of the women
members of the family. .. The almost complete lack of male
employment drives many to seek employment not only in
Belfast, 90 miles away, but in all parts of Britain. 	 Of
those who remain some 'keep house' while their wives act as
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Dreauwinners, and it is tne exception, rather than the
rule, for women to retire from work on marriage. (Macgougan
1948:	 1).
Macgougan continued to display a concern for the problems arising
from Derry' s singular dependence on female labour. In 1948 when
cloth was in short supply ne approached the Minister of Commerce to
argue that Derry firms should be given prior access to what was
available because 'the whole city depends on the industry' (GW:
August 1948). Twice, he drew attention to the unusually high
incidence of tuberculosis among female factory workers in Derry
arguing that it was the result of an excessive workload which he saw
as a consequence of the sexual imbalance in local employment
opportunities (GW: April 1950, and News Sheet of the Belfast
Executive of the Irish Labour Party, February 1953). Finally,
Macgougan, like other left-wing activists who were concerned about
Derry, campaigned for the location of more male employing industry in
the city; but, uniquely among these campaigners he was careful that
the interests of female shirt workers should not be neglected:
the stress has rightly been on the need for male-employing
industries, but it is a mistake to overlook the
considerable underemployment among women workers.' (GW:
February 1959).
Prior to his appointment as local organising secretary,
McGonagle was a well respected and skilled plumber, a lay official in
the plumbers' union, secretary of the Trades Council, and active in
local labour politics. When I interviewed him, he emphasised that he
gave up a good job to take up the NUTGW appointment. Like Macgougan,
McGonagle displayed a keen awareness of the importance of women's
jobs in the shirt industry, but he was ambivalent; to be more precise
he was ill at ease with a situation which, apparently, contradicted
the norms of a male family wage. For example, he described women
factory workers as 'the source of all money that came into Derry..
[the] shirt workers made the economy of Derry with their spending
power, ' but he was reluctant to describe the women as breadwinners
because the term was 'derogatory to their husbands. Moreover, in
contrast to Macgougan, he seems to have been prepared to advocate an
increase in the number of jobs for men even if it was associated with
a aecline in jobs for women in the shirt industry (see Liberty:
Novemoer 1960..
	 McGonage aeniea that ne thought that the
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introouction of male employing industry might be associated with a
decline in joos for women in the shirt industry, but told me that
four years after he became organising secretary of the NUTGW in Derry
(ie in 1951/52) 'I concluded that the shirt industry was in a
decline' '.
Unlike the women trade unionists interviewed in Charles' (1983)
survey, none of my respondants felt that Macgougan or McGonagle had
neglected their interests as women workers. For example, Miss
Gallagher did not feel that the emphasis placed by local union
leaders, including Macgougan and McGonagle, on the attraction of male
employing industries to Derry was indicative of neglect or a threat
to shirt workers: 'work for men in Derry at that time was badly
needed. '	 I asked Miss Cosgrave if she ever thought that union
officials had neglected the interests of female shirtmakers; she
replied:
90% of the women always felt the union didn't do enough for
them. But as Stephen McGonagle used to preach.. . you have
to be honest with the employer and honest with yourself and
not ask for anything that wasn't legal or just. I wouldn't
have been a trade union official for nobody, for money
wouldn't have paid you to take the stick and take the abuse
from the employer and the worker.
Although two of my female respondants felt that women should
have been better represented in the union's hierarchy, the sex of
union officials never became an issue in Derry. Miss Gallagher told
me 'we,.. thought a woman could speak as well if not better for the
woman on the job. ' Mrs Henderson said:
I think they (women) would have understood the shirt
industry better because its all right for them talking, but
when you' re working a place and you can see the things
thats happening and you know whats happening. Like you had
to go and explain to the men the things. They may have
known something, but not the inner things that you had to
use against the employer.	 I could've hit Lowry [general
manager of McCarthy' s factory] with anything that I seen
wasn't right but if I'd said that to Jack Macgougan or to
Willie [Neill, organising secretary of the Derry Branch of
the NUTGW in the late 1950s], or to any of them ones... you
had to go into all the details whereas if you were on the
spot you were able to [rectify it there and then].
Another Branch Committee member, quoted in section 4.2, voiced a
similar criticism of McGonagle over the issue of work study:
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'Bandstitchers knew more about the job than the secretary' (Minute:
September 1948). To be sure, when Sarah Doherty retired there was
some controversy within the Branch over the appointment of her
replacement.	 However, the sex of the replacement was not at issue.
Jack Doherty, a tailor who was a member of the Branch Committee,
objected to the way in which the post of 'organising secretary' was
to be filled. He argued that it should be filled by election within
the Branch not by appointment because in the latter case Macgougan
would have undue influence over the candidate selected. When
McGonagle was appointed, Doherty and a cutter called Patrick Hamill
objected to the fact that he was not a member of the NUTGW, resigned
from the committee, and threatened to form a breakaway union. This
episode is interesting in the light of subsequent events, and it will
be examined further, but for the moment the most important point is
that the sex of the new local official was not at issue. The nature
of the controversy is further illuminated by the fact that Jack
Doherty was one of the applicants for the job. (Minutes: July,
September, and October 1947). In the early 196Os, Jack Macgougan
appointed Francis Maguire, a former clothing worker from Belfast, as
the NIJTGW's women's officer for Northern Ireland.
In other studies, the marginalisation of women's interests
within the trade unions is said to come about not just because male
trade union officials view their female members in terms of family
ideology - the notion that womens' place is in the home and that
their waged work is secondary to that of men - but because 'It also
structureLs] the views and perceptions of... women [trade unionists]'
(Charles, 1983: 19), The question therefore arises: what effect did
the positive value placed on the work of women in the shirt industry
have on the attitude of female union members towards their union?
Was it this which encouraged them to become more actively involved
union affairs than their sisters elsewhere'? The evidence at hand is
not adequate to answer these questions; it is however sufficient to
show the complexity of the issues.
When I asked my respondants why they joined the union in the
first place, and why they later became activists they each gave a
different kind of answer,
	 Miss Gallagher joined because she was
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encouraged to do SO O ner orotner and oy a famil y tradition: she
became active in the i'UTGW because of her opposition to the 1952
breakaway.	 Miss McMorris lobed because she was asked to join; she
became an activist reluctantly and after much persuasion by her peers
(see Appendix 1). As I have already mentioned, Mrs Henderson's
interest in trade unionism developed as a response to the
introduction of work study and because of her hostility to the 1952
breakaway. I will examine each woman's attitude to trade unionism at
length in later chapters; the main point for the moment is that of
all my respondants, only Miss Cosgrave indicated that a recognition
of the importance of women shirt workers' wages to their families was
a part of her commitment to trade unionisrn. She explained her
union involvement in terms of a resentment of the arbitrary power of
management both in small things like tea breaks and toilet facilities
and larger issues such as the introduction of the conveyor system.
In relation to the latter she said:
they [the women] just had to take it and bear with it and
do their work and do the amount they had to because they
had no alternative because most of the women... were
married and their husbands weren't working and there was rio
such thing as social security there.
Moreover, there is evidence that, far from encouraging union activity
on the part of women, the fact that their wages were considered as
being vital to the city's economy was, on occasion, used to dampen
their enthusiasm for action, For example, when it was announced that
work study was going to be applied to production in the City factory,
the Branch Committee - mindful of the refusal of some women workers
in Harrison's factory to accept the new methods of production and
payment introduced by the work study consultants and approved by
McGonagie - warned that,
workers should not attempt to stop efficiency and progress
with this the only industry in Derry, as the whole city
depended on it. . the new scheme must be given an honest
trial,, . the industry was entering a competitive phase and
the worker could make or destroy the whole business. If it
suffered in a small degree then the effect would be
widespread even among other trades. (Minute: 8 January
1949).
To sum up. The comparatively high density of union membership
and participation among women shirtmakers in Derry cannot be
explainea in terms of their supposea position as famil y breaawinners:
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the eviaence suggests that the incidence of role-reversal between
shirtmakers and their husbands has been much exaggerated, and, in any
case, most female union activists were mature single women.
However, the popularity of the idea of women-as-breadwinners seems to
have contributed to the unionisation of shirtmakers in an indirect
way. To judge from the literature (eg Charles 1983) male union
officials usually regard women's work as being secondary to men's
work, and consequently tend to neglect their female members'
interests.	 In contrast, the two men appointed to organise Derry
shirt workers after World War Two approached their job with a
singular zeal.	 Their zeal can, in part, be traced to a heightened
awareness of the importance of women's jobs in the shirt industry to
local families and to the local economy more generally.	 But this
does not, in itself,	 constitute an adequate explanation for the
comparatively high densities of union membership among Derry
shirtmakers.	 What, then, is the explanation'? Macgougan suggested
one possibility. I asked him why he thought trade union membership
in Derry was proportionately greater than in Belfast. In reply, he
told me that the factories in Derry were larger than in Belfast.
This is indeed the case: Hamilton (1955: 27) has shown that, on
average, shirt factories in Derry employed twice as many workers as
shirt factories in Belfast. 	 Furthermore, as Poole (1984: 136) has
pointed out, the association between 'enterprise size and density of
unionisation has... been well documented'. However, he adds that
'the precise factors involved are open to dispute', and for me to
dwell on them here would be to divert me from my main purpose - a
purpose to which I now want to return.
4. 4 Trade Unionism and Sectarianism in the 1930s and 1940s
It has been shown that, contrary to what traditional Irish
marxism would lead one to expect, fluctuations in union membership
among women in the Derry shirt industry during the 1920s, 1930s,
1940s and early 1950s followed a similar pattern to that for the
United Kingdom as a whole, and that union densities and the level of
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active involvement by women in union affairs compared favourably witn
British standaros.	 It nos also been shown that the structural and
institutional factors which underlay the fluctuating pattern of union
membership among Derry shirtmakers were more or less the same as
those which have been identified in Britain and elsewhere. In so
far as the density of union membership among Derry shirtmakers in the
late 1940s was exceptional, one of the main things which
distinguished Derry seems to have been the zeal of the two male
organisers appointed after 1945; this, in turn, was linked to the
widespread recognition of the importance of women shirt workers in
the social and economic fabric of the city.	 Having established
these points, it is now possible to attempt to locate the
significance of sectarianism in the development of the Derry Branch
of the NUTGW in the period.
When talking about the 1930s and 1940s, none of my respondants
recalled any occasion when sectarian conflict interfered with trade
unionism; sectarianism was a problem which they associated with the
1950s. Most of my respondants did not go so far as Mrs Henderson
when she told me that 'no, things like that [politics, religion]
never were mentioned in the factory till that happened [ie the
secession of the Derry Branch Committee of the NUTGW in 1952]', but
they would have agreed with the underlying idea. There was certainly
no conflict on a comparable scale to 1883 or 1899 (see section 3.2);
indeed, I found no trace of sectarian conflict involving shirt
workers in the local press, union journal, or Branch Committee
minutes. However, all my respondants were keenly aware of sectarian
divisions within the shirt industry.	 They mentioned that relations
between Catholic and Protestant shirt workers would become more tense
on 12 July, when the Orange Order commemorates William of Orange's
victory over James the II in 1690; on 12 August, when the Apprentice
Boys commemorate the Relief of Derry by marching through the city;
and on a few other occasions. One of latter was 'Poppy day. ' Miss
Gallagher, a Catholic with a pro-British outlook, noticed tensions in
Harrison's factory when some of the 'Unionist girls' tried to sell
poppies in November each year:
Poppy day would be a day, they [some Catholic women]
wouldn' t let you buy a poppy, some of them would buy, but
as the years went on they just had to leave the poppies in
a box.	 Because some of the girls would go round with a
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box, some of them tooK them and some of them didn't. But
you could see the expression on the others' faces - the
people that didn't want you to buy one, that sort of thing.
And I always used to say to them: 'my brothers and they've
been in the army, ' anything like that and 'you' re
supporting' - but then it got from Stephen's LMcGonagle]
time Lie after the split in the union) all these things
were very noticeable;
she claimed that,'he thrived on things like that at that time.'
Today, the display of red, white, and blue bunting is fairly
commonplace in many Belfast factories during the period of the 12
July celebrations; this was rare in Derry shirt factories, 	 Seamus
Quinn told me, 'I never saw it or heard of it. ' The only occasion
which I have come across was the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II
when the different departments of the following factories held a
competition for decoration: S. lvi. kennedy and Co. , McCarthy and Co.
W. J. Little and Co. , Gilfillan and Co. , and J. Hamilton and Sons
(LS: 2 June 1953).	 The reader may recall that these factories were
all associated with the Protestant community, and one ex-shirt worker
who attended a lecture I gave claimed that the decorations had caused
offence to the Catholic women who worked in these factories.
Most of my respondants attached greater significance to the
religious segregation of the workforce than to actual conflict.
According to Mr Matthews, a Protestant shirt cutter,
Not at all, no [sectarian] problems as regards [the] unions
in the '30s because the average girl wasn' t in a union at
all, she just accepted her wage. But later on it [religous
division] did become, it even came to fisticuffs in some of
the factories between this girl 'Annie' and this girl
'Mary' [this is another reference to the secession of the
Derry Branch of the NUTGW in 1952]. One was in the
Transport and General - Dublin based - Union and the other
girl she was in the Tailor and Garment Workers' Union. Oh
aye, it even came to physical blows and people being
pressurised to get them out of the factory if there was a
big majority of them in the one. McCarthy's would have
been one of the few factories - and maybe Little's on the
Waterside, especially McCarthy's - I think McCarthy's would
have been nearly 100% Tailor and Garment Workers' [Union]
membership because they employed very few Roman Catholics.
Although you weren't asked your religion when you went [for
a job), but they had other ways [of telling]... No, I
coulon't see it Lie religious differences obstructing union
organisation in the 1930s] because it [the union] was so
unimportant.
Mrs Gallagher told me that, notwithstanding tension at particular
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times of the year, there was little sectarian conflict among factory
workers in the 1930s and 1940s,
Not really, only just, you knew the way you were in Derry
like the factory girls.., there was no such thing as
getting a day off on the twelfth [of July] then, no extra
holidays. There never was, I wouldn't say tnere'd be
tension unless there'd be something happen on the 12 July
or the 12 August, and maybe they would bring it to the
factory and the boss[es] they would have to say 'will you
leave that outside when you come in here. ' There might
have been tension in that way but I wouldn't say there was
a lot.. . But the way it used to go with the factories, like
McCarthy's, like they were always considered that was the
Protestant factory and you know like they would say, 'do
you like working in Mccarthy's,' you know that sort of way.
Well Richard's and Harrison's and these [factories] that
was on the town here, they [the workers] were all from the
Bogside and Rosemount Lie mainly Catholic areas] and from
all these places. That was sort of the way it was kept you
know. Like the Ebrington, now the majority were
Protestants in the Ebrington. And you know like they used
to, you know like, that was the only sort of bit of tension
you would have got like, but yet outside they would be
friendly and all that.	 But that was they way we were..
segregat ed.
Most of my respondants,	 Protestant and Catholic,	 identified
McCarthy's and Ebrington as 'Protestant' factories, a few added
smaller factories such as Hamilton's and Little's to the list. As I
suggested in section 2. 4, The ready identification of particular
factories as 'Protestant' seems to reflect the fact that they were
exceptions: the majority of the female shirt workforce was Catholic.
This analysis of the recollections of Derry shirt workers
resonates with Munck and Roiston's analysis of the recollections of
workers in Belfast's linen industry and shipbuilding complex during
the same period; they write (1987: 111),
More common than an active sectarianism was this passive
acceptance of religious divisions within the working
class. . . sectarianism was not always present. Most
workplaces probably did have amiable relations most of the
year round.	 But the divisions were there and there was
always a latent hostility.	 This would become more open
around the twelfth of July.
Despite this - and the fact that their respondents tend to explain
the weakness of trade unionism in Belfast's linen and clothing
factories in terms of the lack of eductation of workers, the high
turnover' in the workforces, management opposition, women's aual role
as housewives and wage labourers, the attitude of male trade
- I/o -
unionists to women, and the like (see 1987: 118-125.) - Hunck ana
Roiston remain wedded to the view that 'sectarianism was unooubteoly
a factor weaKening tne traae unions' (1987: 117), and that 'the root
of most sectarianism in the industrial world' was 'competition over
jobs' (1987: 111). Here, Munck and Roiston reveal their own roots in
traditional Irish marxism, for, as was shown in section 1. 1, tne
central thesis of the traditional marxist analysis of the 'Northern
Ireland problem' is that it is Protestant workers' priveleged
position in the labour market - maintained by discriminatory policies
on the part of the Unionist bosses - which formed the material basis
for sectarianism, and that it was sectarianism which prevented
Protestant workers from uniting with their 'natural' allies -
Catholic workers - in a progressive socialist movement,
I will discuss the effect of sectarian divisions among women
shirt workers on the development of the Derry Branch of the NUTGW in
a moment, but first I want to discuss my respondants' views on the
origins of religious segregation within the shirt industry. It is
important to be clear about what I doing here. It is not part of my
purpose in this thesis to attempt to account for sectarian divisions
in Northern Ireland. 	 It is not even part of my purpose to account
for the pattern of segregation between Catholics and Protestants in
the Derry shirt industry. Rather, the reason for exploring my
respondants' views on the origins of religious segregation in the
shirt industry is to show that - contrary to what the traditional
Irish marxist argument would lead one to expect - competition over,
or discrimination in respect of, the allocation of jobs was rarely a
cause of resentment between Catholic and Protestant shirt workers in
Derry, let alone being the fundamental basis for sectarianism.
The reader may recall that in section 2.4 1 drew attention not
just to the tendency for some factories to be identifed with the
Protestant community but to another form of segregation whereby
Protestants were over-represented in shirt cutting and in management.
There was little doubt among my res pondants - not only the Catholics,
but some oi the Protestants too - that the latter was the result of
active aiscrimination on the part of shirt manufacturers ana factory
mamagers, most of wnom were Protestants, in favour of their co-
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religionists. Macgougan told me that,
A bigger proportion of the cutters were Protestant; it was
widely believed that a Church of Ireland parish was a
regular recruiting agent.
Matthews also felt that Catholics were discriminated against in the
employment of cutters and management. He told me that the first
Catholic to be employed as a cutter in Bryce and Weston's factory had
been when he was the under manager of the cutting room there. He
also told me that employers had no problem finding out the religion
of a prospective employee and gave the example of one of his work
mates who had been asked which school he had attended during an
interview for a job in McCarthy's cutting room. McCorkell explained
the Protestant domination of shirt cutting in the following terms:
You see there was an awful lot of grips and all the rest of
it played a big part. At the time the masons met in a hall
down Magazine street,. . and they were very strong. My
father, he wasn't very happy that I hadn't joined one of
these organisations - he was always telling me how I would
progress in life by joining one of these [societies)... I
was sorry about it because he was a decent old fella.
But he added:
Tell you a funny thing about the City factory.. . they also
had what we called the white collar trade down the
stairs... The manager there was a fella called O'Neill who
was a very good Catholic, lived in Rosernourit, yet all on
that side it was a very good strong Catholic majority,
[bandkriife] cutters and all, 'cause they cut their own
stuff. And up in the shirts Lie shirt cutting room) it was
Protestant right from top to bottom. I don't think it had
much to do with the English, because they were connected
with England - in fact they had a factory outside
Paisley... I don' t think that had a great deal to do with
it. I think the main thing was, if there was a Catholic
like that he was more or less, felt duty bound, to take a
certain number [of Catholics), as many as he could, without
offending the firm's policy. I don't think really they had
a policy - it was the management. Just the same as they
blame the managment in the shipyard now f or where the
shipyard have gone to; you know: bad management.
The domination of management and shirt cutting by Protestant
men, and the suspicions of discrimination which went along with it,
were, as will become apparent, a source of some resentement among the
Catholic shirt workers I interviewed°. However, the segregation
of the female workforce between different factories was viewed
somewhat differently by my respondants and ny Catholics and
Protestants in Derry generally. To be sure, there was some suspicion
-
that small factories such as Hamilton's and Kennedy's had
discriminatory employment policies, but they were not considered
important and it was felt that factory owners, most of whom where
Protestants, could not, in general, sustain discriminatory policies
with respect to the employment of women shirtmakers. 	 Seamus Quinn
told me:
Hamilton was [a Unionist Councillor], and Kennedy was until
he died. They were of very little importance... they had
their political views airight and they applied their
policies in employment policies, but they didn' t carry much
weight... [as regards the other shirt manufacturers] you
got to remember in Derry there was a big inhibition on even
the most bigoted of them [shirt manufacturers] because if
they were going to do that policy [discriminate against
Catholics] - they did it with regard to the male employment
- but with female employment they couldn 1 t.. . because they
needed them. [Employment policies were] not an issue, but
it was well known. I think it was just sort of accepted by
people: 'I wouldn't go to Hanilton's because they wouldn't
employ you.
Quinn suspected that McCarthy's management also had on employment
policy which favoured Protestants, women aswell as men, but told me
that they had had to abandon it when the industrial consultants
employed to introduce work study discovered that some department
managers were finding it difficult to recruit sufficient female
labour, Quinn, like Macgougan and Matthews, regarded the Protestant
identity of the Ebrington, and the two or three other Waterside
plants, to be an accident of geography: the Waterside is an
overwhelmingly Protestant area Far from being a source of
resentment, the employment provided by the shirt industry was
regarded by Derry Catholics as, in the words of Frank Curran, former
editor of the Derr y JournL (1986: 4),
heaven sent, for it was greedy for workers and provided
employment f or thousands of women whose husbands could not
find work, The entrepreneurs who created the world-
renowned industry did not care whether their profits
accrued from the nimbleness of Catholic or Protestant
fingers.
However, there is also the question of whether Protestant shirt
workers resented the fact that Catholics predominated in the shirt
workforce as a whole and in the workforces of most factories. 	 Some
evidence might suggest that they did. 	 As I have already shown,
McCorkell drew attention to a particular Catholic manager in the City
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factory who favoured his co-religionists.	 A manager in Harrison's
a mainly Catholic factory, told me that 'sometimes Protestants
felt hard done by. ' And, Miss Cosgrave talked bitterly of an
occasion when, shortly after having been made a manageress in the
Rosemount factory in the early 1960s, she became the target of
anonymous allegations that she had treated the small number of
Protestants who worked in the factory in a discriminatory way (see
Appendix 1). However, none of the Protestant shirt workers I spoke
to felt that they had been discriminated against in the allocation of
jobs, or expressed any resentment about the number of Catholics
employed in the shirt industry. Moreover, although the Democratic
Unionist Party recently mounted a vigorous campaign to highlight what
they saw as discrimination against Protestants in 25 of the city's
largest employers, only one of these was a shirt factory - the one
factory located in a strongly nationalist residential area - and they
made it clear,
that we were not so much concerned about the long
established firms of which there are many in Londonderry
[this could only be a reference to the shirt industry]...
they draw employees from different religions and ethnic
groups and they also recruit workers who have family
connections with staff... these family links often stretch
back 60, 70, and up to 100 years.. . what the Protestant
community is most concerned about is the recruitment
practice in firms which have been started up in the area in
the past 10 to 15 years. (LS: 3 February 1982; see also:
Democratic Unionist Party, 3 October 1978; FEA, September
1983; and Dempsey 1983).
Despite the lack of political controversy in the Derry Branch of
the NUTGW in the 1930s and 1940s, and the fact that workplace
relations between Protestants and Catholics were trouble-free, Sarah
Doherty was not successful in recruiting members across the sectarian
divide: according to Miss Gallagher, and Mrs Henderson the activists
and lay membership were mainly Catholics. Jack Macgougan's
impression of the Branch on his appointment as Irish regional
organiser in 1945 was that,
It was almost exclusively a Catholic Branch at that time. .
Among the tailors there'd be some Protestants, but they
didn't take any part in the [Branch], one, Wright his name
was, was a Protestant Tailor, he became Branch president
1.for a short timei.
I sought to corr000rate these recollections by asking my responcants
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to tell me tne religious affiliations of each of the Committee
members listed in the minutes of the Derry Branch of tne ASTT/NUTGW.
They were not able to provide me with a religious label for each and
every member of the various Branch Committees between 1933 and 1945,
but I am able to say that the core of female activists in these years
- Miss Doherty, Miss Moore, Miss Nellis, Miss Kelly, and Miss McCourt
- were Catholics. Miss Moore worked in Tillie and Henderson's
factory and this was the factory which retained the biggest
membership during the difficult years of the 1930s and early 1940s:
Percy Burns reported receiving a particularly warm reception from
Tulle and Henderson shop stewards when he visited Derry in 1937 (GW:
November 1937); Waidron referred to it as a factory 'in which we
already have some hundreds of members' (GW: May 1940); and Macgougan
remembers it as one of the few factories in which he found any union
members when he first visited Derry in 1945. Notwithstanding Miss
Gallagher's remarks about poor organisation in Richard's factory in
the 1930s and 1940s, it was clearly better organised than most: Miss
Nellis, Miss Kelly, and Miss McCourt all worked there. This is not
to say that there were no Protestant shirt workers in the NUTGW in
the 1930s and early 1940s; there was: the minutes of the 1937 'Yearly
Meeting' of the Branch mentions that the union had a shop steward in
the Ebrington factory (there was no subsequent reference to her), and
it is likely that the Branch Chairman between 1933 and 1939, a cutter
called John Kilgore, was a Protestant	 However, it Is clear
that they were relatively few. I will consider the reasons why so
few Protestants joined the Branch in the 1930s and early 1940s in a
moment, but first I want to examine what, if any, problems Macgougan
and McGonagle had in dealing with sectarian differences among their
constituency and whether the organising campaigns which they
initiated in the late 1940s resulted in any change in the religious
imbalance in NUTGW membership.
Despite some suspicion, Macgougan - a 'nationally minded
socialist' from a Belfast Protestant backround - got a good reception
from the Derry Branch:
Sarah Doherty thought, of course, I was a communist, but
she treated me with due respect: I was the senior officer.
She indicated early on that she wanted to be relieved of
her post - she'd cancer.
-.	 -IL)
There was, as has already been shown, some opposition within the
Branch Committee to the appointment of Stephen McGonagle as Miss
Doherty's replacement. I have already pointed out that this
opposition was orchestrated by a tailor who was one of McGonagle's
rivals for the job, and that his main complaints were that McGonagle
was not a garment worker and that he was being appointed by Macgougan
rather than being elected by the local Branch. However, Macgougan
told me that although McGonagle was a local Catholic there was also
'an element that suspected the political alignment.., old fashioned
nationalists. ' The suspicion of some members of the Branch that
Macgougan favoured McGonagle's appointment because the two men shared
a common political outlook was, as shall be detailed in chapter six,
not too far from the truth: both men were anti-partitionist members
of the NILP in 1947,
Macgougan and McGonagle sought to recruit union members in all
of Derry's factories irrespective of the religious composition of
their workforces. Neither man hid his political views - both were
active politicians - but they were both sensitive to sectarian
sensibilities. Nevertheless, as Macgougan conceded, they both found
it more difficult to recruit in those factories which have been
described as 'Protestant. '	 Macgougan told me:
The first factory I organised was Harrison's. 	 I got a
marvellous shop steward there.. . she organised. I always
aimed at addressing a meeting - trying to get, sum up,
somebody and then [encourage them to become a shop
steward]... Bridie Maxwell [was the shop steward in
Harrison's]... Ebrington was a slow starter: it was a
Protestant factory.. . got to be blunt about it, part of the
facts of life.	 There was Hamilton's, Ebrington, and a
small one called Little['s].	 Hamilton's was on this side
of the river; the others on the Waterside.	 Well then you
had the Rosemount factory out on the other extreme.
However,
generally speaking we got over to them [Protestant workers]
the fact that we were piggy in the middle and that it
didn't matter to us where they went on a sunday...
McCarthy's was the outstanding example [of a factory with a
Protestant workforce], it later became the cornerstone of
our organisation in Derry.
Macgougan's statement requires two qualifications. First, it is true
that McCarthy's factory became the 'cornerstone' of NUTGW
organisation in Derry, but not until the late 1950s. In 1947/48 when
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Mrs Henaerson began working tnere,
there was only a few [trade union members)... just a
handful, like out of 3 or 400 girls I would say maybe 100,
150 then; if there was that even.
Second, it is clear that workers in the Ebrington did not respond to
either Macgougan's or McGonagie's efforts in the late 1940s: the
minutes of a Branch Committee meeting (19 April 1950) report:
The secretary read a membership analysis of factories in
which we had lapsed members, factories where organising was
making good progress, and factories where we had no
membership at all. He pointed out that in this last
category the [Amalgamated] Transport and General Workers'
Union had some 50 to 60 garment workers in Ebrington
Factory.
Thus, although a significant number of Protestant women joined
the NUTGW in response to Macgougan's and McGonagle's recruitment
campaigns, they were, apparently, less enthusiastic than Catholics.
This is confirmed by an analysis of the composition of the Branch
Committee elected to serve in 1950. My respondants were able to tell
me that 11 out 14. were Catholics; I have been unable to discover the
religious affiliation of the remaining three. Mr Wright, the
Protestant tailor mentioned by Macgougan, had resigned as president
of the Branch in 1947 because of ill health; he was replaced by a
Catholic cutter called Patrick Harnill. Hamill sided with Jack
Doherty in the controversy over McGonagle's appointment, and, having
been implicated in the plan to form a breakaway union, he resigned in
October 1947. Hamill was replaced by a tailor called McCrystal who
was in turn replaced, in May 1948, by Lawrence Hegarty, a Catholic
cutter from Tillie and Henderson's.
The questions that arise from the foregoing analysis are: why
were so few Protestants involved in the Derry Branch of the NUTGW in
the 1930s and 1940s? and why was their response to the recruitment
drives of the late 1940s less enthusiastic than Catholic shirtmakers?
Given the perspective and research techniques adopted in this study,
these kinds of questions are difficult to answer: my respondants were
choosen precisely because they did join, and become active in, the
NUTGW. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile considering their answers to
these questions. Miss Cosgrave and Miss Gallagher, the two women in
my sample who were members of the NUTGW In the 193Us and 1940s,
-
thought tnat Protestant shirt workers were, in general, less inclined
to trade unionism than Catholics because they received favourable
treatment from snirt factory managers with whom they usually snared a
common religious identity. Miss Cosgrave told me:
I'll tell you this much now, and I don't care if you are
recording it or not. I'm not a bit ashamed, now I don't
want to hurt your feelings, [but] if you were a Protestant
and no matter what mistake you made - that was overlooked,
Now I'm being honest and truthful... anything... anywhere
in the factory, if you made a mistake, no matter how big it
was, that was overlooked,	 But if you were a Catholic you
were put out on your mouth and nose in the street if you
made a mistake.	 And they had Protestants in high up jobs
and hadn't a brain in their head. 	 And I'll tell you that
much, making more mistakes than enough that the people on
the ground then. .. rectified when it came to our
department... They [Protestant workers] hadn't a call for a
trade union you see. The firm was their trade union, they
were their stand by.
Miss Gallagher, told me, 'you see the Protestants would think that
they were well enough and didn' t have to join a union.
Several writers have attempted to generalise in a similar way
about other groups of Protestant workers in Northern Ireland.
According to Messenger (1981: 207) one 'factor' which 'worked against
unions achieving a strong position' in the Belfast linen industry
was,
religious sectarianism which worked both to overshadow
common grievances among segements of the working population
and to make it difficult for Protestant workers to overcome
religious convictions and join with Catholics in action
against mainly Protestant management.
She continues (1981: 210):
The negative effects of religious sectarianism upon efforts
to unionize those [workers] in the linen industry have been
recognised by many students of the topic, and a majority of
the workers themselves were well aware of the problem.
'The trouble in Ireland is water. There's Hoiy water and
there's Boyne water. The two don't mix'. Many also agreed
that Catholics were more inclined than Protestants to
consider unions as allies in their attempts to better their
lot.
However, the only evidence which Messenger adduces to support these
contentions is a song aoout a Protestant women who failed to join her
fellow workers in a strike and who was given 'jam and baps' for lunch
by management (see 1978: 210.. Munck and Roiston note (1987: 122)
that,
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A rew people pointec towards a certain aifference between
Catholic and Protestant attituaes towards trade unions.
Lucy McErlaine,	 who worked in Gallaher's [cigarette
factory], thought that Protestants were hostile to trade
unions whereas Catholics supported them.
'But,' they add, 'we were unable to confirm this.' It seems to me
that while generalisations of this kind may tell us something about
the attitudes of the people who make them, they tell us little about
trade unionism among Protestant workers, whether in the case of
Belfast linen workers or of Derry shirtmakers.
There may be an element of truth in the suggestion that the
attitude of some Protestant shirt workers towards trade unionism was
coloured by their relationship with managers, most of whom were, as
has been shown, also Protestants. For example, as the reader may
recall, John McCorkell explained the failure of some Protestant shirt
cutters to join the UGW and support the 1920 strike in terms of their
common identity with managers as members of the Orange Order, the
masons, or the B Specials. However, it should not be forgotten that
many more Protestant shirt cutters were members of the UGW and
supported the strike. Likewise, although the Derry Branch of he
NUTGW was almost exclusively Catholic in the 1930s and early 1940s,
it should not be forgotten that many Protestant shirtmakers responded
to Macgougan's and McGonagle's recrutitrnent campaigns in the late
1940s, and that, as Macgougan indicated, McCarthy' s factory was to
become the 'cornerstone' of NUTGW organisation in the city. It is
not possible to understand why so few Protestants were members of the
NUTGW in the 1930s, or why Catholics responded more enthusiastically
than Protestants to the organising campaigns of the late 1940s, in
terms of a general hostility to trade unionism inherent in the
condition of Protestant workers in Northern Ireland. Rather, both of
these phenomena must be understood as an historical process
constructed through the practices of actual individuals operating in
a particular social milieu.
The key to understanding both phenomena seems to lie in what has
already been established about NUTGW organisation in the 1930s and
1940s - its general underdeveiopment. Prior to Macgougan's
appointment as regional organiser, the Derry Branch of the NUTGW nad
languished.	 Sarah Doherty - oniy a part-time organisirig secretary -
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was content to maintain and service the memoershi p that sne hac; she
did not aspire to expansion. When l vlacgougan arrived in Derry in 1945
the Branch was only
a little clique around Sarah Doherty, she was a very nice
old women, but only a bookeeper, she didn't do any
organising.
Macgougan found 'it hard to say' why the Branch was 'almost
exclusively Catholic, ' but,
first of all, Sarah Doherty was a very devout Catholic,
very nice woman, but very very narrow - very limited - in
her outlook, and she used to a have a few cronies around
her.
In other words, in so far as Sarah Doherty did any organising, she
did it through her own personal network. Certainly, the main NUTGW
activists in the 1930s, and 1940s - Miss Moore, Miss Kelly, and Miss
Nellis - were, by all accounts, close personal friends of Miss
Doherty's. Miss McMorris's recollection of how she first came to
join the NUTGW in Harrison's factory, provides further evidence of
the extent to which Miss Doherty relied on her personal network for
Branch organisat ion:
It was in the period... [when I was] folding [shirts] and
it was a woman who lives in Buncrana now, it was her aunt
called Sarah Doherty, her niece worked with me. All I knew
about the union was as vague as a fly to the moon. Well,
now I did, I went with my father's [union dues] to the
carpenters' [union in] Foyle Street... he sent all his wee
girls with the union [dues], his card, but,.. that's all I
knew about the union... I didn't know her [Sarah Doherty],
it was her niece that took something like six pence or
something [in union dues). 	 I just paid it 'cause every
body was doing [so], see at that age you just did what
everybody else did.	 They looked at you funny if you
didn' t.
To the extent that Sarah Doherty relied on informal personal
relationships for recruitment and the maintenance of union
membership, it is not surprising that the Derry Branch of the NUTGW
was mainly Catholic: informal social networks in Northern Ireland
tend to operate within one or other of	 the two main
religious/political communities. 	 Certainly, Miss Moore, Miss Kelly,
and Miss Nellis - Miss Doherty's personal friends and the leading
NUTGW activists in the 1930s and 1940s - were Catholics. Social
networks within the Derry shirt industry were further circumscribed
by the religious segregation of the workforce between factories.
In this context, it is no great surprise that Macgougan and McGonagle
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were, initiall y
 at least, more successful at recruiting Catholic women
than Protestants.	 As I have shown, in factories like Tillie and
Hencerson's, Harrison's,
	 and Richard's there already existed a
network, nowever rudimentary, of shop stewards and collectors of
union subscriptions.	 The workforces of all these factories were
predominantly Catholic. In factories which employed mainly
Protestant workers - McCarthy's, Ebrington, Hamilton's, and Little's
- there was no such network; it had to be built up from scratch, as
it were.
Harris (1972: 138-139) has identified similar processes with
respect to the membership of voluntary organisations such as the
Young Farmers' Club and the Farmer' s Union in Ballybeg. Here the
situation was the reverse of that in Derry: membership of the
Ballybeg organisations was mainly Protestant. Harris writes that all
the groups had been founded by Protestants and that their core
memberships were drawn from among the founders' relatives and closest
contacts, most of whom were also Protestants. She adds that
Catholics would have been put-off joining the groups because they
would have felt 'socially uneasy' and 'out of place'. Her conclusion
is that:
without any wish to turn these organisatioris into
Protestant movements, the normal pattern of making contacts
with others through the pre-existing network of
relationships inevitably led to the development of just
this kind of situation.
In the Derry case the pattern was broken by Macgougan and McGonagle
who successfully recruited Protestants as well as Catholics into the
NUTGW. However, as we have seen, breaking the pattern was not an
easy matter: Protestants were, initially, less responsive than
Catholics to the recruitment drives. 	 As I suggested above, this
difference can partly be explained by the fact that in factories with
a mainly Catholic workforce - Tillie and Henderson's, Harrison's,
Richard's, etc. - there already was a network, however rudimentary,
of shop stewards and collectors of union subscriptions which
undoubtedly made Macgougan's and McGonagle's task easier than in
'Protestant' factories where no such network existed. But, like
Harris, we must also consider the possibility that Protestant shirt
workers were aiscouraged from joining and becoming active in the
NUTGW because they felt uneasy about its predominantly Catholic
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memoersrii; particularly since lviacgougan and McGonagle were ooth
prominent in anti-partitionist politics.
Miss Gallagher thought that Protestant shirtmakers may have
felt, or been made to feel, uneasy about joining the NUTGW:
You see Sarah Doherty being a Catholic they were all
prejudiced too, you had that running along certain elements
in the factory... But it was all in the area, like you had
Tillie's too, and it was very Catholic.., it was all laid
out, you knew exactly what the feeling was in all those
factories. But like people on this side, around the
Catholic areas. .. they let you know what they were.
And Macgougan told me that the slower response of Protestant workers
to his recruitment campaigns 'was a question of who got was there
first... [if) the Catholics got in the Protestants stayed out and
vice versa. ' Moreover, there was clearly some suspicion of the NUTGW
in Unionist circles in Derry. In 1948, for example, the Reverend
MacManaway the Unionist MP (Stormont) for Derry City asked the
Minister of Labour to look into two allegations of discrimination
against Protestants in Derry. One was in the docks; the other was in
the appointment of ex-service men to a training scheme for tailors.
MacManaway asked if it was true that all 12 of those selected had
been Catholics, and if selection had been entrusted to the NUTGW.
The Minister of Labour replied that the 12 had been appointed after
being interviewed by union, employer, and government representatives;
that all eligible candidates had been considered; and that the most
suitable candidates had been selected (DJ: 16 June 1948).
A superficial examination of Mrs Henderson's experience would
tend to support the view that Protestant shirt workers were wary
about joining the Derry Branch of the NUTGW. She was aware that its
membership was mainly Catholic in the 1930s and early 1940s, and was
ambivalent about when she first joined the union. In my preliminary
interview with her she told me that, 'I wouldn't have went into
Stevie's [McGonagle's] union; he'd broke away when I went into it [le
the NUTGW] you know. ' However, in subsequent interviews it became
clear that she, like many other Protestant workers, had joined the
NUTGW in 1949 or 1950; that is, soon after she started working in
Mccarthy's tactory, and while McGonagle was still the local official.
Mrs Henderson's ambivalence about when she first joined the NUTOW is
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linked to ncr cislike of McGonagle which in turn stems from nis role
in the introauction of work study, and in the estaolishment oi the
breakaway union in 1952. As I will show in cha pter six, she
particularly resented what she saw as McGonagle's attempts to
undermine Macgougan and his nationalist machinations, but she makes
clear that she had no suspicions of McGonagle when she first joined
the NUTGW:
Stephen McGonagle was one of these men, I don't know how to
explain him. He wanted to outshine Jack Macgougan an awful
lot, he tried to really do Jack an awful lot of harm,
although I didn't know Jack Macgougan then... but I
understood it later on - when I got to know Jack - what
this was all about.
Moreover, her answers to my questions about why she did not join the
NUTGW prior to starting work in McCarthy's tend to support my
argument that the comparatively low levels of union membership among
Protestant shirt workers in the 1930s and 1940s was a consequence of
the general underdevelopment of the Branch. She started her first
job in 1938 in Little's factory; she did not join the union because
'there was no union then. ' 	 In 1942 Little' s workers were put on
'short-time', and the labour exchange sent Mrs Henderson to work in
Tillie and Henderson's. The latter was, as has been shown above, a
mainly Catholic factory in which there was some organisation, but so
far as Mrs Henderson was concerned,
Unions were not in the fore front then... if it was [ie if
the union was in Tjllie and Henderson's] it was unheard of.
It might have been a few, but I didn't hear of any nor
never asked to join. . . The union was not ripe in Derry in
the shirt industry until work study came into it. It
wasn't what you call a union minded city at all until work
study came in, and thats what made most of the people go
into it.
Mrs Henderson left Tillies' when she married in 1945; she started
working in McCarthy's factory in 1947 or 1948.
4. 5 Conclusion
The development of the Derry Branch of the NUTGW in the 1920s,
1930s, 1940s, and early 1950s stands in contrast to the usual view of
trade unionism in Northern Ireland as having been thwartea by
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sectarianism. Fluctuations in Branch memoershi p followed the Unite
Kingaom pattern; densities of union membership and levels of
involvement in union activity among women shirtmakers in Derry
comparea favourably with those among British clothing workers.
Perhaps the most obvious difference between women shirtmakers in
Derry and women workers elsewhere in the United Kingdom was that in
Derry the importance of women's wages to local families and to the
local economy was widely recognised, and this may help to explain the
zeal with which the two male union organisers appointed in the late
1940s went about their work. But, as I have shown, the main
structural and institutional factors affecting the development of the
Derry Branch of the NUTGW in this period - labour market conditions,
the effectiveness of internal union organisation, relations with
management, the exigencies of women's position in the family - were
similar to those which have been identified as affecting union
development among women workers in general.
Nevertheless, religious and political divisions clearly had some
influence on the development of the NUTGW in Derry: in the 1930s and
early 1940s Branch membership was almost exclusively Catholic. It
would appear that there was a tendency for - to paraphrase Roiston
(1980: 71) - sectarian or communal. divisions to be 'reconstituted'
within the Branch.	 However, it is by no means clear that this
process occurred in the way that traditional Irish marxists and
others would have us believe. It was not the result of sectarian
conflict because, as I have shown, relations between Catholic and
Protestant women were comparatively pacific during this period, and
discrimination in the allocation of jobs was not a divisive issue so
far as women workers were concerned, it was not a consequence of a
general hostility to trade unionism, as such, inherent in the
condition of Protestant workers, nor of Protestant reluctance to join
a mainly Catholic body: many Protestant shirtmakers responded - all
be it less readily than Catholics - to the recruitment campaigns of
the late 1940s. The changing religious composition of the Derry
Branch of the NUTGW in the 1930s and 1940s cannot be understood in
terms of generalisation such as these; it can only be understood as
part of an historical process constructed by concrete individuals
acting in a particular social milieu.
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As we have seen, the shirt workers were partially segregated by
religion such that while the workforces of most factories were mainly
Catholic, three or four factories employed mainly Protestants, The
secretary of the Derry Branch of the NUTGW until 1947 was a woman
who, for various reasons to do with her employment status and her
health, was not energetic in the pursuit of new members; union
membership and activity were generally at a low level. Union
organisation, such as it was, was conducted through the Branch
secretary's network of personal friends and relations who worked in
the shirt industry.	 The Branch secretary was a Catholic, and as is
often the case in Northern Ireland, her friends and relatives were
also Catholic. Given the tendency for Catholics and Protestants to
be segregated between factories, it was inevitable that - under this
regime - sectarian divisons were 'reconstituted' within the union
Branch. In contrast, when the new union officials, appointed in 1945
and 1947, embarked on recruitment campaigns they did so on a
professional basis, sought members in all of Derry's factories, and
quite quickly enrolled many workers - Protestant as well as Catholic
- as members of the NUTGW. To be sure, organisation was, initially,
more difficult in 'Protestant' factories than it was in factories
with mainly Catholic workforces. This difference was a consequence
of the fact that in many of the latter there already existed a
rudimentary network of shop stewards whereas in the former union
organisation had to be built up from scratch.
- 191-
CHAPTER 5: MALE SHIRT CUTTERS AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NUTGW AND THE
ATGWU 1920-1952: THE POLITICS OF SEX, SKILL, AND RELIGION
5. 1 Introduction
More than 90% of the workforce in the Derry shirt industry was
female.	 The only significant concentration of male workers was in
the trade of shirt cutting, 	 Most of the women were Catholics, and
most of the tradesmen were Protestants. 	 Judging from the material
presented in chapters three and four, it would seem that the shirt
cutters did not care to associate with the women shirtrnakers. 	 Until
1919, the shirt cutters formed unions whose names indicate that they
catered only for practitioners of their trade. In 1919 the Shirt
and Collar Cutters' Union of Ireland amalgamated with the UGW, a
British union which organised clothing workers irrespective of their
sex or skill. However, when local women started to join the UGW en
masse in the aftermath of the 1920 strike, Derry shirt cutters began
to defect to the ATGWU. This process continued throughout the 1920s,
and very few shirt cutters remained, or became, members of the NUTGW
in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s.
Irish marxist writers, of both the traditional and the
revisionist varieties, characterise the attitude of the pioneers of
trade unionism in Belfast towards women linen workers as having been
one of indifference or contempt. The evidence relating to the
attitudes of Belfast trade unionists at the turn of the century is
sparse, but the writers speculate about whether the supposed
indifference and contempt had its roots in 'sexism', sectionalism, or
sectarianism: most of the trade unionists were Protestant tradesmen,
and most of the linen workers were Catholic women (see Roiston, 1980:
72; Munck, 1986: 86-87; Patterson, 1980: 31; and Patterson, 1984:
174). The evidence relating to the organisational division between
male snirt cutters and female shirtmakers in Derry in the pre-1920
period is equally s parse, but, unlike the writers mentioned above, I
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refusea to s peculate.	 Newspaper reports and recollections of the
1920 strike provide some insight into the nature of relations between
men and women in tne Lierry shirt industry. For example, John
McCorkeli suggested that the behaviour of shirt cutters during and
after the strike was coloured by sexual and political considerations.
He told me that the Catholic and Protestant shirt cutters who
defected from the UGW to the ATGWIJ were not keen to belong to what
was becoming a mainly female union Branch, and were anxious about the
introduction of increasing numbers of women to the cutting rooms of
Derry factories. He also felt that some Protestant members of the
UGW did not defect to the ATGWU because they regarded the ATGWIJ's
Derry membership as being too militant and too closely identified
with nationalism. McCorkell's recollections are intriguing, but they
are not in themselves a sufficient basis from which to draw
conclusions.
The available sources of information on trade unionism in the
Derry shirt industry in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, are better and
more varied than for the earlier periods, and in this chapter I will
use them to construct a more systematic analysis of the nature of the
division between male and female shirt workers. I spoke to four
shirt cutters who served their apprenticeships in the 1930s and
1940s. One of these men has already been introduced: Mr Matthews, a
Protestant who started his apprenticeship in Bryce and Weston's
factory in 1926, became a pattern cutter and under manager, and then,
after Bryce and Weston's closed in the late 1940s, worked in a
variety of small shirt factories. Of the other three I have included
only one, Mr Gordon, among my sample of respondants. Mr Gordon is a
Protestant who became an apprentice shirt cutter in Hamilton's
factory in 1930; he worked as a bandknife man there until 1962 when
he moved to Little's factory; he left Little's in 1973 to become a
night watchman for the Housing Executive, the body responsible for
public housing in Northern Ireland. I have not included the other
two men among my sample of res pondants because I was unable to
complete a full schedule of questions with them: both were still in
employment and neither had the time or the inclination to be
interviewed at length; I will, nevertheless, make use of some of
their recollections	 Mr Nelson is a Protestant shirt cutter who
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began nis apprenticeship in McInt yre, Hogg and Marsh's factory in tne
1930s; when I spoke to him he was still working in a small factory on
the Waterside. Mr McDonald is a Catholic; he started his
apprenticeship in Mooney's factory in the 1940s and is now a factory
manager. I will, of course, draw on the recollections of other
respondants in my sample, particularly those of George Hamill the
ATGWU official responsible for the shirt industry between 1950 and
1976. There are also a number of documentary sources relating to the
period. Apart from union journals and the minutes of the Londonderry
Branch of the NUTGW, the most important of these are the minutes of
the Cutters' Committee of the Londonderry Branch of the ATGWU 1950-
In section 5. 2 of this chapter I will examine the reasons
given by shirt cutters to explain their membership of the ATGWU and
set them against the backround of the history of relations between
the ATGWU and NUTGW. One of my main concerns will be to trace what,
if any, role religious or political differences played in the
organisational differentiation of male arid female shirt workers.
Having demonstrated that the ATGWU/NUTGW division cannot be
characterised as a sectarian one, I will turn my attention to the
question of gender. Those writers who have suggested that divisions
in the early Belfast labour movement were rooted in 'sexism' do not
explain why they think sex may have been important. However,
re1atios between male and female trade unionists have been the
subject of considerable debate among British scholars. According to
the main theory to emerge from this debate, tensions between male and
female workers resulted from the way in which the latter were
introduced to the workforce. In the section 5. 3 I will discuss a
particular application of this theory to the British clothing
industry and use it to illuminate the sexual division of labour in
the Derry shirt industry. I will then, in section 5.4, explore the
extent to whicn the ATGWTJ/NUTGW division can be explained in terms of
the tensions arising in the development of the sexual division of
labour in the Derry shirt industry.
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5.2 The ATGWU and the NLJTGW: a Sectarian Division?
Mr Matthews, Mr Gordon, and Mr Nelson each joined the ATGWU
during their apprenticeship. It was a routine matter: the journeymen
under whose supervision they worked were members of the ATGWU and
asked them to join. So far as Mr Nelson was concerned the ATGWIJ was
simply 'the union for cutters.' This situation was formalised when,
in June 1932, the ATGWU and NUTGW signed a national agreement.
According to the agreement the ATGWU recognised the 'right' of the
NUTGW 'to organise the various grades of workers in the tailoring and
garment trades', and the NUTGW agreed to 'render all possible
assistance' to the ATGWU 'In their efforts to organise dispatch men
and transport workers employed in connection with the tailoring and
garment industry'; Derry shirt cutters, however, were exempted and
permitted to remain members of the ATGWU. This exemption was not
specified in the copy of the agreement which I have seen (Conley,
'Circular to All Full-Time Officials...', 24 June 1932), but its
existence is indisputable: as will be shown its precise meaning later
became a matter of heated dispute. Only a few shirt cutters, men
like John Kilgore - chairman of the NUTGW throughout the 1930s -
remained members of the NUTGW; even Willie Roiston, whom McCorkell
remembers as a UGW stalwart, joined the ATGWU - he was a member of
the Cutters' Committee of the ATGWU in 1950. By 1932, the ATGWU was
indeed 'the union for cutters', whether they were Catholics or
Protestants.
Nevertheless, the fact that most shirt cutters in Derry were
members of the ATGWU was regarded - by the shirt cutters, by their
union official, and by NUTGW officials - as being somewhat anomalous.
The anomaly was explained to me as part of a motif which linked the
the failure of the 1920 strike, the weakness of the UGW/NUTGW, the
strength of the ATGWU, and the dockers' power to embargo shirt
factories. Mr Matthews told me that the shirt cutters' membership of
the ATGWU,
always puzzled me... I'll tell you, I think it was just a
group of cutters originally who actually decided themselves
that after the big strike around about 1923 - you see they
made nothing of it at all, and most of these men were in
the Tailor arid Garment Workers' [Union], the Tailor and
Garment Workers' [Union] was never a strong union you
understand - and, of course, after that I think a lot of
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the men in the trade they said, 'why not approach the
Transport and General Workers' [Union] because in the event
of a strike at least we can put the lever on the employer
in the sense, the docks. ' The cutters reckoned if they had
a strike the dockers would come out in sympathy with them
which means the stuff wouldn' t be coming in.. . or going out
of the docks and I would say that was one of the
explanations for it. The Tailor and Garment Workers' was
never a strong union.
Mr Matthews, Mr Nelson, and Mr Gordon had no personal experience of
the 1920 strike; Mr Matthews and Mr Nelson had been told about it by
their older work mates, and Mr Gordon had been told about it by his
mother. Mr Nelson and Mr Gordon echoed Mr Matthews' views about the
Dockers' embargo end the weakness of the NUTGW. Even George Hamill
gave me a garbled version of the story which contained the same
elements as my other respondants:
The cutters were in the Tailor and Garment Workers' Union,
that was their close affinity in an organisational pretext
[sic]. At one time in the '30s there was a big row in one
of the factories here and some of the cutters went on
strike [there was no 'big' strike in the 1930s, this can
only be a reference to the 1920 strike] and they seem to be
getting nowhere - now I think that was in McCarthy's or
Harrison's - but they seemed to be getting nowhere with the
help they were getting from the Tailor and Garment Workers'
Union because the Tailor and Garment Workers' Union hadn't
the same muscle as we had, so they had to come and get help
from the Transport Union, especially the dockers. All the
stuff that was going out of Derry at that time was going
across the water and sea transport. After the strike was
settled-up the Transport Union by the fact that they did
put an embargo on the stuff that was coming from this
factory at the docks sort of brought the thing to a head
[with] the result that alot of the cutters got together and
says, 'we're in the wrong union, need a union with a wee
bit of muscle and a wee bit of backing. '.. . So alot of them
transferred over to our union.
Thus, there would appear to be little mystery about why the
ATGWU became 'the union for cutters' in Derry in the late 1920s and
early 1930s: it is, as we have seen, true that the dockers had
embargoed strike-bound factories in 1920 and that the NUTGW was very
weak in the 1930s. Indeed, Mr Gordon told me
I don't believe there was any Tailor and Garment Workers'
[Union] then, never heard about them in Derry to later
years, don't forget I'm talking about when I was 18, 1934.
That [the ATGWU] was the only union we knew about, they
took in a Branch for the cutting you see. They were really
a transport union but they took in a Branch, the Cutting
Branch.
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But, now had the ATGWU come to be 'the union for cutters'?
Afterall, when John McCorkell left E'erry c1927, shirt cutters seem to
have been evenly ivided between the UGW ano the ATGWU. None of my
respondants could speak out of personal experience on this question,
but they provided clues to an explanation. They suggest that the
failure of the strike demoralised shirt cutters and gave rise to a
disillusionment with the UGW upon which the ATGW1J was able to
capitalise. Mr McCorkell's comments on the cutters' disillusionment
with the UGW have already been discussed; their perspicacity is
confirmed by Mr Matthews who told me:
It [trade unionism] played a very unimportant part even
among the male workers [in the 1930s]. And some of the
older workers would say, 'oh, don't mention unions to me,
you know what happened the last time when we were out on
strike for so many weeks and didn' t get a ha' penny and
didn't earn any money and went back for' - some people told
me they actually went back for a ha' penny less than they
went out at. So they got disgusted with the whole thing
and it was later on. .. some of them must have had a talk
with the dockin' crowd down here and they were always well
organised: they were liable to strike, to have two dozen
strikes in the one year whereas the factories had no
strikes at all.
Mr Gordon told me that he had been told that 'the trade was never the
same in Derry afterwards [ie after the strike]'; this comment was
echoed by Mr Nelson.
	
There is some support for Mr Matthews'
explanation in the documentary record. in 1926, for example, the
local organiser of the UGW, Annie Holmes, devoted one of her Branch
reports (GW: December 1926) to a re-assessment of the strike in an
effort to counter the adverse effects on her remaining male
membership of what she claims was 'management propaganda':
Though Ireland did not participate in the General Strike
[of 1926]... we had more than our share of the organised
lies crammed into us by the press which can always be
relied on to say Tweedle-dee to the British Capitalist
Tweedle-dum... One can understand it may be easy to deceive
people on matters of no immediate concern to themselves,
but it is a matter of amazement to find that people will
believe lies about things of which they have themselves
personal knowledge concerning their individual acts and
know from what source the lies emanate.
There is a fixed idea in the minds of people in Derry city,
many of whom are in a position to know that such a view can
only have emanated from the employers' propaganda, that the
Cutters' strike in 1920 (shirt ana collar trade) has killed
the trade.
Every school boy knows that in 1921 tne big slump in trade
was a realit y .	 Were the Derry cutters tne cause of the
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world slump in traae?. . . .	 ut if tne mentality ot these
people finds tne general world position beyond its grasp
what about tne local position?	 is every other trade in
Derry better than the collar trade?
Examine those who did not have a strike. Before 1920 there
were four large factories producing women's light clothing.
There is only one small one now existing.. . Take the
hosiery trade.	 Two large factories once, now reduced 70
per cent. In corset-making 600 workers were employed not
one now employed. What of Derry port? Once world famous.
Old residents are moved to tears at the sight of the
deserted quays. The shipyard is closed. What of the
aistlilery? Rumour says this was due to a quarrel between
two unions. Not a word is said of the well known fact that
America, a big customer of the distillery, went 'Dry,'
therefore less demand.
What of the cost of production. We heard much of this in
connection with the miners and German competition. If the
British miners worked cheaper they would have more work.
Well, the workers, men and women, in Derry work much
cheaper than their British friends.	 Have they got the
work?	 No!	 the supply gets less and less! 	 Good pay
promotes efficiency.
One never hears the same things said in Belfast or Dublin
about the strike, yet Dublin men struck in 1920 with the
Derry men and have not only kept UP the same wages but
THEIR TRADE IS INCREASING [all capitals are Annie Holmes']
rapidly.
There has been far too long a field for the employers'
dope. Let the workers, especially the Cutters, make up
their minds to kill effectively this lying tale, Let them
be as zealous in the workers' propaganda and hurl from the
house tops if necessary the real truth.
One day a man came to our office to pay his contribution.
He was not young. He was very earnest in his manner. The
remark was made to him that he must have seen changes in
the trade. His reply was convincing.	 'I have been in the
shirt trade for 30 years. In 1916 I had £1 per week for a
wage, and that was not an isolated wage BUT THE CURRENT
WAGE IN THE DISTRICT. When I got a MAN'S wage I FELT like
a man and for that reason I will always PAY MY Society
money IF I AM THE ONLY MAN LEFT IN DERRY TO PAY IT.
She returned to this theme in the following month's Journal (GW:
January 1927):
We pointed out in the December notes that propaganda had
been undertaken in Derry after the 1920 strike in the
Shirtmaking industry to obscure the real advantage and
object of the Cutters' uprising.
To raise a 'Smoke Screen' is a favourite method of
propagandists to cover up something more vital, the
'hidden' thing on this occasion being what has proved to be
of great advantage to the cutters, namely, and advance of
½d. per hour on the Minimum a comparatively small gain) to
the real beneficial one which was that wages fixed by the
Shirtmaking Trade Board in Ireland would be guided by the
rates fixed by tne Shirtmaking Trade Board, Great Britain.
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This undertaking given by the Employers' Federation to the
Garment Workers' Union (of which the Belfast and Derry
cutters had become a part) has been kept and it is a fact
[that] the rates of the cutters have been maintained during
the slump in wages as among the highest rates in Ireland.
No wonder it required a very large volume of black smoke to
cover up this real advance in the Cutters' Charter. But it
is only the first chapter. The apprentice question is
next. Then holidays with pay!
However, it was not just disillusionment with the UGW which led
shirt cutters to join the ATGWU rather than the UGW/NUTGW - the
former was actively recruiting shirt cutters and female shirtmakers
in Derry shirt factories in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The
local secretary of the Derry Branch of the ASTT, Sarah Doherty,
complained several times, to the Branch Committee and in the union
journal, about the ATGWU poaching her organisatiori's members. 	 One
example is a letter printed in the journal of the ASTT,
protesting against the action of the Transport and General
Workers' Union in still further splitting the interests of
the Derry shirt workers at this juncture in view of the
fact that for many years the two unions catering for sewing
workers [ie the UGW and the ASTT] have spent thousands of
pounds on the organisation of these workers. (Journal of
the ASTT, March 1931; see also Journal of ASTT June 1930.
And Minutes of the Londonderry Branch of the ASTT from July
1930 to December 1931).
The Executive Committee responded by sending a protest to the TUC.
The 1932 national agreement between the ATGWU and the newly formed
NUTGW seems to have been a response to this protest. The fact that
shirt cutters - alone among clothing workers in the United Kingdom -
were exempted from this national agreement and permitted to remain
members of the ATGWU suggests that they were treated as a special
case. A suggestion which is strengthened by the knowledge that a
common story In local trade union circles was that the agreement was
signed by the general secretaries of the NUTGW and ATGWU - Andrew
Conley and Ernest Bevin -
	
at 4.00 am in the Metropole hotel in
Derry.
This settlement, and the ATGWU's monopoly on trade union
membership among Derry shirt cutters went unchallenged until the late
1940s and early 1950s. This was the period when, following a series
of vigorous organising campaigns, the NUTGW had gained a large
membership among women shirtmakers and was proving effective in
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negotiations with management.	 Wnen Macgougan came to Derry in 1945
he worked within an interpretation of the 1932 agreement according to
which 'the ATGWIJ organised shirt cutters. ' He made use of a
provision in the agreement which urged co-operation between the two
unions to set up a joint committee to discuss matters of common
interest - primarily the co-ordination of submissions to the Wages
Council. McGonagle, on the other hand, interpreted the agreement
differently and recruited some male shirt cutters. The NUTGW claimed
to have 59 male members in 1950, but I would estimate that less than
half of these were cutters. The highest figure for ATGWU membership
among shirt cutters in the same period is 150 (DJ: 30 April 1954);
this is probably inflated.
The fact that six of the cutters recruited into the NUTGW in the
late 1940s had defected from the ATGWU led to a row between the two
unions. McGonagle went on the offensive: at a meeting of the
ATGWU/NUTGW joint committee held in May 1950 (see Minutes of the
Cutters' Committee of the ATGWU, 18 May 1950), he read a copy of the
1932 agreement, and expressed 'surprise'	 that the ATGWIJ was
organising garment workers in Derry. He argued that the NUTGW was
the negotiating union in the industry and that the fact that the
ATGWU had members in the shirt industry made decision-making
difficult: he never knew what the shirt cutters in the ATGWU were
going to do. A bitter argument ensued during which the assistant
secretary of the Cutters' Committee of the ATGWU said that he would
not permit McGonagle to use 'this meeting to organise his cutters'
section,
The members of Cutters' Committee of the ATGW1J were vehemently
opposed to McGonagle's attempt to recruit shirt cutters. Indeed,
they defied their national officer, Mr Ryan, who, at a meeting held
on 2 February 1951 (see minutes of the Cutters' Committee of the
ATGWU), interpreted the 1932 national agreement to mean a one-way
transfer from the ATGWU to the NUTGW except where a factory was 100%
ATGWU, in which case the workers should not be divided The
members of the Cutters' Committee of the AT7WU had Invited a retired
local secretary of the ATGWU who had been present when the 1932
agreement had been signed along to their meeting; he interpreted the
-
agreement to mean that the 'ATGWU had a right to male workers and the
NUTGW to female [my emphasis workers'. The meeting ended with ATGWU
cutters reiterating their refusal to 'hand over members to Stephen
McGonagle'; demanding that the NUTGW return five of the ATGWU shirt
cutters who had transferred to the NUTGW; drawing attention to 'all
the transport union had done in the old days for them [shirt workers]
when the other union [the UGW/NUTGW] was powerless'; arid expressing
resentment at McGonagle's behaviour, As a result, the ATGWU formally
requested that the six ATGWU members who had defected to the NUTGW be
returned. The NUTGW complied and decided that the only way to deal
with the situation was to 'organise strongly' (Minutes of the Derry
Branch of the NUTGW February and March 1951. ).
Thus, although some shirt cutters responded readily to
McGonagle's overtures most were very keen to remain members of the
ATGWU and vehemently opposed to joining the NUTGW. The behaviour of
the latter cannot be explained purely in terms of the superior
strength of the ATGWU: the NUTGW was nolonger the weak and
ineffectual organisation which it had been in the 1930s. How then
are the different responses of shirt cutters to McGonagle's challenge
to be understood?
George Hamill told me that 'in the main, ' the cutters who
remained loyal to the ATGWU, 'were Unionists, ' and that,
Whatever cutters McGonagle had, they were Catholics... the
chap that stood with me [as an IrLP candidate in a
Corporation election], he was chairman of McGonagle's
Branch: Lorry Hegarty... he was one of the cutters in
Wilkinson's factory at that time, And then you had Barney
Donaghey and that chap Pat Hamill [no relation]... he was
interested in McGonagle's Labour Party and the Labour Party
I was in at one time along with McGonagle [the Labour Party
concerned was the IrLP, see section 2.2 and chapter six],
and so was Lorry Hegarty and people like that. It was
mostly through McGonagle that they were interested.
It was not possible for me to interview a shirt cutter who joined the
NUTGW in this period: none of the three men mentioned by George
Hamill were alive when I carried out my research, and the one man I
traced who fell into this category declined to be interviewed.
Nevertheless,	 it is possible to elaborate on George Hamill's
statement.	 Patrick Hamili actually joined the NUTGW c1945, and was
in fact one of the leading opponents of Macgougan's sponsorship of
-
McGonagle for the post of Derry organiser ot the NUTGW. But there is
no aoubt, as wiii be shown in the next chapter, tnat Fatric HamiT.tl,
Lawrence Hegarty, and Barney Donaghey became closel y aligned with
McGonagle. Political agreement was undoubtedl y an aspect of this;
however, it is also clear that they had been won over by McGonagle's
dynamism as a trade union official, and this was perhaps the more
important factor: at the joint ATGWU-NUTGW meeting held on 18 May
1950 Barney Donaghey is reported to have said that he had left the
ATGWU and joined the NUTGW because the former gave him 'no service',
and that when he wanted to 'find out anything' he had had to go to
Stephen McGonagle.
The opposition of most shirt cutters to their being transferred
to the NUTGW cannot be explained in terms of their political
affiliations. To be sure, as Unionists they would have had little
sympathy for McGonagle's anti-partitionist politics, but in this
respect there was little to choose between the ATGWU and the NUTGW:
George Hamill was as prominent in the IrLP as McGonagle. Indeed, at
about the same time as McGonagle was challenging the ATGWU's monopoly
on shirt cutters, George Hamill was coming under pressure from some
of his Protestant members to curtail his political activities.
Having told me that most of the shirt cutters who remained loyal to
the ATGWU were Unionists, George Hamill went on to say:
we had to be diplomatic in some of the statements we would
make as a matter of fact. I don't know if this is for
[public consumption]... I suppose it doesn't matter now.
You see I was very active - when I got the job [as an ATGWU
official] in the Irish Labour Party that was formed after
the whole break up of the NILP, and I was on the Executive
Committee with McGonagle, a chap called Halley. .. and Harry
Diamond [the last two named were socialist republicans
based in Belfast] and I used to travel to Belfast fairly
often. There was great resentment about me being active -
especially with the busmen. And the chap that was shop
steward for the busmen - he was a good trade unionist, but
he was a very active member of the Black Perceptory and the
Orange Lodge etc. , and he resented very much me playing an
active part, as a Transport and General Worker trade
unionist, in the Irish Labour Party. And at that
particular time you had a split in the bus organisation
because you had a sort of Ulster allied type union, and he
[the shop steward] was losing members and they said they
[the Ulster allied union] was using my activities in this
as a sort of propaganda. So Norman Kennedy [Hamill's
superior in the union)... told me to present a fairly low
profile because it was harming our membership.
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Shirt cutters who were members of the ATGWU may not have liked
Hamill's political affiliations, but it did not undermine their
resolve to remain members of the union: it was some busmen who
threatened to defect. Moreover, as we have seen, shirt cutters
explained their strong, but anomalous, attachment to the ATGWU in
terms an alliance with the dockers - an almost entirely Catholic
group whose identification with Irish nationalism was well known4.
Mr Gordon's and Mr Matthews' views on the relationship between
trade unionism, religion, and politics are complex. The former told
me that he 'voted Unionist,' but that his political outlook did not
influence his preference for the ATGWU rather than the NUTGW; nor did
he think that political or religious differences undermined trade
unionism in the shirt industry gnerally:
No, never any trouble that way. You were too busy making a
living to worry about, to get political.., no, no, we [the
shirt cutters] were a pretty conservative crowd of trade
unionists you know. You only join a trade union to get
more money, just the same as any conservative, its the same
difference.
Notwithstanding his self-professed Unionism and conservatism, Mr
Gordon had little affection for management:
this town was sowed up by the bosses... suppose you were in
Hamilton's factory and heard about a job in Harrison's and
went to see about it, [Mr] Hamilton knew about it before
you were out the back, freemasonry among them, they were
all free-masons.
Moreover, he knew McGonagle through their common interest in fishing
the river Faughan (a tributary of the Foyle), and professed a
complete indifference to his politics: '[I] found him a civil enough
man.'
Mr Matthews, on the other hand, could barely conceal his dislike
of McGonagle. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Matthews was
secretary of the Londoriderry Branch of the NILP (ie the LDLP); the
Party from which McGonagle and Hamill defected in 1948-1949 to join
the IrLP . However, this was not the basis of Mr Matthews' distaste
for McGonagle: he retained an 'open mind' on the question of a united
Ireland, described the people who supported the IrLP in Derry as
'genuine people', and, as I have already noted, shared their disgust
with the Unionist Gerrymander of the Corporation.
	 Like Mrs
- 203 -
Henderson, Mr Matthews' opinion of McGonagle is based, more than
anything else, on a feeling that he had acted in an underhand way
during the setting up of the breakaway union in 1952. Moreover, he
told me that,
My attitude, even from the very start - I paid into the
Transport Workers' LUnion, and] in those early days
whatever few women were in a union. . . were in the Tailor
and Garment Workers' Union, and the men in the Transport
and General [Workers' Union] - I always said that the fact
that we [male shirt cutters] were in the tailor and garment
trade. . . we should by no means, under any circumstances,
anybody, should be members of the Transport and General
Workers' Union from an idealistic point of view. But these
other fellas could point to you: 'well, if anything goes
wrong and there's a bit of a strike, at least... when
you're in the Transport and General Workers' Union you'd
have the backing of what you call several other groups of
workers.
He did not respond to McGonagle's overtures to shirt cutters, but not
because he disliked the man or disagreed with his politics; rather he
did not join the ATGWU because he could not: during the Second World
War Mr Matthews had been made a 'charge hand' in the cutting room of
Bryce and Weston's factory, and he had let his membership of the
ATGWU lapse because a charge hand was 'not expected', by management,
to be a union member. In the early 1950s, following the closure of
Bryce and Weston's, he was helping Fred Bryce to set up another
factory in Derry. Mr Matthews did not become involved in trade
unionism again until the 1960s when he was working as a senior cutter
in a small factory owned by a Mr Szilagy; he joined the NUTGW (see
Appendix 1).
Mr Matthews did not think that political or religious
considerations were significant in the decision of Protestant shirt
cutters to join, and remain in, the ATGWU. He did, however, think
that their position in the workplace influenced their political
behaviour:
I was about the only one [Protestant cutter who supported
the Labour Party]: everyone was afraid,.. La few cutters]
would be sympathetic, but wouldn't become members - they
thought it would cost them their job. Even the boss in
[Bryce and Weston's factory]... his attitude to me became
very strained... [When] I was an ordinary member of the
Labour Party, just went to ordinary meetings, nobody paid
any attention. But [relations with the boss became
strained when] later on I acted as. . . secretary of the
Foyle Division. . . and secretary of the Central Party.
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Moreover, aithouh Mr Matthews coiiectea aues ior the ATGWU in the
1930s, he saw little connection between his political activity and
his invovement in the ATGWU. His political activity did not emerge
from his union activity - he was not very interested in trade
unionism, he saw it as a necessity - rather it developed out a
concern about the political stalemate in Derry and a feeling that the
gerrymander 'iwa]sn't democracy.' 	 He described the 'typical' view
among the shirt cutters he knew in the following way:
If I'd said to George N. about gerrymandering - he'd be a
typical Protestant, he'd be a great boy about the Orange
Order - [he would reply] 'ah you have to keep things that
way because the others [Catholics] would walk over ye'.
But, says I, 'this isn't democracy, this is supposed to be
a democratic state we' re living in.
To sum up. Most trade union minded shirt cutters in Derry
revealed an enduring concern to belong to the ATGWU rather than the
NUTGW. The shirt cutters' membership of the ATGWU was regarded as an
anomaly by many trade unionists in the shirt industry, not least by
shirt cutters themselves, but a ready explanation was at hand: the
Derry Branch of the NUTGW was weak and ineffective by comparison to
the ATGWIJ. This explanation is quite convincing in relation to the
1930s, but it is less so in relation to the 1940s and 1950s. In 1950
the local secretary of the NUTGW, Stephen McGonagle, challenged the
the ATGWU's right to organise in the shirt industry. Some cutters
responded by defecting to the NUTGW but most refused to give up their
membership of the ATGWU. Those cutters who joined the NUTGW in the
late 1940s and early 1950s were Catholics; those who remained in the
ATGWU were Protestants. The former supported McGonagle's anti-
partitionist labourism, but the principal attraction of the NUTGW
seems to have been McGonagle's dynamism as a trade union leader.
The majority of shirt cutters who resisted McGonagle's overtures were
Unionists, but their determination to remain in the ATGWU cannot be
explained in terms of their political or religious identities.
George Hamill, the ATGWU official with responsibility for the shirt
industry, was as well known for his anti-partitionist and left-wing
views as McGonagie. Moreover, the cutters justified their
membershi p of the ATGWU in terms of an alliance with a mainly
Catholic anu assertively nationalist group of workers, the dockers,
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How, tnen, is the enduring and exceptionall y strong attachement
of most shirt cutters to the ATOWU, as opposed to the NUTGW, to be
explainea? One possibility is suggested by John McCorkeil's
statement to the effect that one of the reasons why shirt cutters
originally defected from the UGW to the ATGWU was that,
The cutters were being undermined by women coming into the
cutting room and they didn't like that,,. the men felt that
they had been let down - the Garment Workers' [Union) was a
strong union of women as against the ATGWU.
The rest of this chapter will be devoted to an exploration of this
possibility.
5.3 Sex and Skill in the Derry Shirt Industry
Labour historians and industrial sociologists have long
recognised that one of the most significant influences on British
trade union structure - that is, 'the patterns of union organisation
- the criteria of inclusion and exclusion, the lines of demarcation
and division' (Hyman, 1979a: 36) - has been the exclusivism of
skilled workers towards the unskilled. Marxists usually explain this
disunity as a by-product of the class struggle; that is, as part of a
resistance to employers' attempts to cheapen labour power by
deskilling jobs and replacing craftsmen by less skilled workers. As
Cockburn (1983: 151) notes, this kind of explanation has been adapted
to explain the hostility and exciusivism of skilled men and their
unions towards their female colleagues: women are often presented as
the capitalist's preferred reserve of unskilled labour power.
Coyle's (1982) study of sex and skill in the British clothing
industry provides an apposite example of what I shall refer to as
'the deskilling thesis' (cf Beechey, 1983: 41). Her primary concern
is to explain the concentration of female clothing workers into low
paid and unskilled jobs.	 She is not, therefore, concerned with the
same problem as myself - the form and structure of trade union
organisation in the industry. However, she explains women's
occupational segregation in terms of their introduction to the
clothing industry as a cheap unskilled labour force in the context of
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the deskilling of a male craft, and, recognising that skill not just
a question of 'expertise' but something which is 'socially
constructed' (1982: 24) by organised workers, she comments on the
relationship between sex, skill, and trade unionism in the industry.
Thus she argues (1982: 22):
The [clothing) industry has always relied on women as cheap
labour, but they have also been a direct agency of
deskilling. As a form of female 'takeover' it gives rise to
direct and obvious hostility towards women, and historically
men have organised to keep women out of the industry.., and
out of certain jobs... In some industries men's strategies
of exclusion have been more 'successful' (than in
clothing)... Early strategies of exclusion employed by male
clothing workers. .. have given way to unionisation but still
men's defence of their skills is a contradictory procedure.
As real skill differences are eroded, other forms of
differentiation from unskilled labour are sought.	 Gender
becomes a most obvious form of differentiation.
What she means by gender as 'a form of differentiation' is made
clearer two pages further on (1982: 24):
Skill is a social construction as well as being founded on
expertise, and when the differentiation of skilled and
unskilled labour is posed in terms of male and female
labour, it has a particularly wide social validation. Such
differentiation has been a form of trade union organisation
by which male trade unionists have both sought the
restriction of women's employment and the maintenance of a
larger 'breadwinner's' wage for men... Certainly the
differentiation of men as breadwinners has often been a
distinctive form of labour organisetion in clothing.
In this section I will describe the sexual division of labour in
the Derry shirt industry as it developed historically. The
particular case of Derry will be elucidated by a comparison with
Coyle's analysis of the British clothing indstry as a whole. Having
examined the sexual division of labour in the Derry shirt industry we
will then be in a position to consider the extent to which the
decision of men to join, and remain in, the ATGWU can be understood
in terms of the deskilling thesis.
As I have already stated, Coyle presents the clothing Industry
as a male craft which has been deskilled. She writes that
The traditional method of production is known as 'making
through' and this was defined by the Board of Trade in 1947
as 'the making of a garment by a single skilled worker'.
Under the 'making through' system it was often the case that
the main assembly was undertaken by a single skilled worker
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(male), whilst less skilled operatons, such as the sewing of
botton holes and pockets, were undertaken by his assistants
(men and women). (1982: 13).
Deskilling was effected during the inter-war period in the transition
from workshop to factory production and involved the substitution of
craftsmen by 'female machine minders'.	 According to Coyle, the
result is a,
concentration of men in the cutting room and the stock room,
and an absolute mushrooming of managerial and supervisory
jobs for men. Once men were involved in the making of a
garment but, now deskilled, it has become 'women's work'.
(1982: 14).
Despite deskilling, Coyle argues (1982: 15) that male cutters
have been able to maintain their skilled status:
In looking at men's jobs in the clothing industry, it
becomes apparent how skill is socially constructed in the
context of changing technology. Skill is as much about job
control and wage levels as it is about technique. Men in
the industry are now employed in the cutting room, the stock
room, and in supervisory, roles. The cutting room is a male
stronghold.	 Men lay the cloth, lay the pattern on the
fabric, mark the fabric, and cut the fabric. The craft
basis of these operations was undermined by the introduction
of machines in the inter-war period, notably the bandsaw.
The bandsaw requires a great deal of concentration,
certainly looks dangerous and an error would be expensive
since several layers of cloth are cut in one operation. It
is a moot point, however, whether its operation requires the
three-year apprenticeship (once seven years) which the NUTGW
insist upon.	 (Women have done this work, but informally,
and usually in small non-unionised factories). The
technical basis of men's skills has been eroded in the
cutting room by certain machines, but the relative level of
technical development is quite low, and elements of job
control remain. As other men's jobs have been deskilled and
lost, the cutting room has become a kind of retreat. Inside
the cutting room men defend their wages and skill
differentials.
The sexual division of labour In Derry's shirt industry reveals
several formal similarities with Coyle's description of the clothing
Industry. Shirt cutting is the only process in which a significant
number of men are employed, it has some of the formal attributes of a
skilled trade: male shirt cutters served an apprenticeship of 5-7
years in the 1920s and 1930s - nowadays it is three years - and
command the highest wage rates in the industry. The tasks of
assembling and finishing the shirts are done by women who, though not
- 208 -
apprenticed, undergo a recognised period of training; female trainees
were once known as 'learners.'
These similarities are analogous rather than homologous. Coyle
presents the cutting room as a place into which men have retreated as
more arid more of the processes involved in garment assembly -
formerly a male craft - were deskilled and taken over by cheap female
labour. As we have seen (see section 2.3), shirtmakirig developed in
a very different way: it was never a male craft. Frior to the
development of shirtmaking on a commercial basis in the mid
nineteenth century, shirts were made within the domestic unit as
required by members of that unit (Hamilton, 1955: 6). In the early
stages of factory production, the shirts were cut in workshops
located in Derry; sent, via a network of 'outstations' located in the
surrounding countryside, to be stitched by the wives and daughters of
tenant farmers; and then returned to the city to be laundered and
'finished.' After the introduction of the sewing machine, stitching
operations - performed by women - were gradually concentrated in
factory buildings in the city (see Grew, 1987: pessim).
The women shirtmakers whom I interviewed remembered several
occasions during their careers when the idea of employing men as
sewing machinists or in the laundry was mooted by individual
managers, but it was rarely put into practice and never with much
success: at the turn of the century boys were employed to press
shirts in Tillie and Henderson's factory as an 'interesting
experiment' (The North of Ireland (Illustrated) Up-to--Date. N.D.
c1900: 18); and Mr McDonald told me that 30 men had been employed in
a local Ben Sherman factory when he had been a junior manager there
in the late 1960s. In the latter case, the men were employed for two
years until the factory was 're-engineered' (ie a change in the
orgsanisation of production following a work study) and then either
left or were made redundant because - according to the manager -
they were unable to work at the speed required.
In view of the chronic shortage of jobs for men in Derry, the
fact that so few of the schemes to employ men as sewing machinists
were successful is, perhaps, indicative of the extent to which it was
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seen as a 'women's work'. Mr McDonald told me that it had been
difficult to recruit men as sewing machinists: those who had applied
for the job were either old tailors or 'effeminate.' Moreover, all
the managers I talked to doubted that men had the manual dexterity
necessary to do the job. Moreover, women shirtmakers were opposed to
the employment of men as sewing machinists. Miss Gallagher told me,
Sometimes these English managers came over and suggested it
[ie,employing men as sewing machinists), I knew of one...
but he soon had to forget it: Derry women would have
rebelled.
Miss Cosgrave told me,
It was discussed at the union... Branch meetings... about
teaching the young boys [to operate a sewing machine], but
there's nothing ever came of it... I don't think the [union
was in favour of it] because I'll tell you why... the boys
would have had to get a higher rate of wages than the girls
and that never would have worked out.
Thus, unlike the British clothing industry, shirtmakirig was not
a deskilled male craft: the jobs done by women were always done by
women. However, according to McCorkell, it was the introduction of
women into cutting which the men who joined he ATGWU in 1920 'didn't
like'; therefore, before rejecting the deskilling thesis, it is
necessary to examine the historical development of shirt cutting as a
skilled trade. Coyle, as we have seen, presents cutting in the
British clothing industry as a 'retreat' which men have tried, quite
successfully, to defend against deskilling and encroachment by women.
My respondants presented a more complex and contradictory picture.
On the one hand, they described shirt cutting as a skilled male trade
to which - because of the dearth of skilled jobs for men in Derry -
a considerable status accrued; for example, Mr McCorkell told me, all
be it with a laugh: 'you were an outstanding gentleman, particularly
if you were a special (pattern] cutter.' On the other hand, they
reveal a high degree of uncertainty about both the skilled, and the
masculine, status of their job. To be sure, shirt cutting has, as we
have seen, the formal attributes of a skilled trade, but they felt
this to be a bit of a sham.
Judging from Coyle's description, the detailed processes
involved in cutting shirts were more or less the same as those
involved In cutting other garments.	 In Derry, however, the various
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tasks were named differently. Laying the cloth was known as 'laying-
up' or 'carting', and the person who performed this operation was
referred to as a 'layer-up'; marking the cloth with the pattern was
known as 'pencilling,' and the person who performed this task was
referred to as a 'penciller'; arid what Coyle refers to as a 'bandsaw'
was known In Derry as a 'bandknife.' Moreover, my respondents
included two tasks within the category of shirt cutting which Coyle
does not mention. One was 'pattern-cutting' or 'shape-cutting' which
Involved the design and making of the patterns which were used to
mark the cloth. The other was 'putting-up' which Involved sorting
the cut cloth into bundles according to colour, the decorative
pattern on the cloth, arid shirt size; these bundles of work were sent
to the sewing machinists for assembly.
As Coyle points out (1982: 15), the level of technical
development in cutting was 'quite low', and my respondents did not,
In general, perceive new machinery or techniques to be a threat to
their skilled status. Of the cutters I spoke to only McCorkell was
familiar with the concept of 'deskilllng' which probably reflects the
fact that after he left Derry he became an NUTGW official. He drew
attention to two techniques which were introduced Into Derry cutting
rooms in the 1920s which he considered to be part of a process of
deskllling. One was the use of electrically powered carts to lay the
cloth. Another was pencilling by means of a perforated pattern and a
blue powder to mark the cloth. Only one other cutter mentioned the
latter, so It was not used extensively throughout the industry
probably because although It speeded up the process, the commoner
system of marking by hand was less wasteful of cloth. Mr Matthews
did not talk in terms of deskilling but he described the effect of
the decline In demand for collar-detached shirts on his job, collar
pattern-cutting, in a way which indicates a significant loss of
skill:
The man who was always looked-up-to In the cutting room,
even In the late '20s and mid '30s, a firm who had a good
pattern-cutter had somebody... worth their weight In gold.
The collar pattern-cutting when I went In (to It] was a
trade In Itself... they were artists In their own way. I
was transferred from the pattern-cutting of the collar end:
It started to deteriorate, and the Second World War started,
that changed the whole aspect of things. The loose collar
started to disappear off the market - not immediately of
course.	 You've heard of the trubenised collar, it was a
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wonderful invention.., jt changed the whole aspect of
things... trubenis1ng c came in shortly after the Second
World War.
Contrary to what Coyle asserts, none of my respondants - all
apprenticed in the inter-war period - mentioned the bandknife as a
novel technique which supplanted skill. In fact, the evidence
suggests that the bandknlfe was Introduced Into the shirt Industry
much earlier than Coyle would lead one to believe. Derry shirt
manufacturers were experi!nentlng with steam driven cutting machines
as early as 1860 (Slade 1937), and 'a power-driven hand-knife,
similar to that used In a saw mill' was In common use In Derry
factories by 1912 (LS: 19 October 1912).
A much more significant threat to shirt cutters' status as
skilled tradesmen was the tendency, particularly in the larger
factories to sub-divide the labour process into speclalised jobs
whereby apprentices were trained to be layers-up, pencillers,
bandknife operators, or putters-up, with no experience outside their
particular job or grasp of the trade as a whole. Mr Matthews told
me:
In a big factory... when you went into a cutting room you
had a job to do, but in a small factory you were expected to
put your hand to everything. It [shirt cutting] was a funny
kind of trade, It was a trade and it wasn't a trade. Willie
Dornan (a friend]... I got him started with Szllagy (the
owner of a small factory where Matthews worked In the
1960s). He'd a row In Tulle's1 and he (had] worked there
from a young boy. He became a very efficient machine man,
bandknlfe cutter, but outside of that - says I, 'put your
hand to this or that,' says he, 'I wouldn' t know where to
start,' says I, 'well, I'll teach ye,' and he always used to
say, '1 learnt more In the three years along with you than
In the 40 years (In Tulle's].' Because he was just put to
the one job and he was happy with that: less responsibility
just... The man who was kept to the one job all the time, he
became more expert and more efficient. Didn't they refer to
that as rationailsation of labour? That was one of he terms
they used at the time I used to go to economic schools, old
Workers Education Association.
And George Hamill told me that apprenticeships in shirt cutting were,
nearly as formal [as In engineering) because the shirt and
collar Industry was working under Wages Council rules and
the Wages Council had left down stipulations for cutters.
But I always objected: the employers to all Intents and
purposes didn't carry out the regulations that was on the
Wages Council for cutters because one of the stipulations
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was that they were to get a good knowledge of the different
parts of cutting skills. Well, sometimes they were kept in
there arid put at one particular thing 1 maybe cutting with a
knife, cutting with an automatic hand knife, and they
weren't given proper training at pencilling and bandknife
cutting and laying-up and all the different aspects of
cutting. And you found out sometimes when the time arid
motion men came into the factory and wanted to make changes
and switch round and you found out that you had a cutter who
was supposed to be a full-time man could only do one aspect
of the job.
The uncertainty and insecurity which this system gave rise to
may be illustrated by a few quotes. Mr Matthews elaborated on his
description of shirt cutting as, 'a funny kind of trade, it was a
trade and it wasn't a trade,' in the following way:
take the tailoring establishments over in England, there was
quite alot of men involved there; highly skilled men too,
much more highly skilled than shirt cutters.
When I asked Mr Gordon if he regarded shirt cutting as a skilled
Job, he replied:
You want my opinion here? My opinion about it all is that
the whole thing was really semi-skilled work but the boys
made a trade out of it. They got into a union and made a
trade out of it, and right enough if they hadn't a' done
that they wouldn' t have been paid. But, I don' t know about
shape-cutting, but you could actually get a boy into it (who
was] anyway clever at measurements and he could work it
out... it was really a semi-skilled trade, they made a
trade, they got into the union, and right enough if they
hadn't have banded into the union they wouldn't a been paid.
Mr Gordon presented himself as a 'square peg in a round hole' in the
sense that he regarded himself as a 'countryman' who worked in a
factory. Consequently, he may have had an unusually negative view of
shirt cutting, but it is worth detailing the dismal picture which he
presented: he referred to a particular factory as a 'jail of a
factory'; he described cutting as
a cheap, back street, Lancashire, job. The cloth was full
of lime... if you stood at Derry bridge there at dinner hour
or at six o'clock at night you could've picked out the shirt
cutters coming across the bridge: they were grey in the
face, their clothes were gray... like something out of
Bel sen;
he talked of the envy which he felt on his way to work one day when
he saw a Council workman out in the open air cutting grass, 'and me a
tradesman and him only a labourer!'; and when he finally left the
trade to become a caretaker, he was, 'glad to get out of it... if
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there'd been any work going in Derry there wouldn't been a man in a
shirt factory.'
The cutters whom I interviewed spoke of cutting as a male
preserve, into which a few women had, gradually, been introduced to
do the less skilled jobs such as laying-up and putting-up, and,
occasionally a more skilled Job such as pencilling. For example,
according to Mr McCorkell women were introduced to cutting in the
context of technical changes - changes which he had previously
described as deskilling:
laying-up or hooking-up - first of all there was hooking-up
- then we got to the stage we got carts (ie carts used to
lay-up the cloth], and then the girls started to come in,
they pushed the carts... (that was] when I was about 15
years of age tie 1920]... (there was) very, very, few (women
working in the cutting room before that], if there was I
didn't know about them... And then we used to have men
laying out the lays and they put the shapes in - of the
shirts and the sizes - and pencilled them in. Then we got
the idea we would [use] the perforations, and we were able
to bring a women into it then and she put the cloth down,
put this perforation, a blue dye (was used to] mark the
cloth, and another group of women came in... we got then to
the stage were we were able to eliminate the men on these
jobs... Then we got the small cutters... the wee blade went
up and down and split the shirt lays into small sizes...
then they (the lays] were taken over.., and layed beside the
bandknife and thats were they - eventually fronts, backs,
sleeves, and yokes - were cut to go to the machine room...
and that was the process in the cutting room.
Mr Matthews told me that 'cutting was mostly a man's job'; of the 30
workers employed in Bryce and Weston's cutting room when he started
his apprenticeship in 1926, only seven were women and they were
employed only as 'stampers' (this involved marking the shirt size and
brand name on collars and, though usually carried out in the cutting
room, was not consideted part of the trade):
The cutting end was completely male dominated when I went
in, and the first girl that I saw coming into Bryce and
Weston's cutting room, she came from Portrush... was trained
as a penciller or marker of lays... that was in the shirt
end of the trade. But in the collar end of the trade - the
white collar trade - I never saw a female working in that
trade in those days.
Mr Nelson also described cutting as a 'man's job... men always
outnumbered women in the cutting room.' He claimed not to have seen
a woman pencil until after the Second World War, but conceded that
when he started in the McIntyre, Hogg, and Marsh's factory in the
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early 1930s women were employed to lay-up and put-up. Mr McDonald
told me that the few women who worked in the cutting room were
regarded as 'interlopers.
However, there Is clear evidence that women were employed to do
shirt cutting jobs - including pencilling - from a much earlier stage
in the development of the Industry, and In greater numbers, than my
respondants suggested. For example, The North of Ireland
(Illustrated) Up-to-date (N.D. c1900: 17-18) describes shirt cutting
in Tulle and Henderson's factory In the following way:
Ascending to the next floor, we are Introduced to the shirt
cutting department of the factory; part of the equipment of
this flat Is six steam-powered cutting machines of the
latest type, each capable of cutting through 100 thicknesses
of cloth In one operation. The material for this purpose is
first measured out, folded, and marked from the various
metallic patterns by a large staff of intelligent girls,
previous to being handed over to the men at the cutting
tables.
The Londonderrv Sentinel (19 October 1912) also mentions women as
layers-up and pencillers:
Commencing at the piece stock room, one sees miles of white
long cloth, printed cottons and linens, neatly arranged in
fixtures from which they are taken to the cutting room; here
girls hook-up the material into the right lengths to fulfil
the orders before them.
Others (ie other women] are marking-out the various parts of
the shirt on to the cloth, using cardboard patterns as their
guide. The cloth Is then handed to the men to cut.
Some idea of the numbers of women employed as shirt cutters can be
gleaned from the 1926 and 1951 censusesc6). In 1926 a total of 345
cutters were resident in the city; 269 were men and 76 were female.
In the 1951 census two grades of cutter are distinguished: 'skilled
cutters' and 'knife or machine cutters'. The total In the former
category was 4, 1 man and 3 women; the total in the latter category
was 278, 226 men and 52 women.
Notwithstanding his description of shirt cutting as 'male
dominated', Mr Matthews conceded that:
Most factories employed girls, I would say Bryce and
Weston's was one of the most unusual factories - not that I
moved a big lot at that time Lie In the inter-war period] -
but I heard of girls working, quite alot of girls did
carting or the laying... It was quite a manual Job In them
days, lifting heavy webbs on... these trolleys, they're...
- 215 -
mechanised now.
Mr Gordon took the employment of women as carters, putters-up, and
pencillers, for granted: he told me that when he started his
apprenticeship in the Hamilton's factory in 1930 the cutting room
staff consisted of six men and six women:
There was Mabel McC (she] was a penciller, she could have
worked out a rate and she could have cut it fine: instead of
taking four yards to a shirt she would have took two. There
was her... five or six girls, pencilling or carting or
pencilling and carting... then there'd be the stock room
man, there'd be a young fella or maybe two young fellas a
lay. You're (a gesture towards me] the bandknife man and
they (ie the young men or apprentices] would have been
splitting cuts:	 one'd be carting, taking cloth back and
forward, (that is] the first job you'd get (as an
apprentice]; the other would be splitting cuts with a
Niesman knife (hand held knife] on the table, and then there
was me [operating a bandknife], and two young fellas, that
was all. And in Hamilton's the stock room man was the
foreman, you see, to get the orders out. The collar room it
was a separate cutting room and you had the foreman there, a
bandknife man, a couple of table boys - apprentices at the
table, one or two.
Thus, although the shirt cutters I spoke to presented shirt cutting
as a male trade, they were aware that a significant number of women
were involved in particular aspects of the production process,
including pencilling. However, they were adamant that women never
operated the bandknife. For example Mr Gordon asserted that, 'they'd
[women] never have been near a [band]knife - just table work,
pencilling, and carting, thats all they done.'
Under what terms and conditions were women employed in the
cutting room? Laying-up, putting-up, and pencilling were performed
by both male and female workers, but, although they were all a
recognised part of the shirt cutting trade, the women employed to do
these jobs, unlike the men, did not undergo an apprenticeship. For
example, Mr Gordon told me:
Mabel could pencil out... Mabel used to train wee girls to
pencil, she had them in tears, broke their hearts for six
months or a year, but by the time she had finished with them
they were good pencillers.
I asked, 'would those wee girls have been an apprentice like a boy?'
He replied, 'no, no, never.' 	 I asked, 'but they would have learnt
the trade?'	 He replied, 'they would have learnt that (my emphasis]
trade right enough.'
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Women working in the cutting room were paid less than a
journeyman cutter.	 It is not possible to specify the size of the
differential or to trace movements in it. First, because the wages
of women working in the cutting room were not formalised in the same
way, ie by Wages Council orders, that other workers' wages were.
Second, because the wages system In shirt cutting was quite complex
and varied between and within particular cutting rooms: pattern
cutters were paid on a time basis and their minimum rate, as laid
down by Wages Council, was higher than 'ordinary' cutters; some
'ordinary' cutters were paid a piece-rate, others were paid on a time
basis, and others, after 1948, on a time and bonus basis (more
recently, the bonus was sometimes calculated for the cutting room as
a whole rather than for individual workers). Third, because workers
did not usually tell each other their wages. 	 Nevertheless, all my
respondants, men and women, agreed that women pencillers, layers-up,
and putters-up, earned less than men doing the same jobs. For
example, Mrs Henderson (who as NUTGW shop steward represented women
in the cutting room of McCarthy's factory) told me:
In the cutting room I seen the girls doing the very same
work as the men and their pay was shocking compared to what
the men was getting... carting and laying, I seen women
doing that job and the men coming out with £10 and £20 more
than the girls... in McCarthy's.
To sum up. The sexual division of labour in the Derry shirt
industry is similar to that in the British clothing industry in
general: men are concentrated in shirt cutting; the assembly and
finishing of shirts is 'women's work'. Shirtmaking is different from
other sectors of the clothing industry in that this division of
labour did not the result from the deskilling of a male craft.
However, shirt cutting was, in itself, subject to a process of
deskilling. Shirt cutting had (and has) many of the formal
attributes of a skilled male trade, but in practice it was broken
down into a number of discrete and specialised tasks, and apprentices
did not usually receive an all round training. Moreover, women were
frequently employed - at significantly lower wage rates than
Journeymen - to do not just the marginal, less skilled, aspects of
shirt cutting such as laying-up and putting-up, but also pencilling
which was considered to be a central, skilled, part of the trade.
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5.4 Trade UnionisE and the Politics of Skill
I now want to consider how far Derry shirt cutters' anomalous
membership of the ATOWU and their determination to resist inclusion
in the NUTGW can be explained in terms of the process of deskilling
described in the last section.
There is no doubt that the shirt cutters' membership of the
ATGWU was symptomatic of a desire to belong to a different union from
women shirt workers. This is particularly evident in relation to
those women who worked in the cutting room. Thus, although the ATGWU
was 'the union for shirt cutters' it was not the union for women who
worked in the cutting room. Such women were not formally excluded
from the ATGWU, but they were certainly not encouraged to join and in
some cases they seem to have been actively discouraged. For example,
Mr Gordon told me that the women who worked in his cutting room,
weren't in a union... they could have joined the the Tailor
and Garment Workers' Union, you see I was in the Transport
and General which wasn't really a union for cutters at
all... I'm sure they [women) could have [Joined the ATGWU],
they wouldn't have been refused, but I used to hear some of
the men saying [emphatically] 'worst thing they ever done
[was let] the women into the union.' But I don't know:
there was some women militant enough to join a union, but
they never - as far as I mind - they never were in a union.
They could have been in the Tailor and Garment Workers'
Union, a big lot of them across the water maybe were, you
know, but not in Derry.
As Cockburn (1983: 33) notes, even the print unions - perhaps the
most exclusive and masculist of all trade unions - never, not even in
the late nineteenth century, had
explicit written rules barring women.
	 They did not need
to... there was an effective informal exclusion.
One of the men's main concerns was that women who worked in the
cutting room were paid less than they were. Mr Matthews told me:
In those days a woman wasn't paid the same rate... once a
woman was brought into the cutting room - as I said about
that girl Burns - some of the older men, they objected, but
they didn't make a big lot of it [ie their opposition was
not a success]... And the trade union at that time, there
was two groups, you see the factory workers in Derry were
never united in Derry. The men were nearly all attached to
the Transport and General Workers' Union and the girls were
almost entirely attached to the Tailor and Garment Workers'
Union and that was the difference; so they had nothing
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really in common at all and of course the male was always
much better paid than the female so the way they looked
upon It... once you bring girls into the cutting room they
always looked at it: they' 11 be brought In for cheap
labour.
Mr Gordon was even more definite:
as I used to hear... whenever we were working together, we
were out of time of course [le finished their
apprenticeship]: 'now look boys we are In the Transport and
General Workers' [Union] that's not the union for us at
all; the Tailor and Garment Workers' [Union] should be.'
But we never joined the darn Garment Workers' [Union] and I
think the reason for that was there were some women In It
and the men didn't want the women - (the women] were a weak
link. Some of them women, you see the boss, 'oh Mr so and
so, oh, we'll come in and work for nothing for Mr so arid
so.' That's the way it was you see they fell down and
worshipped the boss, you had to watch that you know.
As part of a general and wide-ranging conversation after the
interview was over, Mr Gordon repeated his view that although the
NUTGW was the 'proper' union for shirt cutters it 'hadn't the clout
of the ATGWU,' and, 'nobody wanted the women in the union, some of
them would have licked the boss' s ass'.
Thus, the deskilling thesis goes some way towards explaining why
most shirt cutters joined the ATGWU rather than the NIJTGW, and why
they strongly resisted Inclusion In the latter. I once thought that
this was sufficient explanation (see Finley, 1987) for the behaviour
of Derry shirt cutters; now I am not so sure. Cockburn's (1983)
study of male compositors in the British printing industry suggests
another kind of interpretation of the relationship between trade
unionism, sex and skill.	 She criticises (1983: 151) those who
explain,
the aggressiveness of craftsmen and their unions towards
women as potential rivals for work... as an Inevitable by-
product of the men's class struggle with the employer.
'They were only defending themselves against the employer's
exploitation of women as cheap labour.'
She argues that,
The conflict cannot be reduced to the single dimension of
class... Had nothing but class interest been at stake, the
men would have found women acceptable as apprentices, would
have fought whole heartedly for equal pay f or women and for
the right of women to keep their jobs at equal pay. As it
was the men and their unions sought to have the women
removed from the trade. The arguments used by the men
against the women differed from those used against male
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rivals. They expressed the interests of men in the social
and sexual subordination of women.
Cockburn's argument does not apply in relation to Derry shirt
cutters with same force as it does to print workers. The latter were
a well organised and cohesive group of men who self-consciously
constructed and defended their identity as a skilled workers. In the
nineteenth century they gained control of entry to the print trade by
'staking exclusive claim of members of the societies lie unions) to
practice it lie the trade] and limiting entry to the societies'
(Cockburn, 1983: 21). The apprenticeship system was an integral part
of this strategy: the printers insisted on long apprenticeships, and
enforced rules governing the ratio of apprentices to journeymen and
the type of work that apprentices could do. However, shirt cutters
in Derry were unable to establish control over entry to their trade.
In 1926, Annie Holmes, Derry organiser of the UGW, wrote:
There are signs that the Important issue of the proper
training of youths entering the Garment industry are to be
catered for. The Executive (of the UGW] are studying the
question and resolutions on the same subject from the
London, Paisley, Bristol, and Edinburgh Branches ensure the
subject being discussed at the General Conference in
August. No Branch is more concerned with this question
than Derry, the home and pioneer of the Shirt and Collar
Industry, though It cannot be claimed that Derry workers
have realised their responsibility in this matter.
The amalgamation of the Shirt and Collar Cutters' Union of
Ireland with the Garment Workers' Union, 1919, had two
effects on this side. Hitherto the Irish Cutters' Union
had been totally Ineffective on national questions
affecting wages were now able through the Amalgamation to
enforce the minimum wage f or the cutters, more important
still these rates were maintained throughout Ireland during
the slump period when every other trade was suffering
severe 'Cuts.' On the other hand the Cutters made a
mistake by believing that the whole of their welfare was
bound up in wages, and they neglected to deal locally with
their employers on local questions requiring local
knowledge and industrious research applied to local needs.
They found the benefit of the Amalgamation and proceeded
then to leave everything to their Executive, a big mistake
on such questions, for example as the Regulation of
Apprentices, Payment of Holidays, Regulation of Overtime
etc. No question has suffered more by this neglect than
the apprentice question, which ought to be studied from a
two-fold point of view - first the question of the proper
training of boys (we leave the question of female training
for future discussion). The boys entering Into the
Industry should be taken in hand by an experienced
Journeyman, and taught his trade throughout... Not only
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that, but if the man was a good Society man, as good
workers always are, he would train the boy to be a good
Trade Unionist...
The second object would be the equally important regulation
of the flow of apprentices into the trade. At present,
certainly in Derry, there are far too many apprentices. It
has a two-fold bad effect, as there are too many to be
trained it is not possible to give the same time or care to
imp8rt information to the boys. Secondly... as Derry is no
longer able to command the whole of the industry as she has
done previously, there is not sufficient work now f or those
who must seek a living in this industry, and in the last
two years during the slump in trade we have had the very
sad spectacle of witnessing adult male cutters walking the
street searching f or work while youths from 16 to 20 have
been working, obviously they were cheaper to employ.
The Derry Branch have repeatedly requested the cutters to
meet and take up this question, but have not been able to
fully impress the importance of this to the cutters, but
the question remains and must be tackled...
It has also been brought to my notice by branches in
England where some of our members have emigrated that these
men have only been taught one section of the trade, and I
raised the matter at a meeting of the Northern Ireland
Shirtmaking Trade Board, asking for better facilities to be
provided for the training of boys, but the matter did not
proceed much further, and I am convinced that it will only
be effectively.., settled by the Irish Branches themselves
supported by their Executive. (GW: July 1926).
Thus, unlike print workers, shirt cutters in Derry were in no
position to insist on apprenticeships and equal pay for women who
worked in the cutting room. But one can be quite sure that this
would not have been the strategy which the shirt cutters would have
pursued even if they had had the choice: like the print workers,
shirt cutters attempted to prevent women from entering the trade.
The fact that these attempts failed does not alter the point. There
are several examples. As we have seen, Mr Matthews recalled that
several of 'the older men' in the cutting room of Bryce and Weston's
factory had objected when Miss Burns was being trained as a
penciller, but that they were unable 'to make much of it.' In the
Garment Worker (August 1929) Edward McCafferty, then Irish regional
organiser of the UGW, reported:
I had occasion to visit Derry regarding the dismissal of
two cutters and the introduction of female labour in the
cutting room of one of the largest factories. In an
interview with the firm I got an assurance that there would
be no further dismissals, that they were not desirous of
introducing any new system, and the firm agreed to pay £3
to each of the dismissed men. 	 The matter does not rest
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there, and I wish to warn our members In Derry that only
100 per cent organisatlon can effectively deal with matters
of this kind.
A more recent example comes from the Minutes of the Cutters'
Committee of the ATGWU (8 September 1952): 'brother' Brown told the
Committee that a 'girl' had been employed in the cutting room of
Harrison's factory. The Committee passed a motion 'strongly
object(ing] to any girl being re-introduced to the cutting room'. In
the light of these examples, it is worth exploring Cockburn's
argument further.
Cockburn urges that we should locate the industrial strategies
of male trade unionists in the context of the way in which
masculinity and femininity are constructed in society. This is part
of a more general theoretical argument about the need to see 'capital
not just as an economic category but as a relation between human
beings' (1983: 5), and the need to understand capitalist society not
just as a 'class system' but also as a 'sex-gender system'. Thus,
she argues (1983: 117)
skill as a political concept is more far reaching than the
class relations of capitalism - it plays an important part
in the power relations between men and women... over very
long periods of patriarchal time women's particular
abilities have been arbitrarily valued lower than those of
men,.. the skill attributed to a job has more to do with
the sex of the person who does it than the real demands of
the work.
The antagonism of skilled men towards women and less skilled men is
about more than pay differentials:
Listening to the skilled man's account of his relationship
to the less skilled, It Is impossible not to sense a
conipetitivesness and fear that has a sexual basis.
(Cockburn, 1983: 135).
We have already seen that shirt cutters were concerned to
represent their trade as an essentially masculine one. Nowhere Is
that concern more apparent than in relation to the bandknife. The
shirt cutters that I spoke to were prepared to concede that women
worked as layers-up, putters-up, and pencillers, but they were
Insistent that, in Derry at least, women never operated the
bandknife.	 Mr McCorkell told me that he and his workmates regarded
the Introduction of women to laying-up as
a great novelty - thats a Joke of course. There wasn't any
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great opposition.., in fact the men were glad because it
was a monotonous job walking up and down with this cart
'till it got electrified of course, I don't want to jump
centuries
But, when he was talking about the 1920 strike he suggests that the
strikers were anxious about the possibility that women might have
been employed to operate the bandknives:
The cutters could have got it (their strike demand] but
this question of - we didn't want to divorce the women from
the men... but we couldn't very well let the women down.
Because if we had lost the women - women were starting to
come into the cutting room and couldn't they have used the
bandknife cutters eventually. Though it was the danger of
the bandknives that was the problem for women, that's why
they didn't get using them... Oh, they (the women] were
locked-out because they couldn't use the bandknives. And
from memory I'm quite certain that the inspectors, the
factory inspectors, said that no way would they agree to
women using the bandknives... Oh, we were totally against
that (women using the bandknife], that was the last bastion
of the cutters, the only strength we had.
Although Coyle writes that women were only very rarely employed to
work at the bandknife in English clothing factories, Mr Matthews and
Mr Gordon were convinced that it was commonplace, and used it as
something with which to taunt their more arrogant colleagues. For
example, Mr Gordon told me:
I heard... there was some of these boys worked across in
England, some of these cutter fellas, and there was some
factory, it was about the Yorkshire area, and they put
women to the bandknife - I only heard it like a couple of
boys talking - they put women to the bandknife and they had
to take them off: they were cutting themselves.., you leave
your fingers on the table on a bandknife. I never seen
them (women] working a bandknife, but one night I was at
the pictures (cinema], and I used to tell these boys - you
know the cutters (who claimed] 'aw, I'm the best cutter in
Derry and all,' you know, and they bragged-up and they'd
maybe (get a] ha'penny an hour more you see - I used to
tell them, says I, 'look, I was at the pictures the night,
you can go to the Midland [cinema] and look at it, they're
making flags... and they were cutting out Union Jacks' -
it was comin' up the Coronation I think, that bunting
stuff... 'there was an oul woman standing cutting (with a]
bandknife, go on down and you'll see the woman cutting the
bandknife!' (laughs]...they wouldn't believe it - you Just
couldn't tell them... I do know one thing, that any
employer is generally going to cut down on wages to get
work done and I'm sure if he could have had women at the
bandknife and all the rest of it he would have had them.
It might have been. .. that just because we were in a union
that they let us, they kept the men at the bandknife end of
it.
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To sum up. The deskilling thesis helps to elucidate the
behaviour of Derry shirt cutters. But it was not simply because the
women who worked in the cutting room were paid less than men that the
latter choose to set themselves apart. The evidence suggests that
shirt cutters were also concerned to maintain their identity as
skilled male workers. As Cockburn (1983: 137) has argued in relation
to the compositors whom she interviewed:
It matters crucially that their masculinity, as they have
defined themselves, is never in doubt. It is often felt to
be challenged, and it is just as often re-asserted. One
form taken by this re-assertion has been the preservation,
until recently, of craft unions as all-male institutions,
clubs from which women were excluded.
Joining the ATGWU was one of the few ways in which cutters in the
Derry shirt industry - an overwhelmingly female industry - could
assert what they saw as the essentially masculine status of their
work.
5.5 Conclusion
One of the major structural divisions running through the
history of trade unionism in the Derry shirt industry has been that
between male shirt cutters and female shirtmakers. The former were
mainly Protestants and the latter mainly Catholics. Such divisions
have been the subject of some discussion in the literature on the
early Belfast trade union movement. The discussion has taken the
form of speculation about whether the indifference and contempt of
organised male workers towards female linen workers derived from the
fact that the latter were skilled men and the former women, or
whether it derived from the fact that the former were Protestants and
many of the latter Catholics. In this chapter I have explored the
divisions between male shirt cutters, female shirtmakers, and their
unions in an effort to determine the part played by sex, skill, and
sectarianism.
Derry shirt cutters recognised that their membership of the
ATGWU rather than the NUTGW was anomalous. They explained how the
anomaly arose in terms of the failure of the 1920 strike, the
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organisational weakness of the NIJTGW in the 1930s, and the power
which accrued to the ATGWIJ by virtue of the dockers' ability to
embargo factories. This is a cogent explanation; however, the
attachment of shirt cutters to the ATGWU and their aversion to the
NUTGW persisted even when the 1920 strike was only dim and garbled
story, and long after the Derry Branch of the NIJTGW had been
reconstructed as an impressive and effective organisation.
There is no doubt that underlying the conjunctural factors cited
by shirt cutters when I asked them why they were members of the ATGWIJ
rather than the NUTGW was an abiding concern about the employment of
women in the cutting room. In part, this concern was linked to the
fact that women who worked in the cutting room had not served an
apprenticeship and were paid lower wage rates than a Journeyman: the
women were perceived as a financial threat. However, the shirt
cutters' organisational separatism cannot be explained in terms of a
simple deskilling thesis. Shirt cutters were not only worried about
wage differentials, they felt insecure about the status of shirt
cutting as a skilled male trade. Membership of the ATGWU was a way
of distinguishing themselves from women workers and of asserting
their masculinity.
The role of sectarianism in this process of organisational
differentiation was marginal. To be sure, when Stephen McGonagle,
the local secretary of the NUTGW, challenged the ATGWU monopoly on
shirt cutters in the late 1940s and early 1950s he succeeded in
attracting a small number of Catholic cutters to his union, and all
but a few of the majority of shirt cutters who remained in the ATGWIJ
were Protestants. However, the actions of neither group of cutters
can be construed as sectarian. McGonagle was a member of the anti-
partitionist IrLP and the Catholic shirt cutters were sympathetic to
his politics, but this cannot have been their main reason for leaving
the ATGWU and joining the NUTGW: the newly appointed ATGWIJ official
with responsibility for the shirt industry, George Hamill, was also
prominently associated with the IrLP. The evidence suggests that
they were attracted by McGonagle's dynamism as a trade union leader,
and by the fact that the NIJTGW, now rebuilt, was a more appropriate
union for them to join.
	
Most of the Protestant shirt cutters were
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Unionists, but their behaviour cannot be reduced to sectarianism
either: in political or religious terms there was little to choose
between George Hamill and Stephen McGonagle, both were anti-
partitionists and both were Catholics. Moreover, the dockers in whom
shirt cutters who were members of the ATGWU placed such faith were a
mainly Catholic and strongly nationalist group of workers.
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CHAPTER 6: THE SECESSION OF THE DERRY BRANCH OF THE NUTGW 1952-1954:
TRADITIONAL IRISH MARXISM STOOD ON ITS HEAD
6. 1 Introduction
The central thrust of the traditional Irish marxist view of
trade unionism in Northern Ireland is that sectarian tension and
conflict in the workplace - arising from competition over, and
discrimination In, the allocation of jobs, and from ruling class
manipulation - created problems for trade unionists seeking to unite
Protestant and Catholic workers and thereby inhibited the development
of the movement. According to my respondants, however, relations
between Catholic and Protestant shirt workers were comparatively
pacific during much of the inter-war period. To be sure, they noted
that there could be tension at times of the year when historical
events of significance to Protestants were celebrated, 12 July, 12
August, and 'poppy day', but none of my respondants recalled a
single occasion when sectarian conflict interfered with trade union
organisation: it was a problem which they associated with the 1950s.
What they were referring to was a series of events which followed the
secession of the Derry Branch of the NUTGW in September 1952. The
'breakaway', as these events are collectively known locally, is
obviously of considerable importance in relation to general theories
of trade unionism and sectarianism in Northern Ireland; it will be
the subject of this chapter.
Before I begin my analysis of the breakaway I want to present an
outline of the sequence of events as reported in the local press.
There are two reasons for doing this. 	 First, it is a complicated
story and a preliminary outline will aid clarity. Second, the
breakaway was a very bitter experience for many of my respondants, it
remains a controversial subject among them, and their recollections
of it are coloured more than usual by hindsight; it is therefore
useful to establish the sequence of events from the outset using more
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dispassionate, contemporaneous sources. 	 Local newspapers are the
only such sources available'.
According to the newspapers, Stephen McGonagle and the Derry
Branch Committee decided to resign from the NUTGW at a meeting on
Monday 8 September 1952. These decisions were made public at a
special meeting of the Branch as a whole on Thursday 11 September
1952. The newspaper reports do not give the number of shirt workers
who attended the meeting, but my resporidants suggest up to 400 women:
significantly more than usually attended meetings of the Branch. The
special meeting passed two unanimous motions: the first, proposed by
a Miss Ruby O'Neill, was that the Branch resign en bloc, the second
(the proposer Is not recorded) advocated the establishment of an
independent trade union. In another vote, the former Branch
Committee and officers of the NUTGW were re-elected to serve the new
trade union (DJ: 12 September 1952, and LS: 13 September 1952). At a
'mass meeting' the following week it was decided to name the new
organisation the Clothing Workers' Union (CWU) and appoint McGonagle
as its full-time secretary (DJ: 17 September 1952; LS: 16 September
1952). The new organisation was soon claiming that there had been a
'100 per cent change over in membership' (DI: 15 September 1952); 'it
wasn't a split, It was a landslide' (LS: 20 September 1952). None of
my respondants dispute the fact that all but 'a handful' of trade
unionists left the NUTGW and joined the CWU. By the end of September
McGonagle was claiming that the CWU had a membership of 3,000 (LS: 27
September 1952); in May 1953 the figure was put at nearly 3,500 (DJ:
27 May 1953 and LS: 28 May 1953). Early in 1953 the CWU employed a
full-time official to assist McGonagle; his name was Seamus Quinn, a
Derryman who prior to his appointment had been a clerk and an active
trade unionist in the Northern Ireland Transport Board in Belfast.
At the time, the fundamental reason given by the Branch
Committee for their resignation and for the establishment of an
independent union was that they had no confidence In Macgougan
because he had ignored their decisions both in relation to the
payment of benefit to a group of workers involved In an industrial
dispute and to the calculation of holiday payments, and beause he had
negotiated with employers without consulting the NUTGW Branch
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Committee or the ATGWU (DJ: 12 and 15 September 1952; LS: 13
September 1952).
Derry Trades Council and the ITUC opposed the breakaway, and in
May 1953 they initiated negotiations to reconcile the two
organisations. The NUTGW negotiators did not include Macgougan: they
were Harold Childs, a national official, and Paddy O'Connor, a Dublin
clothing worker and member of the union's National Executive who had
been sent to Derry as temporary Branch secretary following
McGonagle's resignation. The negotiations broke-down in July when
the NUTGW rejected McGonagle's conditions for reunification (DJ: 24
July 1953). They resumed, only to breakdown again in 15 October
1953. On this occasion McGonagle broke-off the negotiations claiming
that the NUTGW had attempted to use the Derry Trades Council to
ensure that the SMF would not recognise the CWU: (DJ 16 October
1953). On 20 October 1953, 4,300 members of the CWU were balloted on
a proposal that they affiliate with the ITGWU; the result was 3,316
for affiliation, 216 against, 64 votes spoiled, and 461 ballot papers
not returned (LS: 22 October 1953). The decision to ballot the
members on affiliation with the ITGWIJ was presented as a defensive
reaction to the collapse of the reconciliation talks with the NUTGW
and the latter's efforts to ensure that the SMF did not recognise the
CWU. However, given that there were only three days between the
ending of negotiations and the ballot, the NUTGW claim that the CWU
had been preparing to ballot its members prior - rather than in
response - to the breakdown in negotiations is plausible (DJ: 19
Octoer 1953),
Up to this point the opposition of the local labour movement to
the breakaway had been muted and uneven, but condemnation of the
decision to affiliate to the ITGWU was more general and revealed a
sense of outrage: the Trades Council deplored it, and George Hamill
of the ATGWIJ said that it threatened to split the trade union
movement in the city (DJ: 28 October 1953). Some members of the
ATGWU in the docks even threatened not to handle a consignment of
shirts from a CWU/ITGWIJ organised factory which was awaiting
shipment.	 The threat was not carried out because members of the
ATGWU who worked as cutters in the factory concerned advised the
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dockers that it would jeopardise an important order (DJ: 30 October
1953).
Press interest in the breakaway diminished after the ballot on
affiliation to the ITGWU, and did not revive until April 1954 when
members of the ITGWU struck against the employment of a member of the
NUTGW in Harrison's shirt factory. However, it is possible to piece
together what happened during the intervening period using
respondants' recollections. Following the transfer of the CWU to the
ITGWU a number of women left the latter arid rejoined the NUTGW. In
the month after the ballot these women came together with a number of
women who had never defected to the ITGWU - no more than 150 in all -
and, for the first time since the secession, reconstituted a
functioning NUTGW Branch Committee in Derry (Minutes: 17 November
1953). During the winter of 1953/54 tension between the members of
the NUTGW and ITGWU built up as O'Connor and Macgougan attempted to
consolidate their base. The dispute in Harrison's was the climax of
the whole episode: it lasted 17 days and was exceptionally bitter.
Several of the younger managers and political activists whom I
spoke to in the course of my research - people who were too young to
have had direct experience of the breakaway - tended to view the
breakaway as a straight-forward sectarian dispute: the members of the
NUTGW were Protestant, and the members of the ITGWU were Catholic.
For example, for Eamonn McCann 2 ' told me that the breakaway was 'one
of his earliest memories': his father, a member of the Trades Council
at the time, was strongly opposed to the breakaway, and McCann
remembered it being a topic for discussion in his house; he also
remembered seeing women fighting in the street,
tearing each others' hair out. It was very unusual to see
women brawling.
According to McCann, McGonagle had urged women to join 'the dockers
union' which was just a 'code for Catholic, Irish trade union.' It
is not difficult to understand why this view should be so prevalent:
as we have seen, the ITGWU was first established by James Larkin in
1909 as a specifically Irish breakaway from the British based
National Union of Dock Labourers; it subsequently became closely
identified with the nationalist side in the Irish War of
Independence; and in 1952, at the time of the Derry breakaway, it was
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the dominant union in the Congress of Irish Unions (CIU) which had
been set up in 1945 by the members of a number of Irish based unions
who were opposed to British influence within the hUG.
Trade unionists who had direct experience of the breakaway
present a more complicated picture. Many of my sample of union
activists and officials were involved in the breakaway on one side or
the other, and, not surprisingly, their recollections of it differed
in many respects. Nevertheless there were two aspects on which they
all agreed: first, that the split between the NUTGW and the CWU/ITGWU
had sectarian undertones, but, second, that the breakaway originated
in a personality clash between Macgougan and McGonagle, and the
latter was the driving force in the establishment of an independent
union and in its transfer to the ITGWU. As I indicated in chapter
four, my respondants' tendency to explain social and historical
processes in terms of the personalities of the particular individuals
who were involved in them is problematic from the point of view of
social science: to accept it uncritically would be to run the risk of
methodological individualism. Nevertheless, I am theoretically
committed to an approach in which some priority is given to 'the
actor's view', so I will begin my analysis of the breakaway, in
section 6.2, with an examination of relations between Macgougan and
McGonagle; I will, however, attempt to locate their personal
relationship in the context of local politics and the internal
government of the NUTGW. Of course, from a social scientific
perpsective it could be argued that irrespective of what my
respondants say, and regardless of the role played by trade union
leaders, the most important question is: what led women to support
one or other side in the split? I will address this question in
relation to the ITGWU in section 5.3, and in relation to the NUTGW in
section 5.4. Section 5.5 will be concerned with the growing tension
between the two unions and with the inter-union dispute in Harrison's
factory.	 Throughout the chapter I will, of course, be particularly
concerned to locate the causal significance of sectarianism as a
factor in the breakaway. To this end I will seek to compare and
elucidate the Derry breakaway with reference to analyses of union
breakaways and intra-union conflict in other parts of Ireland and in
Britain.
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6.2 The Origins of the Breakaway: Personal Differences and Intra-
Union Conflict
According to Lerrier (1961: 187) trade union breakaways are
manifestations of 'a breakdown in solidarity which occur when a
section of the rank and file lose confidence in their union and
develop different goals.' My respondants present a view of the Derry
breakaway which contradicts this definition. According to them the
Derry breakaway was Instigated and led by the local official, Stephen
McGonagle, not by the rank and file, and he embarked on this course
of action because of a personality conflict with his superior, Jack
Macgougan. As will become apparent, this view pervades my
respondants' recollections; differences arise only as to the nature
of the personality clash. Some - especially, but not exclusively,
McGonagle's opponents - blame McGonagle's egotism or ambition; for
example, George Hamill who knew Macgougan and McGonagle well but was
more friendly with the latter, told me
I was very anti McGonagle breaking away... we'd daggers
drawn Mcoonagle and I over the head of it and we didn't
speak to one another and we were great friends before that
and I told him he was absolutely wrong and I thought it was
a pure bit of personalities and as well as that we were
scared the Irish Transport [Union] would get in... It was
Macgougan who appointed McGonagle in the job [of Derry
Branch secretary of the NUTGW]... [they were] very close
friends.	 It's a question of a wee bit of ego on
McGortagle's part. McGonagle is very egotistical. He's a
good friend of mine at the present time, always has been,
but very much McGonagle. He liked the power, and I suppose
something Macgougan was doing Just took his toes [sic] and
he says, 'he's not going to do it to me, and I'm going to
be my own boss.'
Some, like Seamus Quinn, merely pointed out that both men were very
ambitious. And others, mainly McGonagle's supporters, blamed
Macgougan's style of leadership.
There is no doubt that McGonagle's relationship with Macgougan
had deteriorated prior to the breakaway. McGonagle's resignation
came as a total surprise to Macgougan, but in retrospect he was able
to trace a deterioration in their relationship over a long period:
I picked up [on McGonagle's feelings], suppose it would
have been 1950.	 We were involved in an election in the
Republic supporting the public speakers. He hadn't a car
at that time, I had, but he joined up with other people in
a car and went to different meetings, and it came back to
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me that he'd spent most of his time bemoaning the fact that
he had to work for a character like me. [laughs]
But it got particularly bad in the period immediately before the
break:
McGonagle had been ill, we (the union] gave him leave of
absence - (He was] on the verge of a nervous breakdown -
and when he came back every little complaint seemed to have
been magnified in his mind. He couldn't see why Derry
shouldn't be able to do its own thing... instead of being
tied to what he called 'the London bandwagon.'
Their personal emnity comes through even in the press statements
which they released at the time. McGonagle and his Branch Committee
justified their resignations from the NUTGW in terms of their
dissatisfaction with Macgougan's handling of two issues, one related
to lock-out benefit, but the main one was to do with holiday pay. At
first, Macgougan responded by arguing that his position on the
holiday pay issue was the correct one: he claimed that the Derry
recommendation on holiday pay was, in effect, the same as that put
forward by the SMF; that McGoriagle's advocacy of this recommendation
had resulted in the employers' motion being carried at the Wages
Council; and that it had resulted in anomalies which were detrimental
to many workers (see 'Statement to Irish Branches and Shop Stewards'
12 September 1952). Even today Macgougan remains indignant about the
holday pay issue. However, in successive statements to the press,
McGonagle made it clear that holiday pay as such was not the issue,
it was Macgougan's style of leadership: his failure to take account
of the Branch's recommendation on the matter, and the fact that he
had negotiated with employers without consulting NUTGW members in
Derry (DJ: 15 September 1952). In a later statement Macgougan
rehearsed the reasons which McGonagle had given for his action and
concluded that,
the real reason is the personal ambition of a man
[McGonagle] who dislikes authority and discipline and is
misusing the loyalty of scores of sincere and well meaning
trade unionists. (Press Statement 24 September 1952).
In line with my respondants' recollections, I found no evidence
of mass disaffection with the NiJTGW prior to the breakaway. Indeed,
as will become apparent the secession came 'out of the blue' both to
ordinary NUTGW members in Derry, and to the office staff in the
Belfast headquarters of the union. McGonagle hmimself told me that
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Derry members of the NUTGW 'resented nothing about the Garment
Workers' Union, it was a good union: they followed me because of my
personality.'
Neither is there any doubt that McGonagle was the Instigator and
driving force behind the breakaway. However, the breakaway cannot be
explained simply as the result of a personality clash: McGonagle
acted in concert with the members of the Derry Branch Committee of
the NUTGW and only after he had secured their support. Miss
Cosgrave, one of the two surviving members of the secessionary Branch
Committee (the other was old and infirm at the time of my research
and declined to be Interviewed), told me that 'we knew it [the
breakaway] was on the cards for a long time.' Even before the
breakaway was announced, members of the Branch Committee had rented
and prepared offices for the new union.
What, then, was the basis for the alliance between McGonagle and
the activists? Given the subsequent turn of events the first
possibility which must be considered is politics and/or religion.
Those of my respondants who remained loyal to the NUTGW claimed that,
in addition to McGonagle's personal motives, the breakaway was
inspired by Irish nationalism - a desire to establish an Irish based
union.	 Macgougan 'didn't know' whether or not McGonagle was
motivated by nationalism, but he told me that,
I do know that he carried out a whispering campaign that
Catholic workers should have an Irish union, and then he
went on about a general secretary who'd lived with a man
who was not her husband... Anna Loughlin was general
secretary [of the NUTGW] at the time.
As we saw in section 4.4, it is true that McGonagle and most, if not
all, of the secessionary Branch Committee were Catholics, and that
Macgougan was from a Protestant backround. It is also true that
McGonagle and several prominent members of the Committee, Patrick
Hamill, Lawrence Hegarty, and Barney Donaghey, were members of the
anti-partitionist IrLP. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that the
conflict between McGonagle and the Derry Branch Committee on the one
hand and Macgougan on the other was not based on religious or
political differences. As I pointed out in section 2. 2, the keynote
of McGonagle's successive electoral challenges to the Nationalist
Party In Derry was that by constantly stressing the evil of partition
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they alienated Protestants, and, as we shall see, McGonagle and other
members of the secessionary Branch Comittee went out of their way to
allay Protestant suspicions about the breakaway. Moreover, at the
time of the breakaway Macgougan was also a member of the IrLP. In
fact, it was through their close political affinity that Macgougan
and McGonagle first met and became friends. 	 McGonagle, as I have
already pointed out, joined the NILP in in 1946; Macgougan was the
Party chairman in that year. According to Macgougan, It was
precisely as a result of their political agreement that McGonagle was
appointed secretary of the Derry Branch of the NUTGW in 1947:
I sponsored him, (otherwise] he wouldn't have got it (the
job]: I had the right of veto... I coached McGonagle in
advance about how the Trade Board worked, (and) how the
wage pattern took place - he'd his answers all off pat.
Both Macgougan and McGonagle believed in a united Ireland and they
adopted the same position in the argument which developed between
anti-partitionist and pro-Union elements within the NILP in 1948-1949
(see section 2.2).	 Macgougan was expelled from the Party in 1948,
and McGonagle left soon after. Both men were prominently involved
in the extension of IrLP organisatiori to Northern Ireland. The role
of politics in Macgougan's and McGonagle's relationship and in the
breakaway is summed up well by George Hamill:
He [McGonagle] wasn't inhibited in the Tailor and Garment
Workers' Union with regard to that (politics]: Macgougan
was just as nationalist as he was, sure he stood as a
socialist republican in Belfast. There was no political
differences between Macgougan and McGonagle. That was one
of the reasons Macgougan put him in the job (as secretary
of the Derry Branch of the NUTGW] at first: because they
seen eye-to-eye. McGonagle was not a member of the union
at the time and that caused a lot of bother: the job was
advertised, there was another candidate who took great
exception to it - James (it was actually Jack] Doherty - he
was a member of the Garment Workers' (Union], a tailor. He
took umbrage at McGonagle being appointed... Macgougan and
McGonagle had relations in earlier days through the Labour
Party: Macgougan came up and helped at elections in Derry.
It was a good appointment, Macgougan saw that Derry had the
potential for a full-time official - no, I think it [the
breakaway] was purely personal.
If not politics or religion, what did form the basis of the
opposition to Macgougan? It was a shared feeling that Macgougan was
limiting McGonagle's and the Branch Committee's say in decisions
about matters affecting local shirt workers. Miss Cosgrave told me:
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I felt at the time that Jack McGuigan (sic], Macgougan,
whatever you call him, was tying down Stephen (McGonagle]
too much, wasn't giving him enough lee way. Now Jack
McGuigan and what do you call the other fella (she is
referring to Armstrong an official in the Belfast Branch of
the NUTGW] - there was a girl across the street (Julia
Kelly, another member of the secessionary Branch Committee]
and we were going to a meeting this night - Jack McGuigan
and the other fella came there Re to the street] to
persuade us not to leave their union. We talked out there
for a long time, we'd long discussions, but we had our
minds made up because we knew what Stephen was, we knew he
was an honest person and he always preached, he always let
you know, you had to be honest with your employer as well
as yourself... he told you what you were entitled to and he
told you what you had to do if you wanted that: you had to
work for it. He was very honest, there was never nothing
underhand he never said to you, 'oh, we' 11 get this boy,'
or, 'we'll get this off him.' No, he was straight down the
line... Macgougan was letting everybody know that he was
the boss...	 Jack McGuigan,	 Macgougan,	 was limiting
Stephen's workings in the union. Thats the way we felt.
I have referred more than once to a previous occasion when the Branch
Committee had questioned Macgougan's authority; ironically it
concerned McGonagle's appointment. As we have seen, the opposition
to McGonagle's appointment developed because one of the Branch
Committee members, Jack Doherty, coveted the job. 	 But Doherty was
not alone in suggesting that the position should have been be filled
by an election within the local Branch rather than by appointment
because allowing Macgougan to make the appointment gave him too much
say In the matter. And it is significant that, at the time, several
disaffected members of the Branch Committee - notably Patrick Hemill
who was to become a prominent supporter of the 1952 breakaway -
discussed the possibility of setting up a breakaway union.
There Is some evidence to support the suggestion that
Macgougan's style of leadership had an authoritarian character. For
example, when criticised over his handling of the holiday pay Issue,
he justified his action - that is, his attempt to re-negotiate with
the employers without consulting the Derry Branch - in terms of his
seniority in the Union hierarchy:
The national union has democratic machinery, the branch
committee and appointed official are responsible for
protecting the interests of the members at local level and
conclude agreements with employers. When it comes to
dealing with matters on a broader field then the decisions
are a matter for the Irish committee and negotiations
covering the whole of Northern Ireland are a matter for the
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Irish Officer [himself) who is responsible to the Irish
committee and to the Executive of the union. (Press
Statement 24 September 1952),
Moreover, when I asked him about how he saw his role as Irish
regional organiser of the NUTGW, he told me, 'I was always a great
believer In establishing a chain of command.' Macgougan also told
me that in the period before the breakaway he had felt it necessary
to assert his authority over McGonagle on a number of occasions:
He [McGonagle] was jumpy... [it was] frustration, [as]
somebody said: 'you can't have two cocks In the one barn-
yard'... [but] I was the boss, it was as simple as that.
He would question every directive and he would go to his
Branch Committee: no problem, resolution against Belfast
Interference.., that was going on f or sometime [prior to
the breakaway]... McGonagle had alot of stooges about him.
In short, the breakaway originated in an intra-union power
struggle. Amongst scholars of industrial relations such conflicts
are widely recognised as an integral part of union government in
Britain (see Lerrier, 1961; James 1984; and Hemingway 1978). The
orthodox view is that the source of intra-union conflict is an
inherent tension between the democratic ideal (that is, control by
ordinary members) and a tendency to oligarchy (that Is, control by
officials) which results from the need for organisational and
administrative efficiency. This view was first developed by the
Webbs (1902) and Michels (1958), and is evidently the one which
Lerner had in mind. As I pointed out at the outset of this section,
the Derry case does not conform to this view; James, however, has
developed a model which seems more appropriate. In lames' model the
opposition between 'democracy' and 'oligarchy' or 'representation'
and 'administrative efficency' is replaced by the notion of trade
unions as polyarchles wherein conflict over decision-making Is not
always between leaders/ bureaucrats and the rank and file, but can,
and frequently does, occur at many levels within trade unions:
'representation' and 'administration' need not be
conflicting objectives. For administration to be effective
a high level of participation is required since unions rely
heavily on the contributions of unpaid helpers. These
activists, who become shop stewards and sit on the district
committees, the divisional committee, and the national
committee, expect that their participation will be rewarded
by a share in the decision-making process of the union. It
is not surprising, therefore, that activists at all levels
will seek to maximise their share in the decision-making,
and that this leads to the conflicts which have been
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described as characteristic of trade union governments.
(1984: 113)
James does not regard the rank and file as irrelevant: rather, they
can act as the 'arbiters of legitimacy since their behaviour will
indicate support for one or other collectivity' (1984: 16). In the
Derry case, the rank and file arbitrated in favour of the breakaway
by Joining it in large numbers. In the next section I will examine
why.
6.3 The Breakaway and the Rank and File
Although there was no sign of rank and file disaffection with
the NUTGW prior to the resignation of the Derry Branch Committee,
women shirtmakers appear to have responded to secessionary group with
enthusiasm. For instance, Miss Cosgrave contrasted the routine
attendance at general meetings of the Derry Branch of the NUTGW with
the much larger attendance at meetings of the CWU: the former
attracted,
over a hundred, maybe about a hundred and fifty... (but] at
the time that Stephen was, at the breakaway, it was a hell
Stephen had to take... because there was three or four
hundred at those meetings.
Moreover, as we have seen, membership of the CWIJ increased from
approximately 3,000 in September 1952 to more than 4,000 in October
1953. There is no doubt that the breakaway was popular, and in this
section I will use my respondents' recollections and experiences to
construct an account of how, on the one hand, the leaders of the
breakaway appealed to the shirt workers, and why, on the other hand,
shirt workers found it so appealing. However, to put this popularity
into perspective it is worth making one point about the
practicalities of the situation. Initially, the announcement of the
breakaway created a considerable amount of confusion amongst trade
unionists. In this situation the fact that all the activists
supported the breakaway was crucial. After all, these were the people
who - in the days before the 'check-off' system - collected, or
organised the collection of, union dues, and when they stopped
collecting for the NUTGW and switched to the CWIJ the former
effectively ceased to function as an organisation. Indeed, for Miss
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Gallagher, who later became the mainstay of the NUTGW in Derry, the
secession and the new union was a fait accompli to which there seemed
little alternative:
I was just standing doing my work and one or two of
Stephen's crowd, they were kind of militant, they said,
'don't be paying any union on Friday night until you're
told,' then somebody said, 'why?' and they said, 'Stephen's
starting his own union.' They thought it was Stephen's
union and that's the first I heard of it... and that's what
girls were: they weren't well versed, they didn't know,
they just knew they were going to follow Stephen McGonagle.
They didn't go into details. We were sort of left high and
dry and we didn't know what to do. I remember the brother
sending word to stay put tie remain in the NUTGW], so we
went down to union tie NUTGW] one day in our lunch hour and
they told us straight tie the right way of things]. But it
was like a dead end, there was nobody about, Macgougan
wasn't to be had.
How did my respondents explain the success of the breakaway in
attracting rank and file members of the NUTGW? Again, they tended to
attribute it to McGonagle: his record as a trade union official, his
skills as a communicator, and his general popularity. 	 In Miss
Cosgrave's opinion the ordinary members supported McGonagle because,
Well, you know he held the general meetings which were very
seldom heard of, I never heard of them anyway tie before
McGonagle became an official], and he explained a lot of
things to them and anybody that went to him he was very
helpful and did all he could for them... he let them know
what was going on in the union and what the union was doing
and how the union stood, so I think that would be the
reason [why most of the women supported the breakaway].
Miss McMorris was an ordinary union member at the time of the
breakaway (she did not become a shop steward until the late 1950s);
she told me that she and her work mates joined the CWU:
Because it was Stephen... Stephen was always a very
successful man, very forceful personality. He was that
type: a great jovial type of man end made friends with
everybody and ha ha'd and all that. I would say that it
was due in good part to his personality. Because a lot of
them (her work mates] - maybe I'm saying it but... I know I
got on with him really well.., he was talented and clever
and I wasn't: [in later years] I sat on Wages Council with
him and all these... Queen's Counsels, Stephen had it this
negotiating position] made up in his head, no pen or
nothing and he was very forceful. So I admired that, all
that was lacking tin me]... I secretly admired the man for
his brains.
When talking about McGonagle's popularity, several of my respondents
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alluded to his physical attractiveness. I asked Mrs McMenamin, an
ITGWU activist to whom I was introduced during my research 3 ', why
most of the factory women supported the breakaway; she replied with a
laugh, 'oh, all the women went for Stevie.'	 When showing me a
photograph of the Branch Committee of the CWIJ, Miss Cosgrave pointed
out McGonagle' s 'handsomeness.' 	 And Miss McMorris compared him to
Elvis Presley:
As one manager says to me 'youse are all' - well he didn't
say Elvis Presley, but like we were looking on him like
that, because he was the champion of the factory girls. We
didn't see no wrong In him then, maybe In later years when
the 11-plus came in! (laughs].
In the light of my respondants' emphasis on personality it is
worth noting that Macgougan, though priding himself on his working
class origins and interests, did not consider himself to be good at
communicating with ordinary trade unionists. He contrasted himself
with another local full-time officer of the NUTGW, Billy Lindsay, in
the following way:
he (Billy Lindsay] was very good at plant level
negotiations and explaining things to people that wasn't
terribly literate, and I wasn't. One of my weaknesses was
that my vocabulary was too extensive for speaking at the
level you need to. As Francis Maguire [NUTGW activist in
Belfast, later the first women's officer of the NUTGW]
said, 'the first time I went to hear you and you talked
about, "processing it through the negotiating machinery," I
wondered what the hell you were talking about!' (Laughs]
Certainly, Macgougan's attempts to rally support for the NUTGW in the
autumn of 1952 - by speaking to individual activists such as Miss
Cosgrave, and by addressing workers as they left factories and at a
public meeting (see LS: 25 September 1952) - were unsuccessful.
However, the success of the breakaway and the collapse of the
NUTGW cannot be explained in terms of the contrasting personalities
and abilities of McGonagle and Macgougan. Rather, the popularity of
McGonagle and of the breakaway which he instigated and the
corresponding failure of Macgougan to rally support for the NUTGW can
only be understood when set against the backround of the intense
local solidarity and pride which was, and is, characteristic of Derry
society. This localism was based on shared hardship and poverty and
was linked to a feeling that the city had been systematically
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neglected by the Belfast based Stormont regime. Seamus Quinn told me
that, 'indeed, ' Derry,
has [a strong local solidarity], but of course that's [a
result of] the attitude that Northern Ireland ends at
Glengormley [a suburb of Belfast].
George Hamill summed up the feeling behind Derry localism in the
following way:
Belfast as a city hadn't been popular. Belfast people look
on us as a country village. The bulk of people in Derry
are oriented to Donegal, very few people have any affinity
with County Derry.... [and] there was a bitterness about
the concentration of new jobs and the number of
[industrial] sites established In Belfast.
Having been born and brought up in Derry, McGonagle was known to
many shirt workers not just as a union official but as a neighbour,
as a family friend, and as a member of the same community. McGonagle
came from the Brandywell area, and at the time of the breakaway lived
In Marlborough Road. The former is adjacent to the Bogside; the
latter is situated between the Bogside, the Creggan, and Rosemount -
these were areas where a large proportion of the shirt workforce
lived. Miss Cosgrave had no affinity with Macgougan, as we have
seen, she could barely remember his name, but McGonagle was the man
'there on the spot... we knew what Stephen was, we knew he was an
honest person. ' 	 Miss McMorris drew attention to the importance of
the fact that McGonagle was a neighbour In a more pointed way:
He [McGonagle) only lived around the corner from me, he was
an older man, a family man (I knew him] as a neighbour, as
a man, as an official.., he would have called 'hallo' to me
and I would have just said 'hallo,' never would have called
him 'Stephen' as I did later... union-wise he was very good
at figures and his mind... I remember business men coming
out after him (and] trying to be all wily, wily, oily, wily
after he'd floored them and that made you sicker of
management. I felt great that we had this great bulk of a
person, like, could speak. If he had have been weak it
would have been devastating, to me anyway.
McGonagle himself told me about his roots In a terraced house in the
Brandywell, emphasised the importance of community life and mutual
support in Derry In the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, and contrasted It
with the lack of community feeling in the quiet residential street of
detached bungalows where he now lives.
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Perhaps more importantly,	 McGonagle and the other CWU
spokesmen c4 presented the breakaway in terms which both expressed
arid appealed to Derry localism. Thus, a frequent theme of CWIJ
spokesmen was that Derry shirt workers were better organised and had
negotiated better agreements with local employers than clothing
workers in Belfast, the rest of Northern Ireland, or the United
Kingdom; that Macgougan and the NUTGW general secretary were 'trying
to limit Derry workers' claims to the lower levels attained in the
UK'; and that 'six county workers	 are being denied the right to
negotiate with their employers' (DJ: 12 September 1952). The high
levels of union organisation in Derry were contrasted with poor
organisatiori among clothing workers elsewhere on at least two
occasions: for example, in reply to Macgougan's defence of the NUTGW
in the local press, Lawrence Hegarty, the secretary of the
secessionary Branch, claimed that only 15.5% of British clothing
workers, and 10 to 12% of Belfast clothing workers, were organised
(DJ: 15 September 1952)]; at a meeting in January 1953 it was alleged
that the NIJTGW had failed to organise in the rest of Ireland (LS: 6
January 1953).	 And, In September 1952 McGonagle told a meeting of
shirt workers that,
negotiations carried on in Derry in the last five or six
years had affected the whole industry In Ireland and
Britain (probably a reference to work study negotiations].
The agreements arrived at, while not what we really want,
are so much ahead that they have been used outside the
city. It is regrettable that they have not been used to
far greater effect in such a way that would consolidate
your position. (LS: 27 September 1952).
Faced by this localism, Macgougan and the trade union activists
whom he brought from Belfast and other parts of Ireland to support
the Derry Branch of the NUTGW were unable to make much headway. At
one NUTGW organised public meeting Paddy O'Connor - the Dublin based
NUTGW activist drafted to Derry to act as temporary Branch secretary
in the immediate aftermath of the breakaway - made a reference to
McGonagle having been well paid by the NUTGW; his speech was
interrupted by a female heckler who objected to him 'maligning a
Derryman' (DJ: 26 September 1952). At a later meeting organised by
the NUTGW arid the ITTJC in an effort to promote reunification, an
unnamed member of Belfast Trades Council drew a comparison between
the NUTGW/CWU division and the inter-union dispute which had
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allegedly caused the closure of Watts s distillery in 1921 (see
section 3.4); one of McGonagle's supporters replied, 'Can you show us
any break in trade union solidarity that led to the closing of the
shipyard or the present unemployment in Derry. ' The reference to the
shipyard is particularly interesting: a common complaint among the
older generation in Derry was that the local shipyard, which had
employed 2,000 men in 1919 (DS: 21 February 1919), had been allowed
to close in the mid 1920s while Belfast shipyard was kept going (see
also Nash, 1974). At the same meeting Lawrence Hegarty added that,
'it is not necessary that people from outside Derry should speak
here.' (DJ: 6 January 1953)c6).	 Francis Maguire, then an activist
in the Belfast Branch of the NUTGW remembersthis incident7:
We took McGonagle apart, but a cutter shouted at me:
'You're not a Derry girl!' I shouted back, 'No, but I'm a
garment worker!'
She too thought that 'Derry parochialism' was an important factor in
support for the breakaway; she told me that because of neglect by the
Stormont regime 'Derry sort of crawled Into itself.'
Macgougan certainly felt that he was up against a strong local
feeling: he told me that when he spoke to former NUTGW activists who
had joined the CWIJ he got,
an extraordinary response: most of them said, 'well I would
say to Stevie, "don't do it Stevie," but this Is a Derry
issue; we can' t let the others down. ' This was repeated
over half a dozen of them at different times... there's
always been an anti-Belfast complexion in Derry.
Quinn agreed that support for the breakaway was based on localism,
but denied that the NUTGW suffered from anti-Belfast feeling:
No, I don't think there was any of that (anti-Belfast
feeling], but certainly there was an appeal to local
solidarity and that Derry was getting something that, you
know what I mean, that it hadn' t had before.
However, it is worth repeating (see above) that Quinn himself located
the roots of Derry localism in 'the attitude that Northern Ireland
ends at Glengorinley (a suburb of Belfast].'
Undoubtedly, the localism to which McGonagle and the breakaway
union appealed was felt most strongly within Derry's Catholic
community, and was implicitly anti-Unionist; nevertheless, neither
McGonagle nor any of his supporters sought to justify their actions -
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at least not in public - in explicitly nationalist terms. Quinn told
me:
There was no appeal to nationalism as such, but there was
emphasis on the fact that this, the Clothing Workers'
Union, albeit was only a beginning, it was an Irish union
and that money wasn't going across to England... but there
was no distinct appeal to nationalism.
The significance of this distinction can, perhaps, best be
highlighted by means of an historical precedent. The ITGWU was first
established by James Larkin as a breakaway from the British based
National Union of Dock Labourers (NUDL) in the winter of 1908-1909;
Gray (1984: 193-194) describes Larkin's tactics in the following way:
Just as Larkin had made masterful use of populist rhetoric
as a means to organisation in the Protestant Belfast of
1907, so too it was in the practical interests of his new
union, the Irish Transport and General Workers' Union,
founded on 28 December 1908, that he now spoke with a
distinctively Irish flavour. This in turn was reflected in
the first rule book of the new organisation where Larkin
asked rhetorically, 'Are we going to continue the policy of
grafting ourselves on the English Trade Union movement,
losing our own identity as a nation in the great world of
organised labour?' and replied to his own question, 'We
say, emphatically, no. Ireland has politically reached her
manhood.'
In contrast, although the leaders of the Derry breakaway criticised
the NUTGW as an English union, it was the interests of Derry or
Northern Irish - never Irish workers - that it was said to have
ignored.
Although the leaders of the breakaway did not seek to mobilise
support by a direct appeal to nationalist sentiment, their
identification with anti-partitionism was important in winning the
support of some women. For example, Miss McMorris's father's opinion
was an important factor in her decision to Join the breakaway, and
the fact that McGonagle was an anti-partitionist seems to have been
important to him.	 Thus, she told me that while she supported the
breakaway,
Just because it was Stephen, oh aye because it was him.
But my father had a great influence on me: a fear again,
not that - he was a good father, very loving father, [but]
men in those days didn't show there affection very much.
But he would have - because Sephen McGonagle was a union
man and he a union man himself - [said] it was alright...
he was always labour, but like as long as Ireland was
divided he wouldn't vote labour, only If Ireland was one he
would only vote labour. He was a strong labour man as well
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as nationally minded.., and the fact is if I had voted on
somebody else [other than a nationalist], it all depended
because he was a strong union minded man: he didn't mind,
you know, me [being interested in the union].., because
being a worker himself; he'd a forceful personality
St ephen.
In this context, the absence of nationalist rhetoric may appear
puzzling, but the explanation is simple: most of the Protestant
workers who had joined the NUTGW in the late 1940s followed their
Catholic colleagues into the CWU, and the leaders of the breakaway
did not wish to alienate them. McGonagle professed to me his concern
that the breakaway was untainted by sectarianism and claimed to have
organised in 'Protestant factories'. But we do not have to take his
word for it: there is ample evidence that the leaders of the
breakaway took steps to head-off any incipient Protestant suspicions.
For example, an attempt was made to make the leadership of the
breakaway more balanced: the job of deputy organiser of the CWU was
first offered to a local Protestant socialist who had no connection
with the shirt industry. This man is now dead, but he was Mr
Matthews' brother. Mr Matthews described McGonagle's approach to his
brother in the following way:
That was a nice move too.	 Fred [a pseudonym for his
brother] came over to me... says to me 'you know who called
with me the other day?' Says I, 'Stephen McGonagle. ' Says
he, 'how did you know?' Says I, 'George Hamill mentioned
to me about a fortnight ago that my brother Fred be asked
to be second in command (of the CWW.' That was quite a
clever move, because he knew Fred was a popular kind of
guy... to get back to labels again, Stephen was a Roman
Catholic, and Fred was a Protestant, and that would give
the thing [the breakaway] a respectable veneer.
Fred refused McGonagle's approach because he regarded it as
'opportunist' and because he shared his brother's view of the
breakaway:
I always blamed McGonagle, McGonagle was looking to make a
job for himself... but we'd (Fred and himself] never a real
disagreement with him, everything was done in a gentlemanly
way as far as we were concerned. But we knew in our own
heart and soul (that] he [McGonagle] was doing wrong...
Fred and I always looked on Steve, once he joined the
[Londonderry] Labour Party [of which Mr Matthews was
secretary, and in which Fred was a prominent activist] as a
smart guy.
After Fred Matthews turned down the job it was advertised in the
press; Quinn applied and got it.
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A concern not to alienate Protestant shirt workers is also
evident in the process whereby the CWIJ merged with the ITGWU, a union
which because of its historical identification with Irish nationalism
might have been expected to be unacceptable to many Protestant
workers. Nowadays, McGonagle is not averse to giving the impression
that he led Derry shirt workers into the ITGWU because he had long
admired its 'history', and because he identified with its founder,
James Larkin. For example, he told me that women workers were even
more active in the ITGWU than they had been in the NUTGW because:
'the Irish content Improved it, Ireland's Ireland: why should we have
some Liverpool fella (sic], telling us what to do.' This quote is
interesting because of the reference to 'some Liverpool fella'.
James Larkin established the ITGWU following a series of conflicts
with James Sexton the Liverpool based leader of the NUDL; the NUTGW
had never been based in Liverpool. Notwithstanding these allusions,
it is clear, first, that it was circumstances - not politics - which
led McGonagle and Quinn to seek affiliation to an established union;
second, that the ITGWU was not their first choice; and third, that
when the members of the CWU were balloted on affiliation to the
ITGWU, an effort was made to play-down the fact that the Transport
and General Workers' Union on the ballot paper was the Irish
Transport and General Workers' Union, I will consider each of these
points in turn.
Miss Cosgrave told me that the decision to approach an
established union 'was well discussed, every apsect of it was
discussed, we had meetings nearly every night in the week at that
time', and that the reasons behind the decision were pragmatic rather
than political: 'I don't think we could have carried on a terrible
long time without the backing of a big union.' Macgougan claimed
that the CWU had financial difficulties, but according to Quinn lack
of money was not an immediate problem:
financially we were in a sound position: locally we had no
big financial committments, naturally being a local union.
No, it wasn't financial reasons, but, of course if there'd
been strikes or anything against us then we would have been
in trouble.
So far as Quinn was concerned, the CWIJ needed 'the backing' of an
established union
because [the Amaigmated] Transport and General Workers'
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Union and the Tailor and Garment Workers' [Union] and all
that were all getting lined up against us, and they were
proposing to put embargoes. Although it was a bit silly
(of] the Transport and General Workers' Union: they felt
they could stop everything by stopping the docks which was
a lot of nonsense as has been proved later. But... we felt
we'd need to have some protection.
Macgougan was adamant that McGonagle and Quinn had approached,
and been refused by, the Workers' Union of Ireland (WUI) and the
British based ATGWU prior to merging with the ITGWU. The WUI had
been established in 1924 by James Larkin following an argument within
the ITGWU; the leaders of the ITGWU prevented the WUI from
affiliating to the ITUC, but in 1944, when the former left the ITUC
and formed the CIU, the latter was invited to join the ITUC. In 1953
the WUI was led by James Larkin's son.	 Larkin junior was, in
Macgougan's words, 'a good friend of mine: he told McGonagle to
bugger-off.' Macgougan also told me, 'There's no doubt that'
McGonagle approached the ATGWU, 'because Norman Kennedy and John
Deacon,' ATGWU officials, 'went to see John Newton,' general
secretary of the NUTGW, and promised that if they accepted the CWU
they would 'return the Derry membership [to the NUTGW] when things
had calmed down; of course this would never have happened.' The
NUTGW refused the ATGWU proposal and the ATGWU rebuffed McGonagle.
Quinn admitted that he and McGonagle had approached the WUI, but
claimed that it was the ATGWU which
approached us [the CWU]... to take us in... we hadn't
exactly turned them down... it was Gilbert Lynch, and I
think Ryan was the Belfast official [of the ATGWU]... they
approached us, but we had some reservations about their
good intentions, and then the local officials were behaving
quite the opposite of what they had been suggesting.
I do not intend to arbitrate between these two different accounts -
they are probably both quite accurate accounts of the same process
seen from different perpectives; for my purposes the essential point
is that McGonagle and Quinn considered the WUI and the ATGWU before
deciding to seek amalgamation with the ITGWU. But it is also worth
noting that, in an institutional sense, it was much less problematic
for the CWU to amalgamate with the ITGWU than it would have been to
amalgamate with either the WUI or the ATGWU: these two unions were
affiliated to the same trade union congress as the NUTGW (the ITIJC),
and were therefore honour-bound to seek NUTGW agreement before
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accepting its former members; the ITGWU, as an affiliate of the CIU,
was not.
Such was the confusion about which Transport and General
Workers' Union - the Irish or the British - the amalgamation ballot
was about that a person calling himself 'Derry Docker' wrote to the
Derry Journal in an effort 'to dispel the rumour' that the CWU was
intending to transfer to the dockers' union, the ATGWU, and to
distinguish it from the ITGWU (DJ: 19 October 1953). Moreover,
according to Mr Matthews,
When the original pamphlets (I think he means ballot
papers, but either way the point is .the same] were put
around Bryce and Weston's factory (Bryce and Weston's had
closed by 1954, but after the closure Matthews worked in a
factory set up by Fred Bryce; see Appendix 1] the word
'Irish' wasn't mentioned on the pamphlets at all. When I
read it I couldn't understand it because the first person I
contacted was George Hamill. George says, 'there's going
to be a quare dust-up about this,' he says, 'they' re not
joining the Transport and General (Workers' Union], they're
joining the Irish (Transport and General Workers' Union].'
'But,' says I, 'the majority of the girls don't even know
that.' Ach... the thing was kept under cover 'till he
[McGonagle] got them to sign their names. The average girl
wasn't interested, if she thought she was in a stronger
union, if she thought by Joining this union that they would
have had a more effective platform to fight f or an increase
in wages, because the Tailor and Garment Workers' Union was
pretty hopeless.
It was only after the merger of the CWU and the ITGWU at the end
of October 1953 that trade unionism in the Derry shirt industry began
to assume what might be described as sectarian structure. According
to Quinn the 'Unionists originally voted for the merger... but about
a week afterwards (they] began to withdraw and we lost about 1,000
members.' Four weeks after the merger, on 17 November 1953, the
NUTGW held a Branch Committee meeting in Derry f or the first time
since the breakaway began. The new Branch was composed of a few
women who, like Miss Gallagher, had never deserted the NUTGW, and
larger number of women who had defected from the ITGWU; by all
accounts, they numbered not much more than 150 in all, and most were
Protestants.	 Quinn's estimate of the number of Unionist women who
left the breakaway following the merger is probably excessive, but it
is clear that few Protestants went into the ITGWU.
	
Moreover, it
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would seem that once the CWU had become part of the ITGWU, it began
to attract support on a more explicitly political basis. George
Hamill recalled:
The Trades Council called a meeting in our place [the ATGWU
of f ices] and I was one of the speakers condemning the Irish
Transport for coming in and taking these members that
belonged to the Tailor and Garment Workers' Union...
McGonagle had a couple of boys taking notes at the meeting
of what we were saying: a wee chap called McLaughlin - who
was a great supporter - McLaughlin and some of them
supported the Irish Transport more on a political line than
a trade union line... He [McLaughlin] was a butcher as a
matter of fact, [a] great friend of Stephen. And Stephen
was standing up the street when we were having the meeting
and McLaughlin was coming out and giving him all who was
speaking and all like that. As a matter of fact, I don't
know whether it was at the first or second meeting, I told
him (laughs] - I put McLaughlin out of the meeting
altogether - I says, 'we'll have none of McGonagle's spies
in here' and they resented it very much: maybe I acted a
wee bit high handed.
6.4. The Reconstitution of the Derry Branch of the NUTGW
Miss Cosgrave regarded the defection of Protestant shirt workers
from the ITGWU back to the NUTGW as irrational sectarianism. 	 She
told me:
To me, that was a religious thing. But, now, that
Committee (the secessionary Committee which established the
CWU] is very mixed (in its religious composition] and they
stood loyal by him [McGonagle], but the like of McCarthy's
and some of the smaller factories (did not]. To me it was
because - I'm being honest, this is my way of thinking -
that it was because Irish was mentioned and we were
breaking away from a British trade union. There was
nothing political or nothing... religion or politics was
never discussed were Stephen McGonagle was concerned - what
he was, what he thought, he kept to himself. He was only a
man for the worker. But at the time... I never discussed
it with anybody, but I had to be honest with myself when I
looked around me and heard the way, what they did, in
McCarthy's, [there] was only one thing f or it: It was just
religion. McCarthy's and there was another factory on the
Waterside - [the Ebrington]. 	 They let it be known (that]
they didn't want into an Irish union. It was stupid, I
thought they were stupid: it was in their own interest. It
(affiliating to an Irish union] was nothing political or
anything else... as I said to you before Stephen was tied
down by your man [Macgougan].
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It is true that most of the 150 or so members of the NUTGW
Branch which was re-established following the CWU's merger with the
ITGWU were Protestants, but my research contradicts the picture
suggested by Miss Cosgrave in two important respects. First, the new
NUTGW Branch Committee was more broadly based and more heterogeneous
than Miss Cosgrave would allow. Second, the actions and intentions
of those women who helped to re-establish the NUTGW in Derry cannot
be reduced to sectarianism. These two assertions are based on
material derived from the minutes of the new Branch Committee, and on
the experiences and recollections of Macgougan, Miss Gallagher, and
Mrs Henderson. Miss Gallagher was the founding 'chairman' or
'president' of the new Branch; Mrs Henderson joined the Branch
Committee in the mid 1950s and was elected 'chairman' in March 1960.
Neither woman is typical of women who joined the NUTGW during the
period under consideration: they were the two most enthusiastic and
consistent activists. But, precisely because of their close and
long-standing involvement in the union, they are well placed to talk
with authority not only about their own actions, but about the
behaviour and identities of other members of the union. Moreover,
when this research was carried out the other members of the new NUTGW
Branch Committee were either dead, had emigrated, could not be
traced, or were unwilling to be interviewed. 	 I will begin by
examining the religious affiliations of the Committee members.
The Derry Branch Committee of the NUTGW formed in November 1953
was composed of one representative from each of 13 of the
approximately 30 factories then in production. These factories were
as follows: Harrison's; Wilkinson's; Rosemount; the City (McIntyre,
Hogg, and Marsh); the Ebrington; Tillie and Henderson's; Neely and
Wilkinson's; Kennedy's; Hamilton's, Richard's, McCarthy's, McArthur
and Beattie's, and Moore's (Minutes: 17 November 1953). Seven of the
13 women were Catholics, and five, possibly six, were Protestants
(Miss Gallagher remembered the religious affiliations of all but one
Committee member). It is true that this Committee attracted greater
Protestant involvement than any previous NUTGW Branch Committee;
however, contrary to what Miss Cosgrave suggests, it included
representatives from a wider range of factories than Just McCarthy's
and the Ebrington, and the majority of Committee members were, In
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fact, Catholic. Moreover, the Branch 'chairman,' Miss Gallagher and
the acting full-time Branch secretary, Paddy O'Connor, were
Catholics.
I now want to consider the reasons why these women choose to
become active in the NUTGW rather than the ITGWU. First, however, it
is necessary to examine the nature of the choice, The new NUTGW
Branch Committee did not emerge spontaneously: Macgougan, O'Connor,
and Miss Gallagher had, as we have seen, been attempting to rally
support for the NUTGW in Derry since the breakaway began. Macgougan
is convincing in his assertion that they did not attempt to play on
the religious or political sentiments of Protestant workers: that
'would have contradicted all the policies I stood for - a socialist
that believed in the ultimate unity of Ireland.' However, there was
a stress on the argument that, because of the structural position of
the Derry shirt industry - that is, the fact that most workers were
employed in factories which were branch plants of British firms which
exported to British markets - and because of the wage bargaining
system whereby local managers did not concede wage increases in
advance of negotiations in Britain, the NUTGW, as a British based
union, was best placed to represent the interests of Derry shirt
workers. For example, Miss Gallagher told me:
I always put up Just the argument that we were a British
based union and our negotiations were across the water with
the employers that mattered... we got the increases across
the water that automatically came to us and that was why we
did the negotiations - it wasn't the Irish Transport
[Union]. That was our first argument that I put up,
because to give them to understand that we were the union
that really got them the increases, (see also Macgougan's
Press statement 24 September 1952, and DJ: 9 December 1953)
Thus, the choice for women who worked in the Derry shirt industry was
between two unions which were defined as 'British' and 'Irish'; two
unions between which, as will become apparent in the next section,
relations had become mutually antagonistic.
Given the nature of the choice, It is quite remarkable that most
members of the NUTGW Branch Committee were Catholics, particularly
since several of them came from strongly nationalist backrounds. Why
did these women support the NUTGW rather than the ITGWU'? In at least
three cases, the crucial factor seems to have been the influence of
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fathers who were themselves trade union activists. A family
connection with the ATGWU seems to have been particulary important;
this is not surprising because 1 as I have already shown, although
some ATGWU members in the docks were sympathetic to the ITGWU many
were strongly opposed 8 . According to Miss Gallagher,
Margaret McGeady, her father was a docker [he] was a great
trade unionist, she worked in Tulle and Henderson... Meta
O'Doherty, her father was a big man in the union, in the
dockers' [union]... I think too their fathers had an
influence because he was attached to Orchard street [the
ATGWU office] in some way or another... Selly' s
[McDowell's) father was a railway man... and he was a trade
unionist and I think [he had an influence) you know when
she made up her mind, she was a great girl Selene.
Miss Gallagher remembered only one of the remaining Catholic members
of the Branch Committee, Miss McFarland:
She was very staunch for a while, although her people were
inclined to be very Irish, but I don't know what it was
[made her join the NUTGW]. She worked down in
Wilkinson's... Gerry Morrison - he was Stephen's right hand
man - her and him were at logger heads always and she used
to be able to tell me the crack, what was going on and what
Gerry Morrison said they were going to do and what they
weren't going to do.
Family connections were also an important factor in Miss
Gallagher's decision not to desert the NUTGW. Prior to the
breakaway, she was just 'a sort of [union] member, that was all, it
was the breakaway that just set me off.'
	
She told me that she and
her sister remained loyal to the NUTGW because:
We knew it was the Tailor and Garment Workers' [Union) and
you see that picture above your head... William Logue, my
uncle, when he got married, he married late in life, and
the Tailor and Garment Workers' presented him with that
picture. Its a very old thing and I keep cleaning and
varnishing it, but that is the sort of contact we had, and
then with my uncle there - it was a trade union.
Logue was a prominent labour activist in the 1920s (see chapter
three). Miss Gallagher told me that he was her mother's brother,
and that following the death of his wife he had been unable to carry
on his trade union work and look after his two children so her mother
had brought them up; she concluded by saying 'the trade union must
have been in the family.' Nevertheless, Miss Gallagher's and her
sister's decision to stay in the NUTGW was not an easy one: as I
mentioned earlier, all the other trade unionists in Harrison's had
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supported the breakaway, and when she visited the offices of the
NUTGW, 'it was like a dead end, there was nobody about, Macgougan
wasn' t to be found.' Neither of them knew what to do until,
I remember the brother [an official in the Post Office
Workers' union in Belfast] sending me word to stay put...
it was him pushed me at the beginning when... Stephen took
down, he told me to stand firm, [but] of course the
principle was there.
When Miss Gallagher says that she did riot support the breakaway
because of principle, she means that she did not like,
the national[ism], the Irishness in Stephen [McGonagle]...
it was Just the principle... I was, I suppose I was always
more or less British minded more or less.
Miss Gallagher tended to pose the breakaway and the subsequent
division of shirt workers between the ITGWU and the NUTGW in terms of
Irishness verses Britishness or national mindedness verses British
mindedness: she described McGonagle's supporters in the following
way,
Gerry Morrison, a cutter down in Wilkinson's factory down
the Strand [Road]... and Paddy Hamill were the guts behind
Stephen and all them dealings; they were the real Derry
nationalists.
I asked, 'what were their motives?' she replied, 'the same, just the
same.' Miss Gallagher's identification of anti-nationalism as one of
the major factors in her decision not to leave the NUTGW may seem
problematical in relation to the argument of the previous section.
Undoubtedly, there is an element of hindsight here, for when I asked
her about the origins of the breakaway she did not mention
nationalism, she simply replied:
The way I heard it was that Stephen wanted full autonomy
for the union in Derry... he didn't want to be trucking
with across the water... the one wanted to be bigger than
the other [a reference to Macgougan and McGonagle]...
Stephen was ambitious.
And, her main initial reason for staying with the NUTGW were the
family connections discussed above. However, It is possible that she
was unusually prescient about the the way in which the breakaway
developed - Macgougan thought so.
Miss Gallagher was born and grew up in the same neighbourhood as
McGonagle and Miss McMorris; it was, as I have already shown, a
nationalist area with a strong sense of community. 	 Thus, in her
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British mindedness, and in her support f or the NUTGW, Miss Gallagher
was not conforming to the norms of her social position, How did
someone from her backround come to be 'British minded'?
I was always more or less British minded although my folk
here, the sister and that, the earlier days like, they were
very Irish, but then things change in your life and you go
through life and you see it. I'd been to England you see,
which stood to me I think.., before the War [in 1939 Miss
Gallagher went to England to become a nun; she never
completed her novitiate because she became ill and returned
to Derry to recuperate in 1944 or 1945 - See Appendix 1]
and I worked with all kinds of people, different
religions... It (religion] never interfered with anything
or politics or anything. I think that helped me in a way.
Miss Gallagher had mixed feelings about the the Nationalist Party In
Derry:
You see, you were brought up here you were nationalists,
you supported Paddy Maxwell In those days and your mother
and father sort of knew him... but those kind of men were
more sincere, but the others after him - I never did agree
with Eddie McAteercs) so you may say I was outside the pale
of their politics from the beginning and then when a thing
like this comes up Lie the breakaway] it comes out of you.
My mother was a great Influence on me, she was reared in
England partly and went to an English school. Although she
was taught with the nuns there [in England] when she came
to Derry she used to relate to me how - when she came she
would have been In her 12s [12 years of age] - she was down
with the teachers here, well the nuns were prejudiced
because she came from England. . * and she always thought she
got a raw deal with the nuns... and I remember her telling
me that, because she was gifted enough. She was a singer,
she had a good appearance and she was a forward person...
She always talked about her schooling there in Liverpool, I
think that had an Influence on me too, she didn't agree
with Derry politics.
Miss Gallagher's alienatation from nationalism was not based on
socialism,
I wasn't partial to the Labour Party while I was there [in
England] because we were instructed how to vote in those
days and you were voting tory, you were told who you were
to put down... when you were in the convent.., you were
told, and then you enquired and you talked and they talked
and you listened to them and they would say about the
Labour candidate arid what he hadn't done and what he was
doing.
Miss Gallagher presents a contradictory picture of the
Protestants who joined the NUTGW after the CWU transferred to the
ITGWIJ.	 Despite her British mindedness, Miss Gallagher did not
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identify herself with Unionism or with the Protestant community: she
referred to Protestants and Unionists as 'the other side of the
house.' And, by her lights, many of the Protestants who rejoined the
NUTGW were behaving in a manner which was just as sectarian as those
who had taken the breakaway union into the ITGWU:
McCarthy's (factory]... was a bit of a [NUTGW]
stronghold... if you've heard the history of Derry that was
sectarian again, and then you had the Ebrington, they were
like Mccarthy's: their [Unionist] politics wouldn't have
let them (join the ITGWU].
On the other hand, she strongly resented the view, evidently
commonplace at the time, that the NUTGW was a sectarian, Protestant
union:
The few that joined up with me [in the NUTGW] were mostly
Catholics, but then the Protestants started coming. And
this is what I used to hate because... they['d) say she's
joining because it's British based... but there was
[several Catholics] we had Selene McDowell... [and] Paddy
0' Connor.
Moreover, she makes clear that the reconstruction of the NUTGW in
Derry was not the result of a 'knee-jerk' sectarian response on the
part of Protestant shirt workers to the CWU' s merger with the ITGWU,
but a process whereby she gradually established relations of trust
and mutual respect with a disparate group of women shirtmakers whom
she had not met before:
Some of them would talk in McCarthy's and say 'well Miss
Gallagher is doing shop steward in Harrison's [factory] and
somebody else is [shop steward elsewhere]' and they would
get a few like that. You sort of knew by their politics
what they (would] do... I was the odd one out because
coming from Derry and coming from this [nationalist]
area... [but] they were really friends of mine got through
the union: a Mrs Hughes of Fountain Street and one, they
worked in Hunter's (factory] at the time and they would
send me messages, well then I got to know them and I used
to visit them on a Sunday evening. Then one of them came
on the Committee when we got organised and got the
Committee going, and they must have thought I was doing
airight because when we got the committee together they
elected me the chairman, the chairperson...	 elected
president.
Mrs Henderson was one of those Protestant women who became
active in the NUTGW for the first time in the period after the
transfer of the CWU to the ITGWIJ. She now regards the breakaway as a
nationalist plot orchestrated by McGonagle: 'he wanted an Irish based
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union, thats what it all boiled down to because... the Tailor and
Garment Workers' (Union was] London based'. So far as she Is
concerned, the CWU was only 'a move, because he had to start off like
that, you had to be in a small union before he got affiliated.., he
had that well planned. ' And she left me in no doubt that as a
Unionist, she 'didn' t want to be going Into an Irish based union.'
She was so vehement about this that at first she denied ever having
belonged to a union of which McGonagle was an official. However, her
recollections in subsequent interviews indicate that she joined the
NUTGW while working in McCarthy's factory in the late 1940s, joined
the CWU, and rejoined the NUTGW when the CWU transferred to the
ITGWIJ. Moreover, in disentangling her recollections it becomes
apparent that Mrs Henderson's opposition to the ITGWU was based on
more than the fact that it was Irish.
Mrs Henderson explained her interest in trade unionism in terms
of her experience of the introduction of work study to McCarthy's:
'what made me really take on union work was Stephen McGonagle, his
attitude (to work study]... because he really sided with that.' The
reader may recall (see section 4.2) that Mrs Henderson took McGonagle
to task about his enthusiasm f or work study. Prior to the
introduction of work study and her argument with McGonagle, Mrs
Henderson was 'a member of the union, but I was in no way active
then.' She dated her argument with McGonagle over work study as
having taken place shortly after the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II
- that is, around June 1953. In this period, the only union of which
Mrs Henderson could have been a member was the CWU. Moreover she
claimed that following her argument with McGonagle he asked her to be
a shop steward; an offer which she refused.
When I asked Mrs Henderson why she joined the NUTGW rather than
the ITGWU she cited a number of reasons in addition to the fact that
the former is British and the latter Irish:
Because it [the NUTGW] was unique, it was the only union
that catered for shirt [workers]... Stephen McGonagle, as I
say, took every body on (ie workers other than garment
workers]. I know its prejudiced but... I didn't like what
he done on Jack Macgougan; I didn't like that attitude of
his either. But to me, to be quite honest, and being quite
outspoken, it was a British based union (emphatic] and that
was my - why I - I didn't want to be going into any Irish
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based union, because the way I looked at it the Tailor arid
Garments Lie NUTGW] got our [wage] rise. The Irish
Transport coudn't get any increase in our wages and It was
the Tailor arid Garment's done it and it was them that put
the work, the machinery through, and therefore you had to
support the one that was after the girls' interest.., as I
say the [NUTGW] catered only f or the shirt - well, garment
- workers: tailors and tailoresses.
As I noted in section 4.2, Mrs Henderson conceded that her
judgement of McGonagle contains an element of retrospective
reassessment:
Stephen McGonagle was one of these men, I don't know how to
explain him: he wanted to outshine Jack Macgougan an awful
lot. He tried really to do Jack an awful lot of harm;
although I didn't know Jack Macgougan then... but I
understood it later on - when I got to know Jack - what
this was all about.
Similarly, her comparison of the institutional characteristics of the
NUTGW and ITGWU probably owes much to her subsequent experience of
union work.	 At the time, her decision to leave the CWU/ITGWU and
rejoin the NUTGW may have been influenced by her disagreement with
McGonagle over work study, but, as she makes clear, the crucial
factor was that the ITGWU was Irish and the NUTGW British. This
decision was an expression of Mrs Henderson's Unionism, but, although
she refers to 'prejudice' in the statement quoted above, it would be
wrong to characterise it as sectarian. After all, the union which
she, and other Protestant shirt workers, rejoined was jointly
administered by a member of the IrL?, Macgougan; a Dublin Catholic
with a republican past 10 , O'Connor; and a Branch Committee which
was composed mainly of Catholics. Moreover, to describe Mrs
Henderson as sectarian would, as will become apparent in the next
chapter, make a nonsense of her subsequent union career.
6.5 Inter-Union Relations and Sectarianism
According to Lerner (1961:
	 197)	 'the relations between
breakaways and established unions create intense bitterness among
union members.'	 In part, this bitterness arises from the
circumstances of' the breakaway, but It Is perpetuated by the inter-
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union rivalry which usually follows a breakaway.	 Most often it is
the established union which wins this contest. Established unions
usually refuse to allow members of the breakaway to participate in
negotiating bodies and sanction employers who deal with the
breakaway, and, as James (1984: 2) points out, 'without recognition
the breakaway union quickly disappears.' 	 In the Derry case, the
contest was more evenly balanced. To be sure, the NUTGW, Derry
Trades Council, and the SMF did not officially recognise the
breakaway, but, from the outset, local employers revealed a
willingness to work with its representatives. And, once part of the
ITGWU the breakaway could defy threats from the NUTGW and its ally,
the ATGWtJ, to sanction its members by threatening retaliatory action
against NUTGW and ATGWU members in the Republic of Ireland (see LS:
22 October 1953). Moreover, although the NUTGW was party to the
negotiations with the British clothing manufacturers' federations
which set the parameters for negotiations in Northern Ireland, the
CWU/ITGWU was represented on the Northern Ireland Shirtmaking Wages
Council which determined local minimum wage rates: as Quinn pointed
out: 'you see, the Wages Council doesn't recognise unions as such,
and we had seats from [when we were members of] the Tailor and
Garment Workers' [Union]'. Although the Derry situation was more
evenly balanced than the cases studied by Lerner, the rivalry between
the NUTGW and the ITGWU in Derry was no less bitter.
An industrial review of 1953 published in the Londoriderry
Sentinel noted that
management-labour relations [in the shirt industry] have
remained remarkably good inspite of an inter-union conflict
which has regrettably raged throughout the year. (LS: 31
December 1953).
This is not surprising, for, as we have seen, the NUTGW had virtually
no members in Derry until the end of 1953, and for much of the year
its officals had been negotiating with the the leaders of the
breakaway in an effort to persuade them to rejoin the NUTGW.
However, following the CWIJ's merger with the ITGWIJ, and the re-
establishment of a functioning Derry Branch of the NUTGW, inter-union
relations became sharply competitive. On 31 October 1953, the
Londonderry Sentinel reported that NUTGW members in the laundry of an
unamed factory struck for 'over an hour' when several of their
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colleagues decided to switch allegiance to the ITGWU.	 None of my
respondants recalled this dispute. Early in 1954 each union
submitted separate and different wage claims to the Wages Council;
Macgougan claimed that the ITGWU's submission 'could prejudice
negotiations between the employers' federation and the NUTGW in
Britain' (DJ: 5 February 1954). An impression of the furtive,
incestuous, even fearful, atmosphere which surrounded inter-union
relations in this period can be gained from Miss Gallagher's
recollections. 'I think Macgougan was afraid of McGonagle because he
was inclined to use force'; I asked, 'physical force?' she replied,
Oh, he would have done it, if he could have got hold of him
because even with myself there was days when I come out of
work and going back after my lunch and he'd be waiting for
me in the car with three or four of the members and he'd
say, 'here, listen Miss Gallagher, when are you going to do
the right thing?' and him and me into it in the car on the
street and I go back to my work and I'm not worth a button
because of the abuse. They used to say that Mr Macgougan
was nervous about him, but I could understand, because he
opened his office opposite our offices and it was like a
pantomime: he was looking out of the window to see who was
going into our offices and our crowd were looking out to
see who was going into his, and if there was a meeting in
the lunch hour we could say 'well, such and such a one went
in,
As we have seen, followng the CWU merger with the ITGWU, and the
defection of Protestant workers, trade unionism in the shirt industry
had, despite the wishes of the protagonists, assumed a sectarian form
such that the members of the ITGWU were mostly Catholics and the
members of the NUTGW mostly Protestants. Moroever, the activists in
each union had come to regard their rivals as having been motivated
by political or religious prejudices. Nevertheless, inter-union
rivalry was not expressed in a markedly sectarian way.
In fact, judging from the recollections of Mrs Henderson,
Macgougan, and Miss Gallagher, it was the latter, the Catholic
president of the NUTGW in Derry who seems to have been subject to the
most pressure. Apart from being harassed on her way to or from work,
she was visited in her home by several supporters of the ITGWU who
worked in Harrrison's factory:
They come on Christmas eve.., no it was a few days before
Christmas.,. for I was finishing-off cakes, and the girl
Sarah D... she was from Rosemount and she was very militant
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for Stephen, very Irish - all her generation was, we knew
them, not only as workers, we knew them as neighbours on
the area, and they came and asked to see me and I said,
'well I don't think there's anything I have to say to
youse,' but I didn' t want to keep them on the step and I
brought them in and we were sitting here. They got nowhere
because they said to me, 'after all it's an Irish union and
Stephen' s a Derryman,' and all this, and we had an argument
and it was really politics in a sense... It was friendly
but then they were putting up arguments and there was one
or two I was prejudiced (against], because like, well, I
knew their backrounds and I knew what they were at and I
said, 'no, that was my principle and I'm sticking to it.'
Miss Gallagher thus came under singular and concerted pressure
from ITGWU activists to switch her trade union allegiance, or at
least to stop working so enthusiastically for the NUTGW.
Undoubtedly, she was singled out because she was the NUTGW's leading
activist in Derry, and also because she and her sister were, in the
winter of 1953-54, the only members of the NUTGW in what was
otherwise an ITGWIJ stronghold; but she seems to have aroused
particular annoyance on the part of ITGWU activists because she was
breaking communal solidarity: the women who visited her house were
not just work mates but neighbours, and they invoked communal
loyalties - 'after all it' s an Irish Union and Stephen' s a Derryman.'
Moreover, she was the victim of gossip, that informal sanction which
- as many social scientists have noted - is often used to discipline
nonconformists. She told me that O'Connor's support was very
important in enabling her to maintain her difficult position, and
alleged that supporters of the ITGWU promoted a rumour that they were
having an affair:
We would go to the Trades Council, he would take me to the
Trades Council and bring me back. So much so that they
used to say that they thought I was doing a line with him
at the time. That's the sort of thing Stephen would stoop
to. Stephen would stoop to those kind of things... manys a
day. But you just rose above that. Union meetings, and
weekends (educationals) and conferences - that was all I
did, I never socialised much.
Such gossip would have been all the more damaging both to Miss
Gallagher and to O'Connor because O'Connor had a wife and family in
Dublin. There is some oral and documentary evidence which supports
Miss Gallagher's claim; it will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Sectarian feeling and political differences first found
practical expression during the bitter inter-union dispute which
developed in Harrison's factory in April 1954. The dispute began on
Monday 5 April when 80 workers in Harrison's laundry and finishing
department, all members of the ITGWIJ, refused to work with a smoother
who was a member of the NUTGW. They did not leave the laundry, they
simply refused to work. The NUTGW member, named Jean Harte, had
started work in the factory two weeks previously and had refused to
give up her membership of the NUTGW (DY: 9 April 1954 and LS: 10
April 1954). McGonagle later claimed that the ITGWU was not trying
to enforce a closed shop and that the women had struck because Miss
Harte had claimed management support in refusing to join the ITGWU -
the ITGWU was In dispute with management not the NiJTGW (DY: 12 AprIl
1954). It is true that the management refused to sack Miss Harte,
and upheld the right of the NUTGW to organise in the factory; however
it is noteworthy that the proposals for ending the dispute put
forward by both management and the ITGWU were essentially the same -
that Miss Harte be suspended with pay or moved to another department
pending talks between the NUTGW and the ITGWU or independent
mediation - and that it was the NIJTGW which refused to negotiate on
this basis (DY: 12 and 19 April 1954). On Friday 16 April Harrison's
management shut-down all production and laid off approximately 500
workers; they claimed that they had insufficient storage space for
the shirts which had been produced but could not be 'finished'
because of the strike. In response, McGonagle offered to drop the
demand that Miss Harte either change her union affiliation or be
suspended if the NIJTGW agreed to negotiate (DY: 16 April 1954). That
evening 600 factory workers gathered outside the NUTGW offices, the
report does not make It clear whether they supported or opposed the
NUTGW (LS: 17 April 1954). The factory resumed production on
Wednesday 21 April 1954 (some of the period of closure was the Easter
holiday). The NUTGW offered its support to any workers going to to
work (DY: 21 April 1954), but only five workers, all said to be
members of the NUTGW, responded (LS: 22 April 1954). The dispute was
settled the next day: Miss Harte was permitted to retain her job and
her NUTGW membership, but the ITGWU was granted formal recognition by
the SMF. The ITGWU presented this as vindication of their struggle
f or the 'right of free association.'	 The NUTGW claimed that the
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strikers had been attempting to enforce a closed shop, but that they
had failed: Jean Harte was still working in the laundry and was still
a member of the NUTGW. Management presented the agreement with the
ITGWU as an expression of its ongoing policy of 'neutrality' between
the two unions (DJ: 23 April 1954).
Those of my respondants who were members of the ITGWU were
markedly reticent on the subject of' this dispute. Neither Miss
Cosgrave nor Miss McMorris choose to comment on it. Quinn explained
the dispute to me in the following way:
There had been a bit of feeling against Harrison's: you
see, when the dispute came to a head, Harrison's took the
attitude - suddenly, suddenly - that they didn't recognise
us.
As we have seen, the newspaper evidence indicates that it was Miss
Harte's membership of the NUTGW that was at issue, not union
recognition - Harrison's recognised the ITGWIJ. However, when I
asked Quinn about Miss Harte he replied:
I can't remember that... I'm not saying it's not right...
[you] see the laundry was 100% [ITGWW... I don't remember
anybody going into the laundry, because if I remember the
laundry they wouldn't have tolerated a woman going in [wry
smile].
Fortunately, Miss Gallagher and Macgougan were more forthcoming.
When the strike began, Miss Gallagher, her sister, and Miss Harte
were the only NUTGW members in Harrison's. Miss Gallagher stopped
work when the dispute began, but only because,
when they stopped working upstairs f or us, we had no work
so we had to come out, it wasn't to say we came out of our
own accords, there wasn't any work available for examiners,
so we had to go out.
As the NUTGW representative In the factory, Miss Gallagher
had to go to her [Miss Harte's] aid... they [management]
gave me permission to go to her, and she put in an awful
time and they were sitting on the table singing and dancing
and she was working and it was a most extraordinary thing
and I would go down to have a word with her and give her
support and to encourage her, it was terrible.
As a result of Miss Gallagher's efforts two or three of the strikers
joined the NUTGW:
There was a manager there (in the laundry], Mr Kennedy, now
he was there many years, very respected manager and very
disciplined and I went into [the laundry] to see some of
the girls and, actually, they were going to put me out and
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he had to intervene himself. But one of them said, 'well I
don't care,' she just used the word, she said, 'to hell
with them, I'm joining the Tailor and Garment Workers'
[Union],' and she - there was a Mrs Wilson, [she) was a
friend of mine and somebody else... and they joined and
that broke the ice... They paid me [union dues], well I had
to go into them if they wanted... to see [me], well I was a
nervous wreck when I'd come out because you were getting
abuse - they wouldn't even let you speak - you couldn't
repeat it.	 (see also DJ: 14 April 1954).
On one occasion, Miss Gallagher and Miss Harte required a police
escort to get home through a crowd of ITGWU members. Miss Gallagher
recalls that this incident occurred at the end of the dispute, but it
may have been the day that Harrison's factory was shut down, when, as
I have already noted, the Londonderry Sentinel reported that a crowd
gathered outside the NUTGW offices (LS: 17 April 1954). She told me:
The night he [McGonagle] got recognised with the employers
and we were over in the union rooms we couldn't get home
for the crowd outside and then in the end we had to get the
police, Macgougan was there that night, and we had to get
home and we got up to a friend's house - a girl that worked
in our office, Margaret Deany, she'd an aunt in William
Street [at the entrance to the Bogside] - and the police
escorted us to William Street, and even out in William
Street they were waiting outside and Miss McMorris was one
of them... stood with a crowd.
But Miss Gallagher and her sister were Catholics, so how did
sectarian feeling come into the dispute? The short answer is that
Miss Harte was a Protestant. However, Miss Harte was not an innocent
victim of Catholic sectarianism; according to Macgougan,
What happened was: Harrison's was partially in [the Irish]
Transport and partially in our union, and frankly I think
(Mrs Emberely a shop steward in McCarthy's factory] planted
one of our members.., in the laundry, and it provoked a
strike, and the terms of the settlement were that our
members would have free access, but the Clothing Workers'
[Union], it was Irish Transport (Union] then, could be
recognised [by the employers]... (the strike] was very
tough. I'm absolutely clear in my own mind that [Mrs
Emberely] organised it... This young girl [Miss Harte], God
she was courageous: she held her union card up as she was
walking in... The laundry, to be candid, had a rougher type
of girl in it in general - it was a rougher type of job...
Arthur [the managing director] said, 'under no
circumstances would any worker be sacked because they were
a member of a union.'
Moreover, Macgougan and Miss Gallagher told me that Miss Harte's
father was a member of the Orange Order.
	
Miss Gallagher made it
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clear that he supported his daughter throughout the strike:
Miss Harte went through a bad time... f or a while.., but
she was only one individual.., the father was a great
stalwart, he wouldn't let her move. No you see I was
getting it (abuse] all the time because I was sort of
promoting her and I was promoting the others. I think she
went out of the town in the end. What happened her? She
got married or something. 	 No she didn't give up her
membership - they did harass her a lot.
I asked, 'did her father support her?' Miss Gallagher replied,
Very much.., they told me that's what kept her going...
that's when it [sectarianism] began to show its head
really... when the Catholics got to hear this [that her
father was an Orange man] they put the pressure on more.
Miss Harte and Mrs Emberely emigrated from Derry in June 1954
(Minutes: 2 June 1954). Miss Gallagher continued to 'service' the
two women in the laundry whom she had recruited during the strike and
remained a target for insults from ITGWU members:
It was very bitter... even if you had to go into the
department and some of these members were there, they would
slag you, they didn't care... they would shout about me
being British, you know all this kind of thing, I was a
scab really. Because at that time they wanted a closed
shop in the laundry.
The strike in Harrison's lasted 17 days in all. Although not the
longest dispute involving women in the history of the Derry shirt
industry - Grew (1987: 215-219) notes that 36 shirtmakers in Tillie
and Henderson's struck for four weeks in 1907 - it was probably the
most acrimonious.
6.6 Conclusion
The analysis presented in this chapter may be summarised in the
following way. The breakaway began as an intra-union power struggle
focused on the personalities of the local secretary and the Belfast
based regional officer of the NUTGW. Support for the breakaway
amongst the rank and file was based on a potent localism which was,
in turn, based on the feeling that Derry, as a city, had been
neglected by the Unionist authorities in Belfast. 	 Following the
transfer of the CWU to the ITGWU, a union with a strong historical
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identification with Irish nationalism, trade unionism in the Derry
shirt industry assumed a sectarian form: the officials, activists,
and virtually all of the members of the ITGWIJ were Catholics; the
local official and most of the activists in the NIJTGW were also
Catholic, but most of the members were Protestant. Moreover, the
activists in each union came to regard the other union as being a
sectarian formation composed of people whose union affiliation was
the expression of religious and/or political prejudice. However, the
transfer of the CWU to the ITGWU was not a politically inspired
decision, rather, it was forced on the leaders of the breakaway by
the circumstances in which they found themselves, and by the
institutional structure of the Irish trade union movement at the
time.	 Indeed, throughout the episode, the officials and main
activists on both sides of the split took steps to obviate
sectarianism. Nevertheless, the ensuing rivalry between the NUTGW
and the ITGWU resulted in an outbreak of serious sectarian conflict
in at least one workplace.
The most interesting feature of this episode in relation to the
broader literature is that it reverses the causal connection usually
held to apply between sectarianism in the workplace and trade
unionism. According to the traditional Irish marxists whose work I
reviewed in chapter one, sectarian conflict in the workplace -
generated by competition f or jobs and religious discrimination
combined with ideological manipulation by the ruling class - created
severe problems for trade unionists seeking to unite workers of
different religious and political outlooks, and inhibited the
development of trade unionism. However, as we saw in section 4.4,
discrimination in the allocation of women's jobs was not a
contentious issue between Protestants and Catholics in the shirt
industry; and although my respondants were always aware of sectarian
differences among shirt workers they did not regard sectarianism as a
problem with respect to trade unionism until the breakaway.
Furthermore, the breakaway originated in a trade union power
struggle of a kind which is endemic in trade unions in Britain and
elsewhere. There is no evidence that either employers or the local
ruling class sought to manipulate the conflict within the NIJTGW or
the subsequent conflict between the NUTGW and the ITGWU into
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sectarian channels. To be sure, one of the protagonists in the
Harrison's dispute was given moral support by her father who was a
member of the Orange Order, but this hardly constitutes ruling class
manipulation. Indeed, contrary to what the traditional marxists
would have us believe, the Unionist Lord Mayor of Derry issued a
statement urging the two unions to negotiate a settlement of the
strike (DJ: 14 April 1954); the Catholic Bishop and the Church of
Ireland Bishop offered to mediate between the two unions; and the
former called for the dispute to be resolved 'in the spirit of
Eastertide and christian charity' (DJ: 19 April 1954). Thus, the
Derry breakaway contradicts the usual view of sectarianism and trade
unionism: sectarian conflict in the workplace was generated by a
specifically trade union conflict, riot vice versa'''.
Yet, in another sense this episode seems to confirm one aspect
of the traditional marxist thesis: sectarian divisions were, to use
Roiston's phrase, 'reconstituted within trade unionism' despite the
wishes and efforts of the main protagonists; it was an unintended
consequence of their actions. I will reserve iudgement on this
matter until the subsequent development of the two unions concerned
has been examined.
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CHAPTER 7: RIVALRY AND ACCOMMODATION: TRADE UNIONISM IN THE DERRY
SHIRT INDUSTRY 1954-1968
7. 1 Introduction
In this chapter I will be concerned with the development of
trade unionism in the Derry shirt Industry during the period between
the end of the dispute In Harrison's arid the onset of the current
troubles; that is, roughly between April 1954 and the end of 1968.
For much of this time trade unionism in the shirt industry was
dominated by rivalry and mutual antagonism between members of the
NUTGW and ITGWU. Although the inter-union rivalry was often quite
fierce, a modus vivendi developed in the late 1960s. The main theme
of this chapter, therefore, will be inter-union relations, and the
main focus will be on the NUTGW and ITGWU; the other union with
members in the shirt industry during this period, the ATGWU is, by
and large, marginal to this theme.
I will examine the rivalry and conflict between the Derry
Branches of the NUTGW and ITGWU in section 7.3, and examine the
factors underlying the rapprochement between the representatives of
the two organlsations in section 7.4; first, however, I want to
discuss a bitter internal argument within the Derry Branch of the
NUTGW which, for a time, seems to have posed a greater threat to its
existence than did Its external rival.
7.2 Intra-UnIon Conflict and Accommodation
Although, as we have seen, most of the 150 or so women who
joined the NUTGW in November 1953 were Protestants, a small majority
of Branch Committee members were Catholic. The Protestants were
mainly Unionists who objected to the fact that the ITGWU was an Irish
- 267 -
union, the Catholics included women with a nationalist outlook who
had joined the NUTGW rather than the ITGWU because of family
loyalties. From the outset, the Branch Committee was riven by en
internal conflict in which the main issue was Macgougan's prominence
as a left-wing, anti-partitionist politician. Bearing in mind the
significance attached to sectarianism in the literature on trade
unionism in Northern Ireland, two questions immediately spring to
mind: first, how did the conflict relate to the political and
religious heterogeneity of the Branch Cornmitee? And, second, did
religious and political differences among the union activists
adversely affect the development of the Branch. I will consider each
of these questions in turn.	 -
Macgougan certainly felt that the conflict within the Derry
Branch of the NUTGW had a sectarian logic. He told me that
There's no doubt about it, my effectiveness as a union
organiser was impaired by my political [activity].., there
was no doubt, particularly when I got my name in the paper
for things... there'd be a bit of an upheaval, a threat to
throw the cards In. You were in danger of tramping on
corns both ways, because everyone with a left-of-centre
outlook was a communist in those days on the Catholic side,
and you got a label very quickly if you'd a national
outlook on the Protestant side.
There is evidence that members of the Branch Committee were anti-
communist. For example, they raised funds for Hungary following the
Russian invasion of that country in 1956 - this was the only occasion
that discussion of an international issue was minuted (Minute: 4
December 1956>. And it is true that Macgouganss left-of-centre ideas
were of concern to NUTGW activists in Derry. For example, in
December 1955 Miss Gallagher told the committee that she was
distressed by the adverse publicity caused to the union by Macgougan
adressing Derry Trades Council in the company of 'another communist'
(Minute: 13 December 1955). 	 However, when I asked Miss Gallagher
about this incident she told me that her 'distress' was shared by
Protestants:
There was one meeting he [Macgougan] was at, somebody
brought in a clipping from one of the papers. She was from
McCarthy's factory, I don't know who it was, and he was
speaking in Cork on a platform... there was all shades of
opinion on the platform... but there was somebody was a
great communist in Belfast... Betty Sinclair and somebody
else. They were like a red rag to a bull when they seen
him on the platform with these people - even Stephen's
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(McGonagle] crowd would throw that at me, that was one of
the arguments even: that Sunday they came here to ask me to
stop collecting (NUTGW subscriptions] they said sure he's
[Macgougan] hob fobbing with Betty Sinclair and - was it
Barr (Andy Barr]?, it was a shipyard (man] and all that
crowd. They would throw that (Macgougan fraternising with
communists) at me.
Macgougan was not, nor ever had been, a member of the Communist
Party of Ireland, and the allegation about his communist sympathies
was not pursued. Of greater concern to the members of the Branch
Committee was his espousal of nationalist grievances. At a meeting
held on 24 January 1956 the 'vice-chairman' of the Committee, Mrs
Pollock, reported that 'a large section' of-the Derry membership had
been offended by a press report which quoted Macgougan as saying -
during a debate on 'Partition in the Labour Movement' - 	 that
Catholics were discriminated against in Northern Ireland. The
Committee passed a vote of no confidence in Macgougan. Mrs Pollock
was a Protestant who worked in McCarthy's factory and Macgougan
recalls her as a particularly vehement Unionist. However, it was not
just Protestants who were critical of Macgougan's statement about
discrimination. At a subsequent Committee meeting, held in the
presence of Macgougan and some members of the union's National
Executive, four other women expressed support f or the no confidence
motion: Miss Finlay who worked in McArthur and Beattie's, Miss Hughes
who worked in Hunter's, Selly McDowell who worked in the Rosemount
factory, and Miss McFarland who worked in Wilkinson's. The first two
women were Protestants, the second two were Catholics. Miss Finlay
claimed that she was 'faced with considerable loss of interest' in
the union because of Macgougan's statement; Miss McFarland said
that, on this occasion, she agreed with Macgougan's view but felt
that it was not in the union's Interest for him to have expressed it
In public; they all urged the National Executive to restrain
Macgougan from making further political statements in public.
Macgougan responded by saying that the statement which had offended
the Branch had been taken out of context, that he had expressed a
personal view and not used a union platform, and that it could not be
claimed that he was not competent as regional officer. He refused to
give an undertaking not to speak in public (Minute: 11 February
1956).
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Macgougen's critics were not happy with this response 1 nor did
they think that the Executive was treating the matter with sufficient
seriousness (Minute: 6 March 1956). Another meeting with
representatives of the National Executive was arranged. This time it
was Miss Gallagher who put the case against Macgougan. She said that
since the the breakaway Macgougan's activities 'had been a constant
source of embarrassment' to the members; it had been hoped that
things would improve with the appointment of Mr 011is, but they had
not (Charles 011is had replaced O'Connor as Branch secretary in March
1954, see below). She concluded her statement by saying that several
shop stewards had threatened to resign over the issue, and that she
and her fellow workers were considering similar action. Miss
Gallagher's statement was echoed by Miss O'Doherty, another Catholic,
who is reported to have said that 'the vast majority of members that
she represented (felt that Macgougan] had insulted their religious
convictions.' By this stage, however, a definite pro-Macgougan
faction had emerged; it was centred around Mrs Henderson, the
Protestant shop steward from McCarthy's and Mrs McGowan, a Catholic
shop steward who worked in Tillie and Henderson's. Of the two it was
Mrs Henerson who was most vociferous in Macgougan's defence.
Macgougan told me
I made a speech in a debate with David Bleakley (a
prominent NILP member] in which I described Catholics as
second class citizens, that phrase wasn't well known in
those days and it got a headline and there was a row in the
Derry Branch - every time I made a statement the Branch
Committee (objected]. One girl said, 'I agree with what
you said but you'd no right saying it,' and Martha
(Henderson] chimes in, 'I don't agree with what he said but
he's every bloody right saying it!'
	
I think that's
interesting, I mean I like that.
The meeting concluded on a conciliatory note: the spokesperson for
the Executive said that although Macgougan's statements 'had harmed
the union (they had] confidence in him'; that disaffiliation was not
warranted; and that, having exercised their right to criticise, the
Committee should 'set an example' and remain loyal to the union
(Minute: 10 March 1956). After this meeting the intra-union conflict
abated and open criticism of Macgougan's politics ceased.
Thus, although the the argument within the Derry Branch of the
NUTGW was focused on Magougan's socialist republican politics, it
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cannot be understood in terms of sectarianism. Macgougan's critics
included Catholics 8S well as Protestants, his main ally was a
Protestant, and, lest it be forgotten, Macgougan himself was from a
Protestant backround. How, then, is this conflict to be understood?
Undoubtedly, Macgougan's critics were worrried that some of his
public statements would cause Protestant workers to defect. However,
it was not so simple as this: the evidence suggests that underlying
the argument about Macgougan's politics was an internal power
struggle.
Actually, it would seem that there were two inter-linked power
struggles: one between Macgougan and O'Connor, and the other between
Miss Gallagher and Mrs Henderson. Macgougan claims that O'Connor
'was trying to get me the sack,' and implies that he wanted a full-
time union post. It is not possible to corroborate this, but it is
worth pointing out that O'Connor was only in Derry as the temporary
Branch secretary and that he was a lay activist in the NUTGW who
usually worked in the garment trade In Dublin; moreover, there Is
ample evidence that O'Connor Intrigued against Macgougan. Miss
Gallagher recalled the occasion when the Branch passed the vote of no
confidence In Macgougan:
Then Paddy O'Connor, of course he made the balls [sic]
right enough for us, but he let us see in the light: 'now
this Is the kind of way it's (le Macgougan's politics]
going to effect the membership.' We had the Committee
meeting and said we'd have to get Macgougan down (to Derry]
- because we weren't confident - we weren't going to put up
with It. I remember the night that we did it. The night
that we were there Macgougan turned the tables on me. He
said that he was surprised because he had something to say
that night. He said that Paddy O'Connor... had done that:
he'd written - who was In charge of the Amalgamated
Transport (Union)?... Norman Kennedy - somebody had written
to Norman Kennedy, and It was something to do with
Macgougan, and Macgougan thought that I was at the back of
It, and he hit me with it that night. And I remember it
was a terrible sensation. I don't think the Committee were
ever the same to him after it, because he was just going to
put this thing on me. But it was Paddy O'Connor. He
thought I was along with Paddy O'Connor, that I had known
about It.
This quotation adds weight to the suggestion that O'Connor had
encouraged Macgougan's critics, but It conflates things; the actual
sequence of events, as revealed in the minutes of the Derry Branch of
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the NUTGW, was as follows. On 8 December 1953, less than a month
after the reconstitution of the Branch, the Committee passed a
resolution, proposed by Selly McDowell and seconded by Mrs Emberely,
to the effect that Macgougan's presence in Derry was an 'obstacle to
progress' and urging that his visits be restrained. 	 Then, in
February 1954, O'Connor tendered his resignation. He said that he
could nolonger 'tolerate Macgougan's interference' in the Branch, but
called on the rest of the Committee to remain loyal to the union. He
was persuaded to stay on in Derry until the Committee had sent a
delegation to the union's National Executive to complain about
Macgougan (Minute: 15 February 1954). O'Connor's resignation was
accepted, and Charles 011is, a Catholic tailor who was originally
from Dublin, was appointed full-time organising secretary in March
1954. Although O'Connor was noloriger in Derry he was still a member
of the NUTGW's National Executive and Irish Consultative
Committee 1 ', and he continued to undermine Macgougan. Macgougan
responded to this threat by making sure that O'Connor was not re-
elected as Irish representative on the union's Executive: 'we got him
off the Executive by the processes of democracy (wry smile).' What
Macgougan means by this is that he persuaded a very popular member of
the union in Dublin, Mr Lynchc2), to come out of retirement arid stand
against O'Connor in the National Executive elections. 	 Mr Lynch won
the election. Despite losing his seat on the Executive, O'Connor
stayed in contact with Miss Gallagher, and at some point during 1956
he approached the ATGWIJ with the suggestion that they absorb the
Derry Branch of the NUTGW. It is this to which Miss Gallagher was
referring when she said 'of course, Paddy O'Connor made the balls':
Macgougan found out about the scheme and confronted Miss Gallagher
about it at a Branch Committee meeting on 18 Decinber 1956. Although
Miss Gallagher, in the statement quoted above, denied all knowledge
of O'Connor's activities, the minutes record that she told the
Committee that she had told O'Connor that she wanted no part of the
scheme.
Miss Gallagher probably did not have any part in O'Connor's
approach to the ATGWU, she was, after all, very loyal to the NUTGW;
however, she made no secret of the fact that she would have preferred
O'Connor to Macgougan as Irish Regional Organiser of the union. She
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told me:
Paddy O'Connor knew how to go about, how to attract members
into it (the union]. See Macgougan never would come down
to the level, his own level, he might if you went to a
social (event] or a dance or that. He mixed and had a
dance and made himself at home, but he was always aloof.
She then described how the two of them had gone to the theatre when
they were in London on union business, how impressed she had been by
the dancing on the stage, and how disappointed she had been with
Macgougan's response: he regarded the dancing as
the sign of an ill-spent youth... I always remembered
that... I didn't think he [Macgougan] was suited to the job
all that much: he could talk and he might have been clever
in his own way, but he never was hi jack fella like.
There is no doubt that part of the tension between Miss
Gallagher and Mrs Henderson derived from the fact that one supported
O'Connor against Macgougan and the other supported Macgougan. Miss
Gallager viewed the alliance between Macgougan, a socialist
republican, and Mrs Henderson, a Unionist, with some suspicion; she
told me with some amusement:
He [Macgougan] was very fond, very so so with Martha
(Henderson]... you learn as you go along: you go to
conferences and meetings... it was... (at the] meetings...
that they got great.
Mrs Henderson was Macgougari's protégée. It was Macgougan who had
encouraged her to become a shop steward in the first place: 'Mr
Macgougan heard about me, how he did I don't know, but they asked me
would I take on a shop steward.' Macgougan told me, 'she was good,
she was one of the best (union activists].., she was a street above
the average.' However, although Mrs Henderson defended Macgougan' s
right to engage in political activity she made it clear that she did
not support his politics or agree with everything he said or did:
referring to the disagreement over his remark about religious
discrimination, she told me
I've always been a Unionist, but I believe in live and let
live... I'm the type of person [who]... if I thought a
thing was fair and right and the person entitled to say
it... [and] if I thought there was no malice behind a thing
(I would not object], but if a [I) thought somebody was
using something I'd expose it and have done... Jack
(Macgougan] done a whole lot of things that I didn't like
in him.
It is worth noting at this stage that although Mrs Henderson felt
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strongly that 'a worker had to fight to get a decent living', she had
'no time' for labour politics whether it be Macgougan's left-wing
ariti-partitionism or the NILP's more British-oriented variety: she
was a Unionist, or perhaps more accurately, a liberal Unionist.
There was more to the tension between Miss Gallagher and Mrs
Henderson than that the former was critical of Macgougan and that the
latter defended him: they were rivals for the leadership of the
Branch. Macgougan told me:
I should mention that there was an edge between Martha
Henderson and Kathy Gallagher, very much so... personality
clash again. Kathy didn't like anybody near her throne and
Martha liked going to conferences. She-was always a centre
of attraction, she was a very glamorous looking woman at
that time.
And, indeed, soon after joining the Branch Committee, Mrs Henderson
was questioning Miss Gallagher's authority:
There was a row down in Dublin where we had to vote, a bloc
vote, and we were told by we're Committee - by Kathy
Gallagher... (she] was in the chair - and we were told we
didn't vote for it and it was something to do with a
British based union, I didn't say aye or nye at the
meeting... Maggie McGowan and I went to Dublin, and when I
got it explained properly to me, I voted for it. Well,
that's what started the row between Kathy Gallagher and me
- she never liked me after that, she said I'd no right, I
said, 'I have a mind of my own, I done what I thought was
right.
I now want to consider the effects of these interlinked
conflicts on the development of the Branch. As we have seen,
Macgougan refused to comply with the Branch Committee's demand that
he curtail his political activities, and he remained one of the
leading figures in the Northern section of the IrLP throughout the
decade.	 The Executive of the NUTGW were unsympathetic to the
protests of the Derry activists: Macgougan told me,
I had no problem with an English Executive. I said 'well,
a trade union official active in the Labour Party, any
objection?' - they were all that, they (his critics in
Derry] got no change there.
Nevertheless, neither Miss Gallagher nor any other of Macgougan's
critics carried out their threat to resign from the Branch Committee.
On the contrary, having presented the case against Macgougan to the
National Executive on two occasions (11 February 1956 and 21 February
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1956), Miss Gallagher expressed a concern that the Committee had
become divided into two factions, and urged that 'personal
differences' be forgotten 'in the interests of progress' (Minute: 15
May 1956). She repeated this plea following Macgougan's exposure of
O'Connor's approach to the ATGWU (Minute: 8 January 1957). Miss
Gallagher's hostility to Macgougan and to his politics did not
diminish - even today her resentment is evident - but they, in Miss
Gallagher's words, 'agreed to differ'. Indeed, it would seem that
there was a tacit agreement amongst all the activists - pro and anti
Macgougan - that politics were not to be discussed at subsequent
Committee meetings. Evidently, the activists were bound together,
and to the NUTGW, by something stronger -than the political and
'personal' differences which divided them. In view of the fact that,
as was shown in the last chapter, many of the women who became
involved in the NUTGW did so because they strongly objected to
McGonagle's behaviour, to the breakaway, and to the ITGWU, it seems
reasonable to suggest that it was this common hostility to the other
union and a determination that the Derry Branch of the NUTGW should
not succumb to it which transcended their differences with one
another.	 In this context it is worth noting that Miss Gallagher
qualified her criticisms of Mrs Henderson with the remark:
but she was very staunch... at times she was a flash in the
pan, but she was loyal to the union and we needed her in
the right place - in McCarthy's.
As part of an examination of the effects of the intra-union
conflict on the development of the Branch, we must also consider
whether Macgougan's continuing political activity had the effect on
the wider membership that his critics feared; that is, did his
espousal of nationalist grievances result in a decline in support for
the NUTGW amongst Protestant workers? Miss Gallagher insisted to me
that Protestant workers 'were watching his stance... when you be
talking to the Committee members they'd be telling you what they were
discussing in the factories', but she could not recall any example of
a member leaving the union because she disagreed with Macgougan's
politics. Moreover, when the religious composition of the 1957
Branch Committee' is examined it becomes apparent that Protestant
representation was greater than it had been in 1953-54. As was shown
in the last chapter, of the 12 members of the 1953-54 Committee, 6
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were Catholics, and 5 were Protestants - I was unable to discover the
religious affiliation of the remaining 1, but she was probably a
Protestant; moreover, both the chairman and the secretary were
Catholics. In 1957 the chairman and secretary were Catholics, Miss
Gallagher and Charles 011is respectively, but the the number of
Protestant Committee members had increased to 8 and the number of
Catholics had decreased to 4.
Yet, one cannot help but suspect that the tensions between NUTGW
activists and officials adversely affected the Branch in less
tangible ways. There is no doubt that the ill-feeling created by the
intra-union conflict dampened the enthusiasm of some activists. For
example, Miss Finlay stopped attending Branch Committee meetings for
a while; when she returned she attributed her absence to the
'unfriendly atmosphere' among Commitee members (Minute: 8 January
1957). Moreover, the tension between Miss Gallagher and Mrs
Henderson had a sequel: on 1 March 1960 the latter defeated the
former in the election for the position of Branch president.
Thereafter, Miss Gallagher and two of her allys, Mrs Pollock and Miss
O'Doherty, stopped attending Branch Committee meetings for a time.
Miss Gallagher's absence from Branch Committee meetings during 1960
and 1961 was only partly due to her resentment of Macgougan and Mrs
Henderson: after several years of intense union activity she was keen
to spend more of her free time with her sisters. She did not sever
her links with the union; on the contrary, she continued to be very
active as as shop steward in her factory, maintained her links with
other activists through visiting, and after a year or so she returned
to a more regular participation in the institutions of the union: the
Branch Committee, the Irish Consultative Committee, and union
conferences.
After the election of Mrs Henderson as Branch president
attendance at meetings of the Committee dwindled and they became
irregular, informal, un-minuted afairs (the last meeting of the
Branch Committee recorded in the minute book took place on 6 March
1962).	 However, this cannot be attributed directly to the tensions
between activists.	 It seems to have had more to do with the rapid
turn over among full-time Branch officials in the late 1950s and
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early 1960s. During 1957 Charles 011is, who had replaced O'Connor as
Branch secretary, began to neglect his responsibilities and was
removed from the job at the end of the year
	 His replacement,
William Neill, was something of a stop-gap. He was close to
retirement as secretary of the small Coleraine Branch of the NUTGW
when he was asked to take on the additional responsibility of running
the Derry Branch; his health was not good and he was not very
effective as an organiser - one NUTGW activist described him as
'lackadaisical.' He retired in January 1963 and died four months
later (GW: January 1963 and May 1963). The new Branch secretary was
Billy Lindsay, a Protestant who had previously been a NUTGW activist
in a hat manufacturers in Cookstown. He died suddenly in the early
1970s.
Notwithstanding the fall off in Branch Committee meetings, the
overwhelming conclusion of this section is that, once again, the case
of trade unionism in the Derry shirt industry confounds the
predominant view of trade unionism in the literature on Northern
Ireland. The conflict within the the Derry Branch of the NUTGW was
not a sectarian conflict: the protagonists did not line up against
one another according to their religious identities, and its dynamic
was the politics of union power and influence rather than the
politics of national identity. To be sure, Unionist/nationalist
differences were exposed in the course of the conflict, but the
activists who helped organise the NUTGW in Derry revealed a
willingness to accommodate their political differences in the
interest of the Branch. Moreover, Macgougan's left-wing, anti-
partitionist politics do not seem to have discouraged Protestant
shirt workers from joining and becoming active in the union. Indeed,
as will become apparent in the next section, the NUTGW was uniquely
successful in attracting new members, Catholics as well as
Protestants, in the 1960s.
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7.3 Inter-Union Rivalry and the Changing Pattern of Union
Organisatiori in the Shirt Industry in the 1950s and 1960s
We have seen that although the breakaway began as a commonplace
intra-union power struggle it resulted In a trade union structure
which approximates to Roiston's notion of 'sectarian trade unionism':
the membership of the ITGW1J was mainly Catholic, and that of the
NUTGW was mainly Protestant. Moreover, the activists in each
organisatlon had come to suspect their counterparts of having been
politically motivated, and the Inter-union conflict which followed
the CWU's merger with the ITGWU culminated in a dispute in Harrison's
which had distinctly sectarian undertones.	 According to most of my
respondents, inter-union relations at plant and local level remained
mutually antagonistic, or, at best, unco-operative, throughout the
1950s and for most of the 1960s. In this section I will examine the
hostility between the Derry Branches of the NiJTGW and ITGWU, and
consider the role of sectarianism in perpetuating it. I will then
discuss the effect of inter-union hostility on the development of
trade unionism in the industry.
Inter-union hostility was manifested in various ways. 	 For
example, NUTGW activists refused to sit with members of the ITGWU In
negotiations with local employers. Of course, in refusing to sit
with their ITGWU counterparts, NIJTGW acivists were merely enacting
their union's official policy of not recognising the Derry Branch of
the ITGWIJ, but they persisted with this policy despite the SMF's
threat to negotiate with the ITGWU irrespective of whether or not the
NUTGW representatives were present, and, as will become apparent in
the next section, when Macgougan suggested that participation in
joint negotiations with the ITGWU was advisable, some activists were
vehemently opposed (see Minutes: 6 and 20 November 1956, 23 August
1960, and 23 October 1960). Thus, throughout the 1950s there was no
co-operation between the two unions in the formulation of a common
negotiating position with respect to management. 	 However, It is
important to note that there were no serious disagreements between
members of the two unions with regard to wage settlements.	 Only
three, fairly trivial, differences of opinion between the NUTGW and
the ITGWIJ are mentioned in the documentary record.
	 The first
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occurred in 1954 when the NUTGW attempted to resist the
implementation of a wage settlement proposed by the management In the
three 'time arid motion' factories because it was not based on the
minimum time rate set by the Wages Council which they regarded as the
'accepted method of wage increase'. They felt that the management
had based their case on the attitude of the ITGW1J (Minutes: 11 May
1954, 19 October 1954, and 22 February 1955). The minutes do not
record whether or not the NIJTGW were successful. The second occurred
when members of the ITGWU in the Rosemount factory accepted lower
than the 'general' local wage rates; the NUTGW disapproved but, with
few members in the factory there was little that they could do
(Minutes: 14 and 28 May 1957). The third occurred in Tulle and
Henderson's when NUTGW members wanted to dispute the rate set for a
Marks and Spencer contract but 'the fact that most of the workers in
another department were not members of this union and were not
disputing the rate made it difficult to proceed further' (GW: October
1959).
To understand the factors underlying the perpetuation of inter-
union hostility it is necessary to examine relations between the
members of the two unions at factory level. Obviously, it is not
possible for me to examine Inter-union relations in each of the 30 or
so factories which were in, and out, of production during the period
under consideration. I will focus on two factories, Harrison's and
McCarthy's. I have choosen these two factories because they are the
ones about which I have the most knowledge: Miss Gallagher and Miss
McMorris were shop stewards for the rival unions in Harrisons, and
Mrs Henderson was NUTGW shop steward in McCarthy' s. With respect to
the latter factory I will also draw on the recollections of a member
of the ITGWU, I shall call her Mary, who I met purely by chance but
who worked in McCarthy's during a crucial phase in NUTGW-ITGWU
relatIons 6 . However, it Is important to point out that inter-union
relations in these two factories were not typical: they were probably
worse than in other factories. The Rosemount factory was probably
more typical; according to Miss Cosgrave inter-union relations there
were,
Silent, no they (the NUTGW] didn't make any difference.
Now what they did in McCarthy's Factory I'm not too sure
about... but like where I worked in Rosemount, there
wouldn't have been any more than a half dozen in the other
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union.., the majority in our place was ITGWU, as I say to
you if they had half a dozen that's all it would have
been.
The fact that inter-union relations in Harrison's and McCarthy's were
more antagonistic than elsewhere does not diminish the value of
studying them in detail; on the contrary, it is what makes them most
interesting: it is in these factories that the factors underlying the
general hostility between the NUTGW and the ITGWU are most apparent.
Certainly, if religious and political conflict was a factor which
contributed to the perpetuation of inter-union hostilities, then one
can be fairly sure that these factories would have been the 'storm
centres'; after all, McCarthy's was the factory which was most
closely identified with the Protestant community, and, as we have
seen, there had already been an element of sectarian conflict in
Harrison's. I will begin with the latter.
Miss McMorris felt that relations between members of the NUTGW
and ITGWU were probably coloured by political differences; she told
me
Aye, well... they didn't say it out (loud] but like 'she's
in the other union'; it (the NUTGW] was always called 'the
other union' as if it had horns on it! (laughter] And,
like they weren't with Stephen McGonagle. Whether the fact
that we were all in Dublin or not; and maybe it had
psychologically, maybe it had you know. You don't know
because... it seemed to be in Northern Ireland like it was
our side - like it was awful when you think about life -
and your side,	 We (Catholics and Protestants) were split
long before this trouble started.
However, she thought that the most important factor underlying the
persistence of inter-union hostility was competition for members. At
the end of the 1954 dispute, the NUTGW had only five members in a
workforce of up to 500, but Miss Gallagher was actively recruiting
new members. This was something which ITGWU activists strongly
resented, Miss McMorris told me:
The Tailor and Garment (Union) man always came in for some
of them (Harrison's workers]. Aye, Kathy Gallagher was a
shop steward, and there was a wee bit of mmmm. She tried
to get as many. You were In with Kathy and somebody in
with me, there was a wee bit of aggro there... she's trying
to get her Into her union, Them's now stupid, silly points
and should never have been. But everybody was out to get
as many into their own union... But you see the force would
have been more the Irish Transport's because if we're all
going to be stoppage they [the ITGWU] were the biggest
part. They got the benefit, the Tailor and Garment's, then
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this small number, got the benefits for us fighting it. It
was only Stephen came oftener and it was through him that
everybody benefited.
Miss Gallagher told me that she was routinely harassed on a Friday
night when she was collecting subscriptions from NUTGW members:
You just stood with the box on a Friday night and you just
tried to remember,.. and you just took it and you didn't
always give them their card because you hadn't the time and
if you had produced a card, it would cause a row... maybe
Stephen's shop steward was the foot of the stairs and...
they were a militant type and a rough type and they would
call out '1 hope your not paying Kathy Gallagher up there.'
I had to go through all that.
It was in McCarthy' s that the most serious inter-union conflict
took place. Although most of the women employed in Mccarthy' s were
Protestants, there were a few Catholics. The NUTGW was the majority
union, but the ITGWU had a few members. The ITGWU shop steward was a
Protestant woman, I shall call her Mrs Ferguson, but most ITGWU
members were Catholics. There was some friction between members of
the NUTGW and ITGWU in the 1950s, but not much: the minutes of the
NUTGW record one incident of alleged intimidation (Minutes:29 March
1955). Notwithstanding the fact that the ITGWU was recognised by the
SMF, McCarthy's management did not recognise Mrs Ferguson as a bona
fide shop steward. This does not seem to have presented any problems
while ITGWI.J membership in the factory was small, but by 1962 the
union had 100 members, and they demanded that their shop steward be
recognised. Management refused, ITGWU members struck, and NUTGW
members continued working.
A considerable amount of ill-feeling was generated during the
strike. Mrs Henderson claimed that she took 'an awful lot [of abuse]
that time, they [the pickets] threw pennies at me.' Mary recalled
that the picketing was vigorous but orderly. There is rio doubt that
the ill-feeling between the strikers and the women who continued
working had a sectarian element. Mary thought that the 'scabs' who
broke the strike did so because they were 'loyalists.' 	 Conversely,
Mrs Henderson told me
Well, I dare say there was quite a bit of it (sectarian
feeling] because I remember there was two girls from the
Creggan - we called them the black and white minstrels for
one had her hair blond and the other was jet black and we
used to call them the black and white minstrels - and
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Willie Simpson [pseudonym], I remember he was the manager
of the department then, and Willie [Simpson] was standing
outside the gate with me [laughs] and these two came
down... and says, 'look at him, big yellow streak down his
back,' and, 'Orange Bas[tard]! (laughs] and him an Orange
[laughs].' And Willie Simpson never put a sash on him
after it. I mind that, that sort of thing was brought into
It. Now I'm only telling you that to let you know what way
they thought.	 And Willie Simpson turned on his heel and
(laughs) went out into the yard and his face: he was
raging.	 They called him an Orange B, then they said,
'you've a big yellow streak down your back Willie and you
an Orange man.' And everybody remarked on it [laughs],
everybody was watching the parades after. I looked f or it
myself just to see. Manys a time I've told him after It.,.
'you' re as yellow as they come.' I remember the two black
and white minstrels giving It to Willie outside the gate,
so the thought was there - they got their wee dig in about
it.
Quinn also detected a sectarian element in the dispute, but he said
that it went 'both ways, in fairness, sectarianism wasn't one-way
traffic In Northern Ireland.
However, judging by Mrs Henderson's recollections, the women who
crossed the ITGWU picket line did not do so spontaneously. She
described arriving at the factory on the morning that the strike
began to find McGonagle and Quinn blocking the entrance and the
workers standing outside uncertain about what to do. She told me
that she walked through the crowd, pushed her way past McGonagle and
Quinn, and went into the factory; most of the workers followed her.
When Mrs Henderson got into work she found that dockers and carters
had embargoed the factory.	 She saw to it that the embargo was
lifted:
They stopped the cloth coming In and Mr Lowry [the general
manager) sent for me... [McGonagle had] went down to the
Transport and General Workers' Union and he told them that
there was a strike on and they'd have to stop it [le
embargo the factory]. Well, the man in it [the ATGWU)
didn't realise it was the Irish Transport (Union who were
on strike), and he thought It was the Tailor and Garments
(NUTGW] had called the strike. So Lowry, he sent for me
and I says, 'just a minute,' so I rang yer man Hamill,
George Hamill, and I said to George, 'do you know,' he
said, 'what's happened,' I said, 'you'd better get the
cloth up here, there's no strike in Mccarthy's Factory,'
and they sacked the boy from It. He was blacklisted - the
boy that called the strike, [embargoed] the material going
into the factory -... by Hamill, because he'd no business
to do it. So I mean the cloth came in and everything just
went on from that then on.
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With cloth coming into the factory and most of the employees working,
the strikers were unable to press their demand; the strike ended
after a week.
'Scabbing' is not an activity which one would expect a committed
trade unionist to engage in, and Mrs Henderson was aware that her
role in the McCarthy's strike might appear incongruous, but she had
no doubts about the correctness of her actions: she opposed the
strike because she regarded it as part of an ongoing competition for
members between the NUTGW and ITGWIJ, and as yet another example of
McGonagle's unscrupulous behaviour. She told me that Mrs Ferguson
had been her predecessor as NUTGW shop steward in McCarthy's, and
that McGonagle had made her an ITGWIJ shop steward after she had been
expelled from the NUTGW for defaulting with union subscriptions. In
Mrs Henderson's opinion:
Stephen used her, when he realised he was cemented down out
at the office on the Strand Road he... was out then for to
take as many as he could from the Tailor and Garment
Workers' (Union]... he wanted into McCarthy's, that was his
main (aim), he wanted into McCarthy's... (McGonagle] knew -
I'm sure he srutinised her before he asked her at all (to
be an ITGWU steward] - what happened when she came out of
the Tailor and Garment Workers'.
Mrs Henderson had a profound distrust of the ease with which
McGonagle combined an anti-partitionist outlook with a readiness to
compromise with Unionists. She alleged that he played more than one
'tune' depending on who he was dealing with 7 ', alluded to the fact
that he accepted the job of' Ombudsman for Northern Ireland in the
1970's (see Appendix 1), and then told me
that's why I... (had] the row you see: that he used Mrs
Ferguson against me because he couldn't get, it was very
few Protestants that went with him. And that's what
angered me with him: that I knew he was using her, because
he shouldn't have touched her in the first place. If he'd
one or two [Protestant members in McCarthy's] it would be
the height of it... Mrs Ferguson was the first and she
snatched at it... because she was out to get the Tailor and
Garment's at that time... they (the NUTGW) didn't expose
her... but... I think she didn't want to lose touch with
the union, I think she just wanted to be able to say 'I'm a
shop steward,' But the firm didn' t entertain her at all.
To a traditional Irish marxist this episode might look
suspiciously like yet another case of employers manipulating
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divisions between workers into sectarian channels. After al],,
McCarthy' $ management was reputed (see section 4. 4) to have had a
sectarian employment policy and the strike was caused by their
refusal to recognise an ITGWU shop steward. In such a scenario, Mrs
Henderson's role would be that of the Protestant trade unionist who
placed loyalty to fellow Protestants in management above solidarity
with a group of mainly Catholic workers who had a legitimate
grievance.	 And, it is true that Mrs Henderson expressed an
appreciation of the management's predicament:
They (management] objected very much to her (Mrs Ferguson]
interfering with it. They said it was airight, they
accepted me, but they would not accept her in the Irish
Transport... she didn't know anything about work study
because I remember Mr Lowry telling me she... I can' t
remember Just (what] the saying was now, but she was using
the wrong words in the work studies and he says, 'I
couldn't talk to a woman like that Martha,' he says, 'I
wouldn' t get very far.'
In reality, however, Mrs Henderson had little sympathy with the
managers in McCarthy's. During the first interview which I conducted
with Mrs Henderson she prefaced her account of the ITGWU strike with
the comment, 'I seen me threaten to close down the factory manys a
time', and with a story to illustrate her readiness to use the threat
of strike action against management. In my third interview with Mrs
Henderson, she summed-up her attitude to trade unionism and
industrial relations by saying: '(we would have been] working for
nothing but for the union... a worker had to fight to get a decent
living.' Moreover, one of her main reasons for leaving McCarthy's
factory in the early 1970s was that she found Willie Simpson - the
manager whom the strikers called an 'Orange bastard' - insufferable
(see Appendix 1). Thus, perhaps the management's refusal to
recognise the ITGWU had a political or sectarian component, Mary
certainly thought that it had, but Mrs Morgan was not their puppet.
On the basis of these two cases - Harrison's and McCarthy's - it
can be said that political differences and, occasionally, sectarian
antagonisms played a part in perpetuating inter-union hostility.
However, the main factor underlying these antagonism was an ongoing
competition for members. In the latter respect the inter-union
rivalry between activists in the NUTGW and ITGWU in Derry was similar
to the rivalry and conflict which usually results when different
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unions seek to organise the same group of workers. As Lerner (1961:
66) points out, it is precisely because of the frequency
'jurisdictional disputes' that the British Trade Union Congress
evolved a body of 'parliamentary and case rules', of which the best
known is the Bridlington Agreement, to regulate the relations between
'unions which claimed the right to organise the same group of
workers.' Unlike unions in Britain, the rivalry between the NUTGW
and ITGWU was unchecked: until 1959 they were affiliated to different
trade union congresses - it was a free-for-all.
At this point it is instructive to contrast relations between
the ITGWU and NUTGW in Derry with relations between the ITGWU and
ATGWU. Shirt cutters were differentiated such that those who were
members of the ATGWU tended to be Protestant and those who joined the
ITGWU tended to be Catholic. Moreover, in July 1953 ATGWU members in
the docks embargoed a factory for two weeks until the breakaway union
agreed to return two shirt cutters who had defected from the ATGWU to
the CWU (DJ: 24 July 1953 and LS: 27 July 1953). Yet this rivalry
did not persist after the CWIJ merged with the ITGWIJ. One of the main
reasons f or this was that, although the ATGWU and ITGWIJ belonged to
separate trade union congresses, the two unions had a national
agreement designed to obviate inter-union rivalry (DJ: 30 November
1953 and 4 December 1953).
Having explored the nature of inter-union rivalry and hostility,
I now wish to examine its effects on the development of trade
unionism in the industry during the 1950s and 1960s. There are two
different kinds of question to be considered. One is whether or not
the hostility between the ITGWU and NUTGW, especially the latter's
policy of not recognising the former, adversely affected the ability
of officials and activists to secure their members' interests? The
other is: what was the outome of the competition for members between
the NUTGW and the ITGWU?° The first question will be discussed in
the next section; here I will be concerned only with the second.
In April 1954, the division between the NUTGW and the ITGWU had
a sectarian dimension: the former was a British based union with a
mainly Protestant membership, and the latter was an Irish based union
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with a mainly Catholic membership. There is rio doubt that, given the
religious segregation between factories, inter-union hostility, in
itself, tended to reproduce this pattern: NUTGW activists were free
to organise without ITGWIJ intervention only in those factories where
the workforce was predominantly Protestant; likewise, ITGWU activists
were free to organise without NLJTGW intervention only in those
factories where the workforce was mainly Catholic. Moreover, the
fact that each union had become identified as being 'British' or
'Irish' made them less attractive to shirt workers who did share the
national identity of the union concerned.	 As we have seen most
Protestants who had supported the breakaway defected when it merged
with the ITGWU. And Miss Gallagher told me that some Catholic
workers in Harrison's factory refused to join the NUTGW because they
preferred to join an Irish union; others joined without demur but
left the next day because they would 'go home and their fathers would
tell them, "you should be paying into Dublin."
If anything, these problems were greater f or the NUTGW than for
the ITGW1J; after all the latter had a much larger membrship to start
with. In April 1954, the ITGWU organised about 3,500 of the 7,000 or
so women employed in the Industry; that is, roughly 50% of the
workforce. The NUTGW organised only 150, or 2%, of the workforce.
Moreover, the ITGWU was administered by a popular, dynamic, local
official together with a group of experience union activists. The
NUTGW was administered by a Branch Committee which was composed of a
succession of officials imported from outside the area and a group of
women who had had no previous experience of union work, and which
was, as we have seen, riven by internal rivalries. Yet, despite
these organisational disadvantages and the decline in the numbers
employed in the shirt industry during the 1960s, the officials and
activists of the NIJTGW succeeded in rebuilding their organisatiori
such that by the late 1960s NUTGW membership in Derry stood at
between 800 and 1,000 (see Table 8), nearly 20% of the total
workforce which then numbered approximately 5,000. Table 8 indicates
an even more remarkable change: McCarthy's, the factory most closely
identified with the Protestant community, remained the 'cornerstone'
of NIJTGW organisatiori in the late 1960s, but the union now had a
large membership in Tulle and Henderson's and Harrison's, factories
- 286 -
which had predominantly Catholic workforces. In other words, the
NUTGW maintained and Increased its base among Protestant workers and
succeeded in attracting a significant number of Catholics.
Comparable figures are not available for the ITGWU, but it is
possible to estimate that its share of the workforce declined to
about 2,000 members in the late 1960s; that is, roughly 40% of the
workforce'. The oral evidence regarding the religious composition
of the ITGWIJ is somewhat contradictory, but It seems that, although
ITGWU officials and activists were less successful at recruiting
Protestants than NUTGW officials and activists were at recruiting
Catholics, some Protestant did join the ITGWIJ during the 1960s.
Miss Gallagher admitted that the ITGWU recruited some Protestant
members; she told me about a Protestant shop steward in Hunter's
factory who had supported the breakaway and had become a member of
the ITGWU:
Whatever grip McGonagle had on her she would not give up,
she would not give up (her membership of the ITGWU]. And
manys a (public] meeting we were (at] and she got up and
opposed me and was very bitter about me and everything. A
couple of them [Protestant shirt workers] [were] like
that... and we could never understand them.
But she claimed that,
As time went on, the Protestants then - because the
Catholics came out with this thing 'it's (the NUTGW] a
British based union,' you see, 'and you should have nothing
to do with it' - and the Protestants sort of looked at it
both ways and started thinking, 'the Tailor and Garment
Workers' (Union]'... The few of them (Protestants] were
very bitter (against the NUTGW] but in the end they must
have seen the light because the same person who was working
in Hunter's and when Lily (the NUTGW shop steward] or them
were off (work] or not liflng the union [dues] she was
lifting It for them. And she ended up - before she retired
out of Hunter's - she ended up being the one... to see that
the (Tailor and Garment Workers'] union was kept In...
there was a couple of Protestants very bitter, but they
came round.
Mrs Henderson claimed that following the failure of the strike in
McCarthy's, ITGWU organisation in the factory collapsed. This was
confirmed by Quinn, and by Mary. The latter told me that she never
went back to the factory after the strike, She alleged that the
strikers were made redundant 'one by one', and, having anticipated
this, she 'didn't give them the chance': instead of going
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back to work in McCarthy's she 'signed on the sick' and found a job
In another factory. Quinn, however, claimed that he had more success
in the Ebrington factory, the other large factory which was
identified with the Protestant community. And I met two retired
Protestant shirt workers who spoke enthusiastically about McGonagle's
abilities as a union official. One, Saidie, who had worked In
several different shirt factories during her career indicated that
she had, depending on the factory, been a member of both the NUTGW
and the ITGWU, and told me that she,
couldn't say a word about Stephen McGonagle, because one of
the times I was working in the Black Bear [Factory] and I
was doing neck bands and I wasn't really paid for them -
they were in twelfths, there was more tickets than enough -
we were in with Stephen McGonagle at that time too, and
right enough he got me a bit of a rise. (10)
Miss Gallagher and Mrs Henderson explained their success in
recruiting Catholic as well as Protestant workers in a number of
different ways. Mrs Henderson told me that
a lot of Catholics wanted a British based union. It's
like.., quite a few Catholics have British passports, and
others have Irish passports.
Miss Gallagher told me that her task was made easier because she was
friendly with the supervisor in the training department:
she told me so many [new workers] was coming arid she always
gave them a pep talk and... I usually had most of the
training room: [I] went over arid organised them straight
away, and oncst you got them you kept them.
But both women claimed that their success reflected the fact that the
NUTGW was, in Mrs Henderson's words, 'the union which really got them
[the workers] their (wage] increases', and stressed the hard graft of
dealing with individual workers' grievances. For example, Miss
Gallagher told me that she built NUTGW membership in Harrison's from
5 in April 1954 to 170 in the late 1960s by
Gradual hard working and people hearing (about you] and
cases (grievances] being handled. And maybe someone was in
no union and we would turn around and do something for them
and then a couple of others would join the union. We would
say we'd have to all be in it [the union] because there was
some of them in no union for a long time within that period
(the 1950s and 1960s]; they just decided that they weren't
paying the Irish Transport, and then they didn't come to us
for a long time... you just had to work at it.
When you juxtapose the latter quote with Saidie's remark in the
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previous paragraph it would appear that in many workers' minds, the
national identity of a union was less Important than the fact of its
officials and shop stewards being prepared to represent their day to
day interests as factory workers.
To sum up. Although both unions were able to break out of the
'sectarian ghetto', the NUTGW was more successful at attracting
Catholics than the ITGWU was at attracting Protestants; moreover, the
proportion of the workforce organised by the ITGWU declined
significantly between 1954 and the late 1960s. Miss Cosgrave and
Miss Gallagher told me that this was because ITGWU organisation was
generally less effective In the 1960s than it had been In the 1950s.
Both women thought that McGonagle increasingly left the day to day
running of the Derry Branch of the ITGWU to Quinn and, in Miss
Gallagher's words, 'Seamus [Quinn] let things slip.' It Is true that
Quinn took charge of the Branch in the 1960s; he told me that
It was a gradual process. He [McGonagle] was looking after
Donegal and then he was elected to the Executive of the
Irish Congress of Trade Unions... it ended up with me
looking after Derry... he was still in charge technically.
It is impossible to determine whether or not Quinn 'let things slip'
In comparison to McGonagle; what can be said is that, of the two,
Quinn was more conciliatory towards his counterparts in the NUTGW.
Both this, and, to some extent, the changing disposition of the two
unions In Derry must be seen in the context of the gradual
amelioration in inter-union relations which took place in the 1960s.
It is to this that I now turn.
7.4 Inter-Union AccoinodatIon
The amelioration In relations between members of the NUTGW and
of the ITGWIJ began at official level, and the impetus for it came
from changes In the Institutional structure of the wider trade union
movement, namely the formation of the ICTU In 1959. I will therefore
begin this section by reviewing Inter-union relations at official
level, and explaining the significance of the formation of the ICTU.
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We have seen that the NUTGW pursued a policy of not recognising
the ITGWU and that the principle manifestation of this policy was
that representives of the NUTGW refused to sit with their ITGWU
counterparts in negotiations with the local employers. This was a
serious matter, for although the parameters for wage movements in the
shirt industry were layed down by the Northern Ireland Shirtmaking
Wages Council the implementation of changes in wages and conditions
required detailed negotiations between the unions, the SMF, and
particular employers (see Liberty: July 1958). Nevertheless, there
were, as I mentioned in the last section, surprisingly few
disagreements between the two unions in this area, and the rivalry
between activists on the shop floor does not seem to have adversely
affected wage bargaining. 	 In part, this lack of disagreement
reflects the fact that there were, in Quinn's words, 'no policy
differences' between the two unions. 	 To be sure, there were
rhetorical differences. 	 On the one hand, NUTGW officials and
activists, emphasised the strength that accrued to their Branch from
its association with the NUTGW in Britain. For example, 011is was
quoted in the Derry Journal (DY: 11 April 1955; see also DY: 20 April
1956) as saying:
In pursuance of... [NUTGW] policy in Northern Ireland of
parity with Britain... custom and practice ordain that
increases must first be obtained across the water,
therefore the prospects of an increase for Northern Ireland
workers are dependent on the union's efforts in Britain
On the other hand, ITGWU officials and activists tended to present
British workers as rivals: McGonagle is quoted in Liberty (May 1956)
as saying:
Our staple industry, the shirt industry, is one which
operates on an incentive basis... therefore only with
improved techniques in production and methods of payment
can we hold our own in this highly competitive industry
against our rivals in Britain.
However, in reality, the officials of both unions were committed to
the existing wage bargaining process whereby the wages in Derry
factories were based on the minimum rates set by the Northern Ireland
Shirtmaking Wages Council which were, in turn, based on, though
significantly lower than, minimum rates set by the Shlrtmaking Wages
Council in Britain. Macgougan and McGonagle were both members of the
Northern Ireland Wages Council, and they never let their personal
emnity get in the way of wage negotiations. According to Macgougan
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the two unions did
Not make a common cause [at Wages Council), we would put
the policies down, take it or leave it [clap of hands), of
course once he [McGonagle] got his organisation they did
follow on, supported our motions all the time, never tried
any tricks at Wages Council, but the first time [reference
to the difference over holiday pay which was one of the
reasons given by McGonagle for resigning from the NUTGW]...
the difference between the two applications 2/52nds and
2/5Oths with loss of guarantee, loss of flat rate -
appalling. In other words a few shillings extra for the
high fliers, with no fall back for the ordinary run-of-the-
mill member, a complete negation of trade union principles.
Miss Cosgrave who represented the ITGWU at the Wages Council in the
1950s and early 1960s said of her experience,
There's one thing I must say in fairness to Jack McGuigan
(sic), Macgougan, he would always voted with us at the
Wages Council,.. if it went to a vote. But the girls in
Derry never earned money 'till Stephen McGonagle went into
fight for them.
Thus, Macgougan and McGonagle, both highly professional trade
union officials, took care that the rift between the NUTGW and ITGWU
did not adversely affect their members' interests. However, it was
not until the formation of the ICTU that the two men decided that it
was time, in Macgougan's words, 'to bury the hatchet.' Macgougan and
McGonagle were keen supporters of the movement to unite the CIU and
the ITUC, and each was involved in the negotiations which brought it
about; indeed, Macgougan was chairman of what was called the
'Provisional United Organisation.' Both men saw rapprochement in
Derry as the logical extension of their support for the ICTU.
Moreover, once the ITGWU and NUTGW were affiliated to the same trade
union congress, they became subject to a body of rules and
conventions designed to control competition over membership (see
McCarthy, 1977: chapter 11 passim). This undoubtedly provided an
additional impetus towards rapprochement. For example, following the
dispute in McCarthy's, Mrs Henderson was called to account by the
ICTU. She described the 'hearing' in the following way:
I was taken up in front of them [the ICTU] f or strike
breaking. Jack Macgougan said, 'you're only here as an
observer today,' I said, 'that's what you think!' And then
[the ICTU officer] says, 'why did Stephen McGonagle have
Mrs Ferguson? Why did he use her against Mrs Henderson?'
And Jack Macgougan [said] 'well, it was one of these
[things],' I said, 'excuse me Mr Chairman, I'll tell you
the proper way of it.'
	
And I just told him, and Stephen
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McGonagle hadn't a word, he nearly died! I said 'he
(McGonagle] used that girl against the Tailor and Garment
Workers' (Union),' and I said, 'Stephen McGonagle (is] only
a plumber (laughs); Stephen McGonagle knows nothing really
about the union business; the Tailor and Garment Workers'
is unique, they cater only for the shirt industry; and as
f or Stephen McGonagle, he takes every Tom. Dick, and Harry:
milk men, anything at all! [more laughs]'	 The chairmen
sat, and Jack Macgougan (said], 'oh my God, Martha,' I
says, 'I'm telling the truth, youse [Macgougan and
McGonagle] are sitting there covering up for one another; I
don't believe in that.'... (They] never said a word to me,
and I said, 'I'll do the same again Mr Chairman.'
Incidently, the ICTU seems to have found in favour of Mrs Henderson:
Mrs Henderson told me that she received 'a letter,.. that Stephen
McGonagle said that until God took him he would never fight Martha
Henderson again on a union matter.'
The 'burying of the hatchet' between the two unions was not a
policy which was formally discussed by the two union Branches
concerned and agreed at a joint meeting; it was an amorphous affair.
Nevertheless, it can be traced in three developments which took place
in the early 1960s. The first was the NUTGW's acceptance of an
invitation from the SMF to attend talks about a wage application even
though ITGWU representatives would be present (Minute: 23 August
1960). The second was the NUTGW's decision not to block the
affiliation of the ITGWU to the Trades Council. The third was that
the NtJTGW participated, along with the ITGWU, the ATGWU, and the SMF,
in the publication of a pamphlet on the threat to the Northern
Ireland shirt industry posed by cheap imports from Asia (Guckian,
1963).
I will look at the first two decisions in more detail because
they reveal the extent to which the 'burying of the hatchet' between
the two unions emerged as the result of an initiative by Macgougan
and McGonagle rather than due to an improvement in relationships
between the local activists. The SMF's invitation to talks was
prefigured by a letter from McGonagle to Macgougan in October 1959.
In it, he suggested that all the trade unions organising in the Derry
shirt industry should attempt to work out a common policy on wage
negotiations with the SMF.	 Macgougan put the suggestion to the
Branch Committee of his union; they rejected It. Miss Gallagher said
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that the union had nothing to gain from such co-operation; Mrs
Pollock said that it would have an adverse effect on the membership
(Minute: 6 November 1959). 	 The SMF issued a second invitation to
talks in August 1960. On this occasion, after some encouragement
from Macgougan, the Committee decided to send Miss Gallagher, Mrs
Henderson, Macgougan, and Neill, the Branch secretary (Minute: 23
November 1960).	 It Is perhaps significant that neither Miss
Gallagher nor Mrs Pollock were at the meeting at which this decision
was taken. At this time Miss Gallagher was, for the reasons
discussed section 7.2, not attending Committee meetings, and Mrs
Henderson was Branch president; although the latter was no less
hostile to McGoriagle and the ITGWU than the former she was more
amenable to Macgougan's persuasion.
As I pointed out In the last chapter, the official trade union
movement in Derry was strongly opposed to the introduction of the
ITGWU to Derry and refused to permit the Branch to affiliate to the
local Trades Council. In September 1961 members of the Derry Trades
Council were informed that the Belfast Branch of the ITGWU would not
affiliate to the Belfast Trades Council so long as the Derry Branch
of the union was not permitted to affiliate to the Derry Trades
Council. Delegates were asked to consult their union branches about
the matter; the Derry Branch of the NUTGW agreed not to oppose the
affiliation of the ITGWU to the Derry Trades Council (Minute: 3
October 1961). Miss Gallagher was dismayed:
I remember it ended up in the Belfast Telegraph with the
Trades Council.	 He [McGonagle] wasn't on the Trades
Council. I wasn't so active at this time, I was still
active enough, but I didn't know what was going on, and
then the next thing I heard was that Stephen was being
accepted into the trade union (ie Trades Council] and that
was the sorest point to me. Because like, they accepted
him back and he never looked back from there, and I
remember some of the reporters phoned me up to ask my views
on It and I remember I gave him a whole mouthful: I told
him what I thought and then when I looked in the Telegraph
that night It was all in It. Then Macgougan was going to
expel me from the union - you see there again we clashed -
he was going to expel me for he said that I was speaking as
an Individual, which I was, [but] I worked hard enough for
them [the union].	 He then answered it which hurt me a
lot.., as much to say I stepped out of line.
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There is no doubt that despite the initial reluctance of some
NUTGW activists to recognise the ITGWU, and the ongoing competition
for members in particular factories, the unfreezing of relations at
official level fostered by Macgougan and McGonagle had a positive
effect on the attitude of ITGWU and NUTGW activists to each other.
Moreover, although NUTGW activists were worried that the formation of
the ICTU might undermine the position of British based unions in
Ireland, and expressed some concern about the effect which it might
have on the situation in Derry (see Minutes: 10 January 1956 and 15
October 1957), it would seem that, once the ICTU was established, the
fact that the NUTGW and ITGWU were affliated to the same trade union
congress also helped improve relations between activists. For
example, Mrs Henderson described inter-union relations during the
1960s in the following way: 'there was still that wee bit [of
antagonism) there [in the 1960s], but nothing compared to what it was
in the early 1950s.'	 I asked 'Why did relations improve?' 	 She
replied:
Oh, well when we went into the Trade ah Congress [ICTU] and
things you had to be with them [ITGWU representatives]
because they were there, you were a London based union, but
if you went down to Dublin, or Malihide, or Greystones you
were affiliated with them, you just had to, things went to
a bloc vote... I've had to travel with Stephen McGonagle to
meetings that he was at, even to Belfast and that, I have
travelled with him in a car and have lifted so many of us
to - it saved them paying out fares... you travelled with
them [ITGWU members].
Miss McMorris also commented on the positive effect of common
involvement in the ICTU on relations between NUTGW and ITGWU
activists:
When we became the Irish Transport and General Workers'
[Union] I would only [have) met the representatives of the
other union at Wages Council or at the Irish Congress of
Trade Unions or something like that in Belfast where you
would go up. That's how Francis [Maguire, Belfast based
women's officer of the NUTGW from 1963] got to know us...
we're all chummy. When we met we were like just part of
one family. There was one [congress] then in Bundoran, all
the unions represented, they mixed socially, there'd be no
problem... I imagine even if you went to any part of
England if you were a union member, your whole idea would
be the same thing; how could you be different?... you might
get extremists... you see in England there it's bigger...
when your looking at Derry or Belfast, it's as far as we
can see in union. (11)
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Quinn did not regard the formation of the ICTU as the watershed
in the development of a modus vivendi between the NUTGW and ITGWU In
Derry. He put greater emphasis on new
personalities.., the advent of Billy Lindsay INUTGW Branch
secretary from 1963] and people who weren't involved In the
breakaway, and I wasn't involved In the breakaway as such
and we came together.
In practice this coming together involved, 'agreement... that he
wouldn't take any members or go into any factories I was In and that
I would do the same.' Obviously, Quinn has a vested interest In
claiming the credit for the amelioration In relations between the
members of the two unions, but there Is a considerable amount of
evidence to support his suggestion that the advent of new officials
and activists who had not been involved in the breakaway contributed
to the amelioration of inter-union relations.
One of the implications of Quinn's suggestion is that Macgougan
and McGonagle, the old adversaries, were no longer involved in the
day to day affairs of their respective union Branches. It is true,
as I mentioned in the last section, McGonagle was less and less
involved in local union affairs during the latter part of the 1960s.
Macgougan too was less involved in the Derry scene than he had
previously been: following the conflicts of the 1950s Macgougan had
grown to dislike Derry, and once Billy Lindsay had established
himself as Branch secretary Macgougan was glad to leave local matters
to him. Macgougan told me that his favourite view of Derry was
through 'the rear view mirror of my car' - quite a change from the
newly appointed trade union official of 1945 who spoke so
enthusiastically about the potential f or union organisation in the
city, and who was so struck by the unemployment, poor housing, and
poverty which he found there that he wrote The Londonderry Air
(1948).
Mrs Henderson's experience and recollections supports Quinn's
view in various ways. Firstly, although she was prepared to accept a
lift in McGonagle's car she was never able to establish a co-
operative relationship with him,
He spoke and all that, but I never had very much time for
him. I passed myself with him but I never got real friends
with him.
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In contrast she told me that
Quinn was airight. I didn't have any, much, argument with
him.	 I sort-of respected him as a union man, but not
Stephen McGonagle, I've no time for him at all. 	 But I had
nothing against thing-we [Quinn]. We worked with him; we
talked about things and that, because we've been to vice-
versa with employers him and I.
Secondly, she told me,
Lindsay and him [Quinn] got on, in fact, I think they had
tte--ttes between themselves, the two of them. Of
course I suppose that's (to be expected]... but I don't
think Macgougan would have approved of it, because I don't
think Jack ever got over what McGonagle did. Willie
[Lyndsay] wasn't in the picture (when the breakaway took
place] and didn't know [about] it.
If she was referring to personal relations, then Mrs Henderson is
correct when she says that Macgougan never 'got over what McGonagle
did', but Macgougan did come to terms with McGonagle on a
professional level.	 Moreover, Macgougan was aware of Lindsay
	 and
Quinn's informal arrangement, 	 and accepted it: he told me 	 that
Lindsay and Quinn established 'unofficial spheres of influence.'
Of all my respondants, Miss Gallagher was the least positive
about inter-union relation in the 1960s, Eventually, she accepted
her union's recognition of the ITGWU and was prepared to 'sit with'
its members, but she was ever on her guard:
We got to a stage where we had to sit (with ITGWU
representatives at meetings]... it [the mutual antagonism]
gradually broke-down, because I remember some of the
education meetings that was called, Seamus Quinn was in
them.	 They used to be held up here in the park in the
[indistinct] institute. I remember having to go. It was
like a red rag to a bull going to the meeting: Seamus was
going to be there and you had to watch that you made a good
contribution to it, that you didn't let him do the talking,
and, like, as much to say that he was representing the
garment workers.
She was appreciative of the fact that McGonagle and Macgougan were
not involved in local affairs in the 1960s, but was not much more
amenable to Quinn than she had been to them she told me that she
still felt, 'a wee bit of prejudice there, I always shyed of him
[Quinn]: I thought he was behind the scenes all the time the strife
[around the time of the breakaway] was going on.'
For Miss Gallagher,	 inter-union relations only improved
significantly following a major upheaval in Harrison's factory. 	 By
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the late 1960s Harrison's, McCarthy's, and the Rosemount factories
had been acquired by the Viyella group of companies (see section
2.4). Viyella began to rationauise production in the early 1970s:
workers in Harrison's were given the opportunity to take jobs in the
Rosemount factory, and in 1973 HarrIson's city centre factory was
shut down and production was moved to a new factory in an Industrial
estate on the Waterside. Although these changes occurred after the
period with which I am concerned, it is worth examining why, from
Miss Gallagher's point of view, they led to an improvement in inter-
union relations because what she has to say tends to support what
Quinn told me about the advent of new personalities and the
development of what Macgougan called 'unofficial spheres of
influence.'
Three ITGWU shop stewards with whom Miss Gallagher found
relations particularly difficult left Harrison's during the upheaval.
She described two of these women as her 'arch enemies.' One of them
took early retirement, the other transferred to the Rosemount
factory; the third woman - Miss McMorrIs - also transferred to
Rosemount. With these three women gone, Miss Gallagher found that
inter-union rivalry diminished. Several of the women with whom Miss
Gallagher worked were members of the ITGWU, one, whom she called
Peggy, was quite friendly. The other ITGWU women used to give Peggy
their union dues and ask her for help if they had any problems, 'well
Peggy would ask my advice.., it worked out like that in the end.'12"
Moreover, Miss Gallagher and the new senior 11GW shop steward, I
shall call her Lily, came to an agreement about recruitment: Miss
Gallagher summed up the Improvement in inter-union relations In
Harrison's in the following way,
That antagonism with the union was dying out... Stephen's
shop stewards then, the Irish Transport [Union], we were
more kind of friendly, and then.., out in the new factory,
the majority of the Irish Transport were in the finishing
end, that's the laundry - you know, the dressing end of It
- well then I had more on the floor.., we took It that then
the laundry's the Irish Transport... I wouldn't have [tried
to organise there], like maybe if they [new workers) came
in [to the laundry] I'd have said, 'it's up to you [which
union you choose],' and then... Lily - she was Stephen's
shop steward - she would say, 'well, she's coming in with
me.' We got to the stage were we respected that... I
wouldn't [have tried to organise a woman] if she was in the
laundry unless she came to me. One or two of them did come
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to me, but they'd be maybe the Protestants... well, then
Lily and I got an understanding that she wouldn't oppose
that.
7.5 Conclusion
The history of trade unionism in the Derry shirt industry
throughout the 1950s and for much of the 1960s is a history of
factiousness and rivalry not just between the ITGWU and the NUTGW but
within the latter. Contrary to what traditional Irish marxism would
lead us to expect neither the inter-union nor the intra-union
conflict originated in sectarian differences. The conflict within
the NIJTGW arose out of two interlinked struggles for power and
influence, and the rivalry between the NUTGW and ITGWU arose out of
an ongoing competition for membership: the same kinds of tension
which have caused, and continue to cause, conflict within and between
trade unions elsewhere in the United Kingdom. Trade unionism in the
Derry shirt industry was no more susceptible to such tensions than
trade unionism elsewhwere. As I noted in the previous chapter,
labour historians and industrial sociologists have long recognised
that confict such as that which beset the Derry Branch of the NUTGW
is inherent in trade union government. Similarly, as I noted in
third section of this chapter (section 7.3), Lerner (1961) has shown
that when two trade unions claim the right to organise the same group
of workers - as was the case with the NUTGW and ITGWiJ in Derry -
bitter conflict often follows. Intra-union and inter-union conflicts
in Derry were, perhaps, unusual insofar as they tended to generate
and, in turn be exacerbated by, divisions of a political, and,
occasionally, sectarian nature. However, even in this respect trade
union conflict in the Derry shirt industry was not so very unusual.
Lerner (1961: 100), in her study of the secession of a section of the
London membership of the NUTGW in the 1930s, notes that
Certain religio-ethnic differences existed between London
and Leeds. In London, the non-Jewish members were usually
Protestants; in Leeds there existed a large Catholic
minority. Since Conley, Loughlin, and Sullivan were
Catholics and were identified with the Leeds national
headquarters, the national office was regarded by many
members as being Catholic controlled.	 The identification
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was never raised to a rational level, but rather was an
emotional identification, a feeling.
It is difficult to judge the extent to which all this strife had
an adverse effect on trade unionism in the Derry shirt industry.
After all, it is impossible to know how things would have turned out
had not the Derry Branch of the NUTGW seceeded in 1952. What can be
said is that inter-union conflict did not significantly inhibit union
officials and activists from performing their main role: defending
their members' interests vis-â-vis the employers. Indeed, on the
evidence presented in this chapter, it could be argued that the
competition between the two unions for members made officials and
activists more conscientious about taking up their members', and
potential members', grievances than would otherwise have been the
case. Moreover, during all my research I came across only one
episode in which the split between the NUTGW and ITGWU may have had
an adverse effect on workers' industrial interests. In 1981, Viyella
closed one of their Derry factories - the Rocolla factory situated in
the Creggan estate; many of the workers were made redundant, and some
protested against the closure by occupying the factory (see AP/RN 26
November 1981). I interviewed one of the women who was involved in
the occupation. She told me that the leaders of the occupation
sought support from workers in other local factories which were owned
by Viyella - that is, McCarthy's and Harrison's - but that the
forthcoming support was 'not great'. She felt that this was because
the other two factories were members of a different trade union: the
Rocolla factory was organised by the ITGWU, McCarthy's and Harrison's
were mainly organised by the NUTGW').
Inter-union rivalry may not have had an adverse effect on
collective bargaining, but it did have the effect of, in Roiston's
terminology, reconstituting sectarian divisions within trade
unionism: in the mid 1950s the ITGWU was a mainly Catholic
organisation, the NUTGW a mainly Protestant organisation, and
activists in both unions sought to prevent the other from expanding.
However, this pattern of, to use another of Rolston's phrases,
'sectarian trade unionism' did not last. 	 To be sure, the ITGWU
remained a mainly Catholic organisation, but it attracted some
Protestants, and the NUTGW attracted significant numbers of Catholics
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and Protestants. Moreover, the main factor underlying these changes
was that which Roiston dismisses: the self-consciously non-sectarian
activity of trade union activists and officials.
Thus, trade union activists and officials in the Derry shirt
industry revealed a capacity to accommodate conflicting identities
and interests. NUTGW activists found a way of, in Miss Gallagher's
words, 'agreeing to differ' among themselves, and there was a gradual
and uneven rapprochement between them and their counterparts in the
ITGWU. It is worth pointing out that my analysis of the
rapprochement between the NUTGW and the ITGWU contradicts another
aspect of Rolston's argument. Rolston presents the unification of
the Gill and ITUC as an essentially meaningless institutional
arrangement, but I have shown that it provided the initial impetus
for rapprochement between the NUTGW and ITGWU, and some of my
respondants felt that common membership of the ICTU was a significant
aspect in the amelioration of inter-union relations. However,
Ralston tacitly aknowledges that trade unionism in Northern Ireland
was capable of accommodating members with different religious and
political identities; indeed, one of his main arguments is that it
was precisely this kind of accommodation which resulted in the
political emasculation of the trade union movement; I will examine
this aspect of his argument further in the first section of the next,
and concluding, chapter.
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CHAPTER 8: TRADE UNIONISM AND SECTARIANISM IN THE DERRY SHIRT
INDUSTRY 1920-1968: AN HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL
CONCLUSION
8. 1 Introduction
In this study I have been concerned with the effect of
sectarianism on the development of trade unthnism. I elaborated this
problem and my approach to it in contradistinction to the theories of
trade unionism to be found in the literature on Northern Ireland.
According to the predominant theory, developed most cogently by
traditional Irish marxists, trade unionism was thwarted by
sectarianism. In chapter one I suggested that this theory had more
to do with the preconceptions of its authors than with social
reality. I showed that the traditional Irish marxist view of trade
unionism was based on reductionist and evolutionist assumptions, and
argued that the relationship between trade unionism and sectarianism
might be better understood with an approach in which it is
recognised, first, that trade unionism and sectarianism, like other
social institutions, are produced, reproduced, and changed through
the actions of actual Individuals; second, that while individuals
constitute society they are simultaneously constituted by society;
and third, that attention must be given to the meanings ascribed by
Individuals to their actions and predicaments.
My main purpose in this chapter is to assess the results of
applying this approach In the case of the Derry shirt industry.
There are, however, a set of outstanding issues which must first be
addressed. One of the attractions of the theoretical approach which
I outlined in chapter one is that by insisting that the relationship
between action and stucture should be understood as process in time
it offers the possiblity of uniting anthropology and sociology with
history (see Abrams, 1982: xv). In chapter two I situated my study
In relation to the years 1920 and 1968: both years were political
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turning points, and they delimit a particular era in the history of
Derry and of Ireland. The significance of 1920 is that it was the
year in which the legislative framework for the partition of Ireland
was introduced; and in chapter three I discussed the effect of the
political and military struggle between Unionists and nationalists in
Derry on the shirt cutters' strike and its aftermath. The
significance of 1968 is that it was the year in which the Civil
Rights Movement (CRM) emerged as a mass movement, and my thesis would
not be historically complete without some consideration of the impact
of civil rights protests on trade unionism in the Derry shirt
industry.	 After all, Derry was the 'crucible' (Purdie, 1987: 1) or
'main arena' (Curran, 1986: 55) of the protests. The CRM was the
first effective challenge to the sectarian structure of Northern
Irish society and politics: it was a new and progressive social
movement. In considering its impact on trade unionism in the shirt
industry we are therefore confronted with a question which lies at
the heart of the traditional Irish marxist thesis, and which I have
so far - deliberately - neglected: the question of the relationship
between trade unionism and progressive politics. The reader may
recall that traditional Irish marxists judge the trade union movement
in Northern Ireland as a failure because it did not give rise to a
viable socialist or progressive politics. I argued that this was the
wrong criterion: once the evolutionist and reductionist assumptions
of traditional Irish marxism are abandoned it becomes apparent that
there is no necessary connection between trade unionism and socialist
or progressive politics. Nevertheless, the substantive issues raised
by the traditional marxists concerning the relationship between trade
unionism and progressive politics in Northern Ireland, and the
alleged failure of the trade union movement to confront religious
inequality are important ones, and I will focus my discussion of
trade unionism in the shirt industry and the CRM around them.
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8.2 Trade Unionism in the Derry Shirt Industry, Socialist Politics,
and the CRIt the End of an Era
I discussed the political history of Derry at some length in
section 2.2; here I only wish to refresh the reader's memory. The
stalemate between Unionism arid nationalism which characterised
politics in Derry - and, indeed, the rest of Northern Ireland - after
1920 began to breakdown in the early 1960s when a series of
government decisions combined to create an unprecedented degree of
common purpose between Catholics and Protestants in the city.
Particularly important in this respect was the decision to locate the
New University of Ulster at Coleraine rather than Derry. The
'University f or Derry Action Committee' attracted support from both
the Unionist and Nationalist Parties but it was led by John Hume who,
according to most commentators, represented a new strand in Northern
Irish politics: young, moderate, middle-class Catholics who rejected
the Nationalist Party's exclusive emphasis on the border, and
believed in the possibility of reform within Northern Ireland.
However, following the failure of the university campaign the
political initiative was taken by people with a more radical outlook.
The radicals included members of the 'Derry Young Republican
Association' and of the Derry Branch of the NILP who shared the
conviction that Protestant and Catholic workers could be united on a
class basis in opposition to their conservative masters - Unionist
and nationalist, North and South. The 'quasi-marxist' rhetoric
(Purdie, 1987: 26) of the young radicals was novel in Derry in the
1960s, but they focused on the two most deeply felt and long-standing
grievances of Catholics in Derry: male unemployment and housing
shortages. It was their campaign against poor housing conditions
which attracted the most support. A Derry Housing Action Committee
(DHAC) was formed early in 1968, and it was this Committee which
invited the NICRA to march in Derry on 5 October.	 Police over-
reaction to the march turned the NICRA into a mass movement, and a
series of marches took place in Derry during the autumn of 1968. In
so far as this activity was organised, it was by the Derry Citizens
Action Committee (DCAC) not the radical left. The DCAC was a
cautious body composed of moderate Catholics and Protestants. It had
a dual purpose: to take the political initiative away from the
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radicals and to ensure that protest marches did not get out of hand.
It was quite successful in both respects, but it was unable to
prevent the deterioration in relations between Protestants and
Catholics in Derry which, according to Curran (1986: 108), became
increasingly marked following the march by members of Peoples
Democracy (PD) from Belfast to Derry in January 1969. The PD was a
student based organisation which had close links with the radical
left in Derry. The march, as the organisers expected, was attacked
by loyalists en route, and their arrival in Derry triggered a police
riot in the Bogside.
None of the unions which had members inthe Derry shirt industry
formally supported the CRM. On the afternoon of 18 November 1968
approximately 1, 000 Catholic women shirtmakers abandoned their work
to defy a government ban on marches through the city centre. Eamonn
McCann, one of the most prominent of the radicals, estimated that
there were 'up to 19 separate marches' involving women shirtmakers.
The marchers included many union members - not Just of the ITGWU but
also of the British based NUTGW. However, neither union sanctioned
the strike. Indeed, it would seem that the CRM and the issues which
it raised were never even discussed by the Derry Branch Committees of
the NUTGW and ITGWU. This lack of official union involvement was not
because the full-time officers and activists disagreed with the
demands of the civil rights protestors. As we have seen, Macgougan,
McGonagle, and Hamill - senior full-time officers of the NUTGW, ITGWU
and ATGWU respectively - were among the most prominent anti-
partitionist labour politicians of the post-war era, and had
frequently drawn attention to the issue of discrimination against
Catholics in Northern Ireland. Seamus Quinn, McGonagle's deputy
organiser, and all the union activists whom I interviewed indicated
some degree of sympathy with the cause of civil rights. Seamus Quinn
participated in the 5 October march, and Miss McMorris, a member of
the Derry Branch Committee of the ITGWU, shared the keen sense of
injustice about the Unionist domination of Derry which made the city
the focus of the CRMC1).	 Even Miss Gallagher and Mrs Henderson -
pro-Union NUTGW activists - revealed some concern for the issues
raised by the civil rights protestors. 	 The former told me that
'there was a time when things wasn't equal' between Protestants and
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Catholics in Derry;	 the latter took part in the 5 October
demonstration. These were the leaders of trade unionism in the Derry
shirt industry;	 why did they not seek to add the weight of their
organisations to the civil rights movement?
The first explanation which we must consider is that implicit in
Roiston' s (1980) model of trade unionism in Northern Ireland as an
essentially 'economistic' institution. According to Roiston, trade
unions in Northern Ireland have 'done little to confront issues on
which labour movements in other societies might be expected to
agitate' (1980: 81); the issues to which he refers include those
subsumed under the phrase 'class politics' and those to do with
religious inequality in or outside the workplace and repression (cf
Munck, 1986: 86). He concedes that the NIC-ICTU and the NILP
submitted demands for one man one vote and the repeal of the Special
Powers Act to the government in 1964, but he dismisses this as being
out of character - the work of a few communist trade unionists who
were unrepresentative of the movement a whole. It is this political
emasculation which, by Roiston's lights, makes the union movement in
Northern Ireland a failure, and he sees it as an inevitable
consequence of sectarianism among the working class: 'the taking (of]
political stances outside purely trade union issues' by trade union
leaders 'would certainly drive away one or other section of the
divided clientele' (1980: 73). As I have made clear, I disagree with
Roleton's view that an inability to pursue class politics or
effectively challenge discriminatory or repressive legislation makes
Northern Ireland trade unionism a failure, or even that it sets it
apart from trade union movements in other times arid places.
Nevertheless it is worth re-examining the history of trade unionism
in the shirt industry in the 1950s and 1960s to see, first, whether
the officials and activists behaved according to Rolston's model and
suppressed their political views for fear of driving 'away one or
other section of their divided clientele', and, second, to what
extent this explains the lack of official involvement in the CRM.
Of the the three unions with members in the shirt industry, the
ATGWIJ, which had the least number of shirt workers as members,
conforms most closely to Roiston's model.	 George Hamill became an
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ATGWIJ offical in 1950. The reader may recall that at the time of his
appointment Hamill was a leading member of the Northern Ireland
section of the IrLP, and that shortly after his appointnment he was
asked by the regional organiser of the union to desist from his
political activities because Protestant bus workers were threatening
to leave the union. Hamill complied and the Protestant bus workers
remained loyal to the union. However, it is worth noting that Hamill
was, to some extent, a willing victiriu at the 1985 conference of the
Irish Labour History Society (ILHS) he was asked why he left the
IrLP, he replied: 'when you fought two or three elections and got
such a bloody hammering.., you get depressed sometimes'' 2 '. Hamill's
only notable public association with the CRM was when he sent a
telegram to Harold Wilson at the behest of several hundred dockers
who marched to the offices of the ATGWU to protest about the way in
which the police had dealt with one of the many demonstrations which
followed the 5 October march.
As we saw in the last chapter, the opposition to Macgougan's
politics from the Derry membership of the NUTGW was even more intense
than that experienced by Hamill. Like Hamill, Macgougan was a
prominent member of the IrLP, but in this case the pressure came from
both Catholic and Protestant activists. They resented his left-wing
views, and his attempts to high-light religious inequality in
Northern Ireland; moreover, they felt that his poitical activities
were inhibiting their efforts to recruit new members. Macgougan was
in a stronger position than Hamill - he was his own boss, answerable
only to a British National Executive which was sympathetic to his
political views - and refused to give in to the demand that he
curtail his political activities.	 He retired from active politics
some years later because he was disillusioned with the IrLP:
Electoral defeats convinced me (at last) that there was no
hope for a non-sectarian, socialist, nationally minded
political body. It was only pressure from friends that
persuaded me to defend the Falls council seat in 1959 - the
Irish Labour Party the North was only a small group.
(correspondence May 1987).
Initially, the Northern Ireland section of the IrL? had had some
spectacular successes: in the local government elections of 1949 IrLP
candidates won seven seats in the Belfast wards of Falls and
Smithfield, and secured control of Newry and Warenpoint Councils; in
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the 1951 Jack Beattie, the Party treasurer, was elected MP
(Westminster) for West Belfast.	 However, as Farrell points out
(1980: 223), the Party 'quickly began to fall apart.'	 He describes
the process as follows (1980: 223-224):
Frank Hanna MP left almost immediately having secured his
seat in Belfast Central. Early in 1951 there was a violent
split between Harry Diamond and the majority led by Jack
Beattie arid Jack Macgougan. It was at least partly over
the majority's call for changes in the ultra-Catholic laws
and constitution in the South.
In subsequent elections official IrLP candidates were opposed by
members of the Diamond-Henna group:
In the 1958 Stormont Election the official Party again
failed to win a single seat and a few months later they
were all... eliminated in the Corporation elections by a
new Catholic group led by Hanna. Beattie died a few months
later and the Irish Labour Party faded from the scene in
the North.
Under the pressure of Orange sectarianism they had been
forced to confine themselves to Catholic ghettos, only to
be shattered and destroyed by the virulent anti-communism
arid anti-socialism of the Catholic Church of the 1950s and
ghetto sectarianism against a mainly Protestant-led Party.
In the 1960s Macgougan devoted himself to trade union work: he was
President of the ITUC 1963-64, and in 1968 he was elected general
secretary of the NUTGW. Macgougan left for England just as the CRM
was gathering momentum.
Contrary to what Roiston would have us believe, Macgougan' s
controversial political stance did not 'drive away' members: as we
have seen, NUTGW membership increased amongst both Catholics and
Protestants. In two other respects, however, the case of the Derry
Branch of the NUTGW confirms Roiston's argument. In the first place,
Macgougan's experiences in Derry altered his view of the relationship
between trade unionism and politics. 	 Macgougan was a political
activist before he was union official. Prior to his appointment as
Irish Regional Organiser of the NUTGW, he worked f or an accountancy
firm, and one of the main attractions of the NUTGW job was that he
thought it would allow more scope for his political activity. In one
sense he was right: several of the people who worked In the Belfast
headquarters of the union - particularly his secretary, Ann McKenna -
were sympathetic to his politics and made it easier for him to cope
with the heavy work load generated by his various roles: union
- 307 -
official, secretary of the Northern Section of the IrLP, arid member
of Belfast Corporation. However, following the conflict in the Derry
Branch Macgougan came to regard his union work and his political
activity as distinct aspects of his life which did not 'mix'. He did
not use union platforms to air his political views, nor did he
attempt to proselytise NUTGW members.
Secondly, as a direct result of the conflict over Macgougan's
politics, members of the Derry Branch Committee decided to exclude
political matters from their meetings. As the reader may recall, the
conflict was very bitter, and the Commmittee members felt that any
further discussion of contentious political issues would make it
impossible f or them to continue working with each other, and would
alienate potential recruits. It was f or these reasons that the
Branch never discussed the issues raised by the CRM - the
gerrymander, discrimination in the allocation of houses, and in
public employment, Miss Gallagher told me:
Those political things [were] not discussed, the only time
was when the Committee [was] totally against Macgougan.
Mary Pollock did raise a racket - she was a true Unionist -
but I agreed with them at times... We talked among
ourselves when visiting, we could put our point of view
[then]... (but] with the union you had to keep things
stable because we'd never have got the Catholics back if
we'd been dealing with politics.
Thus, NUTGW activists adopted an, in Roiston's terms, 'economistic'
attitude to their union activities: they voted against Derry Trades
Council affiliating to the National Council for Civil Liberties
(Minute: 1 November 1960); when Mrs Henderson and Margaret Davis
(pseudonym), the Branch officer's secretary, attended the 5 October
demonstration, they did so only in a personal capacity; and both Mrs
Henderson and Miss Gallagher opposed those shirtmakers who wanted to
leave work to join civil rights demonstrations. The former told them
that 'your work has nothing to do with that.' The latter tried to
persuade them not to leave the factory by drawing their
attention to the fact that we weren't going to get the work
out and we weren't going to get orders - you couldn't say
you were against civil rights.
Miss Gallagher tried to set an example to other NUTGW members:
We were on strike on days and [I] kept them at the work.
When the trouble started they were pulling us out as well -
it was political. If there was a march or something, if
you went in [to work], they'd say 'is Kathy Gallagher going
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in?' Well I would go no matter. I always went to my work.
The only political campaign in which NUTGW members participated In an
official capacity was the university campaign.
	
This probably
reflects the fact that it was a comparatively uncontentious issue.
According to Mrs Henderson,
All of Derry was very bitter about that (the New University
of Ulster being located at Coleraine] Irrespective [of
religion or politics]... I was at the meeting in the
Guildhall.
And Miss Gallagher told me:
I was one of the people went to Stormont [to protest about
university decision]. The union was involved.., a crowd
went from McCarthy's, but not many - they were one-sided
too. We had a good Committee going, very genuine people,
Lily Hughes and they went from Hunter's (factory] and she
was very opposite - wasn't a nationalist by any means - but
she put Derry first... I was picked from my department, I
was the only NUTGW shop steward at the time. The other
girls were picked by drawing names out of a hat, some of
them were only teenagers, not an ideal choice: they said
they would go but they were no more interested in
universities - [to them it] was just a day out. Harrison's
put a car at our disposal, and Mr Harrison's chauffeur.
McGonagle found it easier to combine his job as organisirig
secretary of the ITGWU in Derry with his political activities than
did either Hamill or Macgougan. Like Hamill and Macgougan, Stephen
McGonagle was a prominent member of the IrLP, but he left the Party
following his resignation from the NUTGW and devoted several years to
the task of establishing the breakaway union. He returned to active
politics in 1958 when he stood against Eddie McAteer, the leader of
the Nationalist Party, in the Northern Ireland (ie Stormont) general
election of that year. 	 He repeated the challenge in the Stormont
elections of 1962. 	 According to George Hamill, both election
campaigns were funded by the ITGWU. 	 Moreover, although McGonagle
stood as an Independent Labour candidate, he received the tacit
support of most ITGWU activists in Derry. 	 In section 6.2 I noted
that several of the most prominent members of the ITGWU in Derry,
Lawrence Hegarty, Paddy Hamill, and Barney Donaghey shared
McGonagle's anti-partitionist labour views. The two ITGWU activists
in my sample of respondants, Miss Cosgrave and Miss McMorris, also
supported McGonagle in his campaigns against McAteer.
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Despite these propitious circumstances, McGonagle lost both
elections.	 He polled well on both occasions: in 1958 he received
5,238 votes, in 1962 he got	 However, by all accounts, not
many of these votes came from his members In the shirt industry.
George Hamill supported McGonagle in the 1962 election campaign. At
the 1985 ILHS conference, Hamill was asked about the role of trade
unions in labour politics in Derry. He replied:
I'm afraid the trade unions didn't play a very big role.
You had a lot of prominent trade unionists like McGonagle
and myself... and Pat McGowan who did take an active part.
But the trade unions as such? I remember the time even
when McGonag].e stood in the latter stages, later on in the
1960s, and he had a strong organisation of... factory
girls, he was well known and done good. work for them as a
trade unionist. I went down to man the booth, but the
factory girls all came up with Nationalist cards to vote
Nationalist against McGonagle despite the fact that he was
their trade union official and done good ground-work in the
factories for them. There was no strong organisation of
labour people. You had a party of about 30 or 40 and that
was nearly our height at any particular time. And you got
a bit of support in the [mainly Catholic] South Ward (but]
when I fought in the Waterside [during the 1949 local
elections] I wouldn't say there was more than half a dozen
labour men in the Waterside Ward. It was a strong Unionist
area. The only reason I saved my deposit was because the
nationalists had nobody else to vote for but the labour
people and they weren't going to do that only they were
persuaded: it was a clergy man that knew me who persuaded
them to go out and vote for me.
Miss Cosgrave explained McGonagle's failure to translate his
popularity as a union leader into votes in the following way:
There again there was this trend of religion again, and
this trend of anybody voting against the Nationalist.
Let's put it that way:	 they didn't know how good a man
they were getting.	 But it was this old tradition of
Unionism and nationalism, and it was a crime not to vote
nationalism.	 (I] Never voted [for the Nationalist Party],
I voted labour all my life because I was interested in the
labour and I thought they were doing a good job, but this
is one of the reasons (that the women didn't vote for him]
because he was standing against (the] Nationalist.
Miss McMorris told me,
Well, you see, nationalis[m] very strong. I know people
[who] said, 'Stephen's a very good man and I'm with him
whole-heartedly as a trade union member, but no, never
(vote for him].' And that's the way they said it - a bit
like the present-day Unionist and 'No Surrender' type of
thing.
Miss McMorris herself, found it difficult enough to decide who to
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vote for.	 She recalled that prior to the 1962 election McGonagle
had asked her what she thought about him standing against Mchteer:
He [McGonagle] meant like would it interfere with my
national minded[ness], I said it did not - I was in the
office (and] he asked me how I felt about it - but my
father was a strong nationalist even though he was a strong
labour man, but nationalist overrided [labour). He said
he'd only vote labour within the 32 counties because labour
was very important only for the country, but, like, there
was a whole lot of people were brought up the way I was:
whatever your father voted you voted or else it would be
murder.	 But I went in and told my father I was voting
labour... and he says back to me... he says, 'alright, I
don't mind.'	 I didn't have to tell him anyhow when you
think back.
	 But, I just says to him, 'don't be asking me
to vote nationalist, I'm voting labour,' well he says to
me, 'as long as you don' t vote the Communist Party.' 	 You
know, it was in him, although his own father was a
Protestant.	 My grandfather McMorris was a Belfast
Protestant.
Following his defeat in 1962 McGonagle gave up electoral
politics, and he advised his assistant, Seamus Quinn, against
challenging McAteer in the 1967 Stormont Election. Quinn ignored his
advice, fought the election and lost (he recieved 4,300 votes).
Quinn recalled the election campaigns against McAteer in the
following way:
There were sections (of the shirt workforce that] the
Nationalist Party had; you know, even though they were
members of our union they were agin [us] - like Tillie and
Henderson (workers] I remember sending a telegram - that
sort of things: they weren't all for us.
In this light it is perhaps not surprising that although most ITGWU
activists shared a common political outlook with their officials, and
although the union as a whole was more homogeneous in its religious
composition than was the NIJTGW, political issues were not usually
discussed at Committee meetings. Both McGonagle and Quinn were
prominent in the University campaign, and the former made occasional
attempts to high-light the need for reform within Northern Ireland
(eg Irish Weekly 8 October 1964), but neither man associated
themselves or their union with the CRM. As I pointed out in the
last chapter, McGonagle devoted increasing amounts of his time to
union affairs at regional and national level during the 1960s, and
gradually delegated responsibility f or local matters to Quinn. When
Quinn marched on 5 October, he did so as an 'individual' not as an
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officer of the ITGWU. And although the Branch Committee quietly
approved of shirt workers who left their work to join civil rights
demonstrations, there was, according to Quinn, 'no question of an
official attitude.
To sum up. The histories of the Derry Branches of the ATGWU,
NUTGW, and ITGWU show that the relationship between union activity
and politics Is more complex than Rolston allows f or. Nevertheless
they each conform, to a greater or lesser extent, to his model of
economism: trade union officials and activists agreed to exclude
consideration of contentious political issues from Branch Committee
meetings because they did not want to offend-their colleagues and the
wider membership. And this economism goes some way towards
explaining why officials and activists, many of whom were sympathetic
to the concerns articulated by the CRM, did not attempt to secure
official union backing for the civil rights protests. However, to
simply attribute the lack of union involvement in the CRM to the
habitual timidity of trade union officials and activists would be to
do them an injustice; more importantly, it would be to misrepresent
the situation.	 After all, trade union officials and activists were
not the only actors in the situation.	 The CRM was not simply a
unitary set of progressive ideas which trade unionists choose to act,
or not act, upon. On the contrary, the CRM resembles what some
writers, following Foucault, refer to as a discursive formation: 'an
arena of noisy speech and action in which different perspectives on
the world clash, displacing and decentering each other' (Kapferer,
1988: 97). We need to look more closely at the nature of the CRM and
the way it related to the world of trade unionism.
The issues at the heart of the protest movement in Derry in the
1960s were the university, discrimination in housing, and Protestant
domination of local government. These issues, particularly the last
two, were undoubtedly of immediate concern to many shirt workers, but
they were remote from the workplace and the world of trade
unionism'. The failure to establish a link between the concerns of
the CRM and the concerns of trade unionism was not the fault of union
activists and officials alone: the leaders of the various campaigns
and committees which preceded the CRM showed little interest in the
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trade union movement.	 For example, Miss Gallagher described	 the
'University For Derry' motorcade to Stormont in the following way:
a day wasted, we got no further than the lawn... Not so
many trade unionists there... Glover was the mayor...
everybody put him to be one-sided, he was blamed for not
pushing the issue. Stephen (McGonagle) was for it (ie
supported the campaign] and went to the protest, and a few
of his union.., were all for it... I wasn't very enamoured
with the company I was in, there weren't alot of trade
union minded people [there).
Two main groups contended for the leadership of the emergent
CRM moderates, like John Hume, who formed the Citizens Action
Committee (DCAC) and who saw the CRM as an attempt to secure basic
civil rights for the citizens of Northern Ireland; and young
republicans and socialists who thought of it as a way of uniting the
working class, and who had the longer term goal of a workers'
republic. In the days after 5 October, some of the radicals began to
visit shirt factories with the Intention of persuading shirt workers
to join the protest movement. McCann, for example, told me that the
marches by shirt workers in November 1968 were not completely
spontaneous: I ran into factories, I went to the Rosemount
(factory], stood on a chair and they followed me out.
There were about 19 separate marches In defiance of Craig's
(Minister for Home Affairs] ban (on marches).
However, the young radicals did not seek the co-operation of either
the ITGWU or the NUTGW, and their relations with union officials and
activists were strained.
To say that relations between the young radicals and the two
main NUTGW activists in Derry, Miss Gallagher and Mrs Henderson, were
strained is, in fact, an understatement. A more appropriate word to
describe the feelings of these two women towards the radicals would
be loathing. Mrs Henderson expressed a strong distaste for the
radicals' life-style; Miss Gallagher disagreed with their socialism
and found their attitude to her alarming.
	
Underlying both women's
feelings, however, was a belief that the radicals were Irish
republicans.	 As I mentioned above, Mrs Henderson supported the
'University for Derry Campaign' and took part in the 5 October
demonstration.	 This indicates that she had some sympathy f or the
demands which fueled the CRM.
	
Now, however, after 20 years of
violence, she thinks that the situation in Derry
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would have been alright, they [Catholics] brought it [poor
housing and unemployent] on themselves, they went the wrong
way about it (redressing the situuation].
And her main reason for telling me that she attended the 5 October
demonstration was to explain why she did not support the CRM:
I was walking in that march myself... Betty Sinclair (a
prominent Belfast Communist and one of the members of the
original NICRA steering committee] asked for it to be
peaceful, but I seen a section of the crowd lifting stones
- there was a building site - they threw them, and all
(hell] broke loose... The police were attacked first... I
realised then that that was the start of the IRA
movement.
Mrs Henderson's opposition to Catholic workers in McCarthy's who
wanted to abandon their work to take part in demonstrations was not
only a reflection of her desire to distance the NUTGW from their
action, nor was it simply because she could not see any intrinsic
connection between industrial action and the CRM ('your work has
nothing to do with that'): it expressed her deep suspicion of what
the CRM was about. Today she is glad that she left the shirt
industry before the strikes and walk-outs which followed events like
Bloody Sunday: 'I wouldn't have lasted, I wouldn't have let them
walk-out (Mrs Henderson became a forewoman in the late 1960s, see
Appendix 1].'
As we have seen, Miss Gallagher also attempted to dissuade those
members of the NUTGW in Harrison's factory who wanted to leave work
to support the CR14. She too had suspicions about the Intentions of
the radicals, but she did not voice them - 'you couldn' t say you were
against civil rights.' Nevertheless, she claims that the radicals
attempted to discredit her:
You had the like of Eamonn McCann and his party came to see
me, three young men. And they came specially - it was an
awful thing - they wrote a whole ditty on me and what I was
trying to do and they named me and passed this bill head to
everybody going out [of the factory]. It was some of those
socialist crowd. I was very shocked at that... I had a
very unpleasant time for the last 10 years of my stay in
Harrison's... they thought I was pro-British, that was the
crux of the matter
During one of my first interviews with Miss Gallagher she implied
that the young men who came to see her favoured the ITGWU as opposed
to the British based NUTGW, but in a later interview she told me that
they were equally critical of both organisations
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You had the like of Eamonn McCann snooping about... and
sending some of these chaps to the door to see if they
could get hold of me... they put this question to you,
'what's the union doing f or you?' You know. They didn't
want you... it wasn't f or the sake of that he wanted us to
go to Stephen's (McGonagle's union]... it was like the
union's no good to us - that type of thing - [that] they
weren't doing anything for us... He wouldn't have been
pushing for [the ITGWU]... he sort of had his own principle
about it.
A difference in political perspective was also the main cause of
strain between the radicals in the CRM and ITGWU officials and
activists. In this case, however, the problem was not to do with
national identity - ITGWU activists and officials were, as we have
seen, opposed to partition too. Rather, it seems to have been rooted
In a tension between labourism and revolutionary socialism. 	 Quinn
told me:
We were oul Uncle Toms according to them (the radicals]...
but we never got hostile, but, nevertheless, we never had
much to do with them.
Miss McMorris expressed strong views about Bernadette Devlin - then a
member of PD, and closely aligned with the Derry radicals -
See when I used to hear Bernadette Devlin talking about
being a shop [steward] I used to see red, it's a wonder I
didn't have blood pressure. I used to see red at anybody
talked about (being] a shop steward or a trade uriiori(Ist]
that never sat their backside in it, or worked as a shop
steward. They hadn't a clue. They're as far removed as we
are now from heaven.
Miss McMorris's dislike of Bernadette Devlin was, in part, an
expression of their different experiences - the one a factory worker
who felt insecure about her education (see chapter six passim), the
other a university student - but it seems to me that it must also be
seen in the context of Miss McMorris's general suspicion of left-wing
ideas. She described the response of a member of the CPI to a speech
which she gave at an ICTU conference in the following way:
All my life I was whispering like 'he's a communist,' and I
remember this man Barr shook his fist at me, meaning -
making the fist [demonstrating a salute] - fantastic speech
I gave! [laughs]... I'm In a religious organisatlon now,
but the fact Is... communls[m has]... good points, airight,
maybe they went too far. There's so many different aspects
of that, that when you say communist you have to understand
what you're talking about, not ignorant the way most of us
are brought up... I was introduced to one [a communist]...
at the last [ICTIJ] conference I was at... I shook hands
with him and I said, 'that's the first communist I shook
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hands with'; he was there as a delegate.
Certainly, McCann felt that a suspicion of left-wing ideas was
something which inhibited his efforts in Derry: he pointed out that
there was 'never any radical tradition in Derry, never any Communist
Party,' but he also felt that 'we made a bad job of explaining,' and
linked this to the fact that many of the young radicals in Derry were
from a 'university milieu' or had spent time in England -
we failed to explain; it seemed that we were just against
everything, we didn' t get it across that what we were doing
was part of a coherent world view.
Thus, although the radicals sought to mobilise shirt workers in
support of the CRM, they were at odds with trade union officials and
activists. This was not simply because of the latter's economism;
that is, their desire to keep politics out of the workplace and out
of their unions. To be sure, the trade unionists were suspicious of
the radical's politics: NUTGW activists regarded them as anti-
British, and ITGWU activists were unsypathetic to their revolutionary
socialist ideas. However, the radicals were equally suspicious of
the trade union officials and activists: they regarded them as, In
McCann's words, 'conservative trade unionists' or 'bureaucrats', and
made no effort to cultivate them.	 Moreover, to judge from Miss
Gallagher's recollections, union activists seem to have, correctly,
interpreted	 the radicals' intervention as a threat to their
authority.
The moderates of the DCAC - many of whom were business men (see
Curran, 1986: 86) - were uneasy about shirt workers leaving their
work to participate in demonstrations and called for an end to all
unplanned marches (see Purdie, 1987: 44). However, although eager to
marginalise the radicals, the moderates did not make common cause
with officials and activists of the NUTGW and ITGWU. On the
contrary, they seem to have gone to some lengths to prevent trade
unionists from becoming Involved in the CRM. For example, Quinn
claimed, 'I was elected to the Committee of 15 [ie the DCAC], but It
was seen to In the Guildhall that I didn't get on (the committee).' I
asked, 'by whom?' He replied:
I'll not say... everybody knew... the tellers voted me
down.	 It was only on a show of hands and I was clearly
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elected, but we didn't make an issue of it.	 That [the
Committee of 15] was Hume and all those people.
To sum up. The full-time officers of the unions which organised in
the Derry shirt industry were among the most prominent and energetic
left-wing politicians in Northern Ireland during the post war period.
They articulated a moderate form of labour-nationalism, but were
never able to secure the support of more than a few of their union
members. Aware of the fact that most of their members were
unsympathetic to their political ideals, the officers pursued their
union careers and their political ambitions more or less separately.
Union activists also tended to avoid contentious political issues
when acting in their capacity as Branch Committee members: they too
were aware that their particular views might not be shared by the
wider membership; NUTGW activists, in particular, learnt that to
raise political issues in Branch Committee meetings was to risk
alienating some of their colleagues. 	 To this extent, the trade
unions which organised in the Derry shirt industry were, in Roslton's
terms, economistic. The lack of official union involvement in the
CRM can, in part, be explained in terms of this economism. However,
It is important to recognise that the CRM was not just a set of
progressive demands but a mass movement in which people with
different perspectives clashed and competed f or power. The various
contenders had, for different reasons, little time for trade
unionism; they acted without regard for trade union activists, and,
In some instances, in ways which seem to have been calculated to
exclude them from active involvement in the protest movement. Thus,
in this case at least, the lack of official union support for the
undoubtedly progressive demands of the CRM cannot be seen simply as a
failure on the part of trade union activists and officials.
Moreover, the fact that neither the NUTGW or the ITGWU were
associated with the CRM had a positive sequel: trade unionism in the
shirt industry remained intact despite the deterioraration in
Catholic-Protestant relations which followed the events of autumn and
winter 1968. The NUTGW retained its mixed religious membership, and
relations between the officers and activists of the NUTGW and ITGWIJ
continued to Improve.
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It have no desire to use the material presented in this section
to make generalisations about the relationship between trade
unionism, labourism, and socialist politics in Northern Ireland: my
respondants were not choosen with this purpose in mind, and, as I
argued in section 1.2, one of the obstacles to understanding trade
unionism in Northern Ireland has been the tendency for it to get
submerged in debates about the nature of local politics. However, it
is worth re-emphasising the point that the inability of trade union
officials - most of whom were, as we have seen, prominent labour
politicians - to interest more than a few of their members In broader
labour politics, and their consequent tendency to separate their
trade union careers from their political -activity, does not make
trade unionism in Northern Ireland so very different from trade
unionism elsewhere, For example, Watson notes (1988: 171-172) that
none of the British union officials whom she interviewed suggested:
that their role as union officers was to act to bring about
revolutionary social transformation. The majority were
active Labour Party members Involved In wider campaigns at
local and national level against discrimination and
inequality in society. But their work as union officers
was seen to take place within the framework of the existing
structures of society...
The Indirect position of officers encouraged them to take a
broader and longer term view than members. They regretted
that their members tended to 'think Individually not
collectively' which was seen not to be a 'proper trade
union attitude'... (They] argued that members were
generally concerned only with getting the best for
themselves in their own limited context.
8.3 Trade Unionism and Sectarianism In the Derry Shirt Industry: a
Conclusion
In chapter one I posed the question: to what extent and in what
ways was the development of trade unionism in the Derry shirt
industry 1920-1968 influenced by sectarianism? I am now in a
position to attempt an overall answer to that question.
The Protestant-Catholic dichotomy loomed large in the
recollections of my respondants. It was taken for granted that most
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factory owners and managers were Protestants. 	 It was also widely
thought that Protestants were over-represented in the better paid and
supposedly more skilled jobs associated with shirt cutting. The
women workers who constituted the bulk of the workforce were
described as being 'segregated' by religion such that a few
particular factories were identified with the Protestant community.
Statistical information relating to the religious composition of the
shirt industry is sparse, but each of these generalisations is
consistent with the overall history of the industry, and, were
possible, was corroborated with respect to documentary sources.
Although keenly aware of sectarianism as an enduring pattern of
differentiation in the shirt industry and the wider community, my
respondants did not regard sectarian differences between shirt
workers as a problem in relation to trade unionism until the
secession of the Derry Branch of the NUTGW in 1952 (see sections 4. 1
and 4.4).	 My analysis of union growth and structure in the 1920s,
1930s, and 1940s largely confirmed this view. During this period,
and indeed both before and after it, the most obvious organisatiorial
division among shirt workers was that between shirt cutters on the
one hand, and shirtmakers and finishers on the other: the former were
members of the ATGWIJ, the latter were members of the NUTGW.
Although most of the shirt cutters who joined the ATGWU were
Protestants and Unionists, this was not a sectarian division: the
Derry Branch of the ATGWU was led by Catholics and the core of the
Branch were dockers and carters who were traditionally a mainly
Catholic and strongly nationalist group of workers. 	 The initial
defection of shirt cutters to the ATGWU was triggered by a strike
which took place in 1920 (see section 3. 4). The rationale for the
defection was that the ATGWU, largely because of the dockers' ability
to embargo shirt factories, was a more powerful union than the NUTGW
(see section 5.2). This was true at the time; however, both the
original defection and the subsequent determination of most shirt
cutters to remain members of the ATGWU was shown to based in a
concern to maintain their separate identity as skilled men amid a
predominantly female workforce in a context where the skilled and
masculine status of their trade was uncertain and threatened (see
section 5.4).	 As I pointed out in chapter five, this kind of
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exciusivism is a familiar feature in the history of trade unionism in
the British Isles and elsewhere.
Union membership among women shirt workers reached a peak in
1919, declined in the 1920s and 1930s, and increased prodigiously
after 1945. This pattern of decline and growth was in line with
United Kingdom trends, and the institutional factors influencing it -
labour market conditions, union-management relations, the
effectiveness of internal union organisation - were shown to be more
or less the same as those affecting union membership elsewhere (see
sections 4.1 and 4.2). Moreover, contrary to those theories which
suggest that trade unionism in Northern Ireland was underdeveloped
because of sectarian divisions among workers, the density of trade
unionism among women shirtmakers in Derry compared favourably with
those in the British clothing industry generally. In view of the
importance which feminist historians and sociologists have attached
to women's subordinate position in the family, and prevailing ideas
about it, as a barrier to their involvement in trade unionism, it
might be thought that the organisation of women in Derry was made
easier because, by all accounts, female shirtmakers there were often
the main family breadwinner. In fact, the extent of role-reversal
between men and women in Derry families is exaggerated in popular
beliefs, and it would seem that married, and younger single, women in
Derry were no more inclined, or able, to get involved in trade
unionism than their sisters elsewhwere: trade union activists tended
to be older single women (see section 4.3). 	 However, the popular
idea of women-as-breadwinners may have contributed to the
unionisation of women in an indirect way. The prodigious growth in
NUTGW membership in the late 1940s was largely the result of the
efforts of the two full-time union organisers - Jack Macgougan and
Stephen McGonagle - who were appointed in 1945 and 1947 respectively.
Their enthusiasm for the organisation of women workers contrasts with
the indifference which, it is said (see Charles, 1983), often
characterises the attitude of male union officials towards their
female members.	 The enthusiasm of Jack Macgougari and Stephen
McGonegle was shown to be linked to an appreciation of the
importance of women's wages in the shirt industry to their families
and to the local economy more generally.
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This is not to suggest that trade unionism in the Derry shirt
industry was unaffected by sectarianism as a pervasive social
division, or untainted by sectarian antagonism between shirt workers.
I will consider the latter aspect first. Religious and political
differences between shirt workers were, for the most part, latent,
My respondants remarked on a heightening of tension on the 12 July,
12 August, and 'poppy day' - all dates which are of particular
symbolic Importance to Protestants, but they recalled no occasion
when these tensions gave rise to overt conflict or disrupted union
activity. In fact, they recalled only two occasions when sectarian
antagonism came to the fore. The first occurred in 1954 when members
of the ITGWU struck against the employment of a member of the NUTGW
In the laundry department in Harrison's factory (see section 6.5).
The second occurred in 1962 when NUTGW members broke a strike by
ITGWU members in McCarthy's factory (see section 7.3). The division
between the NIJTGW and the ITGWU was sectarian to the extent that the
former, a British based and oriented union, was, for a time, a mainly
Protestant organisation, and the latter, an Irish based union, was
mainly Catholic. However, the organisational cleavage was not,
itself, the result of sectarian divisons among shirt workers; rather,
It arose In the course of a secessionary movement which developed out
of an intra-union power struggle. As I noted In chapter six and
chapter seven, such power struggles are endemic in trade unionism
(see James, 1984: 113), and when they give rise to a breakaway union,
then, relations between the breakaway and the established union
usually become characterised by rivalry and bitterness (see Lerner,
1961: 197). Both of the aforementioned strikes arose out of such an
inter-union rivalry. Thus, in the case of the Derry shirt industry
sectarian antagonisms were activated by inter-union rivalry which was
Itself the result of a fairly typical trade union power struggle.
This is a very significant conclusion. Its significance is that
it Inverts the causal relationship between sectarianism and trade
unionism which most scholars have postulated. The usual argument,
developed most by traditional Irish marxists, is that sectarian
conflict in the workplace - caused by competition for, and
discrimination In the allocation of, jobs, or by ruling class
manipulation, or by a combination of both - Inhibited the development
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of trade unionism. However, as we saw in section 4.4, discrimination
in the allocation of women's jobs was not a contentious issue between
Protestants and Catholics in the shirt industry; moreover, the
protagonists in both of the strikes did not act in the way that they
did because of ruling class manipulation. In fact, in the case of
the dispute in Harrison's factory, the management adopted a stance of
studied neutrality, and local notables - Protestant and Catholic,
Unionist and nationalist - sought to mediate between the disputants.
Management were not neutral in the case of McCarthy's: ITGWU members
struck because management refused to recognise their shop steward)
but, to characterise the leader of the NUTGW strike-breakers, Mrs
Henderson, as a puppet of management would be fantastic. Religious
and political differences between shirt workers were always there,
but they remained latent until activated by rivalry between the NUTGW
and the breakaway union. However, it is true to say that, once
activated, political differences contributed to the perpetuation of
what remained, fundamentally, an inter-union hostility.
Proponents of the view that trade unionism was thwarted by
sectarianism might concede the argument presented in the last two
paragraphs, but assert that it misses the point. After all, the main
thrust of Roiston's argument is that sectarianism was 'necessarily
reconstituted' (1980:71)	 within trade unionista - irrespective of
whether or not individual trade unionists felt antagonistic towards
workers with a different religious and political identity - because
sectarianism was and is one of the fundamental structural divisions
in Northern Irish society (see also Roiston, 1983: 206); a division
which has a 'material reality' in segregated workplaces, housing,
schools, sports, and recreation facilities (see O'Dowd, 1980a: 25).
I do not dispute that sectarianism is an enduring social division
which is deeply embedded in many of the institutions of Northern
Irish life; indeed, I have detailed the pattern of religious
segregation in Derry workplaces. Nor do I dispute that in this
context certain routine union practices can result in organisations
which tend to be composed solely, or mainly, of people with the same
religious identity, and which can therefore be described as
sectarian; on the contrary, I discussed such a process on a number of
occasions. For example, in section 4. 4 I noted that in the 1940s the
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Derry Branch of the NUTGW was a mainly Catholic organisation, and I
showed that this reflected both the general underdevelopment of the
Branch at the time and the tendency of the local part-time officer,
Sarah Doherty, to rely on friends and relatives for recruitment and
organisation. Given the degree of segregation in Northern Ireland
society, personal networks are often confined to co-religionists, and
this seems to have been he case with Sarah Doherty: she and her shop
stewards were Catholics. Another example is the situation which
arose in the two or three years after the 1952 breakaway.
Protestants left the breakaway following its merger with the ITGWU
because they did not want to be part of an Irish union; similarly
there was a reluctance among many Catholics to join the NUTGW because
it had come to be perceived as a distinctly British union. To be
sure, some Catholics joined the NUTGW rather than the ITGWU because
of family loyalties (see section 6.4), but the pattern was for the
NUTGW to be mainly Protestant and the ITGWU mainly Catholic. In
section 7.3 I showed how this pattern was reinforced by rivalry
between the two unions: activists in both unions who sought to
recruit new workers were harrassed by members of the rival union.
Moreover, in line with the religious segregation of the workforce,
NUTGW and ITGWU membership tended to be concentrated in particular
factories and this made it even more difficult for the officials of
either union to gain a foothold in factories dominated by the
opposing union.
Nevertheless, what Rolston (1980: 71) calls 'sectarian trade
unionism' did not develop in the the Derry shirt industry, and to
understand why not, one must take account of that which Roiston
dismisses: social action by real, historical individuals. The trade
union activists and officials whom I interviewed felt strongly about
their various religious, political, and national identities. They
were not immune to thinking of people who did not share their
particular set of Identities in terms of stereotypes. Those who took
different sides during the 1952 breakaway expressed distrust of each
other and articulated suspicions that their opponents' actions were
inspired by religious or political motives. One or two even referred
to their own opinions and feelings as 'prejudiced'. However, it was
precisely because they were not sectarian bigots that 'sectarian
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trade unionism' did not develop in the Derry shirt industry: they
each made a conscious effort to recruit, and co-operate with, shirt
workers regardless of whether or not they . shared the same religious
and/or political identities - and, to a greater or lesser extent,
they succeeded. Thus, in the late 1940s Macgougan and McGonagle
transformed the NUTGW from a small, mainly Catholic, 'clique' into a
mass organisation which included Protestants as well as Catholics
(see section 4.4). And, in the 1960s, despite the bitterness
generated by the breakaway and the resultant inter-union rivalry, the
NUTGW, and to a lesser extent, the ITGWU succeeded in attracting
members from both religious groups (see section 7.3); moreover,
inter-union rivalry eventually gave way to inter-union accommodation
(see section 7.4).
In short, the over-all conclusion of this thesis is that
sectarianism was not as important a factor in the development of
trade unionism in the Derry shirt industry as traditional Irish
marxists and others would lead us to expect. It could be said that
this conclusion reflects the fact that the trade unions I studied
were located in Derry whereas most other studies focus on Belfast: it
is a commonplace among Derry people that their city is less sectarian
than Belfast. It is true, as I noted In section 2.2, that Derry was
not prone to the kind of inter-communal rioting whch marked
Belfast's development as a city in the nineteenth century. However,
it seems to me that the notion that Derry is less sectarian than
Belfast is wishful thinking: an expression of the localism which was
discussed in section 6. 3. Rather, on the basis of my study, I would
suggest that sectarianism, in the sense of bigotry, has been
generally less significant in the history of Northern Ireland than
the traditional Irish marxists claim.
I am not alone in suggesting this: Patterson (1982) has made the
same kind of argument. For traditional Irish marxists the
significance of religious discrimination in the allocation of jobs
and the resultant sectarian conflict between workers is not merely
that it interfered with the development of trade unionism and
socialist politics; it is that the priveleged position in the labour
market which Protestant workers achieved through religious
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discrimination and sectarian conflict formed, and forms, the material
basis for Unionism as a mass movement. Patterson (1982: 28-29)
rejects this view. He argues that although sectarianism has always
been an element in Protestant politics it has never been the main
basis upon which support for Unionism has been mobilised:
sectarianism does not have a 'pre-given significance, its importance
is determined by specific circustances.' 	 In so far as workplace
relations have been characterised by sectarianism,
it did not and does not reflect the needs of particular
groups of Protestants to defend their priveleges. It did
and does reflect an intense distrust and antagonism of some
(his emphasis] Protestant workers to Catholics which has
its origins not in the sphere of production but in the
state of inter-communal relations. The material basis of
sectarianism is in this sense more question of territory
than occupation.
In other words,	 workplace sectarianism has no independent
significance:	 it becomes important when triggered by other,
extraneous, factors. In this respect Patterson argues that 'the
major out-breaks of violence in workplaces 'came only when there was
a general political uncertainty about the future government of
Ireland - 1886, 1912, 1920.' The case of the Derry shirt industry
supports the central thrust of Patterson's thesis: sectarianism among
shirt workers was latent until activated by a trade union power
struggle. Moreover, territoriality seems to have been important: the
dispute in Harrison's in 1954 developed when a Protestant member of
the NUTGW was employed in a department which was both predominantly
Catholic and an ITGWU stronghold; and the conflict in McCarthy's in
1962 followed an attempt by the ITGWU to secure a foothold in a
factory which was both predominantly Protestant and the main
stronghold of the NUTGW in Derry. However, contrary to Patterson's
argument, neither conflict occurred at a time of 'political
uncertainty about the future government of Ireland'; indeed, 1954 and
1962 were years when Catholic-Protestant relations in Derry were, in
general, comparatively stable.
Why, then, have traditional Irish marxists placed so much
emphasis on sectarianism? It may, in part, be part of a general
tendency to look at history in terms of a present in which inter-
communal relations have been poisoned by 20 years of violence. 	 In
the case of Roiston (1980), Munck (1986), and Munck and Roiston
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(1987) it is undoubtedly linked to their adherence to a social theory
according to which it is believed that, since action is determined by
the social structures within which individuals are embedded, the
meaning of action is either Irrelevant or can be inferred from a
knowledge of the structural setting. Thus, particular kinds of
action are labelled as, or implied to be, sectarian even though no
attempt has been made to understand the intentions of the actors; and
particular institutions are labelled as 'sectarian' irrespective of
the religious and political identities of the people who constitute
them. However, this does not fully explain the way in which the term
has been deployed. 'Sectarianism' and 'sectarian' are not neutral
words: they carry negative connotations of bigotry and irrationality.
Traditional Irish marxists argue that the politics of Northern Irish
Protestants are based on sectarianism in the allocation of jobs;
indeed one author has sought to restrict the term as being applicable
only to Protestants (see Roiston, 1984: 	 206).	 In this way the
political legitimacy of Unionism is undermined.
All in all I think that this study demonstrates the value of
attempting to understand institutions in terms of the actions of the
people who produced, reproduced, and changed them. In chapter one I
developed this approach in relation to a debate between traditional
and structural marxists which was in progress when I began my
research. The debate has moved on since then. Various kinds of
marxist revisionism have flourished in the difficult conditions of
Britain in the late 1980s. Several scholars now appear to be
articulating views of society and history similar to those advocated
In this study, and, in drawing this thesis to a close, it would seem
appropriate for me to comnient on them from the perspective of this
study.
One author has characterised recent trends in marxist theory as
a 'retreat from class' (Wood, 1986). Some marxists have gone further
down this road than others. Laclau and Mouffe, for example, are said
to have abandoned the notion of class-based politics altogether (see
Gamble, 1987: 113-114). Others have, as David Edgar remarked in a
recent issue of the Guardian (3 February 1989):, come to think
that the future of socialism must lie in the synthesis of
traditional class analysis with the preoccupations,
- 326 -
insights, and perspectives of the new social movements in
the late 1960s.
This synthesis involves a recognition of the importance of identities
and realities other than class; f or example, sex, ethnicity, and
locality. Its main exponents are Eric Hobsbawm, Stuart Hall, and
other contributors to the journal Marxism Today.
There are certain points at which this thesis has converged with
the revisionists.	 I, like many of them, once had a structuralist
marxist world-view.	 I began to abandon this world-view when I was
confronted by the realisation that my respondants' identities were
much more complex than I had anticipated. Moreover, at several
points in my thesis I have drawn on insights derived from various
attempts to marry socialist and feminist theory. This is most marked
in chapter five where I argue that underlying the decisions of male
shirt cutters to join the ATGWU rather than the NUTGW was a fear of
being supplanted by less-skilled, cheaper female labour. In this
kind of argument the exclusivism of skilled male workers is explained
as a by-product of their class struggle; that is, of their resistance
to employers' attempts to deskill. However, I qualified this
argument by suggesting, like Cockburn (1983: 151), that it failed to
grasp the centrality of gender in the process. Cockburn, incidently,
is currently a member of the Editorial Board of Marxism Today.
To conclude on the basis of these affinities that this study is
part of a current trend in marxist theorising would be to lose my
central argument. I am not simply saying that identities other than
class are important. If I was saying this, then, I would have little
argument with O'Dowd, Roiston, and Tomlinson (1980). One of the
interesting and ironic aspects of O'Dowd et al's work is that in
seeking to defend the central tenets of the traditional Irish marxist
analysis of Northern Ireland against the criticisms of structuralist
marxists like Bew, Gibbon, and Patterson (1979), they prefigure some
of the recent trends in marxist revisionism. I am thinking
particularly of O'Dowd's insistence on 'the importance of social
divisions other than class in all historical capitalist societies',
and of his attempt to marry class and sectarianism. The product of
this marriage is the notion of 'sectarian class relations...
sectarian division is a class phenomena and vice-versa' (1980: 25).
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For me the problem with O'Dowd et al, as with much current
revisionist thinking, is that they retain a deterministic model of
society within which people are simply nodes in the social structure.
Thus, while the revisionists have come to recognise the complexity of
peoples' identities, they present this complexity as the result of
changes in the economic base: from 'Fordist' mass production to
'Post-Fordism'. For example, Leadbeater writes (Marxism Today
October 1988: 15):
the mass aims of the social democratic state in providing
services and housing were founded upon the 'mass' interests
formed by the character of production and work. The
Fordist era of mass-production workers, and mass consumers
confirmed the sense that individual interests could be read
off with some confidence from the great social blocs formed
by production...
But changes in the character and distribution of work have
undermined the unifying tendencies of production and work
under Fordism. The economic restructuring of the 1980s has
produced deep divisions within the working class...
In addition, in recent years the social theatre of
consumption has become more important. Choice in
consumption, life-style, sexuality, are more important as
an assertion of identity.
Hall (ibid: 25) writes:
Classical marxism depended on an assummed correspondence
between 'the economic' and 'the political': one could read
off our political attitudes, interests, and motivations,
from our economic class position. This correspondence
between 'the political' and 'the economic' is exactly what
has now disintegrated - practically and theoretically.
My respondents were born in the early part of this century;
grew up in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s; and worked in a mass-
production Industry. Yet, as I have shown, their Identities were
never simple, nor could they ever have been simply read off from
their economic position. Moreover, personal and subjective elements
loomed large among their reasons for acting in particular ways at
particular times. The central thrust of my thesis is that while
people are influenced by society they also create and recreate it,
and that to understand social and historical processes we must take
what they have to say very seriously. The logic of my argument is
not that class is unimportant, or that its importance is diminishing
in late twentieth century Britain; rather, it Is simply that if
socialists are to be politically effective they need, first, to
understand class as a relationship between concrete individuals,
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something which is constructed by them as part of an historical
process,	 and second, to take heed of what people say about their
experience.	 There is little that is new in this: Edward Thompson
said as much In his well known preface to The Making of the English
Working Class. The fact that this is not a new insight does not
diminish its force or its validity. However, I would like to take
it further and urge social scientists and socialists to recognise
that the personal and the subjective aspects of motivation are
socially and politically important: not something to be left to the
psychologist, psychoanalyst, or biographer.
GIddens (1979: 44) has argued:
The pressing task facing social theory today is not to
further the conceptual elimination of the subject, but on
the contrary to promote a recovery of the subject this
emphasis] without lapsing Into subjectivism
I am sympathetic to this idea, but I think that Giddens's attempts at
a formal general theory of agency and structuration are foredoomed,
or at least premature. I suspect that Marx (1959: 109) was correct
when he argued that the subject-object dualism is not something which
can be resolved in the realm of abstract thought:
subjectivism and objectivism, spiritualism and materialism,
activity and suffering, only lose their antithetical
character and thus their existence as such antitheses in
the social condition: the resolution of theoretical
antitheses is possible only in a practical way... their
resolution Is therefore by no means a problem of knowledge
but a real problem of life.
What I would urge is the need for more studies of individual moral
careers as a way of achieving a better sociological understanding of
subjectivity. It is important to be clear that I have not attempted
such a project In this thesis. Here I have used the recollections of
a small group of trade union officials and activists as, to
paraphrase Paul Thompson (1978: 205), 'a quarry from which to
construct' an analysis of the development of trade unionism in the
Derry shirt industry 1920-1968. I have sought to locate my
respondants' recollections in the context of their life histories,
and of the histories of the society and the particular institutions
which they helped to build, but it was not part of my purpose to
explain their individual careers. However, I imagine that If one was
to attempt such a project, the best advice one could follow Is that
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offered by Abrams (1982: 267); that 1s to treat the problem of
understanding particular individuals and individuality historically:
S85 a problem of understanding processes of becoming rather than
states of being.'
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APPENDIX 1: ORAL SOURCES
The main primary sources used in writing this thesis were not
documents; they were interviews. As I explained in chapter one, I
interviewed a total of 35 people and had conversations with many
more. From all of these people I constructed a strategic sample of
11 trade union officials and activists whom I interviewed in more
depth. Most direct and indirect quotation in the text is attributed
to one or other of these 11 people, and unless stated otherwise, all
these quotations are derived from the transcripts of tape-recorded
interviews. Occasionally I quote, directly or indirectly, a
respondant who was one of the many people with whom I conducted an
interview or conversation but who was not included in my sample. In
some of these cases the quote is derived from the transcript of' a
tape-recording; in other cases it is derived from field notes which
were taken either at the time of the interview/conversation or
shortly afterwards; whatever the case, the respondant is identified
and the precise nature of the dialogue is described, usually in a
footnote. Thus, all of the direct and indirect quotations used in
this thesis are attributed to their author, and are accompanied by a
note explaining who the person is and describing the circumstances in
which the speech-act was made.	 However, in the case of the union
activists and officials who were part of my strategic sample, I want
to go further. As I pointed out in chapter one, a particular
recollection is best understood when put in the context of the
respondant's life history, their past and present circumstances. One
of the advantages of focusing on a small sample of respondants is
that it is possible to spend the time required to accumulate the
necessary biographical detail. 	 Accordingly, in this appendix I
provide biographies for each of the 11 people in my sample.
I interviewed my sample of respondants with the intention of
using their recollections as, to paraphrase Thompson (1978: 205), 'a
quarry from which to construct' an analysis of the development of
- 331 -
trade unionism in the Derry shirt industry. It was not part of my
original purpose to explain my respondants' life histories or their
careers, and it is not my purpose in this appendix; rather, my
respondents' biographies are presented in schematic fashion. Each
biography is summarised under three headings: 'Family Backround',
'Education, Work History, and Trade Union Experience', and 'Political
Affiliations'.	 They each contain basic information, but have been
written so as to reflect those aspects of a respondant's life history
which he or she considered important. Although presented
schematically, the biographies presented in this appendix should
enable the reader to readily identify the main characters in this
history and gain a fuller understanding of them.
I constructed my sample so as to have at least one respondant
who was a member of each of the trade unions which organised in the
shirt industry between 1920 and 1968. Some of my respondants were a
member of more than one of these unions, but each one is categorised
according to the main trade union affiliation in which they appear in
the text.
(Those names marked with an asterisk ' 	 are pseudonyms)
The United Garment Workers' Union
Name: JOHN McCORKELL
	
Year of Birth: 1905
Family Backround:
Born in Donegal. No brothers or sisters. Both of his parents were
Presbyterians and Unionists. The family moved to Derry when John was
very young; they lived in High Street on the edge of the the Bogside,
but during the riots of 1920 they moved to the mainly Protestant
Fountain area. His father worked in the gas works, but died when
John was only 13. His mother was never employed, but kept pigs, and
'the pigs paid f or the house'. 	 By all accounts, it was not unusual
for working class families in Derry to keep pigs or chickens. John
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currently lives in Paisley (Scotland) with his second wife; his first
wife died.
Education, Work History, and Trade Union Experience:
John McCorkell was educated in a Catholic school. He regarded this
as unusual, but was unable to explain it beyond pointing out that he
lived in a mainly Catholic street. He started work as an apprentice
cutter in McIntyre, Hogg, Marsh, and Co. in 1918 when he was 13.
Apprentices usually started at the age of 14, John started a year
early because, 'father died... no pensions for widows, no financial
support; I had to go out to work, simple as that.' He got the
apprenticeship through a relative:
this relative put a word in [for me], and of course a lot
of jobs were done that way, particularly in the shirt trade
- very difficult to get into that trade for boys, [for]
girls there was no problem.
John was made redundant from McIntyre, Hogg, Marsh and Co. 	 c1923.
He worked as a bandknife operator in Desmond's and Hamilton's shirt
factories before moving to Warrington. He returned to Derry c1926
because his mother was ill, but left the city 'for good' the
following year. He worked in various clothing factories in the West
of Scotland and became a NUTGW shop steward. During the Second World
War he was elected to the National Executive of the NUTGW, and was
appointed a full-time official, based in Paisley, in the late 1950s.
Political Affiliations:
He became interested in labour politics while still in Derry. His
interest was stimulated by Annie Holmes, the UGW organiser in Derry,
but was frowned upon by his mother (see section 3.3). After moving
to Scotland he became a member of the Scottish Labour Party, and was
elected to Renfrew District Council. He still takes an active
interest in politics and is very critical of both the Communist Party
of Great Britain, and 'home-rulers' in the Scottish Labour Party.
- 333 -
The Amalgamated Transport and General Workers' Union
Name: GEORGE HAMILL
	
Year of Birth: 1911
Family Backround:
Born in Bishop Street, Derry. From a Catholic backround. His father
worked as a rigger in Derry shipyard until it closed in the mid
1920s, he was mostly unemployed after that; prior to working in the
shipyard he had been a merchant seaman. He has no recollection of
his mother in employment. His parents died 'just before (the Second
World) War. He had one brother who
had to go to Birmingham in the '30s.-.. he was a lorry
driver. [He was) conscripted then... killed in April 1945.
George Hamill married in the 1940s. 	 His mother-in-law bought a
drapery shop for for her daughter; Mrs Hamill ran the business and
they both lived above the shop. 	 Mr Hamill still lives above the
shop.
Education, Work History, and Trade Union Experience:
He left school at 14. His first job was as a kitchen boy in Saint
Columb's College, then he worked as a message boy for 'Tyler's the
boot shop' and later as a bill poster f or an advertising firm. The
latter 'folded-up when the War started' and he 'was idle for nearly
two years.' In 1942 he got a job in the Loridonderry Port and Harbour
Authority as the person 'in charge of the cattle pens.' It was while
working for the Harbour Authority that George became active in the
ATGWU. When he first joined the union 'ordinary labourers' were not
represented on the Branch Committee; he argued that they should be,
and was elected to represent them. 	 He was appointed full-time
official in 1950, and retired in 1976.
Political Affiliations:
George Hamill was among the most prominent anti-partitionist labour
politicians in Derry in the 1940s. He first became interested in
labour politics in the mid 1930s as a member of a small labour group.
Other members of the group included the Finnegans, Mr Finnegan was
the director of Magee College; Bateman, a printer who had been at
Ruskin College; the Matthews brothers (see below); and the McNulty
brothers. George decribed the process in the following way:
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I was greatly influenced by a couple of chaps I knocked
about with.	 At that particular time I had no social
conscious[ness] at all. I was greatly influenced by two
chaps who'd been to England, called McNulty... Their social
consciences were well advanced.., confirmed socialists.
They [had) worked in England as kitchen boys... both them
were chefs. I started to get interested. I met John De
Courcy Ireland (a well known socialist from Eire who worked
in Derry during the Second World Wan.., he used to load me
with all the propaganda.	 My mother wasn't very social
minded or political minded. She didn't like some of the
stuff he was sending down to me: she thought it was too
extreme.
It was as a result of this social and political awakening that George
first became interested in trade unionism, but he did not become an
ATGWU activist until he got the job in the Harbour Authority in 1942.
After the Second World War, George joined the anti-partitionist Derry
Labour Party (DLP). He defected to the Londonderry Labour Party
(LDLP) when the leader of the DLP, Paddy Fox, made a pact with the
Nationalist Party in the Council elections of 1946. The LDLP was
affiliated to the Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP), and when the
latter split over partition in 1949 (see section 2.2) George left the
LDLP and helped to set up a local branch of the Irish Labour Party
(IrLP). He left the IrLP in the early 1950s because he was
disillusioned with electoral defeats, and because he was asked by one
of his superiors in the ATGWIJ to curtail his political activities
following complaints from Protestant bus workers (see section 5.2).
Name: Mr MATTHEWS(*)
	 Year of Birth: 1911
Family Backround:
Born in Rosemount Terrace. His parents were both Protestants. His
father was an electrician who worked in the telephone exchange and
then 'took complete charge' of it. His father died when Mr Matthews
was two years old. His mother had also worked worked in the
telephone exchange, but gave up her job when she married; she did
not return to work when her husband died: 'it simply wasn't done.'
His mother was given £1,000 by the telephone company when her husband
died, 'a terrific sum.' Mr Matthews had two brothers and one sister.
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One brother was a dental mechanic, the sister was a teacher, and the
other brother, Fred - who, like Mr Matthews, was a member of the LDLP
- worked in a hardware store. Mr Matthews never married. He now
lives in a street close to the Bogside.
Education, Work History, and Trade Union Experience:
Left school at 16.	 Became an apprentice shirt cutter in Bryce arid
Weston's factory; he got the apprenticeship through an uncle who knew
Mr Bryce.	 He did not regard shirt cutting as a much sought after
job:
there was no choice: after the closure of the shipyard it
was very difficult for a boy to get a trade.
After he finished his apprenticeship he became a collar pattern
cutter - according to Mr Matthews the most skilled and creative part
of the cutting trade in Derry - and was then promoted to 'charge-
hand' of the cutting room altogether he worked in Bryce and Weston's
for 20 years. After Bryce and Weston's closed-down in the late
1940s, Mr Matthews helped the son of the original Mr Bryce to set up
another factory in Derry. It was financed a Belfast based shirt
manufacturer called Faulkner whose son later became Prime Minister of
Northern Ireland (Brian Faulkner). This factory closed in the early
1950s: 'a kind of recession set in and Faulkner folded it up because
there was no future to it.' Mr Matthews' mother became ill in the
mid 1950s and for a year or so he divided his time between a small
shirt factory in Muff, working as a free-lance pattern cutter, and
looking after his mother (he did not want his sister to break her
career as a teacher).	 After his mother died, Mr Matthews 'ran' a
small shirt factory in Derry. It was owned by a businessman, Mr
Szilagy, who had come to Derry after the Second World War as a
'displaced person.' Mr Matthews retired in 1976. He never held any
formal union office, but he collected ATGWIJ subscriptions in Bryce
and Weston's cutting rooms for many years. 	 He left the ATGWIJ
following his appointment as charge-hand because management did not
'expect' a charge-hand to belong to a union. 	 He joined the NIJTGW
when he was working in Szilagy's factory (see section 5.2). Mr
Matthews could not be described as a NUTGW activist; however, he was
very friendly with Charles 011is, local full-time officer of the
NUTGW 1954-58, and tried to persuade other workers in Szilagy's to
join the union.
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Political Affiliations:
Mr Matthews first became Involved in labour politics in the 1930s
when he became a member of the same political group to which George
Hamill referred above. He later became secretary of both the Foyle
Divisional Committee and the Central Committee of the LDLP. Mr
Matthews' Interest in Labour Politics did not stem from his trade
union work; rather, it developed out of a concern that the
gerrymander '(wa]sn't democracy.' 	 The LDLP faded out in the 1950s,
and Mr Matthews retired from active politics.
Name: Mr GORDONC*)	 Year of Birth: 1916
Fa1ly Backround:
Born In Derry, grew up in a house at the 'Top of the Hill' on the
Waterside. Both parents Protestant. His father worked In Derry
shipyard, then in 'Wilson's mill', then in a 'Buchanan's pork store'.
He was 'idle' for short periods between each of these Jobs. Mr
Gordon's mother worked in Hamilton's shirt factory before he was
born; she stayed at home until he was eight years old and then
returned to Hamilton's to work as a smoother. Mr Gordon is a widower
and now lives with his daughter and son-in-law on a Protestant
housing estate on the Waterside.
Education, Work History, and Trade Union Experience:
Left school shortly before his fourteenth birthday and immediately
started an apprenticeship as a shirt cutter in Hamilton's: his mother
'asked Mr Hamilton and got me a start on 16 May 1930, it was a
Friday.' He became a bandknife cutter, and worked In Hamilton' s
until 1961. He did the same job in Little's factory until 1972. He
then left the shirt industry and got a job as a night watchman for
the Northern Ireland Housing Executive. Part of his reason for
leaving the shirt industry was that his 'eyesight started to go', but
he had been trying to leave for sometime: 'I was clean scundered with
my trade, I wanted a change.' 	 As I mentioned in the text (see
section 5.3), Mr Gordon described himself as a 'square peg in a round
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hole' in the sense that he regarded himself as a 'country man' who
enjoyed 'shooting snipe' and fishing:
I should never have been in an inside job, [but] I can't
complain: I was really better off than most young fellas in
this town. I started with eight shillings and nine pence
In 1930... most boys leaving school could go into an office
or.. • a shop as a message boy f or five shillings a week and
when they were 16 and had to stamp their cards they threw
them out.
	
Most of them boys went in the army and they
never looked back.
Mr Gordon was a member of the ATGWU all through his working life in
the shirt industry, but he never held any union office. He took a
keen interest in the union, but his view of trade unionism might be
described as instrumental: 'you ony join a union to get more money.'
Political Affiliations:
Mr Gordon described himself as someone who 'voted Unionist', but he
told me that he had many Catholic friends in his youth (the Top of
the Hill area was mixed), and he was still friendly with George
Hamill. Moreover, as I noted in chapter eight, he described the
Civil Rights Movement as 'the best thing that ever happened to this
town... the only thing was that the IRA came behind them.'
The National Union of Tailors and Garment Workers
Name: JACK MACGOUGAN
	
Year of Birth: 1913
Family Backround:
Born In the Cregagh area of South Belfast. Both of his parents were
Protestants. His father worked in Harland and Wolff shipyard; he
never recalled his mother going out to work. He now lives with his
wife - 'a cousin of Brian Faulkner' (Prime Minister of Northern
Ireland 1971-72) - near Milton Keynes
Education, Work History, and Trade Union Experience:
He attended elementary and technical school until the age of 16. He
then got a 'summer job' In a plumbing firm, but 'there was no room
for an apprentice.' He got a job as a clerk In a Belfast accountancy
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firm through a 'family contact' in 1929. He was was appointed Irish
regional organiser of the NIJTGW in 1945. I explained why he applied
f or this Job and how he got it in section 4.3; here I will give only
a summary. His main reason f or taking the job was that he thought it
would allow more scope for his political activities than working for
a firm of acountants. He got the Job because he had good experience
as a union organiser - he had organised accountancy clerks - and
because he knew a lot about the clothing industry: his boss had been
clothing and equipment comptroller for Northern Ireland during the
Second World War. He subsequently held many official positions in
the Irish and British trade union movements. He was a member of the
Executive of the ITUC 1950-1969, and was president 1957-58 and 1963-
64. In 1968 he was elected general secretary of the NUTGW (I do not
know of any other Northern Ireland officers of British trade unions
who have achieved this), and he served on the General Council of the
TUG from 1970 until his retirement in 1979.
Political Affiliations:
I discussed Jack Macgougan's political career in some detail in
section 8. 2; here I will only summarise. Jack Macgougan was
interested in politics from a very early age: his father was election
agent for Jack Beattie, a labour candidate in the first Northern
Ireland parliamentary elections in 1925, and Macgoguan, then aged 11
or 12, addressed envelopes and did other campaign chores. After he
left school, Macgougan attended lectures organised by the National
Council of Labour Colleges; he recalls a lecturer named Jack Dorricot
as being particularly influential. In the early 1930s he Joined the
Socialist Party of Ireland which had been formed out of the Belfast
Branches of the Independent Labour Party. The Outdoor Relief Crisis
of 1932 (see section 1.2) and the sectarian violence in Belfast in
the mid 1930s made a considerable impact on him. In 1935 he was
elected secretary of the Socialist Party, and he was selected as a
labour candidate for the Oldpark Division in the 1938 Stormont
election. He lost the election but considers it to have been a good
campaign. The Socialist Party was affiliated to the NILP, and when
the former broke up during the Second World War, Macgougan remained a
member of the latter.	 He was elected vice-chairman of the NILP in
1944, and became chairman 1945-46. Macgougan was one of the leading
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opponents of the pro-Union elements in the NILP, and he was expelled
from the Party in 1948. He had been a member of the IrLP since 1945
by virtue of his position as Irish regional officer of the NUTGW, and
he helped to extend the Party to Northern Ireland. He was elected to
Belfast Corporation to represent a Falls Road ward in 1949, and
remained a member until 1958.
	
He contested the South Down seat in
the Westminster election of 1951, but lost. In the late 1950s,
Macgougan became disillusioned with local labour politics and devoted
an increasing amount of his time and energy to trade unionism rather
than the IrLP (see section 8.2).
	 He retired from active politcs
after he lost his Corporation seat in 1958.
Name: KATHY GALLAGHER C *) 	 Year of Birth: 1917
Family Backround:
Born in the Rosemount area of Derry. Both parents were Catholics;
the father was born and grew up in Derry, the mother was born in
Liverpool, and returned to Derry with her mother when her father
died.	 Kathy Gallagher's father was an 'engineer', who worked in
Derry shipyard ('the yard'), Watt's distillery, and 'ended-up'
working on boats in Warrenpoint.	 Her mother was 'always a
housewife.' Miss Gallagher had two sisters and five brothers.
Neither Kathy nor her sisters married, and after her parents died
Miss Gallagher lived with her sisters, one of whom also worked in the
shirt industry. She did not recall her father as being a keen trade
unionist, but her mother's brother, William Logue (see chapter
three), and her brother, Frank, were both union officials, the former
with the NAUL, and the latter with the Post Office Workers' Union.
Education, Work History, and Trade Union Experience:
Miss Gallagher left school at 14 'as usual [in those days).' She
immediately started work in Richard's 'Paragon' factory:
The funny thing is, the manager lived here a few doors from
us and was brought up with us as family... and he took us
there [to Richard's). In fact, the other sister started
there too... he (the manager] knew the family, was great
with mother and that.
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She was a 'learner' in the finishing department, and 'graded' from
'putting bones, stiffeners, in collars' to pressing and glossing
collars, and then to 'turning collars.' It was while working in
Richard' s that she first joined the NUTGW 'as an ordinary member.'
In 1939 she left Derry to enter a convent in France. The outbreak of
the Second World War prevented her from going to France, so she
joined a convent in England instead.
	 She enjoyed her work with
evacuees and as an 'assistant teacher', 	 but she became ill with a
stomach ulcer which was exacerbated by the blitz and returned to
Derry to recuperate; she did not complete her novitiate. 	 Back in
Derry she worked in a shop, and in a restaurant before returning to
Richard's as a 'smoother.'	 She left that job because it was too
heavy and too hot, and became an examiner in Harrison's factory: 'a
friend [had] a word with Mr Greenan [a department manager].' She
rejoined the NUTGW but did not become active until the 1952 breakaway
(see section 6.4). She was elected president of the Derry Branch of
the NUTGW in 1953, and held the position until 1960. 	 In the late
1960s Miss Gallagher was appointed senior examiner, a job which
involved supervising the other examiners. In 1973 she was awarded
the British Empire Medal. She was recommended for the award by her
employer, and she thinks that it was in recognition of her help in
persuading the workforce to accept a move from the old city centre
factory to a new premises in an industrial estate on the Waterside,
and of her efforts to persuade workers not to strike in support of
the political demonstrations of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Miss
Gallagher felt that some 'nationally minded' members of the NUTGW in
Belfast were a 'bit peeved over' her acceptance of the award, and
when Macgougan arranged a small party to celebrate the award, Miss
Gallagher did not attend. She retired from Harrison's and from union
activity in 1974, but continued to work, on a part-time basis, in a
small factory on the Waterside for a few years. Miss Gallagher had
once thought of attempting to get a full-time position in the NUTGW,
but she put it out of her mind because it would have involved
travelling and she did not like to be parted from her sisters.
Political Affiliations:
Although brought up in a 'national-minded' household, Miss Gallagher
was opposed to the idea of a united Ireland and to its advocates.
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However, she never described herself as a Unionist (see section 6.4).
She was not a supporter of labour politics, but she was an active
member of Derry Trades Council in the 1950s and retains some regard
for it: in the early 1980s she loaned her car to members of the
Trades Council who were campaigning in a local government election.
She is currently very hostile to Sinri Fein, and critical of the SDLP
and its leader John Hume: she feels that the latter 'jockeyed for
position' in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Name: MARTHA HENDERSON	 Year of Birth: 1920
Family Backround:
Born in 'Londoriderry': Mrs Henderson insisted on the name
'Londonderry' at the beginning of my first interview with her, but
she lapsed into using 'Derry' as the interview progressed. Both of
her parents were Protestants.
	 Her father was a driver for the
Corporation; her mother never undertook paid work: 'her father [Mrs
Henderson' s grandfather] owned his own business.'
	 She had three
sisters and three brothers, Both sisters worked in the shirt
industry f or a time, both in McCarthy's factory. One sister married
an American sailor, the other 'went into catering' in a local
hospital. One brother was in the navy, another was a painter and
decorator, and the third was an engineer. None of her family were
trade union minded.
Education Work History and Trade Union Experience:
Martha Henderson left school at 14 and started work as a 'stamper' in
the cutting room of Little's factory on the Waterside. She described
the process of getting her first job in the following way:
When you come 14 your mother and father said, 'out and get
a job,' and you went then and had an interview at the
[factory] door... There was no meeting personnel officers:
you met the foreman or forewoman. Mrs Holmes was forewomen
in Little's factory, and she just came to the door and
[asked], 'what age are you,' and, 'what shool did you go
to,' and, 'you start on such and such a date.'
From stamping she went on to button-holing, and worked in Little's
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until 1938:
We weren't really made redundant. You went slack... and
you might have been on the bru [ie the Labour Exchange] for
maybe Monday and Tuesday, and you went in [to work]
Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday... because it was only a
small concern, You were always expected to go back (to the
factory after a spell of unemployment], but then when you
went on the bru, you had to go where you were sent.
Martha Henderson was sent to Tillie and Henderson's where she worked
as a button-holer until her marriage in 1945. Her husband had
'served his time' as a motorcycle mechanic, and spent some time in
England before he met Martha. He worked as a bread salesman in Derry
for 31 years before getting a job in DuPont's synthetic fibre
factory. They had no children, and Mrs Henderson returned to work in
1948 as a buttori-holer in McCarthy's factory.	 Mrs Henderson first
joined the N!JTGW soon after she started work in McCarthy's. She
joined the Clothing Workers' Union (CWU) at the time of the 1952
breakaway, but returned to the NUTGW when the the CWU transferred to
the ITGWU.	 She began to take an active interest in trade unionism
in 1953. Her interest was stimulaed by the introduction of work
study in McCarthy's and a suspicion of her union official's (Stephen
McGonagle) enthusiasm for it. She joined the Branch Committee of the
NUTGW in the mid 1950s, and was elected Branch president in 1960. In
the late 1960s Mrs Henderson became a supervisor in charge of the '50
girls' who did 'front stitching, heming, patent turning, pocketing,
and button-holing.' She left McCarthy's, and the NUTGW, in 1971 to
take a job as the manageress of a canteen in the DuPont factory. Her
reason for leaving McCarthy' s was that she was 'fed-up': she had been
working in the factory a long time; felt that she was being
overworked as a supervisor - 'if anybody was out [off work] they were
sending f or me to red-up the place [do the absentee's work]'; and
disliked the man who was appointed manager of her department,
this boy thought he was the bees nees... he wouldn't let me
run the line at all.., him and I had a couple of words over
it.
Interestingly, the department manager concerned was the 'Orange man'
who had been abused by ITGWU members during the strike in 1961 (see
section 7.3). Mrs Henderson retired in 1980. She now lives with her
husband on the Waterside.
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Political Affiliations:
Mr Henderson describes herself as a Unionist. However, she might
better be described as a liberal Unionst: she defended Macgougan's
right to articulate his left-wing, anti-partitionist views in public
(see section 7.2), and took part in the civil rights demonstration in
Derry on 5 October 1968 (see section 8.2). Her Unionism has hardened
in the years since 1968. She now regards the CRM as having been a
stalking-horse for the IRA, and thinks that Derry Catholics 'brought
it (poor housing and unemployment) on themselves.
The Irish Transport and General Workers' Union
(Re-established in Derry in 1953)
Name: STEPHEN McGONAGLE	 Year of Birth: 1914
Family Backround:
Born in Derry. From a Catholic backround. His father was from West
Donegal, and worked as a master plumber in a Protestant-owned firm in
the Fountain area. His mother was not in paid employment. The
father was a trade unionist, but not politically active. McGonagle
is married and still lives in Derry.
Education, Work History, and Trade Union Experience:
Stephen McGonagle left school at 14, and served his time as a
plumber. He was appointed organising secretary of the Derry Branch
of the NUTGW in 1947 (see section 6.2), but this was not his first
experience of trade unionism: he had previously been president of the
local Branch of the plumbers' union, and secretary of Derry Trades
Council. He resigned from NUTGW in 1952, established the CWU, and
transferred to the ITGWIJ in 1953. He was Derry Branch secretary of
the ITGWU from 1953, and became North-West district organiser in the
early 1970s.	 He was the first chairman of the NIC-ICTU, and was
president of the ICTU 1972-1973. He has also held various public
offices: he was vice-chairman of the Development Commission which
replaced Londonderry Corporation, 1969-1971, and he was appointed
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Northern Ireland Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration and
Complaints ('Ombudsman') in 1974.
Political Affiliations
McGonagle joined the DLP in the 1940s. He defected to the LDLP in
1946 because, like Hamill (see above), he felt that the leader of the
DLP, was too close to the Nationalist Party. He left the LDLP in the
split of 1948-49 and helped to establish a branch of the IrLP in
Derry. After resigning from the NUTGW, McGonagle devoted himself to
building-up the Derry Branch of the NUTGW. In the Stormont elections
of 1958 and 1962, McGonagle stood as an 'Independent Labour'
candidate against Eddie McAteer, Nationalist Party leader, in the
Foyle constituency; he was defeated on both occasions (see section
2.2 and 8.2). Although he always remained within the anti-
partitionist camp, McGonagle was highly critical of the Nationalist
Party f or emphasising the border to the exclusion of social issues,
and was concerned not to alienate Protestant workers. 	 This stance
created suspicion among some Protestants and Catholics (see section
7.3). McGonagle retired from electoral politics after the 1962
defeat, but he is currently a member of Seanad Eireann (the Senate of
the Republic of Ireland).
Name: SEAt4US QUINN
	 Year of Birth: 1925
Family Backround:
Born in Derry, but both of his parents were originally from Donegal,
and Quinn regards himself as a 'Donegal man too. ' From a Catholic
backround. His father worked as a 'railwayman' in Strabane and
Donegal, and was
47 years a member of a trade union, the NUR [The National
Union of Railwaymen3 and ASLEF (Associated Society of
Locomotive Engineers and Firemen).
Quinn is evidently proud of his father's union record, but he did not
think that this influenced him much: his father died when Quinn was
14.	 He does not remember his mother ever having paid employment.
- 345 -
Quinn now lives with his wife in the Rosemount area. His wife used
to work in the Rosemount factory.
Education and Work Experience:
Attended Saint Columb's College (the main Catholic boys' grammar
school in Derry) until he was 16. He was appointed assistant
organiser of the CWU in 1953, and transferred to the ITGWU in the
same year. Prior to his appointment as a union organiser he was a
clerk in the Northern Ireland Transport Board in Belfast. He retired
in the late 1970s.
Political Affiliations:
Quinn was McGonagle's election agent in the 1962 contest (LS: 23 May
1962). In the 1967 Stormont elections he challenged Eddie McAteer in
his own right (see section 8.2). He stood as an 'Independent Labour'
candidate and described his purpose to me in the following way:
I was looking in the beginning of the 1960s - before these
troubles began - looking for rapprochement between the
Unionist and anti-Unionists as far as it could be obtained,
and looking for (the] labour principle, but I wasn't
prepared to say 'no, no,' to everything the Unionists said'
Quinn agreed that anti-communism was strong in Derry, and agreed that
it was something which was used against McGonagle at election time;
however, he did not suffer in the same way:
No, it never came out against me because I had a different
backround... I went to the local Catholic grammar school...
but he (McGonagle] had an earlier backround in the Northern
Ireland Labour Party... that was thrown against (him].
Quinn took part in the civil rights march on 5 October 1968, and
claims to have been elected to the Derry Citizens Action Committee,
but denied his place by a manipulation of the vote.
Name: Miss COSGRAVE(*)
	 Year of Birth: 1912
Family Backround:
Miss Cosgrave was born in William Street in the Bogside, and reared
in the Rosemount area.
	 Both her parents were from Derry and both
were Catholics.	 Her father, who was a cabinetmaker and undertaker,
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died when she was one year old; her mother, who worked in the
Rosemount factory, died when Miss Cosgrave was 11 years old. She was
'brought up' by her grandmother. She now lives in the Bogside. She
never married.
Education, Work History, and Trade Union Experience:
Miss Cosgrave left school at 14 and went to work as a 'message girl'
in the Rosemount factory. In between 'doing messages' she worked in
the laundry and learnt to starch and shape shirt collars.
I don't know how long I was in the laundry, [but] I was
moved from that job to the boxing [of finished shirts];
then I was moved to dispatch clerk.
As a dispatch clerk, Miss Cosgrave was responsible for preparing
orders and stock-taking for the collar cutting room. She joined the
'Tailor and Garment Workers' [Union]' in 1930, 'if not before';
became a shop steward in the early 1940s; and joined the Branch
Committee in the late 1940s. She supported the breakaway, and became
a member of the Derry Branch Committee of the ITGWU. In the early
1960s Rosemount factory was bought over several times in succession.
There was some upheaval in the management structure, and Miss
Cosgrave became a 'manageress over three rooms [or] departments.'
She was proud of her achievement: she told me that it was 'not usual'
for a woman to become a manageress, and that 'I went in as a message
girl and rose up to manageress.' However, her appointment as
manageress brought her a considerable amount of regret and trouble.
Firstly, she had to give up her trade union membership and her
involvement in the Wages Council and social security 'tribunals'
which derived from her status as a senior shop steward in the ITGWU.
She resented Seamus Quinn for putting his wife 'in my place (in the
union without] notifying me.' Secondly, she was the victim of a
smear campaign orchestrated by one or two Protestant workers who
wrote an anonymous letter to the factory owners claiming that she was
showing favouritism towards Catholic workers. Thirdly, she was made
redundant in 1966 because Mr Harrison (of Harrison's factory), who
had taken over-all control of the Rosemount factory, wanted to
replace her with a male manager. She took her case to an industrial
tribunal and was awarded £420 redundancy pay. She does not regard
this to have been adequate recompense:
foolishly enough (I] conducted this myself; I should have
used the union, but I was so broken-hearted at the time
- 347 -
[that] I couldn't have talked to anybody about it... But
the reason I didn't go to the union at the time was I was
very angry at Seamus Quinn.
I cannot corroborate her story except by noting that when I
interviewed Mr Harrison - long before I contacted Miss Cosgrave - he
told me that each room in his factory had three or four charge-hands,
one forewoman, and a male manager, and that he found women worked
better with a male manager; he added: 'I'm sure that breaches the
Sex Discrimination Act but it's a fact of life.' Miss Cosgrave got a
job as an examiner in McIntyre, Hogg, and Marsh's factory through a
friend, and worked there until she retired in the early 1970s.
Political Affiliations:
Miss Cosgrave never voted nationalist: she claims to have 'voted
labour all my life because I was interested In labour and thought
they were doing a good job.' It is unlikely that Miss Cosgrave voted
labour all her life for the simple reason that in most elections In
Derry she did not have the choice of a labour candidate. However,
she was an ardent admirer of McGonagle, supported the IrLP, and voted
for McGonagle in 1958 and 1962.
Nai: Miss MCMORRIS C *	 Year of Birth: c1926
Family Backrowid:
Miss McMorris was born in Rosemount. Her Parents were both
Catholics, and both from Derry, but she told me that her father's
father - 'my grandfather McMorris' - was a Protestant from Belfast,
and that her mother's mother was also from Belfast. Her father was a
joiner and a member of the 'Carpenter's [Union]'. Her mother was a
button-holer in Tillie and Henderson, but retired from paid
employment when she married:
Joiners' wages were only a pittance... [but] I expect my
father, being the man he was, he just wanted somebody there
for [to cook] his meals. I don't think it was anything to
do with swanking-it, that he had plenty of money, for he
hadn' t.
Miss McMorris has two sisters. She never married.
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Education, Work History, and Trade Union Experience:
Miss McMorris left school and got job in Harrison's factory when she
was 14. She did not want to leave school or to work in a shirt
factory: 'I was thinking of nursing and different things, not the
factory.' But her eldest sister was at 'college' and her parents
could not afford to finance Miss McMorris's education, so her mother
spoke to a family friend and neighbour who was a manager in
Harrison's, and he got Miss McMorris started in 'a desk job.., making
up the wages (for workers in Harrison's].' Miss McMorris 'loved' her
job as a wages clerk, but her mother regarded it as an unskilled and
insecure job, and persuaded her daughter to take a job as a shirt
folder:
She said that if I wanted to stay at that (desk job] she
would still have to pay for night school, f or I couldn't
have walked into another office and say, 'well, I did
accounts'... I needed to have the qualifications... I was
denied alot of things. I really hated (factory work]...
(but] my mother went to the manager and told him that she
didn't want me at that (desk job]... and he put me to
folding shirts... (it] was this idea that you have to have
a trade.
Miss McMorris worked as a folder in Harrison's until she transferred
to the Rosemount factory in the early 1970s. In the mid-1970s she,
along with the rest of the Rosemount factory workforce, was
transferred to a more modern premises in the same area. 	 She
continued to yearn for a desk job and had hopes of getting a job as a
personnel officer in the new factory, but it closed in 1981, and Miss
McMorris has not been in paid employment since then. Miss McMorris
joined the NUTGW in the 1940s (see section 4.4), supported the
breakaway in 1952, and joined the ITGWU.	 She first became a shop
steward in the mid 1950s. She was reluctant at first:
To be quite honest I never was (interested in becoming
active in the union]. It was the bother it entailed. I
was interested in so far as I used to say, 'I wish I was in
a job where you didn't have to force management.' It
[trade unionism] was very necessary... I might say I didn't
like it, but the fact is you couldn't have worked in a
factory without a union... because they would have done
anything with you: wrapped you up in a parcel and sent you
away somewhere! It was awful, the humiliation. They think
they're God some of those managers... and then I lacked
(education] - maybe it was my own fault - it was my 40s and
50s when I began to get a bit educated, academically wise.
She decided to accept the post of shop steward because,
There was nobody else to take it, and some friends of mine
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- it was the shop steward - said, 'I've already said to
Stephen McGonagle (that Miss McMorris was the new
steward],' and I said, 'I wish you hadn't have done that,'
but I says, 'well I' 11 do it 'till somebody comes along.
Nobody came along.
Miss McMorris became a member of the Branch Committee of the ITGWU in
the late 1950s and 1960s. She never enjoyed 'the bother' that being
a shop steward entailed, but she felt that her involvement in union
affairs had added to her confidence and education.
Political Affiliations:
Miss McMorris's father was a firm nationalist, and she grew up as a
nationalist with a stong suspicion of communism and left-wing ideas.
Nevertheless, in the 1958 Stormont election she voted for Stephen
McGonagle rather than Eddie McAteer, the leader of the Nationalist
Party. Today she supports the Social and Democratic Labour Party -
the Party which supplanted the old Nationalist Party as the Party for
which most Catholics vote. But Miss McMorris now considers herself
to be more open-minded and analytical about politics. 	 This open-
mindedness seems to be partly the result of her experience as a trade
union activist. For example, she explained why few ITGWU members In
the shirt Industry supported Stephen McGonagle in the 1958 and 1962
celections in the following way:
Well, you see, nationalis[m] very strong, I knew people
[who] said, 'Stephen's a very good man and I'm with him
whole heartedly as a trade union member, but no, never
(vote for him].' And that's the way they said It - a bit
like the present day Unionist and 'No Surrender!' type of
thing. You can't override It [nationalism]: just say I'm a
nationalist and I always will be a nationalist even though
its a stalemate. The both sides are stalemate and you
could go on like that. It's the very fact that even though
I mightened have been educated enough I knew that much.
Nothing seemed to move, you just voted and that was all: to
show strength and that was all it was, nothing moved. It's
only by going to [union] conferences that then I began to
say, 'well, why not (vote labour]: all this body of people
that I could see spouting at rostrums and [they] could make
a change.' Well, then it came and somebody asked me - the
last couple of elections - why did I vote [SDLP]. Well,
there's nobody to vote [for]... Alliance [the Alliance
Party] doesn't have any labour ideas. John Hume, even
[with] socialist [sic] and labour in the Party [name, ie
Social Democratic and Labour Party], now, they (the SDLP]
mightened come up to all your expectations. He [Hume]
mightened be a full labour man, true enough; he mighteried
be a good socialIst, true enough; but it's [ie the SDLP]
the nearest to labour - no one else. The Northern Ireland
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[Labour] Party never gets in [gets elected]... it's
pathetic like. I don't know what The Workers' Party - are
they republican or what?
However, it is worth reminding the reader that Miss McMorris was
strongly critical of the young revolutionary socialists who initiated
civil rights protests in Derry in the late 1960s (see section 8.2).
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TABLE 2: Stgnatories to the Londonderry Shirt Manufacturers' Federation Statement to the Boundary
Coisission, 92S,
Firms Incorporated
Under Company's act
McIntyre, Hogg, Marsh
Bryce & Weston
McCarthy
Tillie and Henderson
Lawry and Porter
Young & Rochester
tEbrington Factory)
Neely and Wilkinson
Firms Owned as
Private
Partnerships
Harrison
Lloyd, Attvee &
Smith
E, Richards
J, Hamilton & Sons
A,B, Grant
(Rosesount Factory)
Leinster Bros
Firms Owned
by Single
Employers
S,M, Kennedy
alexander
Mills
Burnside
W.J, Little
S. Wilson
D,A, Mooney
Maitland &
Montogomery
W, Jameson
W, Burns
Montcrieff
L Anderson
J.J Carton
Source: Written submission to the Boundary Commission by Londonderry Shirt Manufacturers' Federation
(1926: PRONI MIC 288, Reel 11), Only five members of the Federation did not sign the statement:
Porter and Co., A, Mills and Co., Desmond and Co., Austen Moore, and R, R. Birch and Sons.
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TABLE 5: Numbers of Members in the 'Londonderry' Branch and the 'Londonderry (Factory Workers)'
Branch of the ASTT 1914-1919 (The latter paid union dues in one of the three 'female
membership categories; the former were tailors all of whom paid dues in the male'
categories),
Year
	
Londonderry Branch
	
Londonderry (Factory
Workers) Branch,
1914
	
111
	
100
1915
	
92
	
500
1916
	
85
	
200
1917
	
130
	
3354
1918
	
125
	
3464
1919
	
no figure given
	
3352
Source: 'Tabular Statement of Number of Members, Balances Held by Each Branch, Rates Per Hour, and
Dates Report Received', in the Yearly Report of the Amalgamated Society of Tailors and Tailoresset
1914-1919, Until 1912 the report lists only a 'Londonderry Branch', In 1913 a 'Londonderry
(Factory Workers)' Branch is listed separately from the 'Londonderry Branch' with a separate address
and its own secretary: Kath, Young, 	 However there is no entry for 'Londonderry (Factory Workers)'
Branch in the 'Tabular Statement of Numbers of Members,,,' for 1913,)
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TABLE 6: Numbers of Members in the 'Londonderry' and 'Londonderry (Factory Workers)' Branches of the
ASh 1920-1931 (1931 is the last year for which such figures were published),
Year
	
Londonderry Branch
	
Londonderry (Factory
Workers) Branch
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
87
84
65
84
61
64
64
52
45
50
47
48
200
115
124
- 253
700
755
810
819
770
740
216
317
Source: 'Tabular Statement of Number of Members, Balances Held by Each Branch, Rates Per Hour, and
Dates Reports Received', in the Yearly Report of the Amalgamated Society of Tailors and Tailoresses
1920-1931,
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Target
4,300
850
370
120
300
60
100
100
Area
Derry
Belfast
Coleraine
Bal lymena
Strabane
Omagh
Glenarm
Cloughmills
Number
Employed
6,750
1,250
370
120
400
60
100
100
Membership
3,300
450
320
160
TABLE 7: Estimated Numbers Employed and Numbers of NUT6 Members in the Various Centres of Shirt and
Pyjama Manufacture in Northern Ireland in March 1948.
Source; Typescript document in the NUTGV's Belfast office, dated 12 March 1948,
TABLE 8: Numbers of NUTGW Members in Derry Shirt Factories in Each Quarter of the Year 1970
Factory
McCarthy's
Tillie & Henderson
Harrison's
Mc Cand less
Cedric
Hunter
Bayview
Saracen
Sedgley
Hamilton's
Little
Brookhaven
Tailors
Sundries
Totals
First
Quarter
316
118
168
22
11
23
88
49
7
22
17
841
Second
Quarter
227
130
169
34
21
5
95
7
25
50
90
2
3
849
Third
Quarter
211
148
150
42
17
25
101
7
15
44
90
5
855
Fourth
Quarter
275
167
175
49
24
53
104
54
94
2
3
1000
Source; NUTSW Quarterly Membership Report, manuscript document in headquarters of NUT6, London,
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NOTES
CHAPTER 1: TRADE UNIONISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND: A THEORETICAL AND
METHODOLOGICAL I NTRODUCTION
(1) I have adopted the practice of spelling the noun Union -
referring to the political and legislative Union of Ireland
with Britain - and its derivitives, Unionism and Unionist, with
a capital 'U'. This is to avoid confusion with derivitives of
the compound noun trade union. In the latter case the word
union is only capitalised when it appears in the title of a
specific organisation, or in a chapter heading.
(2) Of course, there are other studies in which trade unionism in
Northern Ireland, or a particular aspect of it, is discussed in
some detail, but none has the theoretical or historical scope
of Rolston's: McCarthy (1973 and 1977) and Boyd (1972) are
historical narratives; Robertson and Barns (1976) is a survey of
full-time trade union officers; Bleakley's article (1953) is
descriptive; Boyd (1984) is a polemic; and Morrissey and
Morrissey (1979) are primarily concerned with strategic
questions.
(3) Gibbon (1975: 4-6) explains the reasoning behind his adoption
of a structuralist approach to the study of Ulster Unionism.
The historiography of Unionism - as represented by such writers
as Beckett (1966), Lyons (1973), and Buckland (1973) - is, he
writes, characterised by a preoccupation with the 'mentalities'
and motivations of the people involved. He identifies real
methodological problems with this approach; in particular the
failure to identify 'the determinants of... action.' However,
his response is also theoretically inadequate because in his
concern to
reconstruct an account of the social arrangements
which provided Unionism's structural foundation.., and
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to identify the principal ways in which the social
arrangements produced (sic] the political and
ideological elements out of which Unionism was
constructed
human agency is excised.
I am also reminded of a criticism of Patterson voiced by the
poet John Hewitt at an Irish Labour History Society (ILHS)
conference in 1981.	 Patterson had been talking about
'Walkerism', the political legacy of William Walker - a
leading member of the Belfast labour movement at the turn of
the century. Hewitt responded in the following terms:
Walker wasn't an "ism". He was a man. He lived down
our street. I used to see him going to work. He wore
a high white collar. (see Fortnight. 254, September
1987).
(4) I lived in Derry for 12 consecutIve months between March 1982
and March 1983.	 I have visited the city on innumerable
occasions since then.
(5) I later found the minute books of the Derry Branch of the
NUTGW and one of its antecedants, the Amalgamated Society of
Tailors and Tailoresses (ASTT), in the Belfast. home of a
researcher who had preceded me. These minute books covered the
period 1924-1961. As wil1 become apparent, the minute books
were to prove an invaluable source.
(6) The person concerned was Stephen McGonagle. His reluctance to
be tape-recorded is probably linked to the fact that, although
retired from active trade unionism, he is a member of Seanad
Eireann (the senate of the Republic of Ireland), and, as such,
a public figure. Moreover, f or reasons which will become
apparent, he was undoubtedly more precious about his past than
most of my respondants. I carried out two interviews with him.
On each occasion I took notes of what he said during the
interviews and transcribed them shortly afterwards. I will use
material derived from both of these interviews in subsequent
chapters, but because they were not recorded, and because of
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his general caution I do not quote as extensively from him as
from other respondents.
CHAPTER 2: DERRY/LONDONDERRY AND ITS SHIRT INDUSTRY 1920-1968
(1) The minutes of Derry Trades Council prior to the late 1960s
have been lost.
(2) At a meeting organised by Sinn Fein in Derry in 1917, and which
was attended by several delegates to the annual conference of
the ITUC which was held in Derry in that year, one speaker
talked of a partnership between Sinn Fein and the Irish labour
movement and said,
it would be a revelation, even in labour circles in
Derry, to know the real attitude of Irish Labour,
accustomed as Derry has been to hear its labour
leaders declare that the labour gospel meant to know
no country.
He added that the resolutions passed at the conference 'would
convince Derry labour of that fallacy.' (DJ: 10 August 1917).
(3) One of my sample of respondants, a Protestant shirt cutter
named Mr Matthews, was secretary of the LDLP in the 1940s, and
he recalled, with some bitterness, writing several letters to
Churchill protesting about the gerrymander; he received no
reply.
(4) In the course of my fieldwork I attended a crowded debate
between Gerry Adams and Father Des Wilson on the subject of
socialism and republicanism in Ireland. After the meeting I
went f or a drink with its organiser, a local Slnn Fein
activist, who expressed a certain incredulity with the success
of the meeting: he felt that a debate on socialism would not
have been possible, or at least, not so well attended, 20 years
before.
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(5) In 1986 I attended a meeting of the Ulster Clubs - a loyalist
organisation set up to oppose the Anglo-Irish Agreement - in
Belfast. Alan Wright, one of the main organisers of the Ulster
Clubs, told the meeting that he had addressed a similar meeting
in Derry several nights before; he referred to the siege of
1689 and spoke with reverence of the stoical resolve of the
people living in the Fountain area: the Fountain is the only
Protestant working class area on the mainly Catholic west bank
of the Foyle.
(6) One of the provisions of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty was for a
Boundary Commission to be established to review the boundary
between Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State (Lyons, 1973:
433-438). This provision was put into effect in 1925. Various
interest groups submitted written statements to the Commission,
and the representatives of some groups were interviewed. The
SMF submitted a general written statement, and two of the
manufacturers who had signed the document were interviewed: Mr
R. P. Harrison of Harrison and Co., and Mr J .J. McCarthy of
McCarthy and Co. These two men also submitted individual
written statements. Unless stated otherwise, all references to
the Boundary Commission in the text relate to the Boundary
Commission Papers (1926: MIC 288, Reel 11) which are held by
the Public Records Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI).
(7) According to my respondants it was not until 1941 that
production and employment in the industry began to expand.
(8) The market for ready-made shirts developed when the stiff
fronted shirt came into vogue: stiff fronts were difficult to
make at home (Grew, 1987: 23).
(9 Flax spinning had been mechanised and the industry as a whole
was becoming concentrated in the South of Ulster (Grew, 1987:
26).
(10) The local solicitor who kept the minutes of the SMF did not
respond to my persistent requests to see them even though I had
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obtained permission to do so from the then chairman of the
federat ion.
(11) My information on Harrison's and McCarthy's is culled from
interviews which I conducted with Arthur Harrison, retired
managing director of Harrison's, and Richard Smaliwoods,
retired general manager of Mccarthy's. Neither interview was
tape-recorded, but in both cases I made notes as my respondants
talked.
(12) One of the women in my sample of union officials and activists,
Miss Cosgrave, became a manageress. Her case was an exception
which, to some extent, proves the rule; to understand why see
Appendix 1.
CHAPTER 3: THE EARLY HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM AND THE STRIKE OF 1920
(1) Complete collections of the annual reports of the ASh and
monthly Journal of the ASTT are held in the head office of the
NUTGW in London. The latter holds copies of the monthly
journal of the UGW, but only from 1926. The original title of
the latter was The Garment Worker, it changed to The Tailor and
Garment Worker in 1932, and reverted to The Garment Worker in
1936; I refer to it throughout simply as the Garment Worker or
abbreviate it to GW. The library of the British Trade Union
Congress holds some copies of the Garment Worker between 1923
and 1936; so far I know, no other library holds copies from
an earlier date.
(2) I am grateful to Theresa Moriarty for this information.
(3) McCarron served on the the Parliamentary Committee of the ITUC
from its formation in 1894 until 1910 (Greaves, 1982: 49). He
was a supporter of the Irish Parliamentary Party and, as such,
was part of the political tradition which predominated in the
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ITUC until the rise of Irish separatism after 1910. McCarthy
(1977: 16-17) describes him as, 'an impresive Redmondite who
had little patience with Larkin, Socialism, or Slnn Fein.'
(4) My interview with O'Donnell was not tape-recorded, but I noted
his answers to my questions during the interview.	 I carried
out one tape-recorded interview with McCorkell. I subsequently
spoke to him several times on the phone. I have included
McCorkell as part of my sample of respondants, see Appendix 1
for further details of his biography.
(5) Incidently, the minutes refer to an appended report on the 1920
strike; however, no such report is attached to the PRONI file.
(6) My interview with James Hamilton was not tape-recorded, but I
noted his answers to my questions during the interview.
(7) This is possibly a reference to the fact that Irish railway
workers were on strike against the movement of munitions f or
the British security forces at the same time as the cutters
were on strike, and that the ITUC voted (on 2 August 1920) to
suspend all wage movements so that all trade union funds could
be put at the disposal of the railway workers. The latter
resolution was the reason which the Derry Branch of the ITGWU
gave for not resisting a cut in wages for the workers in
Watt's distillery in November 1920 (DJ: 8 and 10 June 1921, see
section 3.4 of this thesis).
(8) The Watchword of Labour (18 September 1920) reports that
O'Donnell enrolled workers in Derry's two flour mills just in
time f or them to participate in a conference on a national wage
demand.
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CHAPTER 4: THE DECLINE AND GROWTH OF TRADE UNIONISM AMONG WOMEN
SHIRTMA.KERS 1920-1952
(1) Iricidently, the pattern of decline and growth in trade union
membership described in this chapter makes some sense of the
claim, made by a group of local historians, that, 'the trade
unions started to appear in the factories in the 1930's;
although it was the 1940s before they were organised properly.'
(Londonderry Teachers' Centre and North West Historical
Society, N. D. c1979: 52).
(2) Trade union density 'expresses the proportion of trade
unionists in a given constituency in relation to potential
membership' (Poole, 1984: 114), ie actual membership divided by
potential membership multiplied by 100.
(3) Henceforth material culled from the Minutes of the Londonderry
Branch of the NUTGW will be referred to simply as the
'Minutes'.
(4) Clegg (1976: 12-28) lists government policy towards trade
unionism in a particular country as a significant influence on
trade union density in that country. The Stormorit Government
refused to recognise the hUG (to which the NUTGW was
affiliated) because it had its headquarters In the Republic of
Ireland, a foreign country. None of my respondants mentioned
this as a factor. Moreover, lest the reader get the mistaken
impression that relations between the Government of Northern
Ireland and particular unions like the NUTGW were implacably
hostile, it is worth pointing out that trade union
representatives participated In various statutory bodies - for
instance, the NUTGW sent representatives to the Shirt Making
Trade Board - and that the Journal of the Amalgamated Society
of Tailors and Tailoresses (December 1929) published an article
entitled 'Northern Ireland - An Ideal Centre for New Industry'
by the Right Honourable J. M. Andrews, Minister of Labour f or
Northern Ireland.
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(5) I am able to demonstrate that there was a change in the
attitude or policy of Derry shirt manufacturers to trade
unionism between the 1930s and the 1940s. The question of what
was behind this change is interesting and important, but
difficult to answer without having had access to the minutes of
the SMF. In any case it is not directly relevant to this
thesis and is not, therefore, pursued here.
(6) The women concerned, I shall refer to her as Margaret,
recounted this episode from her life during an interview with
me. The interview was not tape-recorded but I took notes as
she talked. The essentials of her story were confirmed by one
of her friends whom I met by chance.
(7) Michael McGuinness, Community History and Heritage Project.
(8) To give added weight to the significance of this argument, it
is worth pointing out that Derry Trades Council complained that
one of the firms which located in Derry in the late 1950s -
Birmingham Sound Reproducers - was employing too many women
(DJ: 12 October 1961). In fact, Birmingham Sound Reproducers
employed only 150 women in a workforce of nearly 1, 100 (DJ: 18
October 1960). Shirt manufacturers also complained about the
numbers of women employed by new industries: they were
concerned about increasing competition between employers in the
female labour market (Northern Ireland Community Relations
Commission, 1972).
(9) It is worth noting that Miss Gallagher said she often used the
argument that many families were dependent on the wages of
shirtmakers in negotiations with management.
(10) I do not want to anticipate the next chapter, but it is worth
pointing out that Catholic women resented the religious
imbalance in shirt cutting and management more than they
resented the fact that both jobs were male dominated.
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(11) The FEA, since its formation in 1976, has commissioned research
on various aspects of inequality between Catholics and
Protestants in the Northern Ireland labour market. This
research has drawn attention to factors other than active
discrimination which can give rise to imbalances in the
proportions of Catholics and Protestants in particular
workforces. The geographical location of factories is one such
factor.
When different social groups display patterns of
residential concentration, then location of employment
can critically determine the accessibility of jobs to
the respective groups... this accessibility will be in
terms of the actual costs in terms of transport and
time (in relation to available wage levels) and in
contemporary Belfast, whether location requires
crossing sectarian boundaries. (Cormack et al, 1980:
37).
However, in the light of examples of,
sources of employment located in areas which are
comprised of one social group where no member of that
social group is employed in that particular
establishment (1980: 37),
Cormack et al suggest that a more important factor is the
tendency for many firms to recruit workers through informal
networks; that is, through recommendations by existing
employees or by word of mouth. Given that informal networks in
Northern Ireland mainly operate between co-religionists, this
method of recruitment tends to perpetuate patterns of
segregation and inequality. Several of the retired shirt
factory managers whom I interviewed attested the importance of
recommendations from existing employees in the recruitment of
new staff. A glance at the work histories of each of the shirt
workers in my sample of respondants (see Appendix 1) provides
further evidence that informal networks were a significant -
though not the only - method of recruitment in the Derry shirt
industry.
The FEA has noted, but not systematicaly investigated, another
mechanism whereby patterns of religious segregation in
employment may be reproduced: 'once a firm has a reputation for
having workers of one religious persuasion, it may discourage
members of the other persuasions from applying for work'
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(Cormack et al, 1980: 11). Two Catholic shirt workers whom I
met in the course of my research indicated that they would have
found it difficult to work in McCarthy's factory, and Quinn, as
I have aleady noted, expressed the view that Catholic workers
would not have considered going for a Job in a factory, such as
Hamiltors, which was identified with the Protestant community
because they would have considered it to be pointless: 'they
wouldn' t employ you.' Mr Matthews told me that a Catholic
would have been made to feel uncomfortable in McCarthy's - he
suggested that if a Catholic woman left her machine she might
return to find her thread broken. Miss Gallagher, on the other
hand, told me that one of her sisters had worked in McCarthy' s
for years and that she 'had come to no harm.'
(12) Interview with the general manager of Harrison's in 1983. The
interview was not tape-recorded, but I made notes of what he
said as he said it.
(13) None of my respondants remembered this man; some told me that
'Kilgore' was a Catholic name, but most thought it was
Protestant.
CHAPTER 5: MALE SHIRT CUTIERS AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NUTGW AND THE
ATGWU 1920-1952: THE POLITICS OF SEX. SKILL, AND RELIGION
(1) I conducted one interview with Mr McDonald and two interviews
with Mr Nelson. None of the interviews were tape-recorded, but
I took notes of what my respondents were saying as they said
it.
(2) The minute book of the Cutters' Committee of the Derry Branch
of the ATGWU includes minutes from meetings held between 1950
and 1952. No other minutes or records relating to this
Committee survive: I was told by a current ATGWU official that
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many records were destroyed or thrown away when the union moved
to their present offices.
(3) In George Hamill's view, Ryan's interpretation of the 1932
agreement was the correct one. He recalled the history of the
agreement in the following way:
There was a big row (when shirt cutters defected to
the ATGWU) 'cause our union was breaking the
Bridlington agreement. The row ended up with Ernest
Bevin coming to Derry that was in 19 ah [hesitation),
somewhere about say, the middle 30s. I remember a
big meeting he had in the Guildhall - he had a general
meeting of the trade unionists as well - but that (le
the row between ATGWU nad the NUTGWIJ] was one of the
specific things he came for. They resolved the thing
by drawing up an agreement that we were allowed to
keep the cutters that were transferred over to us, but
any further recruitment in the factories after that
would be the prerogative of the Tailor and Garment
Workers' union. But as you know all these agreements
they're airight on paper, but they never work out.
The fact that Ryan's interpretation of the 1932 agreement was
probably the correct one makes the cutters defiance of it all
the more remarkable.
(4) Dockers struck and marched into the city centre when two of
their colleagues were arrested following an Anti-Partition
League Rally in Derry on Saint Patrick's Day, 1952 (see
Farrell, 1980: 203).
(5) Trubenising is a chemical process whereby a 'stiff and 'semi-
stiff' collars were made by emersing collars In a solvent which
fused the front cloth, the back cloth, and the Interlining
which made up the collar. It reduced the number of components
which went Into making a collar, and obviated the need for the
washing, starching, shaping, and polishing which had previously
been necessary to achieve the desired finish.
(6) See Census of Northern Ireland 1926, County and County Borough
of Londonderry (1928: 51), and Census of the Population of
Northern Ireland 1951, County and County Borough of Londonderry
(1954: 69). The other census reports do not list cutting as a
separate occupation.
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CHAPTER 6: THE SECESSION OF THE DERRY BRANCH OF THE NUTGW 1952-1954:
TRADITIONAL IRISH MARXISM STOOD ON ITS HEAD
(1) I have riot had access to the minutes of the Derry Branch of the
NUTGW in the period immediately before the breakaway. The last
meeting in the first minute book of the ASTT/NUTGW was reported
in July 1951.	 The new minute book begins with a meeting in
November 1953: the first formal meeting of a new,
reconstituted, Branch Committee of the NUTGW. Presumably, the
minutes of NUTGW Branch Committee meetings held in the period
between July 1951 and September 1952 were removed from the
offices of the NUTGW when the Branch Committee resigned. The
Garment Worker did not report the breakway. Indeed the only
mention of it is in Macgougan's column of 'Irish Notes' in the
December 1952 edition. This adds nothing new to our knowledge
of the situation.
(2) I spoke to Eamonn McCann twice: once in person and once on the
telephone. On the latter occasion I noted his responses to my
questions as he made them.
(3) I interviewed Mrs McMeriamin once. The interview was tape-
recorded, but during part of the interview my tape-recorder
malfunctioned.
(4) Female activists did not usually issue statements to the press.
The only exceptions were three letters published in the Derry
Journal. The first two (DJ: 21 October 1953) were from
'factory girls' defending the ballot on affiliation to the
ITGWU. The third (DJ: 4 December 1953) was from Sarah McGeady,
an ITGWIJ shop steward in Harrison's criticising the Trades
Council's stance on the breakaway and defending McGoriagle's
record as a trade union official.
(5) The Derry Journal followed the nationalist tradition of using
the term 'six Counties' rather than Northern Ireland or Ulster:
the state of Northern Ireland includes only six of the nine
Counties of Ulster.
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(6)	 It is interesting to note that this was not the first time that
union organisers who were not from Derry were subject to this
kind of attack. One of the criticisms of the Derry Branch of
the ITGWIJ following the dispute in Watt's distillery in 1921
was that its organisers were not from Derry: Ridgeway was
denounced as a 'Belfast Orangeman' (DJ: 15 June 1921), and
ITGWU organisers were said to have 'came to Derry' and
exploited sectarian tensions (DJ: 22 June 1921; see section
3.4). In 1891, opponents of trade unionism in the shirt
factories had criticised Eleanor Aveling as an 'outsider' who
was disturbing what had hitherto been good relations between
employers and employees (DS: 20 November 1891; see section
3. 2).
Hostility to outsiders who came to Derry as a political or
union organisers was not confined to Catholic or Nationalist
Derry. For example, Mr Matthews expressed some resentment of
Macgougan's role in trade unionism and labour politics in
Derry: 'Macgougan operated from Belfast, and outside Belfast
Macgougan wasn't interested in anything at all, (so far as he
was concerned] Derry was only a two-pen' ha' penny place'.
(7) I interviewed Francis Maguire once.	 The interview was not
tape-recorded, but I took notes as she answered my questions.
(8) It is worth noting in this connection that in the case of one
of the breakaways studied by Lerner (1961: 119) - that of the
United Clothing Workers' Union established in the East End of
London in the 1930s - London Trades Council issued warning
about
the possiblity of members' daughters and relatives
being used to build up a new orgnisation that cannot
be recognised by the TUG.
(9) Maxwell was the leader of the Nationalist Party in Derry from
the mid 1930s until 1953 when the party nominated McAteer for
the Foyle constituency. Maxwell stood as an independent
candidate; the contest was bitter (see Curran, 1986: 12-13).
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(10) Macgougan told me that O'Connor had stood as a Glenn na
Poblachte candidate in an election in Eire, but described him
as an 'opportunist.' Farrell (1980: 352) desribes Glenn na
Poblachta as
a populist Republican party... Founded in 1946... it
included many ex-IRA men and took substantial support
from Fianna Fail while its radical social programme
attracted left-wingers.
(11) It is worth noting that another anthropologist has reached
similar conclusions in relation to a Ugandan railway union.
Grub (1973) argues, against the conventional wisdom, that the
endemic faction fighting in this union was generated by the
structure of the situation, not by ethnic rivalry. He
concludes (1973: 175):
In sum, to suggest that faction fighting is caused
basically by ehtnlc rivalry overlooks the extent to
which the latter is the product of the former, and
that both, in turn, are virtually inevitable in this
system so long as the Union itself remains a
desireable prize.
CHAPTER 7: RIVALRY AND ACCOMMODATION: TRADE UNIONISM IN THE DERRY
SHIRT INDUSTRY 1954-1968
(1) Each of these committees were composed of lay activists who
were elected by the members. O'Connor held the one seat on the
National Executive which was allocated to Ireland.
(2) Mr Lynch was the son of the Mr Lynch who was killed in the same
incident as McCarron (see section 3.2).
(3) Aside from the Branch Committee elected in 1953, this is the
only year in which Commitee members were listed (see DJ: 15
March 1957).
(4) 011is was given sick leave and never returned to Derry. He was
removed from the Job because he could not cope with the stress
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of working In Derry. According to Macgougan, 011is was,
A tragedy, he went to Derry while the split was on and
he had a lonely time... [He] was very highly thought
of by the members, I liked him.., but he stayed in
awful digs apparently. He was watched like a hawk [by
the ITGWU] if he'd been seen out with a woman or
anything like that.
There is some corroboration f or what Macgougan says in the
minutes of the Derry Branch of the NUTGW. In 1957 NUTGW shop
stewards complained about 011is's failure to deal with a few
industrial relations problems; Miss Gallagher is reported to
have saved him from a vote of no confidence by arguing that the
complaints were minor and that they only 'assisted the
opposition in their whispering campaigns of which we were all
too familiar' (MInute: 29 November 1957). Both Macgougan and
Gallagher made several references to ITGWIJ inspired whispering
campaigns against them and their union In the early 1950s. In
the last chapter I noted Miss Gallagher's claim that
insinuations were made about her and O'Connor. Macgougan also
told me, spontaneously and without me having mentioned Miss
Gallagher's claim, that O'Connor 'saw' a 'couple' of women
while he was in Derry; he added that Derry was not the sort of
place where that would pass unnoticed, and suggested that the
resulting gossip made O'Connor's position in Derry even more
difficult.
(5) Mary was putting rollers in the hair of Mrs McMenamin, an ITGWiJ
activist whom I had arranged to interview. Part of this
interview is tape-recorded, but Mary' s comments are not: my
tape-recorder malfunctioned for the first half of the
interview, and Mary had finished Mrs McMenamin's hair and left
the house before I discovered the malfunction. However, I
recalled most of what Mary had said and made notes immediately
after the interview was over.
(6) The reader my recall that Selly McDowell, a founder member of
the new NUTGW Branch Committee, worked In Rosemount. 	 Miss
Gallagher told me that Miss McDowell
was great because she worked with us when we really
needed her,.. because I went to all the conferences
with her,	 She was always with me and I liked going
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with her; well she was something the same as myself...
she enjoyed herself in her own way, we enjoyed
ourselves.
However, she was not able to make much progress In the
Rosemount factory, and in 1955 she stopped attending NUTGW
Branch Committee meetings. Miss Gallagher did not know why,
but suspected that she had been subject to moral pressure by
ITGWU members:
I don't know what happened (to) her after that... I
know something happened in the Rosemount, and I got
the shock of my life: somebody told me Selerie had gone
over to McGonagle. And it was true enough because I
met her afterwards... they (the ITGWU] were in trouble
and she was the odd man out and they said to her she
would have to (join the ITGWU]. And, of course some
of Stephen's people must have been In the backround of
that. And I wouldn't have believed it so I came
across and was having a talk with her and she said,
'Kathy, I had to, I had to do it.' But then as far as
I know - she met me after - 'to tell you the truth, at
the moment I'm not In any (union].'
The NUTGW was never able to function effectively in the
Rosemount factory.
(7) It was not just Unionists like Mrs Henderson who were
suspicious of McGonagle. John Sharkey, another left-wing anti-
partitionist in Derry, referred to McGonagle as 'the noted
McGonagle who made himself so popular by being all things to
all men. ' (letter to John DeCourcy Ireland dated 1 October
1962, University College Dublin: P29a/158 	 (2)).
(8) The ATGWU remained the main union for shirt cutters, and its
proportionate share of the shirt workforce did not change
significantly between 1954 and 1968.
(9) In the early 1970s the Belfast office of the ITGWU became
concerned about its declining membership in Derry and
commissioned an independent report on the subject. The Belfast
official of the ITGW1J who commissioned the report refused to
let me see it.	 Quinn claimed that the ITGWIJ had 3,000 members
in the late 1960s, but by my reckoning this is an overestimate.
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(10) I met Sadie by accident. I had arranged to interview a retired
Protestant shirt factory worker called Lily; when I got to her
house I found that she had invited two other shirt workers to
take part in the interview, one of these women was Sadie. I
went ahead with the interview and tape-recorded it; however, I
found that each of the women was less forthcoming about the
political aspects of trade unionism than they might have been
had I met them individually (cf Thompson, 1978: 116). Of the
threes Sadie was the most outspoken and the remark quoted in
the text was about the only thing which any of the women had to
say on the division between the NUTGW and the ITGWIJ. It was
not possible to arrange a further interview with Sadie or
either of the other two.
(11) It Is worth pointing out that when talking about the NIJTGW
people she met, Miss McMorrIs does not include Miss Gallagher
among those she liked and respected; neither women was able to
forget the 'aggro' in Harrison's factory. The NUTGW official
whom she liked best was Francis Maguire, and It is perhaps
significant that relations between Francis Maguire and Miss
Galigher were often strained: Miss Gallagher regarded her as
one of the 'Eire Labour [ie IrLP] crowd.'
(12) Even with Peggy, Miss Gallagher's attitude was coloured by
political disagreement: she qualified the statement quoted in
the text by saying, 'but, there again her [Peggy's] politics
were very Irish.'
(13) My respondant was Margaret: the Catholic woman from the Bogside
who I mentioned in section 4.3 as the only example of a 'female
breadwinner' I came across in the course of my research. It is
worth pointing out that when I interviewed her she was a
prominent NUTGW shop steward in Harrison's.
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CHAPTER 8: TRADE UNIONISM AND SECTARIANISM IN THE DERRY SHIRT
INDUSTRY 1920-1968: AN HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL
CONCLUSION
(1) Miss Cosgrave, the other ITGWU activist in my sample, gave up
her union membership when she became a manageress in the
Rosemount factory in the early 1960s (see Appendix 1).
(2) This quote is taken from the transcript of a tape-recording of
Hamill's paper.	 All of the contributions at the 1985 Irish
Labour History Society Conference were tape-recorded.
(3) Purdie speculates (1987: 11) that the bulk of support for
McGonagle came from nationalists who had not forgiven McAteer
for usurping the Nationalist Party nomination in the Foyle
constituency from Paddy Maxwell in 1953 (see Curran, 1986: 13).
(4) O'Dowd (1980b: 64) has also remarked, albeit in a different
context, on the distance of Catholic politics from the
workplace and production based Issues:
the Catholic working class have remained marginal to
industrial production. The foregoing analysis of
'regional policy' has shown that there are clear and
unequivocal reasons why Catholic protest is not based
at the workplace and why the central political and
military struggle appears so remote from production-
based issues. Restructuring has maintained - if not
extended - the marginality of Catholics; the largest
concentration of urban Catholic males are not on the
shop-floor but on the dole queue and in Long Kesh
(5) It was alleged at the time that a number of local Unionist
notables ostensibly subscribed to the University for Derry
Campaign but in practice supported government policy. They
became known as the 'faceless men' (Curran, 1986: 27).
(6) Mrs Henderson's recollections of the 5 October march are at
variance with contemporaneous accounts written by other
participants (see Purdie, 1988 for a summary). According to
the latter it was the police who attacked first, and although
some of the marchers threw placards at the police there is no
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mention of stones being thrown until sometime after the march
had dispersed. The CRM was not a republican plot, and the IRA
did not re-emerge as an armed force until late in 1970 (see
Bell, 1979: chapter 19 passim, and Curran, 1986: 123).
However, it is true that republicans were involved In the
formation of NICRA, and In the agitation In Derry which
preceded the 5 October march. It is also true that as inter-
communal violence intensified many civil rights activists
gravitated towards physical force republicanism. McCann (1980:
129) writes that the Provisional IRA:
Is entitled to see Itself... as the legitimate
inheritor of the struggle for clvii rights... The men
and women of the IRA today are the rioting children of
a decade ago. To my knowledge there is no member of
the Provos in Derry whose first conscious political
experience was other than attendance at a civil rights
march or rally and, probably, whatever bout of stone
throwing ensued.
In this context, it is worth mentioning that Mr Gordon, Unionist
shirt cutter and member of the ATGWU, echoed Mrs Henderson's views:
The day that the civil rights got on the street was
the best thing that happened from the point of view of
the working man... the only thing was the the IRA came
behind them.
- 376 -
BIBLIOGRAPHY
(This bibliography includes only the published and unpublished
written sources to which reference has been made in the text)
I. PRIMARY SOURCES
(A) MANUSCRIPT MATERIALS
1. The Archives Department University College Dublin, Belfield.
Dr John DeCourcy Ireland Deposit, P29a/158.
2. Head Office of the NUTGW, London
Quarterly Membership Report (1970).
3. The Londonderry Office of the ATGWIJ
Minutes of the Cutters' Committee of the ATGWU (1950-1952).
4. Londonderry Office Office of the NUTGW
Minutes of the Londonderry (Female Factory Workers) Branch of the
ASh (1924-1932).
Minutes of the Londonderry Branch of the NUTGW (1933-1951).
Minutes of the Londonderry Branch of the NUTGW (1953-1962).
5.The Public Records Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI)
Minutes of the Board of Directors of Tulle and Henderson Ltd (1907-
1923) 1.3377/1.
6. The Registrar of Friendly Societies and Building Societies, Dublin
The Londonderry Shirt, Collar, and Underclothing Cutters' Trade
Union, File: 255T.
The Shirt and Collar Cutters' Trade Union of Ireland, File: 114.
- 377 -
(B) PRINTED PRIMARY SOURCES
1. Company Records, Companies Registration Office, London
Harrison's and Co., Company Number: 434,328, and 404,116;
McCarthy's and Co., Company Number: 113,864.
McIntyre, Hogg, Marsh, and Co., Company Number: 97,241.
Young, Rochester, and Co., Company Number: 96,651.
2. Government Reports and Documents:
Boundary Commission Papers (1926) PRONI MIC 288.
Cameron Commission (1969) Disturbances in Northern Irelanth Cmd. 532,
Belfast: HMSO.
Census of Ireland 1901 Volume III Province of Ulster No 7 County
and City of Londonderry (1902) Dublin: HMSO.
Census of Ireland 1911 Province of Ulster County and City of
Londonderry (1912) London: HMSO.
Census of Northern Ireland 1926 County and County Borough of
Londonderry (1928) Belfast: HMSO.
Census of Population Northern Ireland 1951 County and County Borough
of Londonderry (1954) Belfast: HMSO.
Donovan Commission (1968) Report of the Royal Commission on Trade
Unions and Employers' Associatthns. Cmnd 3623, London: HMSO.
Northern Ireland Census of Population 1961 County and County Borough
of Londonderry (1964) Belfast: HMSO.
3. Newspapers
An Phoblacht/Republican News
The Derry Journal
The Derry Standard
The Irishman
The Irish Weekly
The Londonderry Sentinel
The News Sheet of the Belfast Executive of the Irish Labour Party
4. Trade Union Publications
Annual Reports of the British Trade Union Congress.
The Garment Worker (monthly journal of the UGW and, after 1933, of
the NUTGW).
- 378 -
Journal of the Amalgamated Society of Tailors and Tailoresses
Liberty (monthly journal of ITGWU).
The Watchword of Labour (journal of the ITGWU 1919-1920).
Yearly Reports of the Amalgamated Society of Tailors and
Tailoresses.
5. Typescript Docuints
Conley, A. (24 June 1932) 'Circular to all Full-Time Officials:
Agreement Between the National Union of Tailors and Garment
Workers and the Transport and General Workers' Union' (copy
supplied by Belfast office of NUTGW).
Democratic Unionist Party (1978) 'Document of Discrimination', 3
October 1978 (press statement).
Macgougan, J. (12 September 1952) 'Statement to Irish Branches and
Shop Stewards' (copy supplied by author).
Macgougan, J. (24 September 1952) 'Summary of Statement by I.
Macgougan, Irish Officer National Union of Tailor and Garment
Workers, to a Meeting in the Guildhall Derry' (press statement,
copy supplied by author).
McCarthy and Co (1971) History of McCarthy and Company Limited (an
in-house history, photocopy)
Minutes of the Executive Committee of the National Union of Tailors
and Garment Workers, London: Head Office of the NUTGW.
National Union of Tailors and Garment Workers (12 March 1948)
Membership Report (NI), Belfast: Office of the NUTGW.
6. Other Printed Material
Belfast and Northern Ireland Directory (1935-1971).
- 379 -
SECONDARY SOURCES
(A) PUBLISHED
(including books, articles, and pamphlets)
Abrams, p . (1982) Historical Sociology. London: Open Books.
Alexander, S. (1980) Review (of Lewenhak, S. (1978) Women and Trade
Unions. Benn; and Soldon, N. C. (1978) Women in British Trade
Unions 1874-1976. Gill and Macmillan Capital and Class. ii
Summer 1980.
Aithusser, L. (1969) For Marx. London: Allen Lane.
Aithusser, L. (1971) Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essa ys. London:
New Left books.
Arthur, P. (1987) Government and Politics of Northern Ireland.
London: Longman.
Barritt, D. P. and Carter, F. C. (1972) The Northern Ireland Problem:
A Study in Group Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Barron, R. D. and Norris, E. R. (1976) 'Sexual Divisions and the Dual
Labour Market' in Barker, D. L. and Allen, S. (eds) Dependence
and Exploitation in Work and Marriage. London: Longman.
Beckett, 3. C. (1966) The Making of Modern Ireland, London: Faber and
Faber.
Beechey, V. (1983) 'What's so Special About Women's Employment? A
Review of Some Recent Studies of Women's Paid Work', Feminist
Review 15.
Bell, 3. Bowyer. (1979) The Secret Army: The IRA 1916-1979. Dublin:
Academy Press.
Benney, M. and Hughes, E. C. (1956) 'Of Sociology and the Interview'
in Bulmer, M. (ed) Sociological Research Methods: An
Introduction. London; Macmillan 1983.
Bew, P., Gibbon, P., and Patterson, H. (1979) The State in Northern
Ireland 1921-1972 Manchester; Manchester University Press.
Bew, P., Gibbon, P., and Patterson, H. (1980) 'Some Aspects of
Nationalism and Socialism in Ireland 1968-1978' in Morgan, A.
and Purdie, B. Ireland: Divided Nation Divided Class. London:
Ink Links.
- 380 -
Bleakley, 0. W. (1953) 'The Northern Ireland Trade Union Movement',
Journal of the Statisitical and Social Enquiry Society of
Ireland. 20.
Boraston, I., Clegg, H. A., and Rimnier, M. (1975) Workplace and
Union: A Study of Local Relationships in Fourteen Unions.
London: Heinemann.
Bornat, J. (1977) 'Home and Work: A New Context f or Trade Union
History', Journal of the Oral Histor y Society 5 (2).
Bourdieu, P. (1978) Outline of a Theory of Practice. Translated by
Nice, R., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (First edition
1972).
Boyd, A. (1972) The Rise of the Irish Trade Unions 1729-1970. Tralee.
Boyd, A. (1984) Have the Trade Unions Failed the North. Mercier
Press, Dublin and Cork.
The British and Irish Communist Organisation, (1972) The Economics of
Partition. Belfast.
Buckland, P. S. (1973) Irish Unionism. Dublin.
Burton, F. (1978) The Politics of Legitimacy: Struggles in a Belfast
Community. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Charles, N. (1983) 'Women and Trade Unions in the Workplace',
Feminist Review 15.
Clegg, H. A. (1976) Trade Unionism Under Collective Bargaining: A
Theory Based on Comparisons of Six Countries. Oxford: Blackwell.
Clegg, H. A. (1979) The Changing System of Industrial Relations in
Great Britain. Oxford: Blackwell.
Cockburn, C. (1983) Brothers. London: Pluto.
Connolly, 3. (1911) 'Sweat Shops Behind the Orange Flag' in Ryan, D.
The Workers' Republic. Dublin, 1951.
Cork Workers' Club (1975) 'North East Ulster', in Ireland on the
Dissecting Table: Connolly on Ulster. Cork.
Cormack, R. J., Osborne, R. D., and Thompson, W. T. (1980) Into Work?
Young School Leavers and the Structure of Opportunity in
Belfast. Belfast: Fair Employment Agency (Research Paper 5).
Coulter/Mews Music (N.D.) 'The Town I Loved So Well' in 100 Best
Irish Songs and Ballads. Dublin: Mac Publications.
Coyle, A. (1982) 'Sex and Skill in the Organisation of the Clothing
Industry' in West, 5. (ed) Work, Women and the Labour Market.
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- 381 -
Curran, F. (1986) Derry: Countdown to Disaster. Dublin: Gill and
Macmillan.
Derby, 3. (1983) Northern Ireland: The Backround to the Conflict.
Belfast: Appletree.
Dempsey, P. (1983) 'Reversing Discrimination: The FEA's Derry
Report', Iris: The Republican Magazine 6.
Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction for Ireland
(1902) 'The Londonderry Shirtmaking Industry' in Ireland
Industrial and Agricultural. Dublin: Browne and Nolan.
Devine, F. (1986) 'Trade Union Records in the Registrar of Friendly
Societies, Dublin', Seothar: Journal of the Irish Labour History
Society 11.
Dohr, F. (1952) 'The Linen Industry of Northern Ireland', The Textile
Quarterly 2 (2).
Donnan, H. and McFarlane, G. (1983) 'Informal Social Organisation' in
Derby, 3. (ed) Northern Ireland: The Backrourid to the Conflict.
Belfast: Appletree Press.
Dunlop, 3. 1. (1958) Industrial Relations Systems. New York: Holt.
Eaton, 3. and Gill, C. (1981) The Trade Union Directory: A Guide to
All TUG Unions. London: Pluto.
Elias, N. (1978) The Civilising Process. Oxford: Blackwell.
Fair Employment Agency (September 1983) Report on Employment Patterns
in the Londonderry Area. Belfast.
Farrell M. (1980) Northern Ireland: The Orange State. London: Pluto
Press (first edition 1976).
Finley, A. (1987) 'The Cutting Edge: Derry Shirtmakers' in Curtin,
C., Jackson, P., and O'Connor, B., Gender in Irish Society.
University of Galway Press.
Flanders, A. (1965) Industrial Relations: What is Wrong with the
System'?. London: Faber.
Fraser, M. (1979) Children in Conflict. Middlesex: Penguin (First
edition 1973).
Fryer, G. (1973) Paeder O'DonnelL Lewisburg: Bucknell University
Press.
Gallacher, W. (1936) Revolt on the Clyde. London.
Gamble, A. (1987) 'Class Politics and Radical Democracy', New Left
Review 167, July-August 1987.
- 382 -
Gibbon, P. (1975) The Origins of Ulster Unionism'. Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
Giddens, A. (1976) New Rules of the Sociological Method: A Positive
Critique of Interpretive Sociologes. London: Hutchinson.
Giddens, A. (1979) Central Problems in Social theory: Action.
Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Gramsci, A. (1977) in Hoare, Q. Grarnsci: Selections from the Political
Writings 1910-120. London: Lawrence Wishart.
Gray, J. (1984) City in Revolt: James Larkin and the Belfast Dock
Strike of 1907. Belfast: Blackstaff.
Greaves, C. D. (1982) The Irish Transport and General Workers'
Union:	 The Formative Years 1909-1923.
	 Dublin:	 Gill and
Macmillan.
Grillo, R. (1973) African Railwavmen: Solidarity and Opposition in an
East African Labour Force. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Guckian, F. G. (1963) A Great Industry in Peril: The Problem of the
Shirt and Pylama Industry In Northern Ireland in 1963.
Londonderry.
Hall, S. (1988) 'Brave New World', Marxism Today. October 1988.
Harris, R. (1972) Preludice and Tolerance in Ulster: A Study of
Neighbours and 'Strangers' in a Border Community. Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
Harris, R. (1987) Power and Powerlessness In Industr y An Analysis of
the Social	 Relations	 of	 Production.	 London:	 Tavistock
Publications.
Hemmlngway, 3. (1978) Conflict and Democracy: Studies in Trade Union
Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hoare, Q. (1986) Selections From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio
Gramsci. London: Lawrence Wishart.
Hyman, R. (1975) Marxism and the Sociology of Trade Unionism. London:
Pluto Press (first edition 1971).
Hyman, R. (1979a) Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction.
London: Macmillan (first published in 1975).
Hyman, R. (1979b) 'The Politics of Workplace Trade Unionism: Recent
Tendencies and Some Problems for Theory', Capital and Class 8,
Summer 1979.
- 383 -
Hymen, R. end Fryer, B. (1975) 'Trade Unions', in McKinley, I. (ed)
Processing People. London: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston.
Jackson, H. (1979) The Two Irelands: The Problem of the Double
Minority - A Dual Study of Inter-Group Tensions. London:
Minority Rights Group (first edition 1971).
James, L. (1984) Power in a Trade Union: The Role of the District
Committee in the AUEW. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jenkins, R. (1983) Lads. Citizen's. wid Ordinary Kids: Working Class
Youth Life Styles in Belfast. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Kapferer, B. (1988) 'The Anthropologist as Hero: Three Exponents of
Post-Modernist Anthropology', Critique of Anthropolgy VIII (2).
Kendal, W. (1975) The Labour Movement in Europe. London: Allen Lane.
Kettle, M. (1979) 'A Tale of Two Cities: the People of Divided
Derry', New Society 49 (8), 12 July 1980.
Laclau, E. (1985) 'New Social Movements and the Plurality of the
Social', in Slater, D. (ed), New Social Movements and the State
in Latin America. Dordrecht: Foris Publications.
Lande, H. (1978) 'Who Cares For the Family?', Journal of Social
Policy. 7 (3).
Leadbeater, C. (1988) 'Power to the Person', Marxism Today. October
1988.
Lenin, V. I. (1978) What Is to be Done? Moscow, Progress Publishers.
Lenin, V. I. (1964) The Development of Capitalism in Russia in Th..
Collected Works, vol. 3, Moscow.
Lerner, S. (1961) Breakaway Unions and the Small Trade Union. London:
George Allen and Unwin.
Lewenhak, S. (1978) Women and Trade Unions. London: Benn
Londonderry Teachers' Centre and North West Historical Society (N.D.
c1979) The Shirt Industry of the North-West of Irelanth
Londonderry.
Lyons, F. S. L. (1973, revised edition) Ireland Since the Famine.
London: Font ana.
Macgougan, 3. (1948) The Londonderrv Air. Belfast, Socialist Forum
(reprinted from Town and Country Planning. Autumn 1948).
Mackie, L. and Petullo, P. (1977) Women at Work. London, Tavistock.
Manpower Working Party of the Clothing EDC (1972) Wage Payment
Systems In the Clothing Industry. London: National Economic
Development Office.
- 384 -
Marx, K. (1959) Economic and Philisophical Manuscripts of 1844.
London: Lawrence and Wishart.
Marx, K. (1977) Capital (3 Volumes), London, Lawrence and Wishart.
Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1977) The Manifesto of the Communist Party.
Peking: Foreign Languages Press.
McCann, E. (1974) War and an Irish Town. London: Penguin.
McCann, E. (1980) War and an Irish Town (new updated edition),
London: Pluto.
McCarthy, C. (1973) The Decade Upheaval: Irish Trade Unions in the
1960s. Institute of Public Administration: Dublin.
McCarthy. C. (1977) Trade Unions In Ireland 1894-1960. Institute of
Public Administration, Dublin.
McGonagle, S. (1951) 'Work Study, Productivity and Wages', Christus
(2) 2 (reprinted in Liberty February 1954).
Messenger B. (1981) Picking Up the Linen Threads: The Folklore of the
Irish Linen Industry. Belfast: Blackstaff Press.
Michels, M. (1958) Political Parties. New York: Free Press.
Moody 1. W. (1954) A General Survey' in T. W. Moody and J. C.
Beckett (eds), Ulster Since 1800: A Political and Economic
Survey. London.
Morgan, A. and Purdie, B. (1980) Ireland: Divided Nation Divided
Class London: Ink Links.
Morrissey, M. and Morrissey, S. (1979) 'Northern Ireland: Why the
Trade Unions are Central', Marxism Today. November 1979.
Mortished, R. I. P. (1927) 'Trade Union Organisation in Ireland',
Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of
Ireland, Part Cl, Volume XV (Continued), October 1927.
Munck, R. (1986) 'The Formation of the Working Class in Belfast,
1788-1881' Saothar: Journal of the Irish Labour History Society
11.
Munck, R. and Rolston, B. (1987) Belfast in the Thirties: An Oral
History. Belfast: Blackstaff Press.
Murphy, D. (1981) Derry. Donegal and Modern Ulster 1790-1920.
Londonderry: Aileach.
Nelson, S. (1984) Ulster' s Uncertain Defenders: Loyalists and the
Northern Ireland Conflict. Belfast: Appletree Press.
The North of Ireland (Illustrated) Up-to-Date Londonderry (N.D.
c1900), London: Robinson & Co.
- 385 -
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (1979) We Shall Overcome:
The History of the Struggle for Civil Rights in Northern Ireland
1968-78. Belfast: NICRA.
North Tyneside Cmmunity Development Project (1978) North Shields:
Women's Work.	 Final Report vol5,	 Newcastle Upon Tyne
Polytechnic.
0' Brlen, C. C. (1974) States of Ireland. London: Panther.
O'Dowd, L. (1980a) 'Shaping and Reshaping the Orange State: An
Introductory Analysis' in O'Dowd et al Northern Ireland: Between
Civil Rights and Civil War. London: CSE Books.
O'Dowd, L. (1980b) 'Regional Policy' in O'Dowd et al Northern
Ireland: Between Civil Rights and Civil War. London: CSE Books.
O'Dowd, L. (1987) 'Church, State and Women: The Aftermath of
Partition' in Curtin, C., Jackson, P., and O'Connor, B. (eds)
Gender in Irish Society. Gaiway University Press.
O'Dowd, L., Rolston, R., and Tomlinson, M. (1980) Northern Ireland:
Between Civil Rights and Civil War London: CSE Books.
Ortner, S. B. (1984) 'Theory In Anthropology Since the Sixties',
Comparative Studies in History and Society 26 (1).
Patterson, H. (1980) Class Conflict and Sectarianism: The Protestant
Working Class and the Belfast Labour Movement 1868-1920 Belfast:
Blackstaff Press.
Patterson, H. (1982) 'Paisley and Protestant Politics', Marxism Today
January 1982.
Patterson, H. (1984) 'Industrial Labour and the Labour Movement,
1820-1911' in Kennedy, L. and 011erenshaw, P. (eds) An Economic
History of Ulster 1870-1914. Manchester.
Pollert, A. (1981) Girls. Wives. Factory Lives,. London: Macmillan.
Poole, M. (1984) Theories of Trade Unionisin A Sociology of
Industrial Relations. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Popular Memory Group (1982) 'Popular Memory: Theory, Politics,
Method.' In Johnson, R., McLennan, G., Schwarz, B., and Sutton,
D. Making Histories: Studies in Histor y-Writing and Politics.
London: Hutchinson.
Purdie, B. (1988) 'Derry: The Walls Came Tumbling Down', Fortnight
266, October 1988.
- 386 -
Reid A. (1980) 'Skilled Workers in the Shipbuilding Industry 1880-
1920: a Labour Aristocracy?' in Morgan, A. and Purdie, B.
Ireland: Divided Nation Divided Class. London: Ink links.
Robertson, N. and Sams, K. I. (1976) 'The Role of the Full-Time Union
Officer', Economic and Social Review. 8 (1).
Roiston, B. (1980) 'The Limits of Trade Unionism' in O'Dowd, L.,
Rolston, B. , and Tomlinson, B. Northern Ireland Between Civil
Rights and Civil War. London: CSE Books.
Rolston, B. (1983) 'Reformism and Sectarianism: The State of the
Union after Civil Rights' in Darby, 3. (ed) Northern Ireland the
Backround to the Conflict. Belfast: Appletree Press.
Scott, S. (1928) William Scott: Founder of the Londonderry Shirt
Trade. Derry.
Stewart, M. and Hunter, L. (1964) The Needle is Threade
	
London:
Allen and Unwin.
Thompson, E. P. (1979) The Making of the English Working Class.
Middlesex: Penguin (first edition 1963).
Thompson, P. (1978) The Voice of the Past: Oral Histor y Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Turner, H. A. (1962) Trade Union Growth. Structure, and Policy: A
Comparative Study of the Cotton Unions London: Allen and Unwin.
Watson, D. (1988) The Managers of Discontent: Trade Union Officers
and Industrial Relations Managers. London: Routledge.
Webb, S. and B. (1897) Industrial Democracy. London: Longmans.
Webb, S. and B. (1902) The History of Trade Unionism. London:
Longmans.
Wood, E. M. (1986) Th Retreat From Class, London: Verso.
Workers' Research Unit (1979) 'Neglecting Civil Rights: Trade Unions
and the "Troubles", The Belfast Bulletin 7.
(B) UNPUBLISHED
Deans, E. G. (1975) 'Life in Derry in the 1930's: Selected Aspects',
Foundation Studies Dissertation,	 Institute of Continuing
Education, New University of Ulster.
- 387 -
Gledhill, J. (1988) 'Agrarian Social Movements and Forms of
Consciousness', University College London.
Grew, J. A. (1987) 'The Derry Shirt Making Industry 1831-1913',
M.Phil. thesis, University of Ulster.
Hall, R. (1979) 'Capitalist Development on the Periphery: The Case of
Dungannon', Department of Sociology and Social Policy, Ulster
Polytechnic (photocopy).
Hamill, G. (1985) 'Labour Politics in Derry', paper presented at the
Annual Conference of the Irish Labour History Society, Derry 13-
15 September 1985.
Hamilton, I. R. W. (1955) 'The Shirt Industry of Derry, Being a Study
in Economic Geography', Undergraduate 'Honours' Dissertation,
Queen's University of Belfast.
McLaughlin, E. (1985) 'In Search of the Female Breadwinner', paper
presented at the Annual Conference of the Irish Labour History
Society, Derry 13-15 September 1985.
McLenaghan, P. (1985) 'Labour and Nationalism In the North West',
paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Irish labour
History Society, Derry, 13-15 September 1985.
Morgan, A. (1978) 'Politics, the Labour Movement and the Working
Class in Belfast,	 1905-1923',	 Ph.D.	 thesis,	 The Queen's
Universiy of Belfast.
Nash, J. (1974) 'The AUEW (Eng. Section): An Analysis of its
Historical Development and Present Functioning In Derry',
Foundation Studies Dissertation, New University of Ulster.
Northern Ireland Community Relations Commission (N. D. c1972) 'A
Survey of Facts, Figures, and Opinion Relating to the Economic
Situation in Londonderry', Belfast.
Purdie, B. (1987) 'Derry and its Action Committees' (photocopy).
Final draft of chapter 6 of Purdie, B. (1989) 'The Origins of
the Civil Rights Movement', Ph.D. thesis, University of
Strathclyde.
Robinson, A. (1967) 'A Social Geography of the City of Londonderry',
M.A. thesis, New University of Ulster.
Slade, E. H. (1937) 'A History of the Londonderry Shirt Factory',
M.A. thesis, The Queens University of Belfast.
- 388 -
Source: Adapted From Hamilton (1955: Map 4).
- 389 -
